Michal Kurylowicz, Jagellonnian University, Krakow

1. What impact do you think the war in Ukraine is having on the political landscape in your country?

The war in Ukraine is significant for Poland’s political landscape in several ways. The conflict in Poland’s close neighborhood has put the issue of national security and defense at the top of the political parties’ election agendas. Mainstream parties (from the right-wing PiS to the Leftist) show cross-party agreement on the need for large expenditures on defense and armaments. The war has also highlighted the position of the defense minister: those who hold this office use it to build their political position (Mirosław Błaszczak, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz) or to strengthen their party on the political scene. However, this entails the risk of greater political responsibility for controversies related to defense policy that are revealed in the media (Russian drones appearing over Poland, cases of corruption in public procurement, relations between civilian and military leadership of the army). The PiS experienced this in 2023 due to the conflict between the defense minister and the army command.

The war in Ukraine has reinforced the evolution of Poles’ political sympathies to the right, to which political parties have adapted. This is linked to the perception of Poland’s raison d’état in the face of war. At the beginning of the conflict, both the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party (until 2023) and the center-left opposition groups considered political and military support for Ukraine to be a guarantee of Poland’s security. Over time, right-wing parties, including PiS, began to distance themselves more and more from Ukraine’s needs, pointing to the need to invest in the Polish military, while demanding reciprocity from Kyiv (e.g., clear recognition of Ukrainian guilt for the Volhynia massacre of 1943). Donald Trump’s attitude is not without significance in this context. His election victory made it easier for Polish right-wing parties to pursue an assertive policy towards Ukraine, following the example of the American president.

The political shift to the right is only occasionally manifested in acceptance of Russian arguments. Rather, it finds expression in nationalist, often anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. This is particularly true of the far-right parties, which are enjoying growing public support: Konfederacja and Konfederacja Korony Polskiej. Against this backdrop, the stagnation of Law and Justice in the polls is due, among other things, to the party’s inconsistent and unclear stance towards Ukraine, ranging from support for the war effort to criticism of Kyiv.

2. What effect has this war had on perceptions of the European Union in your country, both among the general public and among the political elite?

The change in perception of the European Union after 2022 is a function of two broader phenomena. The first is the shift in political sympathies to the right, already observed in Polish society, which was capitalized on by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), the party that won the 2015 elections. The belief that European liberal elites are imposing specific actions on Poland (e.g. migrant relocation) has resonated with right-wing rhetoric about the European Union being dominated by German national interests.

In this context, the war in Ukraine has reinforced Poles’ distrust of the European Union’s existing “eastern” policy. A significant proportion of Poles believe that the war has exposed the naivety of the German and French political elites, who had previously pursued a policy of cooperation with the Russian Federation, contrary to the position of the Central European countries. This is particularly significant because the European Union is often perceived in Poland as a German-French project. The political consequence of this social distrust of European institutions is the growing popularity of right-wing parties. They make particular use of anti-German rhetoric, criticizing German short-sightedness in the context of the construction of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Similar considerations also underlie the negative perception of a common defense policy, which, according to right-wing parties, would lead to the strengthening of the German army and, consequently, to Poland’s loss of sovereignty. The shift in public opinion towards the right is also reflected in the actions of the ruling center-left coalition. Politicians from the Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska) openly express their support for Ukrainian actions aimed at destroying Nord Stream II, and they also support the court’s decision to release individuals accused by the German side of complicity in blowing up the gas pipeline. Assertiveness towards Germany and, more broadly, towards the European Union, is evident in the actions of both the government and the opposition.

The second phenomenon that influences the perception of the European Union’s actions in the context of the war in Ukraine stems from the deep-rooted belief among Poles that Poland’s security is linked to the United States’ activity in NATO and the presence of American soldiers on Polish territory. For this reason, the EU’s actions are perceived as insufficient or secondary to US policy. Subsequent packages of sanctions against Russia and arms deliveries to Ukraine by European countries do not receive as much media coverage as the actions of the United States. The change in US policy since 2025 has not significantly reduced Poles’ trust in the US: Donald Trump’s arguments, demanding a significant increase in military spending by Europe and criticizing European countries’ dependence on Russian energy resources, find fertile ground in Poland. The public believes that Poland’s security is directly proportional to the stability of its alliance with the US and the effectiveness of Polish defense policy.

---

Małgorzata Kaczorowska, University of Warsaw

1. What impact do you think the war in Ukraine is having on the political landscape in Poland?

The war in Ukraine has significantly changed the political situation in Poland, making security issues one of the most important, if not the most important, topics of public debate and domestic and foreign policy. Since February 2022, national defense and sovereignty have once again become the main topics that, to a certain extent, unite most of the political scene, although they are interpreted differently by different ideologies. The former ruling party (2015-2023), Law and Justice (PiS), has used the conflict to reinforce its narrative of Poland as the leading defender of Western civilization and a key player on NATO’s eastern flank. This position legitimized extensive military modernization programs and an unprecedented increase in defense spending, which enjoy broad public support. Poland has become one of the leading countries in terms of defense spending. According to estimates, in 2025 Poland will allocate a record PLN 186.6 billion to defense, which represents 4.7% of GDP. This is 60% higher than in 2023 and 2.5 times higher than in 2022. At the same time, the current ruling parties, and the former opposition parties in 2022 — in particular the Civic Coalition (KO) — presented Poland’s response to the war as evidence of the need for deeper integration within NATO and the European Union, promoting a vision of security based on multilateral cooperation.

It should be emphasized here that the refugee crisis, which arose almost immediately after the outbreak of war in Ukraine and was caused by that war, was a unique test of the resilience of Polish society and state institutions. The initial wave of solidarity and humanitarian mobilization improved Poland’s image on the international stage and, at the same time, temporarily eased polarization within the country. However, this effect was very short-lasting. As the conflict dragged on, issues of economic tensions, inflation, and resource allocation once again sparked political tensions and debate within Polish society. Moreover, the war has strengthened Poland’s geopolitical awareness, shifting public attention from internal disputes to the issue of regional leadership in Central and Eastern Europe. In summary, the war has become a catalyst for the redefinition of Poland’s political identity – from a semi-peripheral member of the EU to a key player significantly shaping the security architecture of Eastern Europe.

2.  What effect has this war had on perceptions of the European Union in your country, both among the general public and among the political elite in Poland?

It should be noted that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has, to some extent, renewed the focus on the European Union and seems to have significantly changed the perception of the European Union by Poles, giving rise to a complex mixture of pragmatism, renewed recognition, and persistent skepticism. Among a significant portion of the population, the EU is increasingly seen as an essential structure for collective security and economic stability, rather than merely a technocratic entity dealing with regulatory issues. The European Union’s coordinated sanctions against Russia and financial aid to Ukraine have highlighted the value of European solidarity, leading to a slight increase in pro-European sentiment even among traditionally Eurosceptic social groups. It is also worth noting the assistance provided by individual European countries, not only EU member states. At the same time, the EU continues to be perceived as an overly bureaucratic and indecisive organization in responding to crises, imposing unreasonable charges on member states, especially among right-wing voters influenced by nationalist narratives.

---

Torbicka Kinga, University of Warsaw

1.  What impact do you think the war in Ukraine is having on the political landscape in your country?

The war in Ukraine has had a profound and multidimensional impact on Poland’s political landscape, redefining both the directions of foreign policy and the internal dynamics of the state. These events have underscored the importance of military and energy security, as well as the necessity of strengthening transatlantic ties. The parliamentary elections of 2023 led to a change of government and the formation of a new coalition (the KO–PSL–PL2050–NL alliance, known as the “October 15 Coalition”). This marked a partial reorientation of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government policy toward Ukraine—an evolution from the more confrontational stance of the previous PiS administration toward one emphasizing dialogue and the institutionalization of cooperation within the frameworks of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, the presidential elections of May 2025, resulting in the victory of Karol Nawrocki, a right-wing candidate, revealed the persistence of power dualism and the ideological polarization of Polish society. This polarization is being reinforced by the growing support for far-right parties such as Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederation for Freedom and Independence) and the Partia Korony Polskiej (Polish Crown Party). The Independence March (November 11, 2025), one of the most visible symbols of this polarization, demonstrated that even the issue of support for Ukraine has become a point of contention among various political and social groups. Although the majority of society and the political class express solidarity with Ukraine, critical voices have emerged, often linked to concerns over migration, labor market competition, access to healthcare, and historical memory. In this context of collective memory—burdened by differing interpretations of events such as the Volhynia massacre—the Russian-Ukrainian war has paradoxically become a unifying factor for both nations. Despite historical grievances, Poland and Ukraine today perceive Russia as a shared existential threat. This shared perception has produced a strategic consensus that transcends partisan divisions: regardless of ideological differences, all major political forces in Poland emphasize the need for a unified and coherent stance toward the Kremlin’s aggressive policies. As a result, the war in Ukraine has reinforced Poland’s awareness of its geopolitical position and the need to pursue an active, solidaristic, and pro-Western security policy. At the same time, it has revealed internal tensions between two competing visions of the state—the national and the liberal-European—which continue to shape public debate and may ultimately determine the future direction of Polish foreign policy.

2. What effect has this war had on perceptions of the European Union in your country, both among the general public and among the political elite?

The war in Ukraine has had a significant impact on the perception of the European Union in Poland—both among the general public and within the political elite. The conflict has highlighted the EU’s role as a political and economic actor while simultaneously exposing the limitations of its crisis-response capabilities. The new ruling coalition, formed after the 2023 parliamentary elections, views the European Union as a strategic political and institutional framework in the face of war, striving to deepen cooperation with the EU, particularly in the areas of defense, energy, and sanctions policy toward Russia. In contrast, the president and parts of the opposition, rooted in more Eurosceptic currents, emphasize the EU’s shortcomings, accusing it of excessive bureaucratization, sluggish decision-making, and insufficient determination in matters of military security. This political camp prioritizes close cooperation with the United States and NATO. Among the public, there is a prevailing belief that, due to its geopolitical position, Poland cannot function outside Western structures. At the same time, support for the idea of a common EU defense policy and deeper integration in the field of security remains moderate. According to a survey commissioned by the European Commission in June 2025, 54 percent of respondents supported the idea of a joint European army, while 53 percent favored closer cooperation in response to the war beyond Poland’s eastern border[1]. In this sense, the conflict in Ukraine has accelerated the redefinition of Polish Euroscepticism—from a narrative of “Brussels interference” toward a form of pragmatic Europeanism grounded in the belief that only collective action within the frameworks of the EU and NATO can effectively deter Russian aggression. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has strengthened the perception of the European Union in Poland not merely as a political and economic project but, above all, as a community of security and values whose significance—both for the elites and for society at large—has acquired a new, existential dimension.

---

^[1] https://cdn-europeanmovementeu.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/EMI-defence-poll-report-v1.5.pdf.