By Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University.
We usually understand war as organized mass violence, justice as an ethical category, and politics as the “art of the possible” and a way of living together, despite our differences. Their combination is always a great test of reason and morality.
The war in Ukraine has put to the test the world order established as a result of the United Nations’ victory over Nazism and fascism in 1945. This new world order integrates new principles of international law, but above all the principles of respect for human rights and compliance not only with treaties, but also with international norms of justice.
In the decades since, international relations, without changing their anarchical nature (lack of a central world authority), have nevertheless been institutionalized through the creation of a huge number of international organizations and the signing of countless new interstate treaties. In many cases, states honor their obligations, but in many cases, they act selfishly and sometimes behave like brigands outside the law and morality.
The war in Ukraine is discussed more than ever today in light of the glimmering hopes for its termination. One can see the exhaustion of the combatants, fatigue among their allies, even its banalization that always comes after two or three years. How it can end has become the central topic of many political debates.
I think that a certain coldness in analyzing the possibilities for such an end is not only useful, but increasingly imperative. If the debate manages to free itself from categorical statements that do not accept any other point of view, from something like both epistemological and axiological fundamentalism, it is possible to find a solution. A solution that will necessarily be some kind of fragile or temporary balance between the power, the justice, and the possible. Because the biggest risk is that this war will become indefinite or subside like the Korean War (1951-1953), where the North and the South are still officially at war, even though they signed an armistice.
What have we learned about Ukraine?
One of the propaganda theses of Russian nationalists is that Ukraine is an “artificial state”, somehow accidentally created by historical circumstances on a territory previously called Little Russia and New Russia. I would be surprised if any current state is not “artificial”. State borders are not geology, but conquests and politics, there is nothing “natural” about them.
Can we say that the current borders of Ukraine were drawn fairly? After World War II, Ukraine expanded to the west with part of Galicia, Volhynia, Carpathian Ruthenia, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Budzhak, and in 1954, by decision of Nikita Khrushchev, with Crimea. Was it fair? I don’t know, but at the time it was accepted as such, and Ukraine was among the countries most affected during the war (the front passed to the east, and then to the west, twice through the country), as well as in Belarus and Poland. That is why both countries post-soviet during the Cold War each had one additional vote in the UN General Assembly, even though they were part of the USSR (also with one vote).
Today we cannot easily dispute borders – the principle of respecting the territorial integrity of states and their borders is firmly established in international law. Ukraine’s borders are legitimate by virtue of uti possidetis juris – its administrative borders upon the dissolution of the Soviet Federation. Therefore, the history of the creation of the independent Ukrainian state cannot be a basis today for redrawing its borders.
On the other hand, there is the question of who owns certain territories. Formally, each belongs to a certain state, but in fact we must admit that the territories belong primarily to their permanent inhabitants. Therefore, any territorial dispute that does not take into account the demands of the permanent inhabitants of the territory is an imperialist division, but not one seeking a fair solution. And therefore, if today we are talking about Donbass or Crimea, it is best to take into account in the plans what their permanent inhabitants want, and what they want freely, and not under someone’s dictate. Here, however, we are faced with another phenomenon – separatism, but also the right of peoples to self-determination. Is the second always a legitimate argument for the first? Is the demand for separation into an independent state of Catalonia legitimate in a democratic Spain, where the region has de facto autonomy? And what is the difference with Scotland, where they also wanted separation from the United Kingdom, an old democracy. And did the Northern League in Italy legitimately demand the separation of Padania as a separate state? In Catalonia and Padania, separatism was of the rich provinces against the rest, while in Scotland, separatism was for the preservation of the welfare state against the neoliberal policies of the central government. But in all three cases, the central government did not send the army against the separatists but sent negotiators.
In Ukraine, the interim government in 2014, mainly under pressure from the far-right Svoboda party declared an anti-terrorist operation against the protesters in Donbas. Although at that time these separatists only wanted a “special status” for their region, not even autonomy. It is true that they also received support from Russia, which makes them very different from the examples of Catalonia, Padania or Scotland. But the decision of the central government to choose force from the very beginning turned out to be wrong. This only exacerbated the conflict, and the separatists declared two unrecognized republics (April-May 2014). When the then newly elected President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko introduced a special status for Donbas in October 2014, it was already too late. In fact, the war began, although initially between private and irregular military formations (« Azov », « Aydar » and volunteers from « Right Sector » on the Ukrainian side ; separatists and Russian volunteers and mercenaries in “Wagner” on the other side, including Chechens, before becoming interstate war eight years later.
What are the scenarios for the end of the war?
The war in Ukraine can end in different ways. But each of them has a different price, requires different conditions for its implementation. It is the consequences of one or another “end of the war” that are important in order to assess which of them is at least slightly better than the others.
A just peace
It would undoubtedly be fair to restore the territorial integrity of the country, for the aggressor to take responsibility and retaliate for the damage caused, and for those responsible for starting the war to be brought to justice. Fair, but unattainable, unless we just imagine that the war could end in a way described as a “victory for Ukraine”. Unless, also, those supporting Ukraine decide to help by openly entering the war against the Russian Federation, something that no one in the EU, the US, or NATO even thinks about. Because the consequences will be much worse than if this does not happen. Because of the unacceptable maxim “Fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus” (“Let justice be done, even if the world perishes”), because the price of justice cannot be higher than the survival of the world. Therefore, a just peace will probably have to wait for things to change over time.
The military solution
We should not rule out ending the war by force, if one or the other side prevails over the other and imposes its conditions on it. Despite the determination of the Ukrainians to resist aggression, their resources undoubtedly remain limited (demographic, mobilization, territorial) in front of the three times more populous Russian Federation, which also has a significant geographical landscape.
Some observers have already expressed the opinion that if Ukraine had not given up Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory in 1992, it would not have been attacked now. Because it would have used them against the aggressor. Although I cannot imagine a Ukrainian government (unless it is exclusively far-right) that would decide to do this. At least because of the risk of international isolation, but also for moral reasons. Not to mention the risk of retaliation and monstrous consequences far exceeding those of Chernobyl.
Russia, it seems, is also not in a position to prevail, at least not in the near future. Its attempt to achieve immediate success in a week initially failed due to Ukrainian resistance. Unexpected for the Russians, who very wrongly imagined that they would be greeted as “liberators” in Kiev (in some of the abandoned armored personnel carriers to Kiev, parade uniforms were found!).
In military terms, a stalemate is emerging – an impossible victory, at least in the near future, for either side. Thus, the war risks ending like the Korean one – a 70-year-long ceasefire, but an official state of war. This would be a very bad option for Europe, too, because it would be an eternally smoldering war.
Peace through strength
This formula has been repeatedly uttered by European leaders, but they refrain from deciphering it in detail. In short, the idea is that by providing military assistance to Ukraine, it will gain a better position in the negotiations for a ceasefire with Russia. Theoretically, this is justified, but it requires certain conditions. Most importantly, time during which the balance of power will change, but also a certain armistice so that these forces can be accumulated. The risk is that this time will also be used by Russia to accumulate forces. And if military actions continue, then the time may be extended too much and ultimately prove to be insufficient. In essence, the formula envisages the continuation of the war, although possibly with less intensity. Here, another risk is the mutual weakening of the parties, and it is not certain that Ukraine will do so more slowly. Even vice versa, Russia may continue to advance during this time, albeit slowly.
To support Ukraine militarily in order to have the power to negotiate seems completely legitimate from the point of view of justice. But war and military force are legitimate only if they are kept within the limits of proportionality, and therefore – within the limits of justice. Because the end never justifies the means. Weapons usually kill, but some are already banned by international conventions, so the supply to Ukraine of banned anti-personnel mines, banned cluster munitions and the like, even if the other side also uses them, is unacceptable. The border can easily be crossed with chemical and biological weapons (also banned), as well as nuclear ones.
Compromise: not a very fair peace
Now comes the turn of compromises, which can in no way be necessarily and perfectly fair. Initially, there is talk of a ceasefire under certain conditions, later of a lasting peace settlement and a peace treaty. All of this now seems so difficult, and so impossible, although it is some way out of a situation of perpetual war.
Several issues are being discussed: Ukraine’s membership in NATO and in general guarantees for the country’s security, possible territorial changes for Donbas and Crimea, the possibility of deploying peacekeeping forces in Ukraine and along the ceasefire line… But also the prospects for Ukraine’s membership in the EU.
Especially after the election of Donald Trump as US president and his initiative for immediate peace in Ukraine, the country’s membership in NATO no longer seems to be on the agenda. But if it is understandable why Ukraine wants this (security guarantees), it is more difficult to answer why NATO wants it?
Will Ukraine have to cede territories? It is not fair, no doubt, but if it gives it a chance to recover from the war, it can probably be discussed. The issue of territories in general can be postponed, especially for Crimea (which President Zelensky himself has already mentioned).
It is completely unclear what kind of peacekeepers can be deployed between the two armies. Russia categorically rejects this being European forces (they are part of NATO), but allows non-European, for example, Chinese peacekeepers under the UN flag. Whether Ukraine will accept it is not clear. And for how long, how far along this long line of contact? With what forces, how many and for what exactly? Will such a force be able to prevent the renewal of the war? These questions, obviously, cannot be answered now. But isn’t a bad peace better than any war? At least because it prevents new victims and destruction.
What do we do when we cannot achieve justice?
In 2020, the streets of Sofia and other major cities in the country were flooded with civil protests demanding the resignation of then-Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and then-Prosecutor General Ivan Geshev. These demands became a reality, but after seven consecutive parliamentary elections, hardly anyone will confidently say that justice has prevailed. Simply because the supporters of the “end of the GERB model” did not have the resources and power to achieve it. What did society do? Well, it accepted the situation as it is, with the possible hope that in the future it will change (which, in turn, no one can guarantee).
In 1940, Stalin ordered the Red Army to launch an attack on neutral Finland to correct the joint border. This long-standing “hidden war” in Soviet historiography ended with Finnish territorial concessions, which are still valid today. This was not fair at all, especially for the Finns, but they accepted it because after 1945 they had neither the strength nor the support to change it, and because their potential allies were aware that changing this reality by force would produce much more negative results than simply accepting it. But Finland ultimately won because it developed and modernized as a neutral country during the Cold War, although it was a member of NATO.
There are many more examples of wars that ended unjustly, the results of which were accepted by the international community for the above reasons. Did the Korean War end justly – no, because ultimately no one was responsible for starting it. Did the 1967 war in the Middle East, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, as well as the entire city of Jerusalem, end justly, and this continues to this day? No, but the rest accept (for now) the situation, because changing it by force would have worse consequences.
After 1945, Poland was reshaped – it ceded to the Soviet Union the territories that are now western Belarus and western Ukraine, but received in return the former German territories of Pomorie (Pomerania), Śląsk (Lower Silesia) and part of East Prussia. And today’s University of Wrocław (old Breslau) is the successor to the Polish University of Lviv (now a Ukrainian city). Was that fair? I don’t know, but the Poles from Lviv were moved (?) to the west, and the Germans from Śląsk were deported to Germany. Ethnic cleansing? Undoubtedly, but by today’s standards, it seemed acceptable at the time against the backdrop of war-torn Europe, where the blame was entirely attributed to the Germans.
Was the division of Germany after World War II fair? On the one hand, many were convinced at the time that Germans as a whole were to blame for what had happened and had to bear the consequences. But all Germans? And those born after 1945? It is obvious that this division was not fair, it was imposed by new circumstances – the division of Europe and the world according to the logic of the Cold War. But the Germans, and the rest, waited before Germany was reunified. No one even thought of doing this by force, for the reasons above.
What is possible?
This is precisely the challenge for politics, since war (a continuation of politics by other means) and morality (restrictions on politics by other means) cannot achieve the desired goal by themselves – the restoration of justice. At least not immediately.
But moral considerations are always important. Because a war that completely ignores moral restrictions (to spare civilians, not to kill prisoners of war, not to shoot doctors and journalists…), such a war is just mass murder without political goals. And politics that completely ignores moral considerations is simply organized crime. We misread Machiavelli, who advises the ruler not to ignore morality, but to set aside his own moral understandings if this prevents him from preserving the life and well-being of his subjects. Machiavelli preaches a hierarchy of moral commitments, not the abandonment of morality in politics.
Therefore, in seeking solutions to the war in Ukraine, it is good to be aware of two things in order to restore dialogue on this issue. You are not a warmonger if you are concerned about the war ending with a just peace. You are simply putting justice at the forefront, but to some extent underestimating the conditions for its realization and the price for it. You are not encouraging the aggressor if you want an immediate end to the war, even under not very fair conditions. You simply believe that even a bad peace is better than a good war, leaving aside the need for a comprehensive just solution.
The danger in this case is if we are misled by historical analogies. It is true that as humans in new situations we rely on our previous experience. But today, when it is said that we are almost in the situation of 1939, when concessions to Hitler only encouraged him to start a devastating war, this can greatly mislead us. What could the leaders of democracies do then against Hitler’s intentions? A preventive war? Or instead of the “strange war” after September 1, 1939 – a decisive offensive? But they did not have the strength to overcome the “Siegfried Line” on the Rhine and had to pass through neutral Belgium and the Netherlands. Would they have done it, as Hitler later did? I do not believe it.
And today, could a large-scale war in Ukraine have been prevented by a preemptive attack? No, of course. Or the rapid admission of Ukraine to NATO back in 2008? Under Viktor Yanukovych, then Prime Minister of Ukraine? And would this not have immediately provoked an aggressive reaction from Russia and an “agreed-upon occupation”? Who knows, but the risk would be great. The danger is that historical analogies mislead us.
Justice versus real possibilities – an extremely difficult choice, but still a choice. A classic choice between desire and possibilities. It seems that there is no possibility of achieving a truly just peace immediately. But continuing the war is also not just. Where the measure is, I don’t know, but it is worth looking for.
One can start with a ceasefire (a fragile truce), followed by an agreed more permanent truce and distancing of the belligerents, possibly with the deployment of peacekeepers for observation. As well as accepting (for now) the territorial reality (Donbass and Crimea under Russian control). Which does not necessarily mean accepting the situation as just.
This also does not mean not seeking justice. One can even start by simply prosecuting the crimes committed on the ground. Because behind each one, not least, there is a specific perpetrator who cannot justify himself with “I was following orders.” But the crimes on both sides, starting in 2014: not only Bucha, not only the murders of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war, but also the fire in Odessa and the deaths of civilians in Donbass due to the fault of formations such as the Azov or Aidar regiments (then repeatedly indicated by Amnesty International as responsible for this).
An effort for restorative justice for not the most serious crimes is probably also possible. Such organized actions have the chance to restore confidence among the victims, and among public opinion, that some justice is possible after all. Even before the major perpetrators of the tragedy are brought to justice. By the way, if we talk about President Putin’s responsibility, there are probably many Russians in Russia itself who would hold him accountable – they deserve to be helped. This will also contribute to reduce hatred between Ukrainians and Russians – they will remain neighbors and, in the future, they will have to find ways to reconcile (France and Germany can certainly help in this regard with their successful attempt at reconciliation).
Finally, the restoration of Ukraine will come. But if this means that the richest will win again and the poorest will become poorer again, as is usual in such situations, if this turns into “business as usual” for accumulating profits and supporting the oligarchs, it will be very risky. Because it will kill any hope for justice.
Also, effective actions to limit the use of small arms by civilians – after every war, the uncontrolled dissemination of weapons among the population is a great danger to societies. Ukraine is not the USA, but a European country, it can safely adopt legislation like the UK, which is extremely restrictive in this regard.
Ukraine can seriously begin to build a society that will integrate into the EU: a rule of law, respect for minorities (including Russian-speaking ones), resolute isolation of far-right nationalists, respect for diversity. Such a promise could enthuse Ukrainians no less than the defense of their independence.
Imagine!
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Antony Todorov is a political scientist and a professor at the New Bulgarian University. He was visiting teacher at ULB (Brussels) and at the University of Bucharest and president of the Bulgarian Political Science Association from 2001 to 2012. His research interests lie in democracy, party politics, and the study of elections.