The questions of the interviewer are in bold. F.L. stands for François Lafond. The questions were sent to François Lafond in April 2025, while the Serbian student social movement was taking place.
First of all, could you briefly introduce yourself and tell us how you came to work in and on the Balkans?
F. L.: In the framework of the French Foreign and Cooperation policies, in order to strengthen its national strategy towards the Western Balkans, the French government has proposed to these countries to put at their disposal “technical experts” to accompany them in their European trajectories.
In 2017, I did apply to a job description offer looking for an “European expert”. Among other candidates, I was chosen to be deployed at Skopje in the cabinet of the Macedonian Deputy prime minister for European Affairs. I stayed in North Macedonia for 4 years, before applying to a new position “Adviser for Public administration Reform” in Serbia in 2021. I spent two years at Belgrade as French expert in the Ministry for Public administration and local collectivities and in cooperation with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA).
Before these two experiences, I was quite “candide” concerning the complex political, economical and social situation of the Western Balkans. However, I am a convinced “European promoter” since my master’s degrees, amplified then by an internship at the European Commission few months after the Berlin Wall fall. After that, all my professional experiences were colored by the European footprint, wherever I was, in France, in Italy or in the UK. The new opportunity to experiment “live” the Southeastern Europe was quite attractive that could be summarized by few questions I had in mind: How the European Union could become a global power if we are not able to fix the situation in the Western Balkans? How less than 18 million inhabitants could stay apart the European well being evolution, with bilateral disputes continuing and allowing potential instability spreading around neighbors, members of the EU?
Regarding the slowness of the integration process, do you think that all the Western Balkan countries could enter the EU at the same time?
F.L.: Let’s start from the current situation in the region. Three countries have started the negotiations (Montenegro in 2012 , Serbia in 2014 and more recently Albania in 2024), one is still stuck in a nationalist/populist mood refusing a new compromise in order to start effectively the negotiations (North Macedonia), one is risking to fall apart as a nation (Bosnia-Herzegovina), one (Kosovo) is candidate but is still not recognized as a sovereign state by five EU members states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). The process is effectively slow for many reasons. The first is due to the exercise in itself, meaning assimilation of the enormous “Acquis Communautaire” (dozen of dozens of thousand pages of technical legislation and rules) to be adopted by the candidate countries in order to integrate in a smooth way the internal market and participate in a fair manner to the different communitarian policies. The second reason is linked to the historical trajectory of these countries, reluctant to share elements of their “fragile” sovereignty to supranational institutions or to implement reforms that may constraint their governance system and well established “local habits”. Democratic reforms, respect of the rule of law, free judiciary branch and independent media, protection of minorities, open market economy are some basics principles which are still a work in progress. In principle, what we consider the “Copenhagen principles” are a pre-condition to open the negotiations, but their real implementation is still far from basic expectations.
As the EU membership acceptance final decision owns to each Member States (signature and then ratification), it seems difficult today that all the Western Balkan countries will get in at the same time. Some EU member states, because of their domestic political situation, may block for one or another reason. And the unanimity principle is applying for any new member. We did it in 2004 for 10 countries and for very specific timely reasons, but it seems improbable that the Members States want to reproduce the same move, without modifying the Treaties and in particular the current decision-making process. Even if the pressure from the exceptional geopolitical situation (Ukraine and Moldova) may change the current common thinking (own merit-based process), the “regatta” method will prevailed and surely be privileged. Montenegro and Albania may be the first next members of the EU in few years time. For the others, it will depend on the determination of the governments to accelerate the reforms…as their singular EU roadmaps are very clear.
In case of a new EU enlargement to the Western Balkan countries, which consequences are to expect for the EU stability and economic activity?
F.L.: Even more than ever, this is difficult to anticipate geopolitical and economic consequences for events that are not certain to happen in the short term. In particular with the current erratic Trump administration. Without drawing comprehensive scenario, let’s be frank: the EU cannot leave this region in the current middle way situation. The credibility of the European Union is closely linked to the stabilization and the prosperity of the Western Balkans. In several domains, such as foreign policy alignment (and sanctions), industrial defense production, migration contribution, economic growth and green transition, we must convince them to be onboard. Even before becoming full EU members, the gradual accession model that is today on the table, promoted by the EU institutions, gives each of the 6 countries the possibility to play a positive role, agreeing on our society model (values) and contributing to the “European strategic autonomy”.
What does the election of Donald Trump change in the Western Balkan region, as internally as with the relations with the EU?
F.L.: As everyone can see in Washington DC, this is presumptuous to anticipate which specific orientation will be taken. But let me give you two elements of contextualization. During his first mandate, for a short period, a special envoy of President Trump (Richard Grenell) was quite active in the region on a “business and economic mode”, without always coordinating with the State department… Most of the European chancelleries were not used to such an expeditive and individualistic approach. Without any concrete result. Secondly, during the Biden Presidency, on the contrary, both side of the Atlantic were working in real syntony and in particular the “EU special representative for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and other regional issues concerning the Western Balkans” was systematically backed by the US administration. The Europeans were in charge, the Americans supporting. Without better success. What will be the attitude of the Trump 2.0? Eventual real estate interests in Albania and in Serbia? Beyond the differentiated taxes, suspended for 90 days, (Serbia, 37%, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 35%, North Macedonia, 33% and the three others 10%), this is still not so clear how much attention the new US administration will give to the Western Balkans, considering the other wars going on elsewhere and its China’s obsession.
According to you, does the EU have the diplomatic strength to soothe the tensions in the region?
F.L.: The EU has an obligation to succeed. There is no alternative. We shall be obliged to change again the enlargement method, as the new methodology decided in 2019 has not given any expected positive result. We may decide to be more “proactive” with each of these countries if the EU membership is still their real national priorities. Why to do not propose for each of them a more constraining roadmap with specific measures to be implemented with a precise timeline and a strictly monthly monitoring by a quartet of EU representatives (a representative from the EP, from the European Commission, from the Court of Justice and from the Strasbourg ECHR)? A step-by-step approach targets with concrete benefits once the reform initially agreed done. Let’s learn from the process that we have used ten years ago to keep in the Eurozone Greece with the economic successes that we can observe today. The “Troika” was not greatly appreciated by citizens (sovereignty lost) and it has constrained Alexis Tsipras and its government to implement difficult measures. But the economic results of such therapy are today undisputable. Let’s be clear: the European Union implies sovereignty shares or sovereignty transfers. This is maybe this issue which has still to be explained and understood in order to make real progress.
How can you describe the position of Serbia as it seems taken between EU integration and Russian influence?
F.L.: A choice needs to be clearly made by the current President Vucic, who is still stuck in the non-alignment posture of the ex-Yugoslavia. The mirage of the third way…Beyond this historical reference, there are also concrete elements that explains this continue determination to do not take any sanctions against Russia, after the start of the war in Ukraine. Orthodox religion brotherhood, gas dependence (and till today a very good price contracted), and more important, Russian UN security council seat… in order to block any international decision on Kosovo’s recognition. President Vucic is entertaining in a permanent way the ambiguity, claiming that EU membership is the priority of Serbia without acting to prove it, and considering that he is the only one in capacity to know what is good for his country. This is why he wants to stay in power as long as possible. A characteristic that all autocrats in the world are sharing…
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François Lafond is the former France’s special counselor in Serbia and has a long experience in working with CEE countries’ administrations. Before that, he was lecturer for the Center of European Studies at Sciences Po (2013-2016) and researcher at the Center Robert Schuman of the European University Institute of Florence (1992-1999).