Balkans: EU or not EU?

By Johannes Heidecker, former economic advisor for North Macedonia’s PM.

The Balkans are geographically located in Europe. Is this to say that they should necessarily become part of the EU?  History brings no clear answer, or does it?  A view on the perspectives, opportunities and difficulties.

When we say Europe today, many think “European Union”, the idea of Robert Schuman, Konrad Ade­nauer or Jean Monnet who thought of the German-French reconciliation as a base for peace; of Walter Hallstein, Johan Beyen or Alcide de Gasperi, who pushed for a common market as a stability pole in this union; of Winston Churchill who thought that democracy was a necessary base; of Joseph Bech and Paul-Henri Spaak who started with the BeNeLux Customs Union, of Charles de Gaulle who pushed for more European independence, and of Sicco Mansholt with his focus on a common agricultural policy for food self-sufficiency. Later, the common Euro currency, the Schengen borderless travel, common foreign policy and, a short while ago, the common vaccination research and procurement as well as defense were added to the European idea.

Europe grew from an initial nine countries to encompass the western part of the continent. The South with the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, Cyprus and Malta, the North with Sweden and Finland, and Central Europe from Estonia to Bulgaria followed. In the Balkans however, only Slovenia and Croatia, that have long-time links to the European core, are members.

How come? The former Yugoslavia is said to have tossed the idea around 1990, when the country was economically and politically in a better shape than Baltic countries like Latvia. Internal conflicts however soon prevailed over the interest for Europe. Hardly any politician in the Balkans discusses “peace zones”, “common regional markets” or even “free border crossing”, although this existed within the former Yugoslavia. The names we remember are those of the warlords that launch conflicts, starting with Milošević.

Had it not been concerned with stability, Europe could have lost interest. The intensity of the conflict led to the use of military force in Bosnia & Herzegovina since 1992, in Kosovo since 1999 and in today’s North Macedonia in 2001 – this latter quite successfully as an extension of the turmoil could be avoided with much less effort and damage. Still, in the mind of most Europeans, except maybe for their close neighbors, the word of Bismarck echoes “that the Balkans are not worth the bones of a (German) grenadier.”

It was not always so. In the Roman empire, the area was an integrated part, much less exposed than were Germania and other border areas. The location of the region shifted from central to peripheral with the division of the Roman Empire. The north remained linked to the western countries while the south was connected to today’s Istanbul. This is where the different religions, administrative structures and other elements come from, that distinguish the region from most of the current EU countries. While states with central governments emerged in Western Europe, the Ottoman empire governed by sending local governors, yet allowing local communities to regulate their own affairs in the “millet” system: as long as taxes were paid, a Jewish, Christian or Muslim community could self-govern in whatever social, trade or other matter. If this sounds like a perfect democratic solution, specifically in multi-ethnic situations, it should be kept in mind that the population had to comply with the central government’s requirements as to conscription and tax money, usually taken from those opposing the least resistance, namely the weakest. Confidence in the central government was consequently always low. Meanwhile Westerners were guided by the ideas of enlightenment kings like Frederick of Prussia who saw himself as “first servant of the country” and some base state principles dating back to the Magna Carta in 1215.

Is a different history an obstacle that can be overcome?

Whoever doubts this should remember that there were far more reasons to doubt in 1950 that Germany could become a democracy, that countries like Spain or Greece have had non-democratic governments till a few years before joining the EU and that several members of the EU are still monarchies without this being any issue in their daily political life. A region that combines politically stable countries like the Netherlands with younger democracies like Bulgaria is bound to experience internal tensions.

Let’s rather consider what a common vision may bring as advantages. It is far easier to integrate a culture with similar educational or consumer habits than say, Sri Lanka or Nigeria. As a Russian said “Europe is everywhere where people are moved when listening to Beethoven”.

When the EU decided to integrate Romania, the country was poor and it will remain a net receiver of funds for many years to come. But it currently ranks 12th in the EU by nominal GDP, 7th by purchasing power adjusted GDP, and has grown from an average of 44 to 72 % in the GDP per capita classification of European countries since 2007 when it joined the EU, with potential for more. If we imagine the world as competing regions, today with China and India, tomorrow possibly with South-East Asia, Latin America or Africa, it may be a good idea to integrate the geographically close Balkans in the economic space before they potentially turn into a zone of foreign influence and its load of problems. Europe can look for sunshine in Mauritania to produce hydrogen, but the pipeline connections to the Balkans already exist and the sun there is plentiful, too.

The Balkans are an interesting touristic region at affordable cost and can be reached with far less CO2 than Turkey or Egypt. Albania has just been ranked as the country with the highest tourism growth in the world.

From a security perspective, having Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia as NATO partners may not be the biggest gun in the NATO arsenal, but it is a better contribution than to have to station troops like in Kosovo or Bosnia & Herzegovina. Likewise, the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria is already substantial, be it to extend the rocket shield of Europe against Iran or to produce ammunition to support Ukraine. The first ministries to declare themselves fans of the Western Balkans are the ministries of interior: stable Western Balkans mean less criminality infiltrating the richer European countries, and a better control of migration streams.

And last but not least the Balkans can contribute to science and technical progress. It can be discussed if Tesla was a Croat or a Serb, but he was definitely from the Balkans. Porsche has just recently transferred some of their technology development to Rimac in Croatia, a convincing example of what a sunny climate and an innovative culture can contribute in this field.

It is precisely this very opportunity for enrichment that must guide the European countries when they consider the Balkans. Efforts of enlargement, from Iceland to Ukraine, the integration of Canada into the EEA or an increased cooperation with countries like Morocco should of course be pursued as well. However, geographic proximity induces closeness in many other ways.

At the same time, the European ideas and ideals, so dear to a Western Europe torn by wars and eager not to repeat past errors, still have to be planted, nurtured and grown in the many regions that were not part of this movement 75+ years ago. They cannot be replaced by the technocratic requirements of the ‘acquis’. “One sees clearly only with the heart. What is essential is invisible to the eye” – said Saint-Exupery and this also applies to the European values in the Balkans.

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Johannes Heidecker was manager in different industries with a long-time experience in several Central and Eastern European countries. In the last four years, he was economic advisor to the Prime Minister of North Macedonia.