By Sergiu Mișcoiu, Babeș-Bolyai University, interviwed on 29/03/2025.
This interview was first published in adevarul.ro. Link to the original interview in Romanian: De ce nu vrea România să trimită trupe în Ucraina? „Există teama că Rusia ar putea găsi un pretext, un casus belli”| ANALIZA | adevarul.ro.
The coalition of European countries that want to help Ukraine has given up on the idea of sending peacekeeping troops and has come up with a new formula: reassurance troops. Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu explains the difference between the two concepts and the effects for Romania of the refusal to send troops.
The European leaders met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on Thursday, March 27, to discuss ceasefire negotiations and military support for Kiev.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and his Estonian counterpart Hanno Pevkur signaled their willingness to help secure peace in Ukraine with ground troops, at least in theory, Politico reports.
Estonian Defense Minister Pevkur stressed the importance of clarifying the mandate under which the troops will be deployed: “When our troops are there – German, Estonian, French, British troops – then these troops will be fixed there and there will be a temptation for Russia to immobilize us there and then test us elsewhere,” Pevkur said.
However, in the face of Russia’s categorical refusal to accept peacekeeping troops, the Coalition of states willing to help Ukraine has found an alternative – the so-called reassurance troops, which President Macron emphasized are not « peacekeeping troops. »
In the context of maintaining a sustainable truce in Ukraine, which type of troops do you think would be more effective, peacekeeping troops or reassurance troops?
It depends on what the agreement will look like. We are still very far from a peace agreement. We don’t know what it will look like. We don’t know what Russia will accept. These reassurance troops are the option when Russia is not very open to accepting peacekeeping troops.
They appear as a form of guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. But if there is a peace plan and this peace plan works, it would be much more logical to have peacekeeping troops rather than reassurance troops.
It is still very, very early to discuss the plan itself because it has not yet been accepted by Russia, and we do not know its details. For now, Europeans are preparing scenarios and possible options, but it is clear that there is no unanimity regarding the sending of troops, the idea of sending troops in itself, and how they should look and what mandate they should have.
Why was the decision made to move from peacekeeping troops, which were initially discussed, to reassurance troops?
Because of Russia’s outright opposition, which has repeatedly stated that it would not want Western troops on this demarcation territory, and more importantly, Russia has also stated multiple times that it would prefer an international peacekeeping force, meaning troops from other parts of the world, similar to the UN’s « Blue Helmets. » These would have a different mandate and behavior, not having a pro-Ukrainian stance, as Russia suspects Western troops would have had if they were on Ukrainian territory. Therefore, Russia’s hostility towards the presence of troops from NATO member countries, even if they were called peacekeeping troops, led to this second plan, which is much more realistic regarding Ukraine’s security than peacekeeping.
Why do you think some countries, including Romania, do not want to send either reassurance troops or peacekeeping troops?
Because Romania, but also Poland, for example, feels doubly vulnerable, having a large border with Ukraine and thus being at the forefront of exposure to Russia. They fear that, for example, incidents that could occur between peacekeeping troops, in which Romanians or Poles might participate, and the regular army, civilians, or pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine, could lead to drastic measures from Russia. Russia could find a pretext to threaten Romania’s national security. It could be a pretext, a casus belli (reason for war) with Romania and Poland directly, which is much harder to happen with countries that are far away, without a direct border to the conflict zone. I believe this is primarily where this caution comes from.
Do you think this refusal, so to speak, comes with diplomatic costs?
No, I believe this continues the way Romania has had a relationship with the war in Ukraine over time, showing support for Ukraine but maintaining considerable caution regarding direct exposure to the conflict. And consequences, if Romania were the only country in this position, of course, there could be some repercussions from Western countries. But Romania is not alone; for example, the Dutch parliament voted against similar measures, and other countries are in the same situation.
I think the French and the British, who are the main supporters of this « Coalition of the Will, » as it is called, will consider things in a more realistic manner, so I don’t think there will be major consequences.
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Sergiu Mișcoiu is a professor and researcher at Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania, specialist of nation-building processes, political transitions and transformations in CEE and francophone Africa. He is also Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and of the Centre for African Studies.