Politics
juin 23, 2025By Sarah Bomba, Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), Paris.
The dynamics of institutional transformation in Poland after 1989 have led to a gradual erosion of its democracy. Following 1989, the Polish state increasingly embraced the principles of the free market, characterized by a significant reduction in taxes and a growing influence of multinational corporations on public affairs, all under the guidance of a steadily intensifying policy of deregulation. Neoliberalism in Poland solidified in a dogmatic form, what could be called the « dogma of the infallibility of the free market », where private interests prevail over the common good. An analysis of these evolving processes reveals a reconfiguration of social relations reminiscent of a return to feudalism after 1989, with liberal hegemony evoking the dominance of the Polish nobility over other social classes in the 16th century, resulting in a progressive weakening and marginalization of the state.
Poland is sinking into a political and economic polarization that can be deconstructed by referring to its feudal past, indicative of a class-based dimension in social relations that persists to this day. Critical literature on Polish serfdom, prior to the partitions, allows for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. These writings, which denounce aristocratic domination while highlighting the popular history of Poland, began to emerge about a decade ago and have resonated strongly in a society that, since 1989, has been rewriting its history by marginalizing the working classes, departing from the historical policy of the People’s Republic of Poland, which instead emphasized the central role of peasants and workers in national history and identity. The political and economic dominance of the Polish nobility once led to the weakening of the state and its disappearance. The defence of private interests and the disregard for the common good caused a socio-political breakdown, the echoes of which are still felt today. Currently, we are witnessing the emergence of a new privileged class, that of entrepreneurs and higher middle-class professionals, who follow the American myth of the self-made man, aiming to introduce Western neoliberal standards in Poland.
A new aristocracy: the businessmen
On April 4th, 2025, members of the Sejm voted in favour of reducing health insurance contributions for entrepreneurs. The law aimed to reverse the effects of the « Polski Ład » (Polish Deal), that according to the liberal parties had provoked the closure of companies. The results were as follows: 213 in favor, 190 against, and 25 abstentions. The Law and Justice party, along with the Left, voted against the measure, while the Civic Coalition and liberal groups (including the far-right Konfederacja) supported the new law.
This decision will reduce healthcare funding by around (some experts say about 6 bln) 4.6 billion PLN, at a time when the system is already lacking an estimated 20 billion PLN just to function properly. Medical appointment waiting times stretch over several years. Politically, this decision represents a partial privatization of the healthcare system, with the main beneficiaries being the wealthier segments of the population, even though Poland is one of the EU countries that spends the least on healthcare (around 5% of GDP). Public reaction has also been muted. Poles seem to have adopted a form of fatalism toward the privileges that have gradually taken root since 1989.
Privatization had already begun much earlier with two essential public sectors: housing policy and urban planning. These changes led to capital concentration and strengthened the dominance of property developers, entrepreneurs, and other free-market actors. This process fostered the rise of various oligarchies, including figures such as InPost CEO Rafał Brzoska, whose open involvement in public affairs illustrates this phenomenon. He currently chairs an advisory council to the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, tasked with “deregulating” the Polish economy. Understanding this process requires deconstructing it in light of the systemic transformation and the adoption of radical liberalism, which was, in many ways, an illusory response to the social crises of the late 1980s.
The new political elite, emerging from the Solidarność movement, managed to make a major ideological shift: it ceased fighting on behalf of workers and began speaking in the name of future entrepreneurs and private employers. Polish elites were haunted by the idea that the foundation of democracy lies in the privatization of state assets. This belief was later reflected in the creation of national investment funds, through which public assets were sold off. It is important to emphasize, however, that although liberals advocate against state interference in the private sector, that same sector is still heavily supported by public funds – through various state subsidies, tax advantages over the public sector, and many other liberal mechanisms introduced during the “shock without therapy” of 1989, which continues to this day.
Ideological (yet liberal) polarization and the weakening of the State
The political simplification of economic processes has inevitably led to an ideologization of public interest. Indeed, any regulation that goes against the post-1989 order, particularly measures aiming to strengthen the role of the state in citizens’ lives is perceived as a step backward, a return to a centralized economy. As a result, all political parties, including those with socialist traditions, face ideological pressure and cannot fully express their convictions for fear of being labeled as “communist” by the electorate. This is also why public debate in Poland is dominated by moral issues at the expense of economic or social ones. Heightened discussions on abortion, family, education, or civil unions while deepening polarization, serve as an escape for both voters and elected officials from the old communist–anti-communist dichotomy, although moral issues often reproduce this categorization.
The sacralization of private property has further encouraged behaviors aimed at creating social barriers. These can be explained through the lens of the theory of the leisure class. The social group in question differentiates itself from lower classes through ostentatious consumption and leisure habits, be it clothing style, preferred pastimes, or musical tastes, always exaggerated to display symbolic capital. This is why it is more relevant to analyze Polish capitalism not through the lens of production, but through the lens of consumption, by referencing Veblen’s work The Leisure Class, which seems especially pertinent in the context of the artificial class distinction that emerged in a previously classless society after 1989. As such, any criticism of the lifestyles of the wealthier classes is framed as communist rhetoric, and in extreme cases could even be interpreted as the “promotion of a totalitarian system,” which is prohibited by law.
The phenomenon discussed also raises philosophical questions about Polish politics, particularly regarding its relationship with human rights. One could argue that the post-1989 shifts have called into question the gains associated with second-generation human rights, which focus on state intervention and the welfare state. This concept has been completely equated, especially by post-1989 liberals, with real socialism, seen by many as a totalitarian ideology. Therefore, it can be assumed that in terms of human rights, Poland has become divided between proponents of first-generation rights, which align with the early capitalist phase (essentially Poland’s post-1989 condition), and advocates of third-generation rights, borrowing Guy Haarscher’s term, “the inflation of demands”. This dynamic leads to the state’s withdrawal from public life, promoted not only by the elites but increasingly by citizens who, through their votes, demand stronger liberalism.
In conclusion, attention must be drawn to the issue of representativity, with a significant political role now played by unelected individuals, as well as the growing influence of CEOs in the legislative process – both symptoms of democratic erosion in the country. Poland’s post-1989 transformation profoundly redefined the role of the state, aligning it with a dominant liberal ideology that marginalizes any push for public intervention. This shift has led to ideological polarization, where moral debates obscure deep social and economic divides. By sacralizing private property and glorifying ostentatious consumption, a new social hierarchy has emerged, making any form of critique suspect of communist nostalgia. This retreat of the state is accompanied by a drift in the conception of human rights, increasingly reduced to individualistic logic at the expense of collective solidarity.
We can enumerate among others : Leszczynski Adam, Ludowa Historia Polski; Rauszer Michal, Ludowy antyklerykalizm: niedopowiedziana historia; Janicki Kamil, Panszczyzna Prawdziwa historia polskiego niewolnictwa; Kuciel-Frydryszcak Joanna, Chlopki: opowieść o naszych babkach.
Neoliberalism as a « trickle-down economy » ideology refers to a set of economic beliefs that emphasize free markets, limited government intervention, and the idea that benefits given to the wealthy or businesses will eventually « trickle down » to the rest of society.
It is worth noting here that Law and Justice seems to have changed its voting discipline during the debate (Kaczynski requested a five-minute break). Initially, Law and Justice was in favour of reducing the contribution, but after Marcelina Zawisza’s speech, who is MP from Together Party which is in opposition to the government, they changed their position. Despite this, some of them – but check the voting results – voted in favour.
Pakulski Cezary, « Obnizenie skladki zdrowotnej? Ten plan trzeba porzucić », OKO.Press, 01.10.2024.
Drweski Bruno, Zagrabiona historia Solidarnosci. Został tylko mit, Warsaw 2020, p. 453.
Art. 256. – – Kodeks karny. Dz.U.2025.383 t.j.
This commitment is reflected in the increasing support for Sławomir Mentzen, a central figure of the Konfederacja party, who advocates for a radical stance of total state disengagement. According to him, the state should only intervene in core functions such as security and justice, leaving other areas—healthcare, education, and the economy—to the free play of the market. He rejects any social or redistributive model, associating them with authoritarian socialism. This discourse resonates with a segment of the entrepreneurial youth, seeking autonomy and individual success.
__
Sarah Bomba is a Phd student at the INALCO in Paris. Her Phd thesis is about religious lobbyism in Poland after 1989. […]
Lire la suite…
juin 10, 2025By Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University.
Let us recall: with its accession to the EU in 2007, Bulgaria assumed the obligation to join the monetary union (the eurozone) when it managed to meet the criteria for this, and until then a derogation is in effect. This is an obligation for all EU countries, with one exception – Denmark. Since 2020, Bulgaria has been in ERM II (European exchange rate mechanism), the precursor to the Eurozone. Today, it seems that Bulgaria meets the criteria for membership, that is confirmed by the relevant convergence report of the Commission.
Also, since 1997, a currency board has been operating in Bulgaria, with the exchange rate of the Bulgarian lev fixed to the euro in a ratio fixed by law (initially to the German mark). According to the rules of the board, the government does not have full freedom of monetary policy, cannot devalue the lev and cannot spend the foreign exchange reserve at its discretion. So, in essence, Bulgaria is in some way already in the eurozone, without directly using the euro. And two other countries in Europe (Montenegro and Kosovo) have given up their own currency and use the euro as their currency, without being part of the eurozone.
Against this backdrop and on the eve of the convergence report on eurozone membership, a storm of discussions and protests broke out, demanding its postponement. Back in April 2023, Vazrazhdane collected over 600,000 signatures to call a referendum “for preserving the Bulgarian lev”. The National Assembly then voted against it, and the Constitutional Court, which was seized of the issue, rejected the possibility of a referendum on an obligation under a ratified international treaty. As a result, Vazrazhdane’s official position is not “against the introduction of the euro in general”, but against the date of its introduction. However, this is not evident from the party’s current positions announced on its website. And recently, the president has also initiated a referendum on the introduction of the euro from 2026, which was diverted from discussion in the National Assembly and will probably not happen. But he has intensified public debate on the issue and placed it among the central topics of political discourse.
What are the arguments against the euro?
According to « Vazrazhdane », there are six main reasons « why we should keep the Bulgarian lev »:
1. Bulgaria will lose the right to determine its own monetary policy.
2. Bulgaria will not have an equal voice in decision-making in the eurozone.
3. We are not a priority for the European Central Bank.
4. Shock inflation in the first years, especially for essential goods.
5. Billions will be released from the currency board, which can be drained by politicians at current levels of corruption.
6. Bulgaria risks becoming indebted and going the way of Greece.
The first two arguments have been known since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, which is no longer just an intergovernmental organization, but a highly integrated community with supranational law and institutions. In it, each member state has voluntarily granted part of its sovereign rights to supranational institutions. Bulgaria will not be an exception, this is valid for all 27 EU members, as well as for all 20 members of the eurozone. As for the equal vote, Bulgaria is also a member of the IMF, where the countries also do not have an equal vote, but no one wants the country to leave this organization. On the other hand, Bulgaria is a net user of European funds, which in total exceed many times its contribution to the general budget. The effect of these funds is visible in many cases and the country would hardly have achieved the same on its own without this solidary support from the EU.
As for shock inflation, the topic has already been widely commented on and this is only fear-mongering. Especially after our bad experience with galloping inflation in 1997, when Bulgaria fell into a financial collapse completely outside the eurozone. As can be seen, inflation is moving even without the euro.
The last two arguments do not specifically target the introduction of the euro, but corruption. The euro is not the cause of corruption, which has developed sufficiently with the use of the lev and the existence of a currency board. So, transferring deep problems in domestic politics to the euro is speculation, because nowhere else, where the single European currency has replaced the national one, have countries experienced a currency board drain or crisis like in Greece (where the cause was not the eurozone, but the corruption of the rulers).
These arguments are actually not only about the date of entry into the eurozone, but generally against the adoption of the euro, i.e. against Bulgaria’s membership in the EU. This seemingly invisible change in position strongly influences public opinion and leads to misunderstanding about what the problem is. According to a recent survey by « Measure » agency from January 2025, 57.1% of Bulgarians are against the adoption of the euro as the official currency. 39% are at the opposite pole, and 3.9% have no opinion on the issue. But when asked when to adopt the euro, the answers are different: according to 25.7% of respondents, the single European currency should be adopted from January 1, 2026. 30.8% of those surveyed believe that it is good for Bulgaria to adopt the euro, but at a later stage. And 41.4% are of the opinion that our country should not replace the lev with the euro. 2.1 percent have no opinion on the matter. These differences in opinion shows confusion, which is completely understandable, because what competence is needed for a citizen to be able to judge when exactly it is good to adopt the euro and whether it is good to adopt it at all.
This difficulty is solved by using simple arguments:
« We live in Bulgaria, of course we must keep our Lev, our children must learn our history, preserve and maintain our traditions and be grateful that we live here now in our Bulgaria! » – we read on the Facebook profile of the critics of the euro.
“I am protesting in defense of the Bulgarian lev and against the euro. I do not want a foreign currency.” – we hear from another opponent of the euro.
“The eurozone is without a way out – more poverty, less sovereignty” – we read on the website of “Vazrazhdane”.
In other words – defense of “ours” against “foreign”, defense of national identity against foreign influences. An appeal to a patriotism that is understandable to everyone and self-evident, which we have all learned from Vazov’s poem: “Everything Bulgarian and native, I love, cherish and value.” However, if we look more deeply at the poem, we will immediately ask ourselves: is “everything Bulgarian” worth being honored?
Why, however, do so many people accept such arguments with open arms? The arrogant position of some determined supporters of the euro is that these are “simple and uneducated” people, prone to all kinds of manipulations, that this is the result of Putin’s propaganda, that this is a deep misunderstanding of the true interests of Bulgaria, etc. In a modern society there is all this, but it does not seem reasonable to accept such a “simple” explanation. I think that behind the resistance to the euro there is something else that is much less talked about.
From sociological surveys and researchers’ observations, it is clear that our society is divided regarding the introduction of the euro. This division, it seems, is not on the issue of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU (on this issue there is a significant majority that supports it), but on an issue that is only at first glance about the euro. The division is actually deeper and more structural, between those who, back in 1990, Zygmund Bauman defined as globalized and localized. The new wave of globalization of the last 40 years has divided societies, including in Bulgaria, into two main categories – those who, due to their economic, cultural and social capital, successfully fit into globalization and those who, on the contrary, felt neglected, rejected, forgotten, somehow left out of its benefits. Bulgaria’s integration into the EU has been experienced in the same way – there are winners in society, but also those who are not so winners and even convinced that they are among the losers.
This is why the resistance to the introduction of the euro from January 1, 2026 actually hides the dissatisfaction with being left on the side of the losers, which is why you treat with distrust, even resistance, the official institutions that you consider to be firmly on the side of the winners and neglecting the losers. This is precisely why the most essential question is about this new inequality, fueled by very old inequalities, but the introduction of the euro is not among the causes of it. The inequalities are rooted in the logic of the dominant model of corporate global capitalism, and the attitude towards the introduction of the euro is something like collateral damage of the resistance to the widening inequalities.
What are the real risks of introducing the euro?
They are not for galloping inflation, nor for melting savings, nor for the devaluation of real estate, nor for the loss of sovereignty (already very limited with the currency board itself). Many economists are very nuanced on the issue and even those who seem to oppose the introduction of the euro from 2026 explain this issue much more complicatedly (as long as we read them in full and with understanding).
They often quote the author of the currency board, Steve Hanke, invited to Sofia for a conference organized by “Vazrazhdane” on February 7, 2025. In an extensive interview for the Bulgarian National Radio on February 28, 2025, he says: “In my opinion, joining the eurozone would be the wrong decision. A bad decision. From a political point of view, it would be a complete disaster. We know in general about the corruption of Bulgarian politicians and their desire to spend taxpayers’ money freely.” Because according to him, Bulgarian politicians are « arrogant, ignorant and corrupt. » But he also explains: “Do you know that Bulgaria is de facto in the eurozone. In the sense of the currency board, the lev is a clone of the euro. If you don’t like having the lev, you can simply exchange it at a fixed exchange rate with the euro. So the lev and the euro are equivalent.” Steve Hanke’s main argument against adopting the euro is that there is a risk that corruption will turn this into a “Greek crisis”. But he adds something else: the loss of “sovereignty of the monetary regime”, because “if something goes wrong with the euro, everyone who is de jure in the eurozone will have no way to get out. And Bulgaria could easily change its main currency – from the euro to the US dollar or some other currency.” You see, how many contradictory arguments, including the issue of sovereignty, but sovereignty also for politicians who are “arrogant, ignorant and corrupt”. Economist Boyan Durankev is much more precise in describing the benefits and risks of adopting the euro. In an interview with Radio Focus on April 24, 2025, he explains: “The euro united the countries’ currencies, and this is the good news, but it did not unite the economies, and this is the bad news. That is, the euro is like marriage – everyone is ‘for’ until they start paying bills.” The main risk is that “Europe does not have a clear common economic and fiscal policy”, i.e. something that relates to the current state of the EU and the need for deep reform is obvious. But on the other hand, according to him, the advantages of adopting the euro are great, especially with the loss of confidence in the dollar and market shocks after the exotic duties and tariffs introduced by Trump.
The referendum, initially requested by “Vazrazhdane”, but more recently by the president, played an unexpected role. It has intensified public discourse on the topic and led many to more clearly explain their theses and intentions. A debate that has been largely invisible in recent years, overshadowed to a large extent by the series of inconclusive early parliamentary elections since April 2021 and the phrase repeated to the point of trivialization that Bulgaria’s entry into the Eurozone is a strategic goal.
Bulgaria’s entry into the EU was a strategic goal, and its admission to the Schengen area and the Eurozone are a consequence of this. They are rather instruments for something far more substantial – making life in Bulgaria more attractive for Bulgarian citizens. This, the latter, however, requires many other more substantial things.
Two are the most important of them and they are necessarily related: policies against inequalities and against corruption. If, thanks to our entry into the Eurozone, these policies are encouraged and have a visible effect, citizens will be satisfied and resistance to the euro will weaken. Conversely, resistance to the euro will grow if many citizens see that its introduction does not contribute to overcoming intolerable inequalities and corruption. If, on the contrary, the eurozone is mainly benefited by corrupt politicians and businessmen, if governments act like those in Greece before the debt crisis, if the fiscal reserve of the currency board is plundered by private interests. These are the real risks, not the introduction of the euro as a national currency itself.
Ivan Vazov (1850-1921) is considered to be the “patriarch of the Bulgarian literature”, national writer with essential presence in the education.
__
Antony Todorov is a political scientist and a professor at the New Bulgarian University. He was visiting teacher at ULB (Brussels) and at the University of Bucharest and president of the Bulgarian Political Science Association from 2001 to 2012. His research interests lie in democracy, party politics, and the study of elections. […]
Lire la suite…
mai 6, 2025By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.
Introduction
Polish–French relations have been complex and multifaceted throughout the centuries and in recent decades. Despite tensions and differences, both sides have consistently nurtured their relationship, much like in a true friendship. Only after years of efforts, struggles, disputes, misunderstandings, and mutual disappointments does the moment arrive when the value of a partner is recognized and appreciated. After 106 years of official diplomatic relations, a new stage of cooperation between Poland and France is set to be symbolically sealed with the signing of a “Treaty of Friendship” on May 9, 2025, in Nancy, on Europe Day. Friendship treaties play a special role in French foreign policy as a tool for building long-term bilateral ties with key European partners. France has already signed similar treaties with Germany (Élysée Treaty – 1963, Aachen Treaty – 2019), Italy (Quirinal Treaty – 2021), Spain (Barcelona Treaty – 2023), and the United Kingdom (Lancaster House Treaty – 2010, focused mainly on defense and security). The contemporary geopolitical context – the war in Ukraine, a return to great power rivalry, shifting U.S. policy toward Europe, and the unpredictability of decisions by Donald Trump’s administration – makes it clear that both Warsaw and Paris need a « new beginning, » a « new momentum » (as Prime Minister Donald Tusk said), and a « historic agreement » (in the words of President Emmanuel Macron). Today, Poland has become a key strategic partner for France, just as France is for Poland – not only at the state level but also in terms of social and national connections.
A History of « Asymmetry of Feelings »
Bronisław Geremek aptly described Polish–French relations as an « asymmetry of feelings. » For decades, Poland sought recognition and respect from France, often facing disappointment, detachment, or misunderstanding. France, on the other hand, showed periodic interest in Poland but tended to see it as a peripheral country located on the eastern fringes of Europe.
The new treaty will be signed in Nancy – a symbolic place that has long connected the histories of both nations. In 1733, Stanisław Leszczyński became King of Poland, but after the War of the Polish Succession, he lost the throne. Though France attempted to help him regain it, he ultimately returned to France and settled in Nancy as Duke of Lorraine and Bar, where he lived from 1738 to 1766. His daughter Maria married King Louis XV of France and became the mother of future French kings. Leszczyński was also a scholar, writer, translator, and patron of science and culture – a symbol linking Poland and France not only through blood ties but also shared values and intellectual ideals. Polish–French relations fit within the realist paradigm of international relations, in which the state is the central actor. Despite geographic distance, the two countries have forged lasting political, cultural, and social ties. In 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte created the Duchy of Warsaw, rekindling Polish hopes for independence. His romantic involvement with Maria Walewska added a symbolic dimension. In the 19th century, the Great Emigration – including figures such as Chopin, Mickiewicz, and Norwid – strengthened Poland’s intellectual presence in France. During World War I, the Blue Army of General Haller was formed in France (1917).
In the 20th century, one cannot overlook the role of Jerzy Giedroyc and his journal Kultura, the visit of Charles de Gaulle to Poland in 1967, or the founding of the French Civilization Center in Warsaw by Michel Foucault. Despite the challenges of the communist period, France maintained ties with Polish opposition movements and provided humanitarian support (notably through the France–Poland Solidarity Association). In 1989, on the eve of democratic transformation, President François Mitterrand awarded General Wojciech Jaruzelski the Legion of Honour – a politically controversial gesture, but one that symbolized a new chapter in bilateral relations. Two years later, Lech Wałęsa received the same honor.
From Historical Hopes to Strategic Partnership
Diplomatic relations between Poland and France officially began in 1919. In 1921, the first declaration of friendship was signed in Paris, including a military protocol with a mutual assistance clause in case of German aggression. Another milestone was the Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity signed on April 9, 1991, in Paris. This treaty marked a breakthrough, signed during a period of major geopolitical transformation – after the Cold War and the collapse of the Yalta system. It gave new quality to bilateral relations by formalizing a strategic partnership rooted in democratic values, solidarity, and multidimensional cooperation. It had a long-lasting impact on the direction and pace of bilateral relations. Above all, it symbolized Poland’s return to the family of Western democracies and France’s willingness to act as a patron and partner in this historic transition.
Subsequent agreements followed in areas such as internal affairs (1996), defense (2002), culture and education (2004), science and technology (2008), and classified information (2008). Since 2004, regular intergovernmental consultations have taken place. Another important step was the Polish–French Strategic Partnership (2008), which was renewed and updated in 2013. During President Emmanuel Macron’s first official visit to Warsaw in 2020, bilateral relations were reaffirmed through a new cooperation program. This was followed by a visit to Paris by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in 2021 and celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Weimar Triangle. Macron returned to Warsaw in 2024, and bilateral ministerial exchanges – particularly in European affairs, defense, and foreign policy – intensified.
In the 1990s, France adopted the “PECO” concept (Central and Eastern European Countries), viewing Poland as a regional leader. The Weimar Triangle, launched in 1991, aimed to support integration with Western institutions. Not all French politicians were supportive – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was skeptical of EU enlargement, though François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac gradually shifted France’s position. Poland joined NATO in 1999. In 2003, it signed the so-called « Letter of Eight, » supporting the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which provoked a harsh reaction from France – Jacques Chirac criticized Poland for its lack of judgment, straining relations. Another source of tension was the Bolkestein Directive and the “Polish plumber” stereotype in French debates on the EU labor market. Nonetheless, cooperation continued. The 2008 strategic partnership was updated in 2013. In 2016, Poland withdrew from the planned purchase of Caracale helicopters manufactured by Airbus France, leading to the cancellation of President François Hollande’s visit to Warsaw – a gesture perceived in Paris as a breach of trust. In 2020, President Macron resumed political dialogue during a visit to Warsaw, which was repeated in 2024 amid intensified ministerial contacts.
Cooperation Despite Differences: Political, Economic, and Cultural Dimensions
Polish–French cooperation spans multiple domains. France is Poland’s fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest source of imports. Poland is France’s 10th-largest trading partner and the largest in Central Europe. In 2016, Polish investments in France reached €660 million, and more than 1,300 companies with French capital operated in Poland. Regional cooperation (e.g., twin cities) and inter-institutional ties are also robust.
In the cultural and educational spheres, relations remain strong. Poland has long been inspired by francophonie. Institutions such as the Institut Français, Alliance Française, and the Center for French Culture and Francophone Studies at the University of Warsaw actively promote the French language and culture. Poland has held observer status in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie since 1997. Academic exchanges (e.g., PHC Polonium), joint degrees, and scientific cooperation are well established. In France, Polish culture is promoted by the Polish Institute, the Polish Library in Paris, and the Polish Academy of Sciences Research Center.
Conclusion
Does 2025 mark a genuine new chapter in Polish–French relations or just another phase of a traditionally complex partnership? In light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the redefinition of the international order, and Poland’s presidency of the EU Council, the answer is of strategic significance. The leaders of both countries speak of a partnership built on mutual respect, a shared commitment to European strategic autonomy, and support for Ukraine. France has provided substantial military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and the effective delivery of that aid, including training, requires cooperation with Poland. Amid the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s potential return to power, a Polish–French dialogue on security has become essential. As the eastern frontier of NATO and the EU, Poland has increased defense spending (4.7% of GDP in 2024), and France sees this as an opportunity for industrial cooperation, including the Orka submarine program and possibly the construction of a nuclear power plant. The question of extending France’s nuclear umbrella to Central Europe remains unresolved.
Perceptions are also changing. The French increasingly see Poland as an equal strategic partner, while Poles are moving beyond past frustrations. Today’s cooperation is built on complementary needs, shared visions, and a growing sense of responsibility for Europe’s future. As former French ambassador to Poland Pierre Buhler noted, the idea for a new treaty stems from a “need to make up for lost time.” This agreement underscores the importance of renewed mutual understanding and cooperation in confronting the challenges of today’s world – peace, security, and solidarity.
__
Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 26, 2025By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.
Introduction
The National Deterrence and Defence Project “Eastern Shield” (2024–2028) is a comprehensive initiative aimed at strengthening Poland’s defensive capabilities along its eastern border. The programme was developed in response to the deteriorating security environment in the region, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which highlighted the need to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. The “Eastern Shield” initiative is of strategic importance—it has been designated by the Polish government as the largest operation to fortify Poland’s eastern frontier and, simultaneously, NATO’s eastern boundary since the end of World War II. Its significance has also been acknowledged internationally—on March 12, 2025, the European Parliament recognized “Eastern Shield” as a flagship security project of the European Union (EU). This recognition was reaffirmed by the European Commission a week later, which underscored the European dimension of the initiative. This analysis outlines the main assumptions behind the programme, its strategic context, and its significance for the security of Poland, EU, and the NATO.
Description and Objectives of the “Eastern Shield” Programme
The “Eastern Shield” programme envisions the establishment of a 700 kilometers belt of defensive installations along Poland’s eastern and northeastern borders, extending up to 50 kilometers into Polish territory, according to the official programme website. Its primary objective is to enhance deterrence and defence capabilities through the expansion of military infrastructure along the borders with Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast) and Belarus. The programme is designed to serve a deterrent function and, in the event of conflict, to increase the safety of both civilian populations and Polish armed forces.
The plan is being implemented on four complementary levels: (1) Enhancing resilience to surprise attacks—expansion of surveillance systems, including the development of satellite intelligence, camera and sensor networks along the border, and unmanned observation systems; (2) Restricting adversary mobility—construction of extensive fortifications, engineering obstacles, and terrain impediments (e.g., anti-tank ditches, anti-vehicle barriers), as well as deliberate landscape modifications (wetlands, forestation) in the border area; (3) Ensuring mobility of friendly forces—establishment of specialized infrastructure (roads, bridges, bases) to facilitate rapid deployment and supply of Polish forces; (4) Protection of own forces and civilians—construction of shelters and concealment facilities to increase survivability and continuity of defence operations.
These elements form a coherent defensive system designed to address the possibility of a large-scale conventional conflict. The “Eastern Shield” reflects lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and anticipates scenarios resembling those of World War II more than high-tech limited engagements. The planned fortifications include physical anti-tank barriers (ditches, steel hedgehogs, concrete obstacles), barbed wire fences, and preparations for future mine deployment (mines are to be stored and deployed only in the event of war). The programme also encompasses the development of advanced surveillance and early-warning systems, such as aerostat and satellite observation platforms, and air defence and anti-drone systems to monitor Polish airspace.
Importantly, “Eastern Shield” is not limited to technical infrastructure—it also includes the training and structural preparation of personnel. In 2024, a dedicated training and testing center was established in Orzysz (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship), tasked with preparing engineering units for fortification construction and testing new materials and technologies. In autumn 2024, the first military exercises showcasing elements of the “Eastern Shield” were conducted, attended by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Defence. By the end of that year, the first segment of fortifications on the Kaliningrad border was completed. These developments demonstrate that the programme is moving from planning to tangible implementation.
The initiative is multi-annual in scope, with implementation scheduled for 2024–2028 and an allocated budget of approximately PLN 10 billion.
The “Eastern Shield” in the Context of NATO’s Eastern Flank
The “Eastern Shield” must be viewed within the broader context of NATO’s eastern flank security strategy, encompassing countries bordering Russia and Belarus (Poland, the Baltic States, and further south, Romania and others). Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has significantly increased its presence and readiness along its eastern periphery. At NATO summits (Warsaw 2016, Madrid 2022, Vilnius 2023, Washington 2024), decisions were made to strengthen the Enhanced Forward Presence, establishing multinational battle groups in Poland and the Baltic States and expanding defence infrastructure.
As the largest country in the region, Poland plays a pivotal role in this strategy—hosting allied forces (10,000 American soldiers are stationed in Poland) and coordinating defensive actions along the northeastern flank. Polish Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has emphasised that the “Eastern Shield” is a strategic operation from the perspective of Poland and the entire Alliance.
From NATO’s standpoint, strengthening the eastern flank through initiatives like the “Eastern Shield” enhances the credibility of deterrence policies. It signals that frontline states—supported by the entire Alliance—are prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. Notably, the scale of the Polish initiative is unprecedented in postwar European history: according to government declarations, it is the largest fortification project on NATO’s eastern frontier since 1945. It can be compared to Cold War-era defensive lines in Western Europe, with the key difference that Poland’s national efforts are now supplemented by allied support (rotational NATO troop deployments, joint exercises, system interoperability).
Poland’s Cooperation with the Baltic States (Baltic Defence Line)
Given the geographical and strategic coherence of the threat landscape, Poland maintains close cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in strengthening defence capabilities along the northeastern corridor. In parallel to Poland’s “Eastern Shield,” the Baltic States are implementing their own initiative known as the “Baltic Defence Line.” Its goals are analogous—constructing fortifications along the borders with Russia (and Lithuania’s border with Belarus) to maximally delay potential invasion forces. These governments have openly declared their intention to link their national efforts with Poland’s system, ultimately creating a unified NATO and EU defence line stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians.
In practice, the Baltic Defence Line incorporates both natural barriers and artificial engineering obstacles. Lithuania has announced a 20-kilometers-wide border zone where deforestation will be banned—fallen trees and dense vegetation are intended to impede enemy manoeuvres, particularly on roads and river crossings. Latvia and Estonia are planning multi-layered anti-tank barrier systems (steel hedgehogs, “dragon’s teeth” concrete blocks, etc.) and minefields, with explosives stored during peacetime and deployed only under imminent threat. Estonia has also announced plans to build approximately 600 field bunkers for border defence. These investments have already commenced—Lithuania, for example, allocated €32 million in 2024 for its segment of the Baltic line.
Coordination between Poland and the Baltic States in these parallel projects is crucial for regional defence coherence. The so-called Suwałki Gap—a narrow corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus linking the Baltic States with the rest of NATO and the EU—is of particular concern. It represents both a vital logistical connection and a potential chokepoint vulnerable to Russian military action. Strengthening this corridor through joint Polish-Baltic fortifications significantly raises the cost of aggression: the adversary must reckon with delayed advances due to a network of obstacles, mines, and defences prepared in depth. In essence, the Baltic Defence Line and the Eastern Shield are mutually reinforcing, forming a single protective barrier shielding NATO’s interior. This cooperation extends beyond engineering concepts and includes joint military exercises and coordination of allied support requirements (e.g., intelligence, logistics). It exemplifies practical solidarity within NATO—frontline states enhancing each other’s security and, by extension, that of the entire Alliance.
The Strategic Relevance of the ‘Eastern Shield’ in the Context of the War in Ukraine and the Russian Threat
The Russo-Ukrainian war constitutes the direct backdrop for the emergence of the « Eastern Shield » concept. Analyses of combat operations in Ukraine have unequivocally demonstrated that traditional field fortifications, engineered obstacles, and extensive logistical-defensive systems have regained relevance in the face of conventional warfare against a well-equipped adversary. Russia’s invasion—with its scenes of trenches, minefields, and fortifications in the Donbas—served as a wake-up call for NATO countries bordering Russia. Observing the war on its immediate eastern frontier, Poland has drawn critical lessons and proactively prepared for the possibility of a similar scenario. Consequently, the « Eastern Shield » is being developed in an explicitly conventional manner, prioritizing territorial defence with anti-tank barriers, artillery, and layered protection, rather than relying solely on rapid manoeuvre warfare or cyber operations. This reflects a conscious return to historically proven methods of delaying and complicating large-scale enemy offensives.
An equally significant factor shaping the programme is the direct threat posed by Russia and Belarus. Since 2022, Moscow has repeatedly employed hostile rhetoric towards Poland, including nuclear threats and accusations of aggression (e.g., support for Ukraine). In 2023, Russia deployed part of its tactical nuclear arsenal to Belarus, where Wagner Group mercenaries had previously operated—developments that heightened the sense of threat along Poland’s border. Already in 2021, Poland experienced a hybrid assault on its border with Belarus, when the Minsk regime—encouraged by Moscow—orchestrated a mass migrant crossing, triggering a border crisis. These events prompted Warsaw to accelerate investments in physical border security (such as the steel barrier completed in 2022) and integrate border protection with broader national defence strategy. Accordingly, the « Eastern Shield » is intended not only to prepare Poland for open military aggression but also to bolster its resilience against sub-threshold actions—hybrid warfare, sabotage, provocations, and limited border incidents. The deployment of sensors, drones, and permanent observation posts along the border is expected to hinder enemy reconnaissance and special operations within Polish territory, while the expanded military infrastructure will provide the Polish Armed Forces with spatial and temporal advantages in the event of sudden threats.
Ultimately, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » also carries considerable psychological and political weight: it strengthens public confidence in national security and signals the state’s resolve to defend its territory. In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, such resolute preventive action enhances Poland’s credibility as a state committed to safeguarding its citizens. It also serves a deterrent function vis-à-vis the Kremlin, demonstrating that Poland is preparing for worst-case scenarios and thereby raising the cost of any potential aggression. Without question, the war in Ukraine and the persistent threat from Russia provided the impetus for both the creation and the design of the « Eastern Shield, » making it a central component of the new security architecture in Central and Eastern Europe.
Poland’s Defence Policy: Expenditures and Military Expansion
The execution of such an ambitious defence initiative as the « Eastern Shield » is made possible by a fundamental shift in Polish defence policy following 2022. Poland has significantly increased its defence spending and launched an expansion of its armed forces to levels not seen since the Cold War. The Homeland Defence Act, adopted in March 2022, guarantees a gradual increase in defence expenditures to at least 3% of GDP; in practice, however, Poland already allocated approximately 4% of its GDP to defence in 2023. In absolute terms, this reflects a sharp rise in the military budget: the financial plan for 2025 envisages defence spending of PLN 186.6 billion (approximately 4.7% of GDP). These substantial resources enable simultaneous funding of army modernisation and large-scale infrastructural projects such as the « Eastern Shield. » Simultaneously, the Polish Armed Forces are undergoing numerical expansion. The government has officially declared its goal of increasing the total number of troops—including regular forces and the Territorial Defence Forces—to 300,000 by 2035. Poland is already considered to possess one of the largest land forces in the European Union. This status stems from rapid recruitment and the creation of new military units, including additional divisions in eastern Poland. Massive investments are also being made in the acquisition of modern weaponry. Since 2022, contracts have been signed for U.S. M1A2 Abrams tanks, self-propelled howitzers and HIMARS rocket systems, fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and South Korean K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, Chunmoo rocket launchers, and FA-50 light combat aircraft. This equipment is gradually being delivered to Polish units, significantly enhancing the army’s combat potential. Notably, a substantial portion of the newly acquired arms is being deployed specifically in eastern Poland, where new units are being formed and equipped with Abrams and K2 tanks (e.g., the 1st Warsaw Mechanised Division). As a result, Poland is poised to soon possess one of the strongest land forces in Europe in terms of both size and modernity.
It is also worth highlighting the broader philosophy of Polish defence policy, of which the « Eastern Shield » is a core element. Poland pursues strategic autonomy and deterrence through strength—investing in capabilities that discourage aggression by their mere presence. This includes the development of air and missile defence (e.g., Patriot systems, the « Narew » programme with CAMM missiles), as well as plans to create a missile shield and reinforce cyber defence forces. This comprehensive military modernisation, combined with the construction of the « Eastern Shield, » aims to make Poland militarily robust enough that the prospect of conflict becomes a deterrent in itself.
Poland as the Border of NATO and the EU: Leadership in Regional Security
Poland’s geopolitical position renders it a frontline state for both NATO and the European Union. Its eastern borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region constitute both the EU’s external frontier and NATO’s eastern line of defence. This confers a dual responsibility and leadership potential upon Poland: any action it undertakes to strengthen its security directly enhances the safety of the entire Euro-Atlantic community. In recent years, Poland has increasingly asserted its role as a security leader in Central and Eastern Europe, initiating or supporting key defence initiatives in the region. A prime example is its promotion of the « Eastern Shield » and the « Baltic Defence Line » as a common protective barrier for NATO/EU frontline states.
Polish diplomacy and government authorities are actively advocating for eastern flank security to be prioritized on the EU’s agenda, especially during Poland’s current Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2025). From Warsaw’s perspective, the EU must intensify its engagement in defence matters, investing in infrastructure and military capabilities of eastern member states. Evidence of the effectiveness of these efforts includes the March 12, 2025, resolution of the European Parliament recognizing the « Eastern Shield » as a flagship EU security project and calling for its financial support. On March 19, 2025, the European Commission echoed this position, describing the initiative as a model for strengthening EU resilience and prioritizing it in future budgetary plans. Although largely political in nature, these decisions reflect a growing European consensus that the security of Poland and the Baltic States is inseparably linked to the security of the entire Union. In short, Poland is successfully articulating its role as the EU’s bulwark—the fortified frontier whose protection serves the common interest.
In NATO, Poland also plays an active role in advocating the reinforcement of the eastern flank. Within the framework of the Bucharest Nine (a group of nine eastern NATO members), Warsaw co-authors joint positions and recommendations for the Alliance, calling for greater allied troop presence on its territory and more robust collective defence planning against potential Russian aggression. Many of these demands have been reflected in NATO decisions—such as enhanced readiness of forces in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of additional equipment stockpiles in Poland. Poland has earned the reputation of being the « European advocate of deterrence, » persistently reminding Western allies of the threat posed by Moscow’s imperial ambitions and the need for unity.
Beyond political measures, Poland sets an example for neighbouring states through its own actions—both via elevated defence expenditures, which serve as a benchmark, and direct support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Warsaw has become a major supplier of military aid to Kyiv, providing tanks, artillery systems, and ammunition, and facilitating the logistics of Western deliveries. Although these actions fall outside NATO’s formal remit, they enhance security across the eastern flank by weakening the adversary before it can threaten NATO territory. Poland argues that by supporting Ukraine while simultaneously rearming and fortifying its own territory, it creates a regional security buffer for all of Europe. This logic is gaining increasing recognition—reflected in the EU’s growing willingness to treat Polish defence initiatives as integral components of its broader security strategy.
Conclusion
The National Deterrence and Defence Programme « Eastern Shield » (2024–2028) represents a groundbreaking initiative that integrates Poland’s territorial defence efforts with NATO and EU security objectives. Encompassing extensive military infrastructure, surveillance systems, and deep fortifications along the eastern border, the programme responds to the realities of a new cold war in Europe—marked by Russian aggression, the lessons of the war in Ukraine, and the strategic unpredictability of the new Trump administration. The « Eastern Shield » strengthens NATO’s eastern flank, complements similar efforts by the Baltic States, and forms part of a collective deterrence strategy. Simultaneously, it reflects Poland’s determination to safeguard its national security through record-high defence spending and the development of the largest land army in the EU. Its designation as a flagship EU security project underscores the initiative’s transnational importance—its success is in the interest of all of Europe. In the coming years, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » will be closely watched by allies and adversaries alike. Its completion by 2028 will significantly raise the security threshold on the eastern flank, complicating any potential Russian aggression. More broadly, Poland’s deterrence and defence model may serve as a blueprint for other NATO border states seeking to address contemporary threats—combining traditional defensive measures with modern technology and robust political backing. The « Eastern Shield » cements Poland’s role as a regional security pillar and demonstrates that Central and Eastern Europe is capable of initiating and executing projects vital to collective defence. In the face of continued instability beyond the EU’s eastern borders, such a proactive approach constitutes a meaningful contribution to building a more secure future for the continent as a whole.
__
Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 7, 2025By Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University.
The head of the European Prosecutor’s Office, Laura Kövesi, has temporarily suspended Bulgarian representative Teodora Georgieva and even launched an investigation against her. This unusual move in such an EU institution has become the centre of a scandal in Bulgaria, involving a former investigator, a former prosecutor general, a current party leader, a current minister and several institutions.
The Bulgarian European Prosecutor was suspended due to threats against her in connection with the investigation into the misuse of European funds for the expansion of the gas storage facility in Chiren (near Pleven, Bulgaria). According to Georgieva, she is being threatened by MP Delyan Peevski, who is subject to sanctions for corruption by the US and the UK. The Bulgarian European Prosecutor stated that the MP had demanded a bribe of 20 million leva (10 mln. €) to arrange who would implement the project. Separately, there is also an accusation against officials for changing the technology in order to save and embezzle another 80-90 million leva (40-45 mln. €).
For his part, Delyan Peevski, a highly controversial political figure in Bulgaria, accused Georgieva of being elected to the post at the suggestion of another character, former investigator Petyo Petrov, nicknamed Pepi the Euro, who has been wanted by the investigation for a long time for multiple crimes. Moreover, the wanted investigator himself has filed a report with the prosecutor’s office that during the period 2019-2023 he gave Georgieva 10,000 leva per month. And Delyan Peevski threatened to sue her for perjury. In addition, he claims that she is the “personal prosecutor” of one of the leaders of the opposition and a sharp critic of the “Peevski model” Kiril Petkov.
The story also involves a connection with another dark figure of crime in Bulgaria – Martin Bozhanov, nicknamed the Notary, who seems to have worked together with Pepi the Euro. Bozhanov was killed by an unknown perpetrator in late January 2025, but became known as a man who could get someone out of prison, ruin someone else’s business, and provide an “umbrella” over someone else. Names from high politics came out of his presence, and his widow is an employee of the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP).
The scandal took on a new dimension with the publication of a hidden camera video allegedly of a meeting between Pepi the Euro and Teodora Georgieva. In fact, this does not look good and many believe that it is compromising material prepared to disqualify the Bulgarian European Prosecutor. However, Pepi the Euro himself, who recently returned to Bulgaria from Dubai after months of hiding from the prosecutor’s office, claims that such a meeting took place and that opportunities to influence specific court cases were discussed at it. And one more thing – a few days before the release of the video recordings, Teodora Georgieva’s mother died in a fire in her home under still unclear circumstances.
This whole story is not a script for an action movie on a crime theme. And although the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office claims that it is starting to carefully investigate all this, public opinion is again sceptical that anything will really be brought to light. The public is left with the impression that there is a well-developed criminal network for control and influence over the judicial system, for corruption of public officials, for fraud not only with European funds, for pressure on inconvenient judges and prosecutors, but also the presence of too many corrupt justice officials.
There is now some expectation among public opinion that the intervention of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in this case will unravel some of the most dangerous and obvious manifestations of organized political corruption in Bulgaria. Because society as a whole does not believe that the current National Prosecutor’s Office and the current Supreme Judicial Council in Bulgaria, responsible for the career development of prosecutors and judges, will be able to do this. It remains to be seen whether the EU institution will now help Bulgarian citizens to believe that there can be real justice in the interests of the people.
__
Antony Todorov is a political scientist and a professor at the New Bulgarian University. He was visiting teacher at ULB (Brussels) and at the University of Bucharest and president of the Bulgarian Political Science Association from 2001 to 2012. His research interests lie in democracy, party politics, and the study of elections. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 3, 2025By Wojciech Albert Łobodziński, journalist.
This article was first published in Cross-border Talks. Link to the original article: Donald Tusk’s Vision for Poland: Unlocking the Future or Selling It Short? – Cross-border Talks.
Since his return to power, Donald Tusk has sought to project the image of a moderniser, a pragmatic leader who will untangle the bureaucratic web that is supposedly strangling Polish business. His political philosophy, however, seems to be based on a controversial belief that minimal state spending is optimal. Believing that a business-friendly government will propel Poland into the future, Tusk seems to ignore the potential erosion of state authority, institutional robustness and collective trust in public goods. And this is a price that may prove too high for a country still struggling with inequalities and a fragile social fabric.
This philosophy was on full display on 10 February when Tusk, alongside Finance Minister Andrzej Domański, unveiled his economic strategy at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Held under the evocative symbolism of Poland’s millennium of statehood, the event was designed to convey a sense of historical momentum — a return to the courage and boldness of Boleslaw the Brave, Poland’s first king. But beyond the spectacle, the underlying message was clear: deregulation would be Poland’s way forward, just like it is under Trump & Musk in the US.
The star of the event was not a government official but a businessman — Rafał Brzoska, the founder of InPost, whose parcel locker network revolutionised Poland’s delivery market. It was possible largely due to the weaknesses of the underfunded and mismanaged state postal service. Presented as Tusk’s equivalent of Elon Musk, Brzoska was publicly tasked with deregulating the Polish economy. This gesture, which Brzoska accepted with a theatrical ‘challenge accepted’, underlined Tusk’s belief in outsourcing economic leadership to private capital.
Brzoska’s credentials as a disruptive entrepreneur are well known, and his methods raise questions about the kind of society such a vision fosters. His views on work-life balance are extreme; he expects employees to devote their lives to their work. Labour flexibility, often celebrated by proponents of deregulation, in the Polish practice usually means precariousness and the erosion of workers’ rights protection. Moreover, InPost’s rapid expansion exploited regulatory loopholes — parcel lockers springing up in chaotic, unplanned locations became a meme, symbolising both convenience and urban degradation. Brzoska, on the other hand, became an idol for Poland’s managerial elite — a symbol of raw, unfettered market success.
While Brzoska’s rise exemplifies entrepreneurial energy, it also highlights the tension in Tusk’s vision. Poland’s development cannot rely solely on deregulation and flexible labour markets. The most successful societies balance market efficiency with robust public services, social protection and strategic state intervention. Tusk’s invocation of the World Happiness Report as a benchmark for Poland’s aspirations was particularly revealing — and ironic. The top countries in this ranking, including Finland, Denmark and Norway, are welfare states with comprehensive public services and high levels of equality. Their secret is not deregulation, but rather the strength of their institutions and the safety net they provide.
The Vision
Tusk’s concrete proposals, though ambitious on paper, betray the same bias. His government plans to invest PLN 180 billion in railway infrastructure and PLN 65 billion in expanding the energy transmission network. In addition, capital market reforms aim to support high-risk ventures, raise limits on retirement savings accounts (IKZE), reduce capital gains tax and promote ETFs. Deregulation, both narrowly (reducing administrative burdens) and broadly (Brzoska’s systemic reform), is the linchpin.
However, when juxtaposed with the World Bank’s recent recommendations for Poland, critical gaps emerge. The Bank emphasises sustainable urban development, the digitalisation of public services and the integration of local investments into global value chains. It urges Poland to increase citizen participation and empower local governments to improve operational efficiency. While Tusk’s strategy focuses on transport and energy, it lacks a comprehensive vision for urban planning, smart cities and participatory governance. There is little mention of using digital technology to modernise local government, not to mention increasing public participation in decision-making.
Equally, glaring is the absence of a robust social agenda. Tusk’s reliance on business dynamism sidesteps the pressing issues of income inequality, labour market insecurity and poverty. His government talks about cutting red tape, but is silent on improving protection for vulnerable workers. The Polish labour market remains characterised by precarious contracts and low wages for many, especially in sectors outside the major urban centres.
Underfunded Ambitions
These concerns are compounded by the chronic underfunding of Polish science and research. Despite ambitions to increase spending on innovation, the reality remains stark: Poland consistently ranks among the lowest in the European Union in terms of R&D spending. In 2022, R&D spending amounted to just 1.46% of GDP, well below the EU average of 2.27%. This underinvestment stifles the potential for home-grown technological breakthroughs and limits the ability of Polish universities and research institutions to compete internationally.
While countries like Germany, France and even Estonia are aggressively positioning themselves as AI innovation hubs, Poland has yet to articulate a coherent strategy for harnessing AI for economic growth. Without significant public and private investment in AI research and development, Poland risks becoming a technology consumer rather than a creator, perpetuating its reliance on foreign innovation. While at the same time is one of the major exporters of IT specialists, so far, it could not create a sustainable environment for them at place — it seems that this will not change.
Polish Success Story
This emphasis on deregulation and market solutions is all the more puzzling given the fact that, on macroeconomic terms, Poland’s post-Socialist history, and especially the last two decades are, after all, a success story. Between 1990 and 2020, Poland’s GDP per capita grew by more than 600%, exceeding $18,000 by 2022 (World Bank). Exports rose from $14 billion in 1991 to more than $355 billion in 2022. The country’s poverty rate fell from 16% in 2005 to less than 5% in 2021. Infrastructure development is a measurable reality: Poland now has more than 4,800 kilometres of motorways compared with just 400 kilometres in 1990. These gains were driven not by deregulation alone, but by a mix of strategic public investment, EU funds and social policies that lifted millions out of poverty.
It was precisely this state-led development model — combining market dynamism with public investment and EU support — that underpinned Poland’s success. Deregulation had its place, but it was not the sole driver. The risk now is that Tusk’s government, in its zeal to emulate Anglo-American models, forgets the formula that worked for Poland.
Short-term Success
There is also a political subtext to Tusk’s rhetoric. By aligning himself with Brzoska, he seeks to bind the business elite to his coalition, thereby insulating his fragile parliamentary majority. This alliance may provide short-term stability, but it risks alienating voters who expect more from the state than just efficiency slogans. The controversy over flood relief, where celebrity endorsements masked operational failures, is a case in point. Optics trumped substance; victims were left behind.
Ultimately, Tusk’s challenge is not just to simplify regulations or woo entrepreneurs. It is to articulate a vision that combines market dynamism with social cohesion and institutional resilience. Poland’s future prosperity depends on more than parcel lockers and stock market announcements. It requires investment in people, cities and public services — building on the hard-won successes of the past three decades.
The risk is that Tusk’s government, fixated on short-term media wins and market orthodoxy, will miss this opportunity. And in an increasingly unstable world, where social trust and state capacity are vital assets, that is a gamble Poland can ill afford.
__
Wojciech Albert Łobodziński was a former correspondent from France, Italy and Poland, writing about foreign policy, climate change, labor rights, but also new social phenomena for Cross-border talks, publishing in English. He is now Generation Climate Europe’s new Membership Coordinator. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 2, 2025By Wojciech Albert Łobodziński, journalist.
This article was first published in Cross-border Talks. Link to the original article: Take back control? On the new Polish migration strategy – Cross-border Talks.
At the Civic Coalition convention in Warsaw on Saturday 12 October 2024, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the Polish migration strategy. In his speech on the project with the resonant name ‘Take back control, ensure security’, Tusk said that: ‘the Law and Justice party for eight years built a system, partly corrupt, which allowed the uncontrolled influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants (…) All this led to Law and Justice bringing hundreds of thousands here, which the state may not have wanted to see come to Poland at all,’ he said. At the same time, he stressed that ‘the state must regain 100 per cent control over who enters and leaves Poland’, and therefore ‘illegal migration will be reduced to a minimum’. But everyone remembered only one sentence of Prime Minister Tusk: ‘One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand in Europe the right to recognise this decision’. After a second, he emphasised this by adding: ‘If someone wants to come to Poland, they must accept Polish standards. They must want to integrate.’
Undoubtedly, this speech will go down in history, the question is, of what: the European Union or extremely catchy political PR?
But the whole story of Poland’s harsher stance on migration starts a lot earlier than that. On 31 August 2023, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki dismissed Piotr Wawrzyk from his post as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was only the beginning of a major scandal involving the Polish foreign service. According to the liberal opposition, foreign ministry employees were selling Polish visas, going so far as to allow the sale of signed papers at an outdoor stall in an unidentified African country.
According to some, the entire affair involved a significant part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others say it involved about a dozen people. There was also disagreement over the number of visas allegedly sold. The opposition said 300,000, while the Foreign Ministry admits that no more than 300 to 400 documents were wrongly allocated.
A parliamentary committee has been set up to investigate the so-called visa scandal, which has uncovered irregularities in the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely evidence of lobbying by third parties to increase the number of visas or temporary work permits that were later to be cancelled. The legal consequences of this are to be borne by the politicians of the previous government, or at least that is what the current power camp is preparing for, probably closer to the presidential elections — which will be about ‘difficult and troubled (geopolitical) times’. Whoever demonstrates that the other side is unfit to lead in such times will win.
Interestingly, however, anonymous voices from within the committee pointed to another dimension of the affair. Namely, that there is a forceful private sector lobby in Poland calling for more cheap labour immigrants in the country. This is a thread that a committee does not want to pull because of the potential political costs. After all, big business is behind Poland’s two hegemonic parties, both of which are right-wing. Nevertheless, expert voices from all sides of the political argument have forced the new government to act — at the end of the day, Polish politicians have never created any migration strategy, leaving everything to fate, or rather, business actors.
Already in February 2024, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration launched work on the development of a comprehensive, responsible and safe Polish migration strategy for 2025-2030. A timetable of activities was set, according to which a draft of this strategy should be developed in October-November 2024, following public consultations.
‘Take Back Control’
On 15 October, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the strategy ‘Take Back Control. Ensure security. Comprehensive and responsible migration strategy of Poland for 2025-2030’. On 17 October, the 36-page document was published by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and submitted to the public.
According to the assumptions presented, the final version of the draft migration strategy will be prepared in December 2024. The draft will then be discussed by the Council of Ministers. On this basis, new draft laws will be prepared between January and June 2025. This will include a new law on foreigners. Nevertheless, now we know where the new strategy leads.
The Polish migration strategy proposed by the government of Donald Tusk marks a significant shift in response to evolving national and regional needs. The main focus of the strategy is to outline changes in eight key areas of migration policy. These include the development of a rapid response model to counter provocations — so-called hybrid war — from neighbouring Russia and Belarus
Firstly, a key component of the strategy is the introduction of employer declarations for the hiring of foreign nationals, initially limited to citizens of three and then six Eastern European countries. In addition, the plan emphasises the digitalisation of migration processes in order to streamline the processing of residence permit applications and reduce staff turnover in migration offices.
The government also proposes:
Introduction of a points-based system to regulate the entry of foreign workers, tailored to Polish labour market needs
Implementation of student admission limits in specific academic fields
Adjustment of absenteeism policy, shifting from an annual to a semi-annual assessment
Creation of special visas for grant-funded international researchers to attract global scholars
Development of enhanced policies to encourage diaspora return
Establishment of a structured pathway for the rapid and effective integration of foreign children into the Polish education system
Secondly, the strategy also emphasises the elimination of exploitative practices and legal loopholes in migration and employment systems. This includes targeting temporary employment agencies that break the law or exploit workers, and closing loopholes that allow fictitious student enrolment to secure residence in the EU.
Addressing the illegal practices document focuses on measures dedicated to eliminating irregularities in the visa system, preventing abuse of visa application procedures and tackling the misuse of company shares by foreigners to circumvent formal employment rules. The strategy also aims at eliminating intermediaries who exploit legalisation procedures for residence, thus ensuring that only genuine applicants benefit from migration policies.
Finally, the document calls for:
Restoration of border controls
Implementation of digital processing for residence legalisation applications
Adaptation of government offices to meet the needs of foreign nationals
Alignment of migration policies with market and state needs
Increased role for the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Minister of Internal Affairs
Strengthening border cooperation with Schengen Area countries
At the same time, following the ‘visa scandal’, work on a visa policy is still in progress; this has only been outlined in the form of potential practices within the above document, but the specific diplomatic activities and framework in which they are to operate still need to be worked out, subsequently becoming part of the Migration Strategy 2025-2030. It is planned, however, that it will be based on two criteria: country of origin and foreigner profile.
Another moral panic?
So what was it about Tusk’s words that everyone remembered? Donald Tusk’s remarks about suspending the right to asylum caused a bit of a stir. Not only did coalition partners have questions, but so did party members. The same went for the media, experts, activists in one or another way connected to the broader liberal camp — which used to fight gainst the Law and Justice’ ‘fascist’ government and its anti-immigration measures. Some said to wait for the strategy to be published, while others were quick to change their rhetoric on the migration issues right away. Leading to many revolting U-turns rhetorically aimed at yesterday’s allies.
The Prime Minister was quickly facing backlash from legal and humanitarian groups. They sent him a letter reminding him that the right to asylum is guaranteed by the Geneva Convention, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Polish Constitution.
‘Denying migrants the right to asylum is not only against Polish law and international agreements. It’s just cruel,’ commented Magdalena Biejat, who is the Deputy Speaker of the Senate, at the time one of the leaders of Razem party, after a U-turn now one of the turncoats that switched sides, joining the camp of Tusk’s government.
The Marshal of the Sejm, Szymon Holownia, leader of Poland 2050 party, wrote on Facebook on Monday that his party backs stronger border security, but also thinks that the right to asylum is a fundamental right. He noted that the Prime Minister was only expressing his opinion, as the strategy wasn’t part of the coalition agreement. So what was the Tusk’s aim in making such a revolting statement?
Tusk tends to play politics with moral panics that focus all the attention on him and not on concrete actions or solutions — which can be infinitely far from what he himself has said. This was also the case here; a few days later, Tusk himself began to soften his own remarks.
The overheated statement on asylum may also have been a prelude to the two-day European Council summit in Brussels, which began on Thursday 17 October. Migration is supposed to be one of the main topics of the meeting, and such a radical stance would have improved the negotiating position of Poland — which does not want to accept any migrants apart from those from Ukraine or Belarus.
In Poland, the declaration on asylum would change the tone of the migration strategy. Although the whole point of the document is to regulate and de facto limit immigration, the right wing is presenting it as the opposite — mainly because of the plan to open more than 40 centres for foreigners, which can hardly be considered anything apart from the restoration of the state’s competence in the field of migration. So far, it has not existed.
Thanks to Tusk’s words, there is a good chance that right-wing audiences will not notice the PiS’s spin, but the outrage in liberal circles over the prime minister’s anti-immigrant tones. In media leaks, activists from parties that are part of the Civic Coalition indicate that, in their view, the prime minister’s words may have been a deliberate excursion into right-wing territory. They were intended to divert attention from the actions of the still-powerful Law and Justice, and also to strengthen the Civic Coalition ahead of the presidential elections – whose main themes are supposed to be security and hard times. Stepping into the right-wing’s shoes seems ideal, especially since, after taking over the public media, they have all the machinery at their disposal to highlight it.
End product
There’s been a big decline in the number of babies being born in Poland recently. The latest figures from the country’s Central Statistical Office (GUS) show that just 259,000 babies were born between August 2023 and July 2024. That’s the lowest number since World War II. July 2024 saw a slight rise in the number of live births, with 23,500, but this is still well below the 19,000 recorded in June. The numbers are still way down compared to previous years, with 272,000 births in 2023 and 305,000 in 2022.
This decline in the number of births is partly due to a smaller number of women of childbearing age (15–49), which has fallen to 8.6 million, nearly a million fewer than in 2010. There has also been a decline in the number of children born per woman, which fell to 1.16 in 2023. The combination of low birth rates and a natural population decrease – 148,000 more deaths than births in the past year – is a worrying trend for Poland’s future. It raises concerns about whether the population will be sustainable in the long term.
Meanwhile, Poland is facing a rapidly ageing population, with demographic trends showing a declining birth rate and an increasing life expectancy. As younger generations shrink, the proportion of older adults grows, placing pressure on social services, healthcare, and the workforce. The latest data indicates that the number of people over 65 is projected to rise significantly, exacerbating challenges in providing adequate support and resources for the elderly. This demographic shift raises concerns about economic sustainability and the capacity of social systems to handle a growing elderly population.
Poland’s demographic policy should be multifaceted and include not only issues that directly encourage people to have children, but also migration, housing and health policies, among others. However, all the indications are that in the current situation, any political issue, even if it is the demographic crisis, the literal extinction of a nation, can only be addressed if it can be used to attack an opponent. This is also the case with the current migration policy. It is difficult to see bold solutions, difficult to find concrete solutions. You could say that we are talking about everything and nothing at the same time. What will it look like in the end when the strategy has been refined? Nobody knows. But it is possible that in many respects it will be too late to come up with a strategy.
__
Wojciech Albert Łobodziński was a former correspondent from France, Italy and Poland, writing about foreign policy, climate change, labor rights, but also new social phenomena for Cross-border talks, publishing in English. He is now Generation Climate Europe’s new Membership Coordinator. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 1, 2025By Vladimir Mitev, journalist.
This contribution was first published in Cross-border Talks and is re-published with the agreement of the author. Link to the original publication: The government of Rosen Zhelyazkov is a bridge to all – Cross-border Talks.
Boyko Borissov is again at the centre of the Bulgarian political system. All roads pass through him. The broad support for the government is a chance for legislation and reforms – but it faces difficulties as well.
The formation of new Bulgarian government has been accompanied in the Romanian media, in part, by comments that Bulgaria is yet another country in the region that is joining the group of countries led by Hungary and Slovakia that have a pro-Russian orientation. Thus, the interpretations about Bulgaria have entered into the popular cliché in Romania that Bulgarians are inherently Russophiles, without taking into account that the country is part of NATO and the EU or that there are other influential geopolitical vectors in its politics.
With this text, I try to suggest some guidelines that would allow looking at Bulgarian politics and society beyond the standard two-dimensional coordinate axis with two ends – West and East, and a constant pendulum-type movement between them. At this stage, I find more convincing a paradigm in which there are many more internal contradictions in the country, but also an aspiration for renewal, which, however, is often hindered by the fragmentation and polarisation of Bulgarian society. In such a situation, I hope that Bulgaria’s neighbours in the EU, and countries in the region in general, will in time begin to cast less aspersions on the Bulgarians because of their alleged “awkward” foreign policy ties, and will increasingly gain the understanding and the tools to connect transformatively with the Bulgarians. I don’t believe anyone is inherently Western or Eastern in their beliefs or essence – we live in a real world with specific problems whose solutions point us in one direction or another.
In fact, the new government of Rosen Zhelyazkov follows a classic formula for the Bulgarian state to be a bridge between different national and international forces.
There are both ministers who come from the NGO sector (an example in this respect is Deputy Prime Minister Tomislav Donchev, who is career-linked with the Open Society Foundation, but also Interior Minister Daniel Mitov, who was executive director of the Democracy Foundation), and representatives of populist parties (a classic example in this respect is “There is such a people”, but the Bulgarian Socialist Party also relied until recently on “conservative-left”, Orbanist ideology). The leader of the main party in it – GERB-SDS – Boyko Borissov, is on excellent terms, both with the President of the European Commission, and with the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, not to mention Recep Erdogan. In parliament, the government enjoys the support of some political currents among the Bulgarian Turks. And although some politicians from the Bulgarian Socialist Party – United Left have a Russophile profile, the government says it will continue to fulfil its commitments to Ukraine.
All these and other signs testify that the Zhelyazkov government is trying to be nice to everyone. And this is not only because the archetype of the modern Bulgarian state is a bridge (and we can see this archetype in all recent stable cabinets – from Borisov 3, through Petkov to Denkov/Gabriel).
For years the Bulgarian state has needed reform and modernisation, for which it needs broad support. But the transitional period the world was in after the war in Ukraine and during the war in the Middle East made it difficult for the Bulgarian political elite to find a consensus on how to adjust to the political winds blowing in the region and the world. This has caused long periods of caretaker governments in recent years. After the US, British and other elections passed, the Bulgarian political elites found the formula of the Zhelyazkov cabinet.
The Zhelyazkov cabinet – composition and intentions
Like the Petkov cabinet (December 2020 – August 2021), Rosen Zhelyazkov’s government contains small parties that often create conflicts around themselves. So it can easily be modified if necessary or simply fall apart if a new major dividing line arises in international relations. The likelihood of greater tensions between the US and the EU leads to growing insecurity in the region – and it could force changes in the Zhelyazkov government.
The Zhelyazkov cabinet has vectors in different directions, precisely because stability is needed so that reforms can be implemented and legislation passed after a long period of gridlock in the state and its administration. At the formation of the government in parliament, Rosen Zhelyazkov himself said that the government programme would be ready in a month – i.e. in mid-February. He only briefly outlined some of the political highlights of his cabinet.
One of them is joining the eurozone. Bulgaria is close to meeting the last requirement for joining the euro area – the price level.
In Zhelyazkov’s words, the government will prioritise the quality of life of the people with a focus on education, healthcare and the development of the labour market. Among the important tasks he added ensuring the rule of law, sustainable finances, a balanced budget, as well as accelerating the implementation of the National Recovery and Sustainability Plan, coordinated family policies, a sustained increase in investment in research and innovation with an ambition to reach 2% of GDP.
Zhelyazkov also outlined as important tasks the guarantee of energy security as well as national security through the modernisation of the Bulgarian army and the enhancement of defence capabilities, active actions to expand the European space with the Western Balkans, decisive actions to tackle the crisis of waterlessness and guaranteeing access to drinking water in the affected areas.
Crises and incidents greet the government in its first weeks
Two weeks after Rosen Zhelyazkov and his government took office, the difficulties in its activities are already visible. It had to present a mini-legislative programme for parliament to work on until the announcement of the government’s full programme in mid-February. But so far this has not happened.
There are suspicions that the 2025 budget is looking at a 9% deficit, so the draft budget has been withdrawn from discussions and will be presented in an updated version probably in mid-February 2025.
In foreign policy terms, Bulgaria has resolved (with the help of Middle Eastern mediators) the crisis with its Houthi hostage sailors. But a new international scandal arose after the Bulgarian ship Vezhen was detained by Sweden on suspicion of committing an act of sabotage by severing an international cable in the Baltic Sea. Eventually the Swedish prosecutors didn’t formulate accusations and let the ship leave for the open sea.
These and other crises show that the Zhelyazkov government’s task will be difficult. It may have parliamentary support. But it is clearly difficult to stack the various political tendencies and drive the state machinery, after the administration was in a semi-stasis for a long time during Dimitar Glavchev’s caretaker government.
Borissov is back with great force in Bulgaria’s political system
Since 2020, when anti-corruption protests erupted against the stableocracy of Boyko Borissov and influential businessman and politician Delyan Peevski, Bulgarian society has theoretically been making attempts to modernise its social model. An influential anti-corruption trend has emerged in Bulgarian politics, represented by the We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria formations. Although they ruled during the Petkov (December 2021-August 2022) and Denkov (June 2023-April 2024) cabinets, the reforms they carried out were not significant. The balances in the judiciary do not appear to have changed. The constitutional changes that saw anti-corruption parties rule in collaboration with those they considered symbols of corruption, Borissov and Peevski, were criticised for the difficulties they created in finding a prime minister for a caretaker government and were partially overturned by the Constitutional Court.
Ultimately, the politicians of these parties themselves never articulated a clear vision of what exactly “change” means in Bulgarian conditions after the fall of the Borisov 3 government. Currently, prominent cadres of the anti-corruption parties are accused by the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office – the former prime minister and leader of We Continue the Change Kiril Petkov in connection with the illegal arrest of Boyko Borissov, and his former chief of staff Lena Borislavova for document crimes.
Indeed, in recent years, Bulgarians’ salaries and pensions have been rising. But the societal model is still extremely dominated by people and groups with financial resources. Unlike Romania, Bulgarian society is almost devoid of grassroots organisations and social movements. That is, change from the bottom up is not encouraged and cannot happen, not least because many people find it pointless to develop civic activity. They believe that the only change can come from access to certain political or financial power. That reinforces the belief that in Bulgaria change can only come from the top down, from the people and structures with power resources.
In this context, since 2020, the Bulgarian political wheel of fortune has come full circle. And now again Boyko Borissov is at the centre of the political system, on good terms with everyone. And again he is the European face of Bulgaria, since during the European elections in 2024, Ursula von der Leyen herself came to Plovdiv to express support for him and to receive support from him.
During Trump’s first term, Borissov managed to win his favour through a military order for 8 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets. The first of these fighters was handed over to Bulgaria on 31 January 2025.
In the new era of Trump, Borissov’s talent for being on good terms with everyone will certainly benefit the Bulgarian state. But it still faces the challenges of modernization and reform, not just managing an aging status quo.
Hypotheses for knowing and understanding the Bulgarian rebus
In this context, it would be great if the Romanian interest in Bulgaria and Bulgarians were better able to identify the forces that can transform Bulgarian social reality for good, and to connect with them. It is not possible for every attempt to change the citizens of Bulgarian society to be tamed forever by the well-entrenched interests within it. It is logical that over time it evolves towards greater complexity. And to unravel it will require concepts and language to name the realities.
The government of Rosen Zhelyazkov is an opportunity to observe and read this “complexity” or “ambiguity”. And these are not just Bulgarian phenomena in the age of Trump. Romanian politics is also beginning to be filled with bridge people. Presidential candidate Crin Antonescu is the husband of a former Romanian EU commissioner, but he has also historically been an ally of the face of sovereigntism in the Social Democratic Party, Victor Ponta. Another presidential candidate, Nicusor Dan, comes from NGO circles, but by his own statements and actions has nothing conservative in his views – for example, he has long put off getting the COVID vaccine.
So the phenomenon of politicians or government-bridges is not something exclusively Bulgarian. The challenge is to see in them the potential for new experience, not the status quo from which we want to break away. Will Rosen Zhelyazkov give us a chance to see in him something more than “GERB with a human face”? What we will see also depends on our ability not to see the world as black and white, but to read the shades of grey.
__
Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian and Romanian-speaking journalist. He is correspondent of Radio Romania for Bulgaria and is an editor at the Romanian section of Radio Bulgaria. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 31, 2025By Jacek Wojnicki, Warsaw University.
This article has already been published in Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (Polish Review of Constitutional Law), 2020, 5 (57), 481-499. doi: 10.15804/ppk.2020.05.35.
Introduction
The analysis looks at the evolution of the systemic position of the Prime Minister of Hungary both in the context of existing legal and constitutional regulations and the developed constitutional practice. It covers the period after the beginning of the 1989 political and systemic transformations and the first contested election to the National Assembly in March and April of 1990. At the same time, the traditions of the institution of the government and its head in successive systemic orders from the mid-19th century (the Spring of Nations and the formation of Austria-Hungary institutions) have been included. It is noteworthy that the institution of the Prime Minister and the government has functioned in different systemic models – constitutional monarchy, parliamentary monarchy, the authoritarian system developed during the regency of M. Horthy (1919-1944), the parliamentary cabinet system (1945-1949), the system of a single state power dominated by the communist monoparty (1949-1989), and the peaceful transition towards the parliamentary model after 1989. A significant milestone in Hungary’s modern political history is 2010 when the ruling party, FIDESZ, won a constitutional majority in the National Assembly. The hypothesis of the article is as follows – the institution of Hungary’s Prime Minister has been affected to a larger extent by the tradition of shaping this institution than by direct constitutional regulations. This trend was particularly evident in the interwar period (the so-called regency) and the period of political transitions after 1990. The personality of a Prime Minister has significantly affected the political position of the head of government (the case of I. Bethlen, M. Rákosi, I. Nagy, J. Kádár, J. Antall or V. Orbán). Here, it is worth quoting the opinion of a Hungarian political scientist referring to the political changes introduced after 2010 by the FIDESZ government: The number of fundamental changes introduced in the public sphere alone makes it difficult to describe them even superficially and to characterize the government’s policy. But it can be summed up as a desire to confer more power (economic and legislative) on the executive in relation to other state agencies and institutions.
2. A historical overview
During the Spring of Nations, Lajos Kossuth, as the head of a delegation of the parliament’s lower chamber, presented in Vienna a programme of political-systemic and social-economic reforms. He demanded the establishment of an autonomous Hungarian government that would be accountable to the parliament (elected by taxpayers with voting rights). On 18 March 1848, the Austrian emperor decided to accept the presented demands and consequently appointed Count Lajos Batthyány as Prime Minister. He set up a government composed of liberal Hungarian politicians. At the same time, the parliament convened in Pozsony (now Bratislava) amended the constitution, establishing a constitutional monarchy. The parliament had a two-chamber structure – with an upper chamber composed of aristocracy and appointed dignitaries, while deputies elected for a three-year term sat in the lower chamber. After the Spring of Nations was defeated by the imperial forces in 1849, the Monarch revoked the 1848 regulations concerning Hungarian institutions (the parliament and the government).
A settlement was reached in February 1867 under which Hungary became a constitutional part of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was given a separate parliament and government, joint (Hungarian-Austrian) ministries of foreign affairs, military affairs and treasury were established. The so-called delegation was created, whose task was to agree on common matters involving the relationship between Budapest and Vienna.
The Hungarian constitutional act consisted of the April and December 1867 acts and many other legal regulations relating to more than 1,000 years of history of independent statehood. The Hungarian government carried out its decisions through the administrative apparatus and local autonomous authorities. These included counties and cities authorized to enact local laws. By 1918, there were 67 counties and 25 cities with legal autonomy in Hungary. The government of the Kingdom of Hungary – in accordance with the adopted model of parliamentary monarchy – was politically accountable to the parliament. In the area of the so-called common matters, in turn, „imperial-royal” ministers who did not belong to the Austrian or Hungarian government were in charge. The common ministers were accountable to the so-called delegations elected by the parliaments – the Austrian and the Hungarian – and to the Emperor.
After the Hungarian Soviet Republic was overthrown in the summer of 1919, Hungary’s system was de iure a form of constitutional monarchy. The functions of the head of state were performed by the regent while the royal throne remained vacant. The Act no I from 1920 established a tripartition of power – the legislative one was exercised by the parliament, the executive one by the regent, and the judicial one by the tribunals. The regent had the right to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and – at the request of the head of government – appoint individual ministers. The appointment of a Prime Minister did not require searching for a majority parliamentary coalition around their candidacy. Relevant regulations stipulated that a Prime Minister appointed by the regent automatically became the leader of the ruling faction – the Unity Party, regardless of his previous political affiliation. Moreover, a Prime Minister could not be dismissed by the deputies without prior consent of the regent.
According to the constitutional act passed on 31 January 1946, Hungary was proclaimed a republic. The President of the Republic exercised executive power through ministers accountable to the National Assembly. The head of state had the right to appoint and dismiss a Prime Minister after hearing from the Assembly’s political committee. In this regard, he acted according to the principle of parliamentary majority. The President appointed and dismissed ministers – at the request of the head of government. The appointed government was obliged to present its action programme in the parliament within 8 days. Before the government was approved, the head of state could not dissolve the National Assembly. Every presidential decree and regulation required a countersignature of the head of government and the responsible departmental minister. (art. 13 of the Constitution)
The president’s competences included appointing government officials above the fifth service group as well as all the judges – at the request of the head of government and the relevant departmental minister. (Art. 14 of the Constitution)
The constitution of 20 August 1949 proclaimed the Hungarian People’s Republic as a state of people’s democracy. The Council of Ministers was defined as the supreme body of state administration. Its structure and tasks were specified in the fourth chapter – the Supreme body of state administration. The Council of Ministers was composed of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, ministers without portfolio and ministers in charge of individual departments. The authority of requesting an appointment and dismissal of individual members of the Council of Ministers was taken over by the Presidential Council. The members of the government, who were not deputies, could also take part in parliament sittings and have their say in discussions (par. 23 of the Constitution). It is worth noting the new name of the governmental body, the Council of Ministers, which had not previously existed in Hungarian legislation.
The government was accountable to the National Assembly and reported to it on its activity. The Hungarian legislator also established the responsibility of the Prime Minister individually and of individual ministers for the orders they issued and their public activity. The government could act directly or through a specific ministry in the areas falling within the competence of the Council of Ministers. It could also take state administration branches under its direct supervision and create special bodies to this end.
In April 1972, the National Assembly passed a comprehensive amendment to the 1949 constitution. Hungary was proclaimed a „socialist state”, rather than a „state of people’s democracy” as before. New legal regulations relating both to the institution of the government and the entire state administration were introduced then. The supreme body of state administration reverted to its traditional name – the „Council of Ministers”, which had been replaced in November 1956 by the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government. The legislator broadened the tasks of the Council of Ministers by adding the following to the existing catalogue – protecting and securing the state system, the social order and the rights of citizens; managing the activity of field councils and exercising supervision over the lawfulness of their actions; determining the development directions in science and culture and providing the necessary human resources and material conditions for it; creating the system of social provision and health care, and securing material resources for these objectives.
The democratic transition launched in Hungary in the late 1980s resulted in the hammering out of a comprehensive amendment to the existing constitutional act from August 1949 by negotiators from the government’s side and representatives of the political opposition gathered at the „Triangular Table”. The fundamental constitutional principle was based on a joint declaration of building a democratic state and the rule of law. The constitution was amended in October 1989 and on 23 October 1989 – the 33rd anniversary of the outbreak of the People’s Revolution – the Republic of Hungary was proclaimed (marking the country’s return to its name from 1946-1949).
As Hungarian constitutional scholar Adam Antal emphasized when analyzing the model of government developed in Hungary at the time, „the system of government can be classified as a parliamentary republic. The situation and position of the new authorities, i.e. the President of the Republic, the government and the parliament, as well as relations between them, are largely determined by the traditions of parliamentarianism. The President of the Republic has not been equipped with the right of arbitration”. The key task of the head of state is to carry out the mission of cooperation and balance from the point of view of the parliament and the government. The parliamentary cabinet model was based on three elements of its structure: 1/a unicameral parliament elected by universal suffrage; 2/a separation of the tasks of the President of the Republic and the head of government, and 3/a non-separation of the executive power which was assigned to the government. Witold Brodziński emphasizes that the Hungarian political elites recognised the division and balance of powers as the essential guarantee of the democratic system. This allowed for the development of a bipolar system of government where the key levers of state power included the parliament and the government. Inside the government, ministry heads received significant competences.
Under the 1989 regulations, the government consisted of the Prime Minister and the ministers. It returned to the traditional name of the executive body, the name the Council of Ministers was scrapped. The post of Deputy Prime Minister was notably skipped. At the same time, the Hungarian legislator declares that the Prime Minister is replaced in their duties by a minister designated by the head of government. New rules for electing the Prime Minister and the government were introduced. The President of the Republic obtained the right to present a Prime Minister candidate to the National Assembly. Then the parliament needs to take a stand on the submitted candidacy. The Prime Minister is elected by a majority of votes of the statutory number of deputies. As the Prime Minister is elected, the National Assembly expresses its views on the issue of approving the government’s programme. Ministers, in turn, are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic. But he acts in this area at the request of the Prime Minister. The government is created when its ministers are appointed. At the same time, after the government has been formed, the members of the government are obliged to take an oath before the parliament (par. 33 of the Constitution). In the view of Hungarian constitutional scholar Nóra Chronovski, the constitutional position of the President of the Republic represents the features of the head of state in a parliamentary democracy. The constitutional definition of the President emphasizes ”representing the unity of the nation and safeguarding the democratic functioning of the organization of the state”. One can only agree with Bogusław Pytlik that the order of chapters established in the autumn of 1989 (chapter III – the head of state, chapter VII – the government) does not reflect the real constitutional position of these authorities of state power. The President of Hungary ranks among the weakest heads of state in Central Europe in the political and constitutional realities after 1989.
In the 1997 amendment, the chapter on the government’s structure and rules of operation was rephrased. Par. 33 was amended by adding points a and b. They relate to cessation of the powers of the government and its individual ministers. The legislator declares that the powers of the government cease: 1/after a new parliament has been installed; 2/after the head of government has died; 3/in the event the Prime Minister has lost voting rights; 4/in the event incopabilitas is established by the Prime Minister; 5/after a constructive no-confidence motion has been passed and a new head of government has been elected. (par. 33/A)
In the case of a minister, on the other hand, it was determined that their powers expired in the event of: 1/a cessation of the government’s powers; 2/resignation; 3/dismissal; 4/death; 5/a loss of voting rights, and 6/when incopabilitas is established by a government member. (par. 33/A) As noted by Bożena Dziemidok-Olszewska, the system of parliamentary government developed in the Republic of Hungary in the early 1990s had its origins in the Austro-Hungarian times. It resulted indirectly from the tradition of the political and legal culture of the Hungarian society and its attachment to a special position of the parliament among the supreme bodies of state power.
3. The constitutional regulations
First of all, it is worth analyzing the constitutional regulations relating to the institution of the government and its relations with the legislative power on the one hand and the President of the Republic on the other.
The Basic Law of Hungary of 11 April 2011 devotes to the government one section in the chapter The State – containing articles 15 to 22. The Hungarian legislator precisely defines the tasks of the government and its place in the structure of other bodies of power. The government is referred to as the main executive authority whose scope of responsibility and competences encompass all the areas of activity, except for those constitutionally transferred to other authorities. It is an example of a negative definition. It was declared at the same time that the government is politically accountable to the parliament. The government is the supreme body of public administration which, by law, can create state administration bodies. The government is authorized to issue regulations – acting within its competences, on issues ungoverned by laws, or based on statutory authorization. The Hungarian legislator declares that a government regulation must not contradict other legal acts (art. 15 of the Constitution).
The position of the Prime Minister is underlined in the constitutional regulations relating to government formation. The make-up of the government is determined through categories of its members – the Prime Minister and the ministers. But the Prime Minister, by way of a regulation, can designate one or more Deputy Prime Ministers from among the ministers, it is therefore their discretionary power. The procedure of appointing the Prime Minister also points to his role in the government and is similar to solutions applied in the chancellor model of government. The Prime Minister is elected by the deputies at the request of the President. It is necessary to obtain an absolute majority of votes for an election to be effective. The head of government takes office upon election. The election of the Prime Minister takes place in two circumstances – at the inaugural meeting of the National Assembly and within 15 days after the Prime Minister’s mandate has expired. Such expiration can occur in the following circumstances: resignation, death, establishing the existence of a conflict between the office of Prime Minister and the functions they perform, a failure to meet the necessary conditions to be elected Prime Minister, a no-confidence motion. In the event a candidate submitted by the head of state fails to be elected Prime Minister, the President is required to present another candidate within 15 days. Ministers, on the other hand, are appointed by the President at the request of the head of government (art. 16 of the Constitution). In addition, it should be noted that the Hungarian legislator stipulates that the Prime Minister determines the main directions of the government’s policy. Within the main directions of the government’s policy, the ministers independently run the public administration departments under their control and subordinated bodies and also carry out the tasks assigned by the government and the Prime Minister (art. 18 of the Constitution).
The Hungarian legislator precisely defines the circumstances when the Prime Minister’s mandate expires. These include: the installation of a newly elected parliament; an expression of no confidence in the Prime Minister; the parliament’s failure to express confidence at the request of the Prime Minister; resignation; death; when a conflict is established between the function exercised and other public functions performed; when the conditions necessary to elect them Prime Minister no longer exist. The constitution states it is up to the parliament to decide that the conditions necessary for the Prime Minister’s election no longer exist and that there is a conflict between the Prime Minister’s function and other public functions they perform. A two thirds majority of the voting deputies is required to issue the decision in question (art. 20 of the Constitution).
As already mentioned before, the Hungarian regulations draw on the experiences of the chancellor model. They are apparent when the no confidence procedure is discussed. The measure envisaged by the Hungarian legislators includes a constructivist element with a requirement to simultaneously submit the name of a candidate for the next head of government. A relevant request can be made by a group of at least one fifth of deputies to the National Assembly. An absolute majority of the statutory number of deputies is required to take an effective decision. The Prime Minister has two more instruments in relation to the parliament. First; they can call a confidence motion. The National Assembly does not express its support for such a request if no more than half of the statutory number of deputies support it in a vote. Second; the head of government can link the issue of confidence in their cabinet with the fate of a specific government submission. In such a situation, the parliament, by refusing to express its support for a governmental proposal submitted for vote, also takes a stand on the issue of no confidence in the cabinet (art. 21 of the Constitution). Wojciech Orłowski points out that the system of government shows several similarities to the chancellor model found in Germany, with the president equipped with limited competences, indirect election by the parliament, as well as the procedure of electing the Prime Minister by the parliament at the request of the head of state.
4. The constitutional practice
It is worth analyzing the issue of who has occupied the Prime Minister’s seat in Hungary after 1990. The time frame begins with the first free and democratic parliamentary election in Hungary since 1945; it naturally ends in 2020 (the moment the article was written).
Table 1 – PMs of Central and Eastern European countries after 1990
No.CountryName and surnameFactionThe mandate’s duration1HungaryJózsef AntallMDFVII 90-XII 932.HungaryPéter BorossMDFXII 93-VII 943.HungaryGyula HornMSzPVII 94-VII 984.HungaryViktor OrbánFIDESZVII 98-V 025.HungaryPéter MedgyessyMSzPV 02-IX 046.HungaryFerenc Gyurcsány**MSzPIX 04-IV 097.HungaryGordon BajnajBezp.IV 09-V 108.HungaryViktor Orbán***FIDESZV 10-
MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum ; MSzP – Hungarian Socialist Party ; FIDESZ – The Federation of Young Democrats.
Source: the author’s compilation
Seven heads of government have been in office in Hungary in the analyzed period. Politicans have been Prime Ministers twice: Ferenc Gyurcsány and Viktor Orbán four times. It is noteworthy that one (i.e. the first) term of V. Orbán is interrupted by an eight-year period in parliamentary opposition (the years 2002-2010). However, Hungary has not seen a single case of an interim government, nor have there been any early elections to the National Assembly, which is a sign of certain stabilization of the political system as well as consolidation of the party system. But it does not mean that all the governments have survived entire four-year parliamentary terms.
The government has been most often headed by the leader of the victorious political party (the casus of MDF, MSzP, FIDESZ). There have been four such Prime Ministers out of a total of seven, including one who was first the head of government and only during that period became the leader of the ruling party – Ferenc Gyurcsány. One of the Prime Ministers replaced a deceased head of government late in the parliament’s term – in December 1993. That was the case of Peter Boross, interior minister in the first democratic government of Jozsef Antall. After two years of participation in the government, the politician joined MDF and even became its vice-chairman. One of the Prime Ministers took office following a vote on a constructive no confidence motion – G. Bajnaj at a meeting of the National Assembly on 14 April 2009.
Alternation of power occurred in Hungary already in the first contested election to the National Assembly (1990), in the first period the main sociopolitical division differentiating the political scene involved historical issues, along the lines anticommunist opposition–postcommunist parties. In Central and Eastern European countries, the historical division first lost its importance in Slovakia (in March 1994), with Hungary following suit (July 1994). A governing coalition was then formed between the postcommunist MSzP and the social-liberal SzDSz originating from the Budapest democratic opposition (it formed the parliamentary basis of the cabinet of G. Horn). That coalition was again formed in 2002 (the cabinet of Péter Medgyessy and the first government of Ferenc Gyurcsány) and once more in 2006. In the latter case, however, the coalition did not survive a full term, after the ministers recommended by SzDSz stepped down in 2008 due to their disapproval of the social and economic policy pursued.
Table 2 – The length of a Hungarian PM’s time in office after 1990
No.countryName and surnameThe mandate’s durationFaction1.HungaryViktor Orbán165 monthsFIDESZ2.HungaryFerenc Gyurcsány55 monthsMSzP3.HungaryGyula Horn48 monthsMSzP4.HungaryJózsef Antall43 monthsMDF5.HungaryPéter Medgyessy28 monthsclose to MSzP6.HungaryGordon Bajnaj13 monthsclose to MSzP7.HungaryPéter Boross7 monthsMDF
Source: the author’s compilation
It follows from the data presented in table 2 that Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán has served as Prime Minister for the longest time, more than 165 months in total, or over 13 years and 9 months by April 2020 (taking into account his four terms including the current one, yet to be completed at the time of writing this article). There have been different reasons why the head of government’s mission was terminated – the PM’s faction lost the next parliamentary election four times (P. Boross, G. Horn, V. Orbán, G. Bajnaj), in one case the Prime Minister died in office (in April 1993 – J. Antall), internal conflicts in the MSZP leadership were the reason twice – 2004 – Péter Medgyessy, and five years later – Ferenc Gyurcsány.
The sociodemographic structure of Hungarian heads of government is as follows. Notably, only men have been heads of government, a woman has only served as Deputy Prime Minister. The youngest Prime Minister at the time of his election was V. Orbán, 35 in July 1998, 47 when he took the office of Prime Minister again. The oldest Prime Minister at the time of his election was P. Boross – he was 65 then. Hungary has also had two heads of government in their 40s – Ferenc Gyurcsány (45) and Gordon Bajnaj (41). Those in their 60s included Gyula Horn (62), P. Medgyessy (60). In turn, the first democratic Prime Minister after 1990, J. Antall, was 58 years old at the time of his election.
When it comes to education, it should be noted that all Hungarian PMs completed university studies. Four of them graduated in economics (G. Horn, F. Gyurcsány, G. Bajnaj and P. Medgyessy). In addition, two of them could boast of holding a PhD degree – J. Antall in history and G. Horn in economics. J. Antall (philology and history), V. Orban (law and philosophy of politics) and F. Gyurcsány (pedagogy and economics) studies at two faculties. In the context of their political (as well as government) career, it should be noted that two PMs were members of the communist governments before 1990 – G. Horn headed the department of diplomacy in the last MSZMP cabinet led by M. Nemeth (1989-1990), while P. Medgyessy headed the finance ministry (1987) and was Deputy PM for economic affairs in the governments of K. Gross and M. Nemeth. He was also in charge of the finance ministry again in the cabinet of G. Horn (1996-1998). Those who had experience in government administration before taking office as PMs also include P. Boross (interior minister in the government of J. Antall), F. Gyurcsány (minister of youth and sport in the government of P. Medgyessy) and G. Bajnaj – head of the department of regional development and local government as well as minister of economy and national development in the cabinet of F. Gyurcsány (2007-2009).
Andrzej Antoszewski points out that the potential and real power of Prime Ministers in the discussed region is growing. This stems from several premises – the process is connected with the consolidation of democratic systems, but it has come with an increase in some undemocratic tendencies (the case of Hungary); the position of Prime Minister constitutes a key link in the political system; heading a government is increasingly connected with party leadership which is evidenced by examples not only from the discussed region of the Old Continent. This practice has emerged in full swing in Hungary, beginning with the government of J. Antall. Heads of government who weren’t party leaders at the same time were exceptions. They were appointed during deadlocks in political elites of the ruling factions (usually leftist -MSZP). A particular strengthening of the political position of the head of government can be seen on the example of Viktor Orbán, beginning with his first term after 1998. An increased tendency to consolidate power around the instruments subordinated to the Prime Minister has been seen since 2010. In this context, it is worth quoting an opinion of a columnist familiar with Hungary: Orbán appears to be benefitting from Hungarians being accustomed to strong leaders who rule for many years. If we take into consideration the past century alone, only three leaders have ruled the country over 70 years: the regent Miklós Horthy, the communist first secretary János Kádár, and Orbán. Although only the last of them was elected in democratic elections.
5. Summary
In summary, it should be noted that we can see an evolution of the institution of the Prime Minister in Hungary since 1989. According to the adopted model of government (largely modelled on parliamentarianism, with some exceptions in regulations and constitutional practice since 2012), the position of the head of government is a key post for the leaders of political factions. Ambitious politicians with leadership qualities have sought to head the government, becoming the most influential politicians in the country (the case of Jozsef Antall, Gyula Horn, Viktor Orban). Those who held office for the longest time have spent more than 100 months in the Prime Minister’s chair (the case of V. Orban). The real power of the head of government is at its weakest when the Prime Minister is not in the chair of the ruling party’s leader, which is a direct result of the adopted constitutional and systemic solutions (the case of P. Medgyessy and G. Bajnaj).
A particular strengthening of the Prime Minister’s power has been seen since 2012. It has resulted from several reasons – the victorious political camp, de facto FIDESZ, holding a constitutional majority in the parliament, carrying out a constitutional change which additionally strengthened the position of the government and its head against the parliament, also by reducing the influence of the parliamentary opposition on the legislative and supervisory process towards the cabinet and state administration. As a Hungarian political scientist depicted the dilemma: A two thirds majority means higher expectations of voters and a greater burden of responsibility on the ruling parties. That’s because all the actions will be assessed more strictly when the rulers do not face any serious opposition that could be a counterweight in legislative work. From this point of view, what matters is not the constitutional threshold, but the fact that the rulers can ignore dissenting voices, which may create an impression of a deficit of democracy. The columnist’s conclusion offers an afterthought: While they have held a constitutional majority for a large part of this decade, the country hasn’t seen profound systemic or social changes. The new constitution enacted in 2011 did not fundamentally change the system, but it made institutional corrections in favour of FIDESZ instead. It was similar with the amended electoral law, which was remodelled to benefit the candidates of this party. What merits particular attention is a weakening of the supervisory functions performed by the parliament. It is a core element of the parliamentary cabinet system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1949
Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, H. Donath, Warszawa 1992
Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, W. Brodziński, Warszawa 2002
Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, A. Gwiżdż, Wrocław 1975
Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich. Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1950
Rebirth of democracy. 12 constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Coucil of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 1996
A. Agh, The Politics of Central Europe, London 1998
A. Antal, Le rôle de la Constitution en Hongrie, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001
A. Antoszewski, Partie i systemy partyjne na przełomie wieków, Toruń 2009
A. Antoszewski, Potencjalna i realna władza premiera w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W kręgu nauki o państwie, prawie i polityce. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żmigrodzkiemu, B. Dziemidok-Olszewskiej, W. Sokoła i T. Bichty, Lublin 2012
M. Bankowicz, Transformacja konstytucyjna państw Europy Środkowej, Kraków 2010
W. Brodziński, System konstytucyjny Węgier, Warszawa 2003
Cet etrange post-communisme. Rupture et transitions en Europe central et orientale, G. Mink, J. Szurek, Paris 1992
The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press 1999
N. Chronovski, The Head of State in the Hungarian Constitutional System, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001
R. Chruściak, Wolne i demokratyczne wybory powszechne w 1990 roku w Europie Wschodniej (Bułgaria, Czechosłowacja, Węgry, Rumunia), Transformacja ustrojowa państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, E. Zieliński, Warszawa 1996
Communism in Eastern-Europe, T. Rakowska-Harmstone, London 1979
A. Czyż, S. Kubas, Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej – od Jánosa Kádára do Viktora Orbana, Katowice-Sosnowiec 2011
J. Debreczeni, Viktor Orbán, Warszawa 2015
Demokracje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej, A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Wrocław 1997
H. Donath, Przemiany ustrojowo-prawne 1939-1949, Wrocław 1978
M. E. Ducreux, Czechy i Węgry w monarchii habsburskiej w XVIII-XIX wieku, Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, J. Kłoczowski, Lublin 2000
B. Dziemidok-Olszewska, System polityczny Węgier, Systemy polityczne państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W. Sokół i M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005
B. Dziemidok-Olszewska, T. Bichta, System polityczny Węgier, Systemy polityczne państw bałkańskich, T. Bichta, M. Podolak, Lublin 2012
Emergence of East Central European Paliaments: The First Steps, A. Agh, Budapest 1994
W. Felczak, Historia Węgier, Wrocław 1983
J. Fitzmaurice, Politics and government in the Visegrad countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Basingstoke: Macmillan 2002
M. Grzybowski, Pierwsze wolne wybory parlamentarne: Polska, Czechy, Słowacja: w poszukiwaniu adekwatnego systemu, „Ad Meritum”, 1995, nr 1
F. Hőrcher, Większość konstytucyjna bez opozycji: ciężar czy szansa? Po wyborach 2014 roku, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016
L. Holmes, Post-Communism. An Introduction, Durham 1997
J. Kochanowski, Węgry: od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Seria: Historia państw świata w XX wieku, Warszawa 1997
T. Kopyś, Historia Węgier 1526-1989, Kraków 2018
B. Kovring, Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár, Stanford University 1979
J. R. Nowak, Węgry 1939-1969, Warszawa 1971
W. Orłowski, Republika Węgierska, Ustroje państw współczesnych, tom 2, E. Gdulewicz, Lublin 2002
Post-Communist Transition. Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, A. Bozóki, A. Kőrősényi, G. Schőpflin, London-New York 1992
A.Przeworski, Democracy and the market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, New York 1991
B. Pytlik, Prezydent Węgier, Prezydent w państwach współczesnych. Modernizacja instytucji, J. Osiński, Warszawa 2009
J. Reychman, Dzieje Węgier, Łódź-Warszawa 1963
I. Romsics, Historia Węgier, Poznań 2018
The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, J. Elster, University Of Chicago Press 1996
A. Sadecki, Orbán w koronie, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 2020, nr 16
K. Sobolewska-Myślik, Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej po 1989 roku, Kraków 1999
M. Szabó, Państwo i demokracja: świat jako wola, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016
L. Szamel, Le système étatique de la République Populaire Hongroise, Budapest: Institut des Sciences juridiques et politiques de l’Académie des Sciences de Hongrie et l’Association des Juristes hongrois 1966
T. Szymczak, Ustrój europejskich państw socjalistycznych, Warszawa 1983
Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001
Ustawa Zasadnicza Węgier, wstęp W. Brodziński, Warszawa 2012
J. Wojnicki, Kształtowanie się systemów wielopartyjnych w Europie Środkowowschodniej, Pułtusk 2004;
Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne: zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005
Zagadnienia konstytucjonalizmu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, T. Mołdawa, Warszawa 2003;
B. Zawadzka, Zmiany systemu politycznego w ustawodawstwie państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 1989-1991, Warszawa 1992
E. Zieliński, J. Zieliński, Rządy w państwach Europy, tom 4, Warszawa 2007
END NOTES
See M. Szabó, Państwo i demokracja: świat jako wola, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016, p. 132
See M. E. Ducreux, Czechy i Węgry w monarchii habsburskiej w XVIII-XIX wieku, Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, J. Kłoczowski, Lublin 2000, p. 401; W. Felczak, Historia Węgier, Wrocław 1983
See J. Reychman, Dzieje Węgier, Łódź-Warszawa 1963, p. 61
See T. Kopyś, Historia Węgier 1526-1989, Kraków 2018, p. 303
See I. Romsics, Historia Węgier, Poznań 2018, p. 312 and J. Kochanowski, Węgry: od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Series: Historia państw świata w XX wieku, Warszawa 1997
See H. Donath, Przemiany ustrojowo-prawne 1939-1949, Wrocław 1978, p. 14 et seq. And J. R. Nowak, Węgry 1939-1969, Warszawa 1971, p. 18
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1949, p. 214
Ibidem. See B. Pytlik, Prezydent Republiki Węgierskiej, Prezydent w państwie współczesnym. Modernizacja instytucji, J. Osiński, Warszawa 2009, p. 698
See B. Kovring, Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár, Stanford University 1979, p. 234 et seq.; J. Kochanowski, Węgry: od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. …, op. cit., Communism in Eastern-Europe, T. Rakowska-Harmstone, London 1979
See Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich. Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1950, ps. 44
See T. Szymczak, Ustrój europejskich państw socjalistycznych, Warszawa 1983, p. 256 and L. Szamel, Le système étatique de la République Populaire Hongroise, Budapest: Institut des Sciences juridiques et politiques de l’Académie des Sciences de Hongrie et l’Association des Juristes hongrois 1966
The amendment should be seen in the context of similar amendments in other Central and Eastern European countries in the 1960s and 1970s. See I. Kovács, New elements in the evolution of socialist constitution, Budapest 1968
See Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, A. Gwiżdż, Wrocław 1975 and E. Zieliński, J. Zieliński, Rządy w państwach Europy, Warszawa 2007, p. 283
See Rebirth of democracy. 12 constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Coucil of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 1996 and The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, J. Elster, University Of Chicago Press 1996
See A. Antal, Le rôle de la Constitution en Hongrie, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001, p. 116
ibidem
See W. Brodziński, System konstytucyjny Węgier, Warszawa 2003, p. 55
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, H. Donath, Warszawa 1992
See N. Chronovski, The Head of State in the Hungarian Constitutional System, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001, p. 350
See B. Pytlik, Prezydent Republiki Węgierskiej, Prezydent w państwach współczesnych…, op. cit., p. 706
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, W. Brodziński, Warszawa 2002
ibidem
See B. Dziemidok-Olszewska, System polityczny Węgier, Systemy polityczne państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W. Sokół i M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005, p. 584
See Ustawa zasadnicza Węgier, W. Brodziński, Seria: Konstytucje państw świata, Warszawa 2012
ibidem
Viktor Orbán was twice elected Prime Minister under the new Hungarian constitution – at the first meeting of the National Assembly after the 2014 and 2018 elections. A request to approve the Prime Minister candidate was submitted by the President of the Republic – János Áder. He was elected by the National Assembly on the first ballot.
ibidem
ibidem
A constructive no-confidence motion has been voted on once in the Hungarian political practice – on 14 April 2009, when Gordon Bajnaj was elected to replace Ferenc Gyurcsány (still under the previous constitutional act).
See W. Orłowski, Republika Węgierska, Ustroje państw współczesnych. Tom 2, E. Gdulewicz, Lublin 2002, p. 291. See Emergence of East Central European Paliaments: The First Steps, A. Agh, Budapest 1994
See M. Grzybowski, Pierwsze wolne wybory parlamentarne: Polska, Czechy, Słowacja: w poszukiwaniu adekwatnego systemu, „Ad Meritum”, 1995, nr 1; R. Chruściak, Wolne i demokratyczne wybory powszechne w 1990 roku w Europie Wschodniej (Bułgaria, Czechosłowacja, Węgry, Rumunia), Transformacja ustrojowa państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, E. Zieliński, Warszawa 1996; A. Agh, The Politcs of Central Europe, London 1998; Post-Communist Transition. Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, A. Bozóki, A. Kőrősényi, G. Schőpflin, London-New York 1992
See J. Debreczeni, Viktor Orbán, Warszawa 2015 and https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Orb%C3%A1n
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C3%A9ter_Boross
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Bajnai
See A. Antoszewski, Partie i systemy partyjne na przełomie wieków, Toruń 2009; K. Sobolewska-Myślik, Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej po 1989 roku, Kraków 1999; J. Wojnicki, Kształtowanie się systemów wielopartyjnych w Europie Środkowowschodniej, Pułtusk 2004; Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne: zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005
See A. Czyż, S. Kubas, Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej – od Jánosa Kádára do Viktora Orbana, Katowice-Sosnowiec 2011; J. Fitzmaurice, Politics and government in the Visegrad countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Basingstoke: Macmillan 2002; The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press 1999
This refers to Deputy Prime Ministers dr Mónika Lamperth (in office V 2002-2004) and Kinga Gőncz (VI 2066-IV 2009). Both served in centre-left cabinets formed by MSZP and SZDSZ – P. Medgyessy and F. Gyurcsány.
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%C3%A9gorie:Premier_ministre_de_Hongrie
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%C3%A9gorie:Premier_ministre_de_Hongrie
See A. Antoszewski, Potencjalna i realna władza premiera w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W kręgu nauki o państwie, prawie i polityce. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żmigrodzkiemu, B. Dziemidok-Olszewskiej, W. Sokoła i T. Bichty, Lublin 2012, p. 38
It is worth noting, however, that Viktor Orbán gave up party leadership in May 2000, wishing to focus all his attention on running the government. After the lost election in 2002, he returned to the leadership post in FIDESZ, which he has held up to the present day, combining it from V 2010 with the duties of a ministry head.
See A. Sadecki, Orbán w koronie, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 2020, nr 16, p. 46
See F. Hőrcher, Większość konstytucyjna bez opozycji: ciężar czy szansa? Po wyborach 2014 roku, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016, p. 316
See A. Sadecki, op. cit., p. 46
__
Jacek Wojnicki is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Warsaw University (UW), head of the Department of Political Systems. His research interests are centered around the issues of political and administrative systems in Central Europe and the Balkans. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 27, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
Credits : Gage Skidmore, all rights reserved.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was a slightly unexpected new addition to yesterday’s Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington. US conservative and MAGA audiences have long embraced Hungary’s national-populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as a poster boy for the kind of authoritarian change they seek in the US. Czechia’s mercurial billionaire populist Andrej Babiš has also thrown in his lot with Orbán’s Patriots for Europe alliance and has appeared at a CPAC regional events in Budapest.
But Fico — who has always positioned himself as a tough, socially conservative Central European social democrat — was perhaps the most obvious new figure at yesterday’s Trump-fest in Washington. Socially conservative and nationalist thinking on the fringes of the European left is, of course, nothing new. Nor is the reluctant (and sometimes not so reluctant) conclusion that the left must do business with the radical populist right, or the unhealthy fascination some figures have with Donald Trump and MAGA. Fico has included radical right parties in his coalition governments since the mid-2000s. Czech “conservative socialist” intellectuals have drawn similar conclusions. The British Labour parliamentarian Lord Maurice Glasman, intellectual guru of the Blue Labour movement, is a J.D. Vance admirer and attended Trump’s presidential inauguration.
In his speech, Fico tried to present himself to the US conservative and MAGA audience as a right-wing populist in the mould of Viktor Orbán, completely airbrushing out his left-wing and communist background. It was an unmemorable, wooden speech delivered without much panache — Fico’s English wasn’t quite good enough to reproduce his hard-hitting speaking style in Slovak. It ticked off standard socially conservative themes on gender and rehashed anti-Ukrainian, Kremlin-aligned talking points that Fico shares with Trump.
The speech also struck some odd notes. Listeners probably understood — or cared — little about Fico’s complaints of political “persecution” while in opposition. His evocation of Slovakia’s anti-fascist traditions, by mentioning Slovaks who fought in the US Army in WWII, may have been intended more for a domestic US audience than for CPAC attendees. His brief plea about tariffs toward the end of the speech struck a bathetic note, at odds with the anti-liberal bombast. It only underscored the reality that the existence and interests of small Central and Eastern European countries count for little — and probably don’t register at all — with a Trump administration inclined to sideline the EU entirely and carve up the world into spheres of influence.
As the Slovak press was quick to note, Fico did get a name-check from Trump at CPAC, along with various US state-level politicians and other foreign guests. But the speech is likely to have very limited — if any — political impact and seems oddly belated. Anyone on the US right looking for a Central European representative of MAGA-style populism will continue to favour the better-known, more established, and more ideologically heavy-hitting Orbán, whose total dominance of Hungarian politics means he has real achievements under his belt. Despite aggressively dismantling Slovakia’s public broadcaster and special anti-corruption prosecutor’s office, Fico’s shaky left-nationalist coalition has done far less — and certainly won’t win any prizes from Elon Musk for “moving fast and breaking things.”
With a Trump 2.0 presidency now taking shape, the period when the US MAGA right, in opposition, was interested in foreign models and supportive European leaders is well and truly over. Compared to Orbán — or even Czech President Miloš Zeman, who backed Trump as early as 2016 — Fico has arrived too late to the party.
__
Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 26, 2025By Cristian Preda, University of Bucharest.
This article was first published in the review Comunitatea liberală 1848 on the 4th of March 2025. Link to the original publication, in romanian: Să venim împreună și să facem un push mare – Comunitatea Liberala.
Even if she was in the spotlight for only a few days, Anamaria Gavrilă left us with something very precious. No, I’m not referring to her 112 call asking the police for help to escape the group of journalists who wanted to find out whether she was still running for president. The POT (Partidul Oamenilor Tineri; Romanian Youth’s Party) leader gave us something far more valuable for understanding the era we live in.
The gem lies within the words she uttered in a phone conversation. She was called by Realitatea TV —recently self-proclaimed as « the people’s television »— to explain whether she was withdrawing from the race for Cotroceni. Well, in response to this simple question, Gavrilă said the following: “I know it’s delicious to talk about positions, but this is about making all Romanians, even those from the other side, understand that it’s a difficult situation for Romania. We all need to come together and make a big push to restore constitutional order and freedom in Romania. We all need to go beyond parties and any discussion.”
What caught people’s attention was her use of so-called « Romgleza, » a mix of words from two languages as different as Romanian and English. Expressions like “this is about,” “to come together,” or “to make a big push” reveal an evolution in speech that extends beyond the political sphere. A superficial Americanization of our public life, which has taken place since 1989, has changed the way our fellow citizens express themselves. While the nationalist generation of C. Vadim Tudor and George Pruteanu still upheld the ideal of a correctly spoken Romanian language, the recent nationalist wave writes without diacritics and sprinkles Americanisms among words recorded in the official Romanian dictionary (DEX). The fantasy of a connection to Dacian or Getic origins completes the picture.
But that’s not the most important takeaway from the POT leader’s intervention. What truly matters is her project to establish constitutional order without parties and without too many words. No one has expressed this totalitarian dream more clearly since King Carol II, who abolished political parties by decree and then created the National Renaissance Front, which he legitimized in 1939 through elections where all deputies and senators wore uniforms. Gavrilă is the bearer of a project that undermines democracy.
She asks us to unite “for a big push,” meaning to trample on freedom of association, the right to free speech, and political competition.
No, thank you much, we do not need așa ceva… (No, thank you very much, we don’t need that…; editor’s note).
__
Cristian Preda is a professor in political science at the University of Bucharest and a former MEP (2009-2019). His research areas are large, from political regimes, to political history, elections and party politics. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 26, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
More than a century ago Czechoslovakia’s future founder-president wrote of the Problem of Small Nations in the unfolding European crisis of World War I. For him Central Europe was a region of small and medium sized states and societies, which need balance national sovereignty and identity with integration into larger political and economic structures capable of delivering security and prosperity. Caught between Germany and Russia with an absent isolationist USA, things ultimately didn’t work out so well.
Post-1989 transition and subsequent EU accession and NATO membership seemed finally to solve this dilemma. But recent developments suggest this vision is running of steam. Russia’s aggression, the collapsing reliability of the United States as a security guarantor, and the spread of illiberal populism within the Union itself puts question marks over this ‘post-Wall’ settlement. The EU may not be the democratic soft power superpower that it once was – or, at the very least, that it will need to walk a careful line to adapt to geopolitical changes while preserving its core values.
Shifting centre of gravity
The centre of gravity in European politics may shift away from EU institutions. As security and defense issues become pressing, the rise of “coalitions of the willing” outside formal EU structures may become more common, especially if illiberal governments such as Hungary’s—and potentially Slovakia’s or Czechia’s—can hold up decisions in key areas needing unanimity.
The recalcitrant non-EU Brits with their large military establishment are newly important. Even with the EU there may be compromises on rule of law and liberal values, if populist governments, seeing they can’t have their cake and east, knuckle down and align with the EU’s broader security priorities. Poland’s previous nationalist-populist government, despite democratic backsliding, maintained a strong pro-Ukraine stance. Italy’s far-right led government is similarly positioned.
Central Europe’s influence in shaping these dynamics looks limited. Suddenly, the dynamics of European politics seem all about larger states and great powers – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia – in a way that would have been all too familiar to Masaryk.
Democratic backsliding has been a global – but not a universal trend. Until recent Central Europe was laboratory and testing ground for such illiberal governance. The assumption that institutions would bed down and safeguard democracy proved overly optimistic. And in Central Europe democratic erosion was driven by mainstream political actors rather than radical movements rising from the fringes. But radicalisation and illiberalism post-communist Europe have exhibited a greater ideological fluidity than their Western European counterparts, blending left-wing, right-wing, and technocratic elements in ways that defy simple classification. Contemporary populist movements are less defined by coherent ideological position and more by their ability to fire out memes and adapt messaging based on public opinion.
Things have moved fast in Central Europe because parties and institutions tended to be less deeply rooted in society than their counterparts in Western Europe and – we would have said until a few years back – North America. And they moved fast because the region has lost the compelling narrative that once framed its politics catching up with and emulating Western Europe. However, economic convergence has been slow, and full parity with Western European living standards remains elusive. The European Union and Western societies are no longer perceived as models to be imitated.
Initial enthusiasm for European integration has given way to more critical attitudes, with illiberal actors framing Western Europe as a declining civilization that can no longer serve as a reference point. Hardline national populists are looking to the model of Trump’s second administration as blueprint on how to take down EU institutions and big up “states’ rights” in a ‘reset’ and renamed Union. For USAID read, the European Commission.
Central Europe’s bumpy ride
The political trajectories of Slovakia and Czechia illustrate Central Europe’s bumpy ride in terms of both democratic and undemocratic development. Slovakia’s Fico government, returned in 2023, is taking aggressive steps to undermine independent public institutions. But this isn’t simple one-off crisis of democratic backsliding. Slovakia has been a cycle in which liberal political forces gained power, struggled to govern effectively, and being eventually replaced by resurgent nationalist-populist forces. A similar pattern may be about to occur in Czechia, though with differences in timing and scale as billionaire-populist Andrej Babiš seems set to win upcoming 2025 Czech parliamentary elections.
But with Czechia’s PR system, handsomely topping the poll isn’t enough. The role of smaller parties will be decisive. In 2021 Babiš lost power because small left-wing and populist parties, who would have been his natural coalition partner, missed the five percent threshold – and if they clear it, the high effective thresholds in some regional constituencies can squeeze their representation badly. From the polls none of the smaller Babiš-inclined parties – not Tomio Okamura’s radical right SPD, nor the Communist-backed Enough! bloc, nor the dead-in-the-water Social Democrats, nor right-wing populist Motorists’ Party, led by former racing driver Filip Turek, which has a vibe which is half manosphere, half TV shopping channel, are a sure fire thing.
So Babiš’s ANO movement – operating in pretty much permanent campaign mode – is focused on maximising its vote share by consolidating support a few big constituencies to ramp up its representation without killing off potential allies too much. Babiš, it is rumoured, may also include the Social Democrats (SOCDEM) on his electoral list to expand his vote. Having failed to clinch a deal with the Communist-backed left populist Enough! bloc, SOCDEM may well be grasping for such a lifeline. Some analysts, including me, even wonder if we might gradually end up as Trojan Horse for the eventual “social democratization” of the movement if and when Babiš exits politics.
And minor party allies don’t come through, there’s always a plan B: Babiš could opt not to be prime minister if such a move would secure a coalition agreement with parties from the current governing coalition. ANO’s number two Karel Havlíček is currently the bookies’ second favourite to take over as premier.
Czechia 2025: when Babiš is back?
What would a second ANO-led government mean for Czechia? Illiberal populist parties tend to be much more prepared and determined when they return to power after a period in opposition. However, the extent of their ambitions varies. Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico faced immediate legal and political threats that incentivised a more radical approach to consolidating power.
By contrast, Babiš, who was acquitted in high profile but low value Stork’s Nest case, does not face the same level of personal legal risk. Fico’s premiership has also been shaped by personal experiences, including an assassination attempt, which have contributed to his increasingly paranoid and confrontational political style. That said Babiš bears considerable enmity towards the liberal media and Czech public TV and radio, and like so many political leaders simply bypasses traditional media entirely, using social media and direct communication to engage with supporters while avoiding scrutiny. Czech public media which would be vulnerable to political strong-arming by populist government with requisite parliamentary support.
The last question to the panel was what advice we would leave the young and up-and-coming Czech and Slovak audience for when they to grapple with steering their societies. Our advice: pay attention to local on-the-ground realities and local politics, it provide new avenues for democratic renewal; look for new ideas and political models moving beyond the binary framework of catching up with or rejecting the West; and – very Masarykian – aim to tell the truth and spot when other aren’t.
__
Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 24, 2025By Juraj Marušiak, Institute of Political Science of Slovak Academy of Science, Bratislava.
In addition to the sharp polarisation of society between the government camp and the opposition, which concerns the issue of the state’s relationship with civil society, as well as the attitude towards the EU and the war in Ukraine, Slovak politics has been paralysed by several months of government crisis. The coalition of the two nominally social-democratic parties, Direction – Social Democracy and Voice – Social Democracy , and the national-conservative, pro-Russian Slovak National Party (SNS), formed after the September 2023 parliamentary elections, has only a narrow majority of 79 votes out of 150 in parliament. Slovakia has faced a government crisis since October. However, with the appointment of Samuel Migaľ as the new Minister of Investment, Regional Development, and Informatization on March 19, the government appears to have restored its narrow parliamentary majority (Prezident Slovenskej republiky).
The policies of Robert Fico’s fourth government have been the subject of protests practically since its establishment. Initially, opposition to the government’s approach to cultural institutions and public media, as well as its attempt to gain control over commercial media through economic means, dominated the debate. However, the protests, held regularly every two weeks, escalated after the statements of Tibor Gašpar, the deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, who in January 2025, after a visit to Moscow, together with five other coalition MPs, admitted the possibility of Slovakia’s withdrawal from the EU. Although the more pro-European Hlas-SD coalition rejected such an alternative, as did President Peter Pellegrini, Prime Minister Robert Fico stood up for T. Gašpar. Although Fico also denied any thoughts of Slovakia leaving the EU, the protests have mobilised a significant number of citizens and are taking place not only in large cities such as Bratislava or Košice, but also in smaller towns, including those considered to be electoral strongholds of Smer.
However, the protests themselves do not pose a threat to the government. The destabilisation of the ruling coalition was a much greater risk. The first contradictions were already evident after Peter Pellegrini’s victory as president of the Slovak Republic. When he resigned from his previous post as President of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on June 1, 2024, the most minor coalition partner, the SNS (Slovenská Národná Strana, Slovak national party), began to claim the post, which the Hlas-SD party, founded by Pellegrini, rejected. As a result, the Slovak parliament did not have a speaker until March.
The most vulnerable place is the SNS parliamentary caucus. Representatives of several smaller groupings and independent personalities were on its candidate list, but thanks to the system of preferential voting, they managed to enter the National Council. Thus, it happened that only one member of the ten-member SNS club was a member of the party: the party’s chairman and also the deputy chairman of parliament, Andrej Danko. However, he had only limited possibilities to influence the work of the other « his » MPs for the above reason. Yet in October 2024, a group of three deputies led by Rudolf Huliak, who are members of the National Coalition, a minor far-right party, left the SNS parliamentary club. The reason for their decision was dissatisfaction with SNS staff appointments, especially in the environmental field. Huliak, who defends the interests of hunters and criticises the Green Deal and the work of nature conservationists, was one of the candidates for the post of minister of this department in 2023. Still, his statements questioning Slovakia’s membership of the EU were one of the reasons why he did not become a minister in the end. With the departure of this trio, the SNS parliamentary caucus has effectively disintegrated, as its membership has fallen below eight. It was only saved by the transfer of a close Fico associate, Dušan Muňko, from the Smer-SD club, making the SNS a satellite of the strongest coalition party.
Another problem arose within the Hlas-SD party, as four of its MPs began to question the government’s policy in public and criticized the party’s rapprochement with Smer-SD. In doing so, the Hlas-SD was formed in 2020 by splitting from this party. Members of the group around R. Huliak openly stated that they were demanding a place in the government or positions in the state administration, which would, in practice, mean the recognition of their group as the following coalition partner. This was vehemently opposed by the SNS, on whose list they were elected. However, the dissatisfied Hlas-SD members criticised the government’s policies towards cultural institutions and NGOs, as well as its foreign policy rhetoric.
In particular, the group’s unofficial leader, former journalist Samuel Migaľ, declared the need to support Ukraine’s struggle, thus differentiating himself from the rhetoric of government officials. Some of them refused to support the coalition in the vote to remove the leader of the strongest opposition party, Michal Šimečka, from the post of parliamentary speaker. Although parliament was paralysed several times as rebels from coalition parties failed to speak, preventing the session from starting, key government bills were still passed. At the same time, both groups declared that they did not wish to see the government fall. Migaľ and one other deputy were expelled from the Hlas-SD at the January 24, 2025, working congress, which President Pellegrini attended. Another one left the party on his own and joined Huliak’s group. A fourth declared his loyalty to the Hlas-SD party.
Not only did the opposition discuss possible early elections, but Prime Minister Fico also threatened them. However, this would mean the end of the political activity of both groups of discontented people. At the same time, Fico initiated direct negotiations with the rebels without the mediation of the presidents of SNS and Hlas-SD. He stripped the two smaller coalition partners of their ministries. R. Huliak thus became the new Minister of Sport and Tourism, while S. Migaľ was appointed Minister of Investment, Regional Development, and Informatisation. These nominations were already given to them as Smer nominees. The rebels from the Voice lost their parliamentary mandate, which opened the way for the former head of Migaľ’s ministry, Richard Raši, to become speaker of the parliament. In return for the ministerial seat, Migaľ, of course, overnight forgot all his critical remarks about the current government.
Migaľ announced the founding of a new party. If he takes such a step, a unique phenomenon in Slovakia will emerge – an extra-parliamentary ruling party without a single MP. So far, governments led by Smer have been characterised by a certain degree of professionalism, even in the case of coalition partners. This has been one of the sources of Smer-SD’s political strength. However, the new government appointments have brought into the government individuals without the necessary political and professional competence to hold the positions mentioned above. The members of Migaľ’s group do not even have a relevant political background; in terms of preferential votes and influence in their former party, they were marginal figures until the end of 2024.
Fico used the crisis to strengthen his position in the coalition. At the same time, however, he does not want a complete collapse of his partner parties. He is aware that he will need partners to govern after the next elections. So far, he has criticized the governments of his opponents for organizational instability and incoherence, as the coalitions without Smer-SD participation in 2010-2012 and 2020-2023 were composed of four or more parties. At present, however, his government is a de facto coalition of five parties. The leaders of the partner parties Hlas-SD and SNS feel humiliated. Although they are more concerned with the government’s survival than before, they are making their discontent known. Moreover, they will be in government together with former members of their parties, which will certainly not be a stabilising factor for the current coalition.
Especially the people around S. Migaľ have done the almost impossible. Despite the intense polarisation of Slovak society, both segments of it have managed to agree that they are despised. Solving the government crisis is only putting out an acute fire. Fico’s willingness to make far-reaching concessions to preserve the government’s majority is a signal to other potential coalition MPs that it may be worthwhile to challenge the government and secure ministerial posts in this manner. The government will thus have to spend more and more of its efforts fighting for its own survival rather than implementing policies.
__
Juraj Marušiak is a senior research fellow at the Slovak Academy of Science. His research fields lie in political regimes and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe and contemporary history of Slovakia. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 18, 2025By Ivaylo Dinev, Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Berlin.
On 15 March, the largest protest demonstration in Serbia’s history took place in Belgrade. It was the culmination of the student protests that started after the death of 15 people in the Novi Sad train station collapse. According to police figures, which traditionally give a lower number of protesters, the number of participants was 107.000, while the non-governmental organisation « Arhiv Javnih Skupova », which counts participants at the protests through images and drone videos, put the number between 275.000 and 320.000. According to opposition media, there is talk of as many as half a million or 700.000 people.
If such a protest had occurred in a major Western country, the media would likely frame it as a revolutionary moment — because that is precisely what it is. Yet, beyond its immediate political implications, the Serbian protests set a powerful example for other countries: they demonstrate how people from vastly different social backgrounds and ideologies can unite behind a shared cause. At a time when the political divide between progressive urban centers and more conservative rural areas, or between different generations, is widening across the world, Serbia has defied this trend over the cause of justice, accountability, and transparency. Over the past four months, the protests have not remained confined to the major urban centers Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš. On the contrary, they have spread nationwide, with demonstrations taking place in over 400 towns and villages. Students have deliberately marched from city to city, where they are welcomed in each new location as national heroes. They have purposefully aligned themselves with protest campaigns by workers, pensioners, and teachers, creating a broad-based movement.
A renewed sense of hope and solidarity through large protests.
The result? A rare sense of solidarity and hope. Recent polls show overwhelming public support for the students and their demands, reflecting the depth of the movement’s reach.
However, the outcome of such crisis is not dictated by internal dynamics alone. President Aleksandar Vučić is skilfully leveraging international factors and state resources to maintain his grip on power. Just days ago, Donald Trump Jr. met with Vučić, a visit linked to the Trump family’s long-standing interest in developing a hotel complex in Belgrade. Meanwhile, the European Union’s response has been soft, with no significant criticism from key regional players.
The protesters have already achieved much of what is need for a successful revolution: they have mobilized on a national scale, gained support from diverse social groups, and secured high public legitimacy. Yet, a critical question remains unanswered — what comes next? The protests have made it clear that change is necessary, but no clear alternative to Vučić’s rule has emerged so far. With March 15 likely marking the peak of mobilization, the real challenge now is not just sustaining momentum, but defining a clear path forward during this rare moment of opening of political opportunities.
Protesters at a political crossroads.
Two potential options lie ahead. The first is for students to organize a plenum with representatives from political parties and civil associations to lay the groundwork for a new political movement. The second is for the opposition to form new electoral alliance, drawing on the support of students and other key protest groups. Each option carries its own challenges and opportunities, but one thing is clear: the momentum of the protests must now transform into concrete institutional change.
A comparison with neighbouring Bulgaria highlights both the potential and the challenges ahead for Serbia. While Bulgaria’s 2013 and 2020 mass protests, including a student occupation, led to the creation of new political parties that entered successfully electoral arena, they remained largely confined to Sofia and ultimately resulted in political deadlock. Still, the institutionalization of the protest movement reshaped the party system. The Serbia’s protests have broader public support and social basis, suggesting that if activists successfully channelled the mass protest into political movement, they could drive deeper transformation of the country’s political system.
__
Ivaylo Dinev is a researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), in Berlin where he coordinates the Multi-method data laboratory of the KonKoop research network. He is a specialist of social movements, protests and civil society. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 17, 2025By Cristian Preda, University of Bucharest.
This article was first published in the review Comunitatea liberală 1848 on the 4th of March 2025. Link to the original publication, in romanian: Trei trumpiști români sau poate trei și jumătate – Comunitatea Liberala.
We don’t know if there are, in fact, any Romanian Sorosists, but it’s certain that we have, among us, a few Trumpsters. Indeed, to my knowledge, there has not been a single one of our fellow countrymen who has claimed to be a George Soros. We have, instead, several political figures who claim to be claiming to be the American president. I sketch below some portraits that are most relevant to the political situation we find ourselves in.
The oldest Romanian-speaking Trumpist is undoubtedly Mihail Neamțu. He dedicated a book of more than 300 pages to the leader in the White House, during his first term in office. It’s hard to summarize the portrait painted by the younger admirer, but basically Neamțu saw the American president as a conservative patriot of the Maniu, de Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan series – who love « organic communities » in which the individual is not crushed by a « greedy state ».
Such leaders were opposed to Zelea Codreanu or Putin, exalted exalts who confiscate Orthodoxy and use it in « macabre terrorist actions ». Neamțu’s sympathy for his idol went very far: he forgave his « controversial morality, divorces, adventurous life » because even someone as honorable in the Orthodox synaxarium as Stephen the Great was not prevented from marrying the Turks by « intense sexuality ».
Compared to M. Neamțu, our other trumpians are even more contradictory. Călin Georgescu, for example, who was an environmentalist in his youth, joined the Trump sect as a denouncer of George Soros, even though – as a recent Recorder investigation showed – he has for years used funding provided by the American philanthropist’s foundations, as well as USAID. Georgescu is thus mimicking what Orban Viktor Orban, also a Soros grantee in the 1990s but an outspoken opponent of one of the policies supported by foundations built in the post-communist East, namely sexual tolerance.
Georgescu also defends the « traditional family ». Perhaps the plural « traditional families » should be used – for the pro-Russian leader is on his second marriage. Contrary to what Neamțu said 7-8 years ago, Georgescu has made Putin a model of a leader. He is thus trying to sell to our public a Putinized Trump or, if you prefer, a Trumpized Putin, taking advantage of the White House’s change of attitude towards the Kremlin.
The third Trumpist profile – Victor Ponta – is even more opportunistic. He debuted as a social-democratic hopeful some quarter of a century ago. He climbed the PSD hierarchy by becoming prime minister, then the party’s presidential candidate in 2014. At a time when German Christian Democrats who criticized the government in Bucharest were labeled « fascists ». At the same time, he found the Chinese communists to be a common sight. Later, leaders such as the Serb Alexandr Vučić and Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan, to whom he was an adviser, also seemed to him to be like that.
By 2020, Ponta was happy that Trump had lost the election to Biden and explained to Romanian journalists that Biden could become your friend, while the outgoing president was a capricious man who would only solve your problems if you played golf with him. Four years later, the same Ponta seems to have become a Trumpian after a game of golf with the new occupant of the White House. At least that’s what he bragged about, shortly before announcing he was running. We need to get on the history train. And that’s because PDS voters, Ponta argued, need a different offer than Antonescu.
In short: I am a Trumpian and I want social-democrat votes.
Antonescu is a Trumpian too, but only half. Hence the title of this article. Forced by circumstance to talk about US foreign policy, the government candidate for the seat at the Cotroceni said he was not a Trumpist, but that he wished the Republican had won last year. In another context, he recognized Trump as a role model, praising « the energy, determination and sincerity with which he says: the interests of my country surpass all other interests » and adding that it would be good if Romanians also elected such a man. I am not a Trump fan, but I would like to be something like him: that is pretty much his position.
Neamțu, Georgescu, Ponta and Antonescu set the tone for a concert of smaller, less expressive and generally very vulgar voices, which also come across as expressions of the Trumpism imported through « ourselves ».
From the already famous “marș, mă” (Piss off!), patented by a TV moderator – who is not only a moderator – to the attacks by a former Education Minister and the current Prime Minister on the enigmatic Sorosists, public imprecations consume untold energies. It’s a sign of misdirection. Let’s see who will run after all. For, with 11 days to go before the deadline for filing candidacies, we don’t know who will enter the race.
__
Cristian Preda is a professor in political science at the University of Bucharest and a former MEP (2009-2019). His research areas are large, from political regimes, to political history, elections and party politics. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 17, 2025By Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University.
On March 13, 2025, the Constitutional Court (CC) of Bulgaria declared the election of 17 deputies to the National Assembly in the October 2024 elections illegal. At the same time, it obliged the Central Election Commission (CEC) to recalculate the distribution of mandates in parliament. The decision of the CC was expected for a long time; by law, the court should have ruled within two months, but it was delayed due to the need for detailed expert opinions.
The constitutional case was filed on the basis of five complaints against the announced election results, which the court merged into one, requesting an expert opinion on the results in over 2,200 polling stations (out of a total of nearly 13,000). The Court found that physical ballots were missing in two of the sections (the polling stations) , that some of the paper ballots were visibly filled in with the same handwriting, as well as discrepancies in some protocols with the number of ballots actually cast.
Pavlina Palova, President of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Credits : BTA, all rights reserved.
After the decision, the CEC carried out the recount and 16 new deputies took the place of the canceled deputies, and at the same time a new group of 10 deputies entered the parliament with the lists of the Velichie party. This small party was founded in 2024 with a nationalist and anti-corruption ideology, and has now announced that it will be in opposition.
The early elections of October 2024 were the second in 2024 and the seventh since 2020. After this long series of inconclusive elections for the National Assembly, participation remained relatively low (39% of voters). Eight party lists entered parliament, and the Velichie party then remained below the electoral barrier of 4%, falling short of 21 votes.
Political fragmentation once again made it difficult to form a government majority, and after many attempts (the time frame is relatively limited), a government was formed headed by Rosen Zhelyazkov from the centrе-right GERB party. The majority included also the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the There is Such a People party, a populist party founded in 2016 by an influential showman. The majority is supported by the Aliance for Rights, a party organized after the split of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the party of Muslim and Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The paradox of the government majority is that these parties were among the most vocal critics of GERB’s long-term rule (since 2009), marked by corruption and the use of the prosecutor’s office as a political tool against inconvenient politicians and businessmen.
However, the October 2024 elections were described by many observers as extremely poorly organized and burdened with electoral fraud and vote-rigging. The Constitutional Court decision showed that almost 10,500 members of the Sectional Electoral Commissions (13.5% of all polling stations) were replaced at the last minute with people who had not been previously trained. In many places, fraud was detected with additions to protocols, with filling out ballots on behalf of citizens who did not show up to vote, with additions to protocols by the Sectional Electoral Commission.
On the eve of the Constitutional Court’s decision, however, the prosecution also intervened in the process. Referred to by the head of the state-owned company “Information Services”, which summarizes the votes cast in the elections, the prosecution demanded from the constitutional judges all documents submitted to them in connection with the verification of the legality of the elections. Competent lawyers immediately stated that the prosecution could not control at all the Constitutional Court. Observers saw an attempt to subordinate the Court by the lobby of Delyan Peevski, for years pointed to as an emblem of political corruption in Bulgaria. According to the expertise of the Constitutional Court, from the checked sections, the most votes rejected as illegally counted were cast for the party led by him, which emerged as a result of the split of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).
The reactions of the political parties were not long in coming. The new redistribution of seats reduces the current government majority from 126 to 121 (out of a total of 240 MPs), which greatly complicates the work of the difficultly formed government. The parties in the government reacted differently. GERB leader Boyko Borisov suspected President Rumen Radev of sabotaging the government. BSP and ITN criticized the Constitutional Court for nullifying the results of the sections for which it turned out that the paper ballots cast had disappeared, but there were filled in results in the election protocols. The far-right nationalist party Vazrazhdane as well as other nationalists from the smaller parties in parliament demanded the cancellation of the elections in their entirety and new elections. The right-wing liberal coalition PP-DB, as well as President Radev, sided with the Constitutional Court and were critical of the prosecutor’s office.
From now on, things are in the hands of legislators – whether they will find a good solution to the accumulated problems with the elections, such as the return of machine voting everywhere and taking into account the machine result, as was introduced in 2022, stricter rules for the appointment and training of Sectional Electoral Commission members, and real countermeasures by the prosecutor’s office against election fraud.
__
Antony Todorov is a political scientist and a professor at the New Bulgarian University. He was visiting teacher at ULB (Brussels) and at the University of Bucharest and president of the Bulgarian Political Science Association from 2001 to 2012. His research interests lie in democracy, party politics, and the study of elections. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 14, 2025By Alexandra Iancu, University of Bucharest.
Romanian elections elicited tremendous interest. While the jury is still out on the legal and procedural aspects of the constitutional doctrine of militant democracy (banning candidates on the grounds of illiberal statements and actions, the annulment of the presidential elections), the events unfolding during the past months are, first and foremost, an epic failure of politics. The political appeal surrounding the unexpected electoral surge of Mr. Calin Georgescu, the radical right candidate who seems to challenge half of a century of findings in social sciences, continues to spur numerous hypotheses of how it was possible, through what channels, and with what outcome. The recent ruling of the Romanian Constitutional Court on banning Georgescu from running in the presidential race is final. Mr. Georgescu’s statement in the evening of his candidacy’s invalidation – “my mission has been completed,” the seeds of ‘awakening to consciousness’ had been planted” bears however some bitter truth.
The sole focus on Călin Georgescu is to discard the elephant in the room, namely the leading causes of the recent democratic decline in Romanian politics. One might argue that understanding the origins of the recent political cataclysm could be instrumental in knowing what to do next.
The current crisis results from a long period of micromanaging political stability. For the last four years, the governmental coalition of the Romanian social democrats and liberals secured an ideological, eclectic, yet relatively stable cabinet with a comfortable parliamentary majority. The high levels of fragmentation of the parliamentary opposition, which included both progressive and radical right parties, unable to cooperate in putting pressure on the government, rarely strong-armed the executive. In an overall context of economic hardship (high budgetary deficit and public debt), the electoral erosion of governmental parties was bound to happen.
In this vein, the 2024 electoral year was, first and foremost, an attempt to micro-manage the effects of political uncertainty by controlling the election calendar or testing viable competition formulas. The decision to couple the EP and local elections in June 2024, presented as a measure to ensure domestic stability in a sensitive geopolitical context, bore some fruits. Social democrats and liberals fell below the symbolic – and highly desired – threshold of 50% of the vote (48,5%). Yet, the overlapping local/European electoral calendar acted as a political buffer against the emergence of a sovereigntist/integrationist cleavage (see Iancu chapter on Romania forth.). Radical positions gathered altogether about one-fifth of the vote. It was only a momentary victory. In the fall, a symmetrical attempt to play with the timings of the presidential rounds of elections and the parliamentary electoral calendar backlashed. The governing parties lost support (barely reaching 35% of votes), whereas the self-defined sovereigntist camp broke the glass ceiling of 30%. While the first round of presidential elections influenced parliamentary elections’ results, they also marked the official beginning of a genuine and visible new type of polarization. The political competition in the pro-European camp and the inability to present a common candidate in the electoral race had an ample effect on the competition structure in the first round of the presidential elections. Fourteen candidates competed against each other. Plain calculus on election’s results shows that a center-right alliance or a joint candidate of the governmental coalitions would have easily beaten Georgescu’s score.
Legal conundrum and lack of accountability
Starting with the ruling in October to ban Diana Șoșoacă, a radical right candidate, from the presidential competition on the grounds of the court’s newfound mission to defend constitutional values, to the annulment of the first round of presidential elections and the banning of a second right-wing candidate Călin Georgescu, the Court became the centre of a national and international debate about the legitimacy of its interventions in the electoral processes. For some opinion leaders, the Court raised to the challenge of defending democracy; for others, it self-bootstrapped its jurisdiction. However, a note should be made. The CCR’s activism is far from exceptional, resulting from a long process of individualizing the Court as the most significant problem-solver in Romanian crises, of which there are many and recurrent. This was primarily the effect of a political choice. All major parties/actors took key moments to legitimize their options not politically/democratically but through the Court. While it is true that the Romanian CC rulings spurred an impressive wave of political emotions and polarization, it failed – as usual – in nudging public institutions to assess and become accountable for their action/inaction. For instance, the decision to annul the first round of presidential elections came after intelligence service briefs were declassified, suggesting that Călin Georgescu, a far-right, pro-Russia politician who came in first in the first round of elections (22,94%), benefitted from a mass interference operation carried out from abroad. While Georgescu has been indicted on an extensive list of offenses, no significant sanctions on the institutional failures preceding the campaign or related to the intelligence briefs came to light until the present day. The recent change of the president of the Permanent Electoral Authority seems oddly unfair, as a potential systemic failure of state institutions seems without other notable outcomes. This could only boost conspiracy theories and victimization strategies by the far-right.
The Georgescu model.
Calin Georgescu’s rampant ascent did not come out of the blue. An intensive social media campaign using TikTok contributed to bolstering his public notoriety and challenging preexistent values towards his candidacy. Alleged foreign intervention (which needs substantiation) and a colorful entourage (mercenaries, shady businessmen, etc.) suggest he was not the lonely underdog fighting the system with zero funding. However, while he branded himself as a messianic leader, it is not less worthy of mention that Georgescu masterfully manipulated preexistent political, social, and economic systemic failures.
In the first round of elections, Georgescu voters had been primarily young people (almost a third of the citizens aged 18-24 years old) with medium levels of education, residing mainly in small and medium-sized towns. His electoral backing also received an impressive vote of confidence from the Romanian diaspora. The low electoral score of Georgescu in Bucharest (13%) also suggests a potential regional/economic divide activated in the recent elections (as the Bucharest-Ilfov region is also highly developed from a social and financial standpoint as compared to other areas of the country. However, the economy is only partially to blame for the contemporary hurdles of Romanian politics. Recent forms of polarization have more in common with the symbolism of inequality (and different forms of social marginality) than proper socioeconomic grievances, as the country’s Gini Index has continuously declined.
Two days before the conclusion of the registration process of future candidates for the next presidential elections, the attention continues to turn toward various names and their fitness to govern or to political alliances and projections in terms of the electoral outcomes. From an institutional standpoint, the recent constitutional adjudication was unlikely to yield a different result. However, it is still accurate to say that Georgescu’s ban on running could end up solidifying his legacy. The seeds have been planted. The glorification of the far-right interwar Romanian leaders, the challenge of the Ukrainian-Romanian border status quo, hardline Euroscepticism, and the antimigrant discourse came to the fore for the first time. In the absence of a political program meant to respond to some of the causes of his political success, it is more than likely that his ideas will amplify and increase the identity gap over time. In the short run, it is also expected to create further resentment and surprises at the polls.
__
Alexandra Iancu is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Bucharest. She teaches courses on comparative politics, political parties and ideology, democratization and democratic backsliding. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 13, 2025By Ervin Goci, University of Tirana.
At a time when the world is being torn apart by deep geopolitical and cultural divides, the ruling class in Albania has found a remarkable sense of harmony. Politicians across the divide all seem to be going out of their way to showcase their deep admiration for the new US administration. Rather than clashing over our innumerable pressing domestic issues, the country’s two main opposing political parties — one center-right, called ‘democratic’, and the other left, even called ‘socialist’— seem only to clash over who can fawn more over American President Donald Trump.
On one side, we have Albania’s Democratic Party (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë, PDSH or PD) which holds high the flag of conservatism. With Trump’s coming to power, their populist ideology has rapidly advanced further to the right, to the point that the party’s leader, Sali Berisha, now calls himself the “New Sheriff in Town,” promising a new law for the de-‘Sorosization’ of Albania with penalties for those who push pro-LGBTQI+ agendas in education, while declaring a war on « woke culture. » Berisha presents himself as victim, playing up his political ‘assassination’ while drawing parallels with the American President. But, above all, for the current 2025 election campaign, the Democratic Party has hired one of Trump’s former campaign managers, introducing the slogan « Make Albania Great Again,” directly mirroring the US’s “MAGA — Make America Great Again” sentiment.
On the other side, current Prime Minister Edi Rama, chairman of the Socialist Party (Albanian: Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë, PS or PSSh), has exceptionally granted full development rights of Albania’s Sazan Island to Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, ignoring civilian backlash and public consultation. Rama has begun a pilgrimage across Europe to tell Europeans what a blessing it has been that Trump was elected US President. In mid-February, Rama went to the Munich Security Conference and told European leaders that they did not understand how lucky they were that Trump was re-elected; that the American President was a generous gift from God because his presence would serve to wake up Europe. He repeated the same message for the Spanish media outlet “La Razon,” adding that an internal danger to Europe from immigrants should not be ignored — using verbatim the rhetoric of US Republicans about immigrants – which US Vice President Vance also strongly emphasized at the Munich Conference.
This comes as a shock since one can recall that earlier, in 2016, Rama explicitly said in two media appearances that Trump was a threat to Albanian-American relations, as well as a threat to America itself. Now, he seems to have changed tuned, reflecting the US discourse around the “danger of immigrants,” contradicting his earlier statements on Albania, saying: “we are a nation of immigrants.” Thus, the two political and ideological opposing leaders of Albania both pray and thank God that President Trump is in power. While some smaller political parties continue to fight on behalf of citizens, with regard to the two main parties, now the primary issue of debate is TikTok being shut down. Rama’s SP government says they will ban the social media platform domestically, and Berisha’s DP opposition says they would work immediately to reinstate it upon coming to power. Concerningly, neither side talks about Albania’s economic structures or the oligarchies that have taken over the country. We hear nothing about the challenges tied to over-tourism and environmental degradation, the geopolitical pressure on Kosovo, relationships with Europe, NATO, emigration, education, social services — all pressing issues that citizens would expect be discussed in the face of upcoming elections. Albania’s government has instead become transfixed on impressing the United States, and if it had the surface area and close geographic position of Greenland, we would not be surprised if our two main parties joined forces to propose Albania become the 52nd American state – since Canada has already been unilaterally earmarked as the 51st.
__
Ervin Goci is a researcher at the Department of Journalism and Communication, Faculty of History and Philology of the University of Tirana. His research focuses on communication theories, theories on public space and community engagement. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 10, 2025By Petia Gueorguieva, New Bulgarian Univeristy
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) held its 51st Congress on 15-16 of February 2025. The Congress is the party’s highest permanent body, elected for a four-year term. It is composed of local organizations’ delegates, party leadership and deputies. To 51st Congress, 917 delegates have been nominated, and 872 registered on 15 February 2025, including 43% women and 57% men.
The 51st Congress takes place in challenging times for the party, as its mere survival is at stake following the long-lasting and steady decline since 2009. Over the years, BSP has changed its leadership, programme and statutes, but failed to modernize, renovate and to offer a progressive left alternative to Bulgarian voters and to enlarge its support.
On the contrary, under the leadership of Kornelia Ninova (2016-2024), the BSP suffered splits, internal “wars” between factions and has been transformed into personalized leader party. Critics have been either silenced or expelled from the party. For instance, in February 2023 during the 50th Congress, 14 socialists including one MEP and members of the National council were excluded. In 2017 new party statues were adopted, providing for a direct selection of party president by all party members, abolishing the traditional practice according to which the Congress elects the party chair. New statutes introduced a limitation of mandates for elected party officials and deputies.
Bulgaria has been in protracted political crisis and has organized seven national elections from April 2021 to October 2024. The crisis along with the appearance of new challenger parties have precipitated the decline of BSP, which from main opposition and second parliamentary force has been reduced to fifth parliamentary place. Successive electoral defeats failed to trigger any substantial party change. After the “catastrophic” electoral results, the party leader Ninova announced twice her resignation in 2019, and then in 2021, but she managed to stay at the top position. In September 2020, she ran the first intraparty direct leader election, which she won by an overwhelming majority of party members votes, leaving competitors far behind.
June 2024’s early elections led to another electoral debacle for BSP. The coalition “BSP for Bulgaria” received only 151 560 votes (6,85%) and won 19 seats in the 240 members parliament. Moreover, the party obtained only two MEPs in 2024 European elections, losing three out of the five seats it had in the European Parliament elected in 2019. Consequently, the intraparty opposition and especially the Youth organization pushed Ninova to resign. She has been expelled from the party. The National council has designated the deputy chairman Atanas Zafirov as an interim president of BSP and Borislav Gutsanov at the leadership of the party parliamentary group in the 49th parliament elected in June 2024.
The “post-Ninova” BSP hasn’t achieved an electoral surge at the seventh parliamentary elections held on 27 of October 2024. The coalition “BSP – United Left” received 184 403 votes (7,32%) and 20 MPs. However, the new party leadership has broken with the main party’s strategy of never forming a coalition with Citizens for European development of Bulgaria (GERB). Thus, BSP joined the three-party governmental coalition formed by GERB with the populist party “There is Such a People!”. The new government led by PM Rosen Jeliazkov (GERB) is approved by parliament on January 16th, 2025. The BSP has four ministries – Labour and Social Affairs; Environment and Waters; Youth and Sports, and Regional Development and Public Works. The party interim president Atanas Zafirov is nominated Deputy Prime minister.
51st Congress of the Bulagrian Socialist Party. Credits : Petia Gueorguieva, all rights reserved.
The main tasks of the 51st Congress are the election of the new party chair and new national party’s bodies. But the most important task is to put an end of internal “wars” and to consolidate the organization. The National council proposed to Congress several amendments of party statutes. Consequently, the abrogation of the direct leader selection by all party members has been supported by vast majority of delegates. On the contrary, Congress has rejected the proposal to abolish the limitation of number of mandates for elected positions. Moreover, the delegates have approved the proposal to change the designation “President of the Party” to “President of the National Council” of BSP to underline the collegial party.
The abolition of the direct election of party leader by all members allowed the Congress to proceed with the selection of new president. Initially 17 candidates received nominations and registered to run for the position but a great number of them gradually withdrew their candidacy. Eventually, seven candidates ran the first round on February 16th. The biggest number of delegates’ votes received the interim party president and deputy PM Atanas Zafirov and the minister of Labour and Social Affairs Borislav Gutsanov. Zafirov won the second round with 422 votes against Gutsanov who received 365 votes. The Congress has elected the new National Council and Control Commission. A new executive bureau is taking place too.
The 51st Congress of BSP has discussed a document “New guidelines for the development of BSP”. According to it, the party must clearly define its direction to democratic socialism of the 21st century and to find the pathway toward its revival as a major national political force.
__
Petia Gueorgieva is a senior professor in the Department of Political Science of the New Bulgarian University. Her researches focus on Central and Eastern Europe politics and parties, the process of europeanization and democratization. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 6, 2025By Michel Perottino, Charles University, Prague.
It is an understatement to say that Trump’s arrival was expected: finally, a president who lives up to the expectations of Czech conservatives, especially at a time when the space on the right is becoming particularly (too) full. Trump´s victory was supposed to support certain political lines (put the weaknesses of the European Union into perspective and possibly propose a sovereignist alternative, strengthen climate scepticism, and clarify the need for an austerity policy) but also to see more clearly who is who, and who is with whom on the right. The advantage was a priori on the side of those currently in government, logically on the front line in the event of a direct connection with the White House.
The government coalition Together (Spolu) already included the conservative right (ODS, the Civic Democratic Party), the pro-European right (TOP 09) and the Christian Democrats in need of recognition of “traditional” values (KDU-ČSL). While these three parties each claim to be politically conservative, it is the ODS that best corresponds to the definition of this political family, especially since it is led by Petr Fiala (since 2014 and now Prime Minister), who sometimes cites not only Reagan or Thatcher but other more classical authors. While Fiala is less of a Eurosceptic today, he is nonetheless a constant and systematic critic of the EU and is also one of the main pillars of the conservative alliance in Europe.
Credits: Michel Perottino, all rights reserved.
An ultra-conservative turn took by Babiš since 2022.
ANO 2011, led by Andrej Babiš, had already changed its tune and for some time now they have been presenting themselves as the representatives of the true conservative right, even though the parties in government continue to stigmatize them as being “left”. ANO 2011 and its president had indeed succeeded after the 2017 elections in emptying the social democrats and even the communists of their electoral substance. At that time ANO 2011 was a member of Renew Europe. Nevertheless, Andrej Babiš, let us remember, had made the liberals jump and threatened to exclude him from Renew Europe after his participation in the ultra-conservative CPAC conference organized by V. Orban in Budapest in 2023; a shift already undertaken on the occasion of the Czech presidential campaign in late 2022-early 2023.
Finally, a newcomer broke the bank in the 2024 European elections: the Motorists for themselves (Motoristé sobě), a new Klausian party claiming to be the most unbridled neo-conservatism, between Klaus, Milei and the AfD… against the ODS criticized as being too weak and increasingly distant from its founding father, V. Klaus.
Let us recall that today the ODS is a member of the Party of European Conservatives and Reformists, while ANO 2011 and the Motorists are part of Patriotes.eu. (an affiliation of ANO 2011 that has still not been taken into account in the Czech Republic).
At one time, Petr Fiala’s ODS seemed to be the best candidate for the conservative game by displaying Giorgia Meloni, Mateusz Morawiecki, or Janez Janša as early allies. Let us recall that at the instigation of the latter, the Slovenian (Janša), Polish (Morawiecki) and Czech (Fiala) prime ministers courageously made the first official trip of European representatives to Kyiv, shortly after the start of the Russian aggression, thereby criticizing the EU’s inaction of its representatives with too little legitimacy.
Trump’s victory seemed to be going in the right direction, that of Euro-Atlanticism more Atlanticist than European. That of an Atlanticism clearly posted against Russia and Putin´s aims of reconstituting the Soviet empire (the one that goes all the way to the former borders of the Eastern bloc… including the Czech Republic). Trump’s first kicks in the Euro-Atlantic alliance allowed the hawks to cry victory: finally Europe was backed into a corner, a weak Europe without a leader… In this specific understanding of the change, Trump allowed the EU to take stock of its shortcomings and weaknesses and lead it to finally react. The “time for awareness” would then have come. But Trump has gone much further. For the moment, much too far: humiliating Zelensky in a trap in the Oval Office has already caused doubt among government conservatives. The presentation of Putin as the good guy (and Zelensky as the dictator) and the pause in military aid to Ukraine has caused their consternation.
In doing so, Trump has made his choice between the line of the conservatives in power, fiercely anti-Russian (and pro-American) on the one hand, and on the other that of the partisans of Russian “peace”, those who want immediate peace, to the detriment of the aggressed, as in the case of Babiš or Turek. The facts do not matter: the same appeal to “common sense” hits the mark.
The memories of a heavy past do not matter, that of Munich in 1938, when Czechoslovakia, abandoned by the British and the French, had paid the price of Hitler’s need to expand its living space… with the support of the mediator Mussolini. Without the Czechoslovaks, it must be remembered, absent from these negotiations. The nail was hammered home by the Motorist´s MEP, Turek, who refuses to call Putin an aggressor, because “one cannot offend the one with whom one wants to make a pact”. Turek was also present at the CPAC conference in Washington (as well as one of Fiala’s lieutenants, Alexandr Vondra of the ODS) where he met Musk and reported on the Czech political scene that the Nazi outstretched arm is a symbol of the left (Hitler and his party being left-wing since they were national, but above all “socialists”…).
Trump’s policy, however, comes at a bad time: the Czech Republic will hold its elections to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2025. The support of the Czech population for Ukraine has declined and that for Andrej Babiš and his party is hovering far above that of the Together coalition. The pro-Russian camp is growing stronger, from ANO 2011 to the national « communist » coalition Enough! (Stačilo!), including the Motorists. All the more so since the allies were also making mistakes, even faults, which cast doubt on the vitality of the Union and its ability to overcome the crisis without American support, such as organizing a conference on security in Europe without certain Europeans (for example, E. Macron forgot, among others, to invite the Czechs at the end of February 2025, reinforcing the Eurosceptic stance).
The ODS and Together currently seem to be denied in their very foundation by the one in which they had based many hopes. However, there remains the criticism of Russia as cement and the hope that the United States, which has remained upright in their pro-Israeli position, will reverse the decision to leave Europe to its fate. Luckily for these conservatives, this hope is ultimately a form of realism, since Trump can, as we have seen in recent weeks, change his mind overnight.
« Luckily » for the ODS, there also remain cultural themes, in particular the fight against Islamist terrorism (present in Germany, but so far luckily absent from the Czech Republic), the rejection of « wokeism » and « cancel culture » (just as absent), the call for the free market and an economically strong Czech Republic (benefiting in particular from investments in the Czech arms industry). And, of course, the rejection of any form of environmental policy, in particular that of the hated Green Deal.
The ultra-conservative alternatives, ANO 2011 and Motorists, however, take advantage of their rejection of military spending (it will be necessary to cut social spending on which part of the ANO 2011 electorate depends since 2017 – only one problem here: the decision taken by the current government to buy the very expensive Boeing F-35s) and their pro-Russian foreign policy (slammed on that of R. Fico in Slovakia and V. Orban in Hungary… supposed assurance of cheaper Russian raw materials, oil and gas in particular, among the Klausians a long-known orientation) and beyond the recognition of the right of the strongest, dear to the neo-realists. It is always safer to be on the side of the handle… even if it means changing your speech or even your mind later.
__
Michel Perottino is an associate professor and researcher at Charles University, Prague. He is head of the Political Science Department since 2015, his main research interests are Czech politics and political parties. […]
Lire la suite…