By Michał Kuryłowicz, Jagiellonian University, Poland.

There are five weeks left until the first round of Poland’s presidential elections, but the election campaign is only now beginning in earnest. Few remember already the first – autumn – stage of the battle for the presidential palace, that is, the selection of candidates of the two largest parties: Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Although Donald Tusk’s party’s indication of Rafal Trzaskowski seemed obvious for a long time (he already ran in the 2020 elections and won almost half of the votes), unexpectedly the Civic Coalition decided to hold party primaries. Their purpose was twofold: first, to show voters that the selection of a candidate is fully democratic. Second: Trzaskowski’s challenger, current Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, had strong cards in hand. He is internationally recognized, and he also fits better into the main axis of the election campaign, which is related to the security theme.

With the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and uncertainty over Donald Trump’s policies, Radoslaw Sikorski could, as a potential president, strengthen the « Polish » voice in Europe and vis-à-vis the United States. However, the party primaries resulted in a victory for Trzaskowski, suggesting that for members of the Civic Coalition, Radoslaw Sikorski is still an outsider (he once served as Defense Minister in the Law and Justice government in 2005-2006). What’s more – the support for Trzaskowski, clearly betting on equality discourse, says a lot about the leftward turn of the largest party in the current parliamentary term. However, even Rafał Trzaskowski, a natural peacetime candidate, has had to adjust to the demands of a campaign taking place in « pre-war » times (according to Donald Tusk’s metaphor) and has begun to pay more attention to state security and preparing Poland for a possible defense war against Russia.

No less difficult a choice faced Law and Justice. Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s party, weakened by its defeat in the 2023 parliamentary elections (it won the most seats in those elections, but failed to form a government and ceded power to the opposition after eight years), decided to field a little-known candidate: the incumbent president of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), Karol Nawrocki. Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s calculation was probably to avoid fielding too strong a candidate, who is likely to lose to Rafal Trzaskowski anyway. However, betting on Nawrocki – a person hardly recognizable even to Law and Justice voters – turned against the party. Nawrocki has no political experience, in addition, the media point to his former ties to the criminal world in Poland. As a result, his position in the polls oscillates between 23-25%, clearly below the ratings of Law and Justice.

One of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s calculations was that he hoped Donald Trump’s victory in the US would also strengthen the conservative camp in Poland, reversing the unfavorable poll trend for him. However, this did not happen, and it was mainly the US president himself who contributed to this. The enthusiasm of Law and Justice politicians after Trump’s victory became incomprehensible to at least some Polish voters, as the US president began to suggest after his inauguration the need for a reset in relations with Russia. Security issues thus re-entered the presidential campaign in Poland, but did not strengthen the Law and Justice party, known for its anti-Russian rhetoric. Slawomir Mentzen, the candidate of the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), appeared to be the beneficiary of the situation.

Starting in November 2024, Slawomir Mentzen’s popularity is recorded to have increased dramatically. By March 2025, polls were already giving him around 20% support, causing the media to consider his entry into the second round of the presidential election (in which he would face Rafal Trzaskowski). His popularity is explained by at least several factors. The most significant of these is the apparent weariness among a significant portion of voters with the two-decade-long dominance of two political parties: Civic Platform and Law and Justice. The dispute between them, often reduced to a personal conflict between the leaders of the two parties, Donald Tusk and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, increasingly reflects the political views expressed by Poles.

Another reason for Mentzen’s « phenomenon » is the progressive « Trumpization » of Polish politics: a significant shift of the axis of political discussion and sentiment to the right, an emphasis in public debate on the importance of national security, and an increasingly cooler attitude toward the conflict in Ukraine. The colonialist attitude of Donald Trump and members of his administration toward Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Ukraine, although it crippled the previous international narrative of Law and Justice, at the same time strengthened the Confederation distancing itself from Ukraine and Slawomir Mentzen personally. The latter has begun to transfer the American argumentation against Kyiv to Poland: in his view, Ukraine should show more gratitude to Poland for the assistance it has provided since the beginning of the conflict, and it should engage in peace talks with Russia.

Mentzen’s strength also turns out to be the far-reaching mediatization of the ongoing election campaign. Thanks to it, Mentzen, who makes abundant use of social network promotion, is gaining popularity for his views, especially among the youngest part of Polish society. It is worth noting that it is for this social group that the previous dispute between Tusk and Kaczynski seems most anachronistic. From the point of view of young Poles, Slawomir Mentzen seems to go beyond the familiar set of slogans of the two biggest protagonists of the Polish political scene with his radical slogans.

What was the Confederation candidate’s strength at the beginning of the presidential race may hurt him at the finish of the campaign. The final weeks of the election battle are forcing him to go beyond individual meetings with voters and promotion through social networks. Slawomir Mentzen, but also the other candidates, have to answer journalists’ questions more often, and a TV debate with all registered participants in the race is planned for the week before the election. Slawomir Mentzen already has to explain the slogans he preached in 2019 (the so-called Mentzen Five): « we don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the European Union. » Such a set of views, of course, finds support from a part of the Polish electorate, but it does not exceed 10%. It seems, therefore, that the Confederation’s candidate has now reached the maximum of his poll potential. Going beyond this ceiling already requires a softening of rhetoric, meanwhile the traditionally conservative electorate has already been cultivated by Law and Justice.

The meaning of  elections in Poland goes far beyond the possibilities facing a future president. Antoni Dudek, a Polish historian and political scientist, points out, moreover, that the presidential campaign in Poland is largely a „deception of voters”. This is because the highly personalized election campaign forces candidates to make a series of specific proposals and address detailed questions from the media. Meanwhile, the political position of the Polish president gives him representative powers and the ability to block laws created by the government and approved by parliament. The presidential legislative initiative is rarely used in practice, especially under cohabitation conditions, when the head of state has no certainty that his bill will be passed by the Sejm.

The real stakes of the May elections, however, are the comfort of the current government and a possible overhaul of the party system in Poland. In the event of a victory by Rafał Trzaskowski, Donald Tusk’s government will have the opportunity to fulfill a number of its 2023 election announcements, so far blocked by Andrzej Duda (including, in particular, an accounting of Law and Justice’s actions, from its 2015-2023 period in power). Even more important is who will come in second place and enter the second round of elections, announced for June 1. A weak result for Law and Justice candidate Karol Nawrocki, or his potential drop to third place, will not only strengthen his rival on the right (the Confederation). It could also set in motion a process of disintegration of the party itself, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. A potential split of Law and Justice into two factions, a moderate one and a radical one, would change the current party structure in Poland. The extreme faction would likely take up a partnership with the Confederation. The moderate fraction could be a convenient partner for the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), a center-right party, today a member of Donald Tusk’s government coalition. This scenario is therefore unfavorable from the point of view of the current prime minister and at the same time head of the Civic Coalition. It could lead to the situation in which Law and Justice found itself two years ago: although the Civic Coalition wins the elections, it is unable to form a government.

In this situation, it may be in the interest of Donald Tusk’s party to frontally criticize the Confederation’s candidate. Weakening Slawomir Mentzen and the Confederation behind him helps to reassure voters that the most important political dividing line is still between the pro-European Civic Coalition and the eurosceptic (but notorious for its actions) Law and Justice. Such tactics also allow Donald Tusk to convince the Polish People’s Party to continue working together in government. The latter party supported the current Speaker of the parlament, Szymon Holownia, in the presidential election, but did so without conviction. At the beginning of the election campaign, Holownia hoped to score above 10% and come in third in the elections. However, he was overtaken by Slawomir Mentzen. Polish election observers argue that Holownia (who is currently supported by 6-8% of voters) and Mentzen are competing for the same voter, who supports free-market reforms. Stronger support for the Confederation’s candidate would, in this situation, be a « red card » for a government that fails to deliver on its promises. Donald Tusk, aware of these changing electoral preferences, decided to support one of his coalition partner’s flagship proposals: lowering the health taxes for entrepreneurs. In early April, the Parlament passed a law on the issue, but so far this has not translated into election polls. However, these actions confirm that the real stakes of the presidential election are both the balance of power in the government coalition and more broadly: the balance of power in the entire Polish party system.  

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Michał Kuryłowicz is a researcher at Jagiellonian University, Poland. He is specialized in the study of Eurasian politics with a focus on relations of Eurasian countries towards Russia. He also studies history of the Eurasian region, from Poland to Central Asia.