Central Europe
septembre 8, 2025By László Andor, Secretary General for the Foundation for European Progressive Studies.
From the very start of the Russia—Ukraine war, Hungary has been seen as an outlier in the EU, due to the ostensibly pro-Moscow pivot of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He took decisions against Hungarian arms deliveries to Ukraine, or even just to allow such transports through our country. He did not visit Kyiv for very long (2,5 years after 24/2), contrary to many other leading European politicians. He has waged a propaganda campaign against anti-Russian sanctions and visited Moscow as only EU head of government for the funeral of Mikhail Gorbachev (September 3rd, 2022)s. Not even his foreign minister met his Ukrainian opposite number since the invasion for almost two years, and Orbán’s ferocious media empire peddles pro-Kremlin language in shifts.
However, the case is more complex than just pointing to Orbán as a traitor, or his functioning as an agent, spy or supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Ahead of the Alaska summit of Trump and Putin, Orbán was the only EU leader not signing a common declaration in support of Ukraine’s position, while after the summit Budapest was among the cities mentioned as potential venues for direct Russia-Ukraine talks (potentially with the involvement of the US). Orbán never develops and maintains a policy without knowing that it meets the expectations of his core constituency and potentially a much wider supporter base within Hungary and sometimes beyond. Therefore, the issue in question also requires a thorough analysis from the perspectives of both domestic and international politics.
The significance of the 2022 April elections
The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war coincided with the parliamentary election campaign in Hungary. While foreign policy had not been among the top campaign issues till then, the Russian invasion of Ukraine made a big effect on the Hungarian campaign in the last five weeks and turned out to be decisive factor. Against the unity candidate of the broad opposition Péter Márki-Zay, Orbán successfully played the “peace and security card”, and the pro-government media regularly called the opposition “pro war”.
For many ordinary voters, the understanding was that “Orbán will keep us out of this war while Márki-Zay would drag us into it” and this turned out to be a crucial argument. Some who had considered voting against Orbán decided to vote for him at the last minute and even more decided just to stay at home. The opposition’s narrow focus on gigantic Fidesz corruption and Orbán’s alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin energized committed voters but failed to bring new ones (since these issues appear to be less relevant for ordinary people than material gains).
After the elections, Hungarian politics and public opinion remained divided in Hungary. The most important political office holder of the opposition, Budapest mayor Gergely Karácsony did visit Kyiv with other capital city mayors from the Visegrad countries (January 2023), and also the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine, which for a millennium formed part of Hungary and still is home of a 150 thousand strong ethnic Hungarian community.
From the very start, Fidesz framed this war differently than the US led Western alliance. They have been referring to “the fight of two Slavic nations” (and not to the clash of democracies and autocracies of the planet). While in 2022-23 much of Europe and North America spoke about the necessity of a victory over Russia, Orbán continued to bet on Russia not losing the war (even if not winning it). The importance of the negotiating table as opposed to the battlefield has remained a central piece in the narrative of Orbán and his camp, reflecting continued support for this interpretation among the Fidesz voting base and much of the wider population.
The duplicity of Orbán’s Ukraine policy
The European Union, of which Hungary has been a member since 2004, has played a coordinating role to support Ukraine and sanction Russia from February 2022 onwards. As part of the European Council, Viktor Orbán voted for all sanction packages, and participated in the provision of financial and humanitarian support. What he has not done is supplying military support, which may not matter too much for the total armament effort of Ukraine (due to the size of Hungary), but still is seen as a betrayal, not least because it also is coupled with an ideology that markedly deviates from the EU mainstream.
One could make a defensive point which is that Hungary has not been very famous for having a strong military or a significant armament industry. On the other hand, many supportive governments participated in the collective efforts even with minimal deliveries, ensuring that Ukraine can collect what it needs adding up from small donations if necessary. Gestures also matter, but here even the gesture was denied.
There have been two well-known cases when Orbán managed to alter the content of sanctions packages. One notorious case was about dropping from the list Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, an ardent supporter of Putin’s neo-imperialist strategy. Orbán made the point that sanctions should connect with politics and not with religion. The second case was more material: allowing landlocked countries receiving crude oil from Russia through pipelines to continue to do so, given the greater technical difficulties to switch from one source to another if we compare these mainly landlocked countries (also Czechia, Slovakia and Austria) to others which mostly import through their ports. Hungary also belongs to the camp that draws a red line when it comes to potentially including nuclear cooperation in the list of sanctions.
Orbán also has been mindful that many Hungarians look at the political landscape of neighboring countries, including Ukraine, through the lens of the minority question, which is partly the source of the current conflict. There are many in Hungary who have been paying attention to the concerns of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine who felt culturally oppressed at the time of rising Ukrainian nationalism. For those who are particularly sensitive to this question, it is more difficult to portray the Russo-Ukrainian hostility as a fight between good and evil.
Hungary—Ukraine parallels
Nations close to the territory of Russia have been expected to line up in support of Ukraine out of solidarity based on shared history of having been invaded or oppressed by Russia. Poles recalled the periods when their country was partitioned by Russia and other greater powers. Baltic statelets, with their experience of incorporation in the Russian Empire first and then the Soviet Union, took a position in the frontline of the propaganda war.
However, such expectations may ignore how complex the history of Central Europe has been, which does not necessarily allow for black or white conclusions. Parallels can be drawn between different historic situations, but history does not use copy-paste. Besides, various views on various chapters of history mix with various assessments of the current geopolitical reality, which eventually allows for diverse judgments on the current war.
The general expectation is that smaller nations in the proximity of Russia would share an anti-imperialist sentiment, and out of similarities in their historical experience, they would display similar if not identical reactions. This assumption partly works in the Hungarian context but at the same time there are some contradictory considerations as well. One can draw a parallel between Hungarian and Ukrainian history, but this does not necessarily work out according to the expectations.
The Russian Empire acquired much of the present time Ukrainian territory in the 18th century, just as the Habsburg Empire annexed Hungary fully in the 18th century. In both cases the acquisition of territory took place at the expense of the Ottoman Empire which at that time was in decline. Hungarians fought the Austrians for independence (especially in 1848-49) in vain, but the best time for economic and political development for Hungary came after the famous compromise with the Austrians in 1867. In other words, in Hungarian history the compromise with the oppressor (Austria) is not necessarily a negative concept.
Further, there is a notion in circulation, due to the centrality of Trianon in Hungary’s 20th century history, suggesting that a multiethnic country can be subject of internal and external pressures, and eventually either disintegrate or be partitioned. Treating ethnic minorities badly increases the risk of being destabilized, which was a factor playing a role in the case in Hungary before Trianon, and arguably can also be observed in our time. In the 1990s, it was common to speak in Hungary about the Trianon of Serbia. Similarly, the current war in Ukraine can also be viewed as a Trianon of the Ukrainians, leading to an unjust peace (which the Hungarians had to endure after 1920.
Hungary and Russia in conflict
The recent history of Hungary-Russia relations serves with many examples of conflict. However, this was not always the pattern. When fighting for independence (from Austria, after the expulsion of the Ottomans), Ferenc Rákóczi, the Prince of Transylvania, tried to get support from Tsar Peter I during his liberation war against the Habsburgs (1703-11). One century later, during the Napoleonic wars, the Hungarian nobility decided to stay loyal to Austria, and was in conflict with France, but not with Russia.
When Hungarians launched another war of liberation against the Austrians (1848-49), it was eventually put down with the help of the Russian army, which came to the rescue of the Habsburg Empire fulfilling a commitment they had made in 1814, at the end of the Napoleonic wars. The qualifier here is that the fights against the invading Russians in 1849 took place on territories to the East of the contemporary borders. And the former Prime Minister of Hungary and the 13 generals of the war of liberation were executed by the Austrians, and not the Russians.
In 1945, Hungary was liberated by the Soviet Red Army from the occupation by Nazi Germany. Most Hungarians resented the continuing Soviet occupation and domination in the four decades after WWII. However, Hungarian nationalist views also held that the West “gave us” to the Russians at the Yalta Conference (February 1945). Linked to this is the notion that in 1956 the West (US, Radio Free Europe etc…) encouraged but did not support the armed uprising of Hungarians against the Soviet intervention. This is being compared to current Ukrainian situation, when some Western politicians (like Boris Johnson) explicitly refer to it as a “proxy war”.
The impact of historic experience on contemporary national psyche and political judgment would require deeper research. In case of Hungary, this would need to pay attention not only to the legacy of 1956, but also very important other episodes like the fate of the Hungarian Second Army during World War II. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 (Operation Barbarossa), Hungary’s Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy decided to send a 200 thousand strong Hungarian army to aid the Wehrmacht campaign in the East, more precisely in the battle of Stalingrad. The false promise to these people was that their fight will earn the gratitude of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and secure the return of Hungarian lands lost after World War I.
This was not only a national sacrifice serving the evil interest of someone else, but the cruel behavior of Hungarian soldiers against the Soviet population has been understood to be a factor that could not have generated a benevolent approach from the Soviets subsequently (whether we speak about politicians around negotiating tables or solders occupying our country following the liberation from the Third Reich.
Russia and other evils in Hungarian history
Altogether, the average Hungarian may feel no love or have high opinion on Russians. But in a historic experience of the suppression by Russia (1849) or the Soviet Union (1956) must be put next to other tragedies: the destruction of the Hungarian Second Army, the Holocaust, Trianon, colonization by the Habsburgs, or the 150 years of Ottoman rule. If we compare the damage inflicted by all these cases of foreign intervention or domination, the ones for which the Russians are responsible do not stand out.
Fundamentally, modern Hungarian nationalism has been anti-Austrian, and not anti-Russian (as opposed to the cases of Poland or Western Ukraine). This is reflected in arts, literature and all types of political symbolism. If one looks around at the square outside the Hungarian parliament, you find two main monuments there: one to Count Ferenc Rákóczi (Prince of Transylvania), and another one to Lajos Kossuth (Minister and Regent). Both fought Habsburg colonialism (the first in 1703-11 and the second in 1848-49).
Although Hungary ended up on the wrong side in both World Wars I and II, the national consensus is that we were dragged into WWI by the Austrians and the Germans and duped into WWII by the irredentist double act of Hitler and Horthy. The feeling that it is better to stay away from great power conflict is not new. Whatever the pretext, most Hungarian people are rather suspicious if greater powers want us to be in conflict with this or that adversary.
If you ask Hungarians what the greatest tragedies for us were (in 20th century), more right-wing people would say the outcome of World War One (including Trianon) and more left-wing people would say the outcome of World War Two (including the Holocaust). In first France and in second Germany is implicated. 1956 does not come near in either case what concerns the number of victims or further implications. The memory of 1956 hurts Hungarians but it rarely mobilized large numbers in the last 30 years when celebrating the anti-Soviet uprising has been free. Maybe most Hungarians don’t particularly like Russians, but they put things into perspective and value the opportunities of peaceful and pragmatic cooperation, to the extent that opportunity may come back at all.
The failure of 1956 to mobilize
Various nations may look at a current conflict through their own experience and form an opinion under such influence. Czechs and Slovaks surely recalled the suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring when they saw Putin’s tanks rolling into Ukraine in 2022, which boosted solidarity with Ukraine and resentment against Russia. Hungarians supposedly have similar reactions if they think about 1956. However, such automaticity has not been observed.
In 1956, to invade Hungary and suppress the anti-Stalinist uprising, the Soviet Union invoked the Warsaw Pact that had been signed one year earlier. The intervention of the Soviet army in 1956 cost over 2000 lives and the repression that followed was severe (over 200 people were executed and about 200 thousand emigrated). Western observers are indeed perplexed how can someone so close to Putin, like Orbán, paint himself to be a man of peace? Why Hungarians, with the memory of 1956, do not react stronger against the invasion and show more solidarity with Ukraine? With a closer look at Hungarian history and society, this is not so difficult to understand.
No doubt, the Soviet military intervention to suppress the Hungarian uprising in 1956 was brutal, but the assumption that all further developments would be determined by this dark episode is wrong and delusional. Hungarians had several heroic uprisings in history and 1956 is just one of those. But “golden ages” in Hungarian history were usually linked to compromise with colonial powers (late 19th century and the 1960s—70s). After 1956, those Hungarians who emigrated lived a better life in Western Europe, North America or Australia. But from the early 1960s onwards, Hungarians who stayed also experienced prosperity and step by step liberalization, known as “goulash communism”. For many who grew up in those times the constantly improving living standards are more important than which army is stationed in the country.
It should also be noted that in 1956 the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy declared neutrality of the country (i.e. leaving the Warsaw Pact but not joining anything else), and this remained a national wish until the early 1990s. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the accession to NATO was framed as part of a broader Euro-Atlantic integration. The referendum that took place in 1997 supported NATO membership with an 85.3 % majority, but at a relatively low turnout (49.2 %).
The final reason for 1956 not working particularly well for generating pro-Ukrainian solidarity in Hungary is that the invading Soviet army by definition included many Ukrainians. From a Hungarian perspective, it is hard to see a kind of civilizational difference between Russians and Ukrainians. And while contact with Russian people, except for some tourists, has not been a significant part of the everyday life for Hungarians in the last 30 years, the experience with Ukrainians has been more intense, and is not particularly positive. The reason is partly the extensive Ukrainian shadow economy, but also the increasingly harsh treatment of the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathian region since the start of ethno-nationalist state building.
A broader regional perspective
When in Western Europe people commenting Russia—Ukraine issues mention “Eastern” countries, they typically consider the Polish—Baltic views representative of the Eastern EU member states. This way of thinking is obviously flawed. While Orbán and his government can rightly be considered as an outlier in the EU as a whole (because of their attitude to specific EU actions), but if we only focus on the South-East European region, Orbán appears as a bolder and more influential version of a more general pattern.
Overall, South of the Carpathians peoples are less Russophobic than in the Baltic region. This is due to a few historic reasons. Most importantly, while the Baltic three and partly also Poland were once incorporated in the Russian Empire, this was not the case South of the Carpathian Mountains. South-East Europe does not share the same historic neurosis which is a feature in the Baltic region, and such reminiscences cannot be exploited for militaristic purposes today.
Russia has been a factor in the history of the South-Eastern European region but neither in an outstanding way nor particularly negatively. A lengthy period of history to the South of the Carpathians was characterized by a triple hegemonic rivalry with the Habsburg, the Ottoman and the Russian empires as competitors. For some, and especially for Orthodox Slavs (Serbs and Bulgarians, Russia was not an oppressor but a liberator who helped keeping Catholic or Ottoman invaders or occupiers out. Greeks, in the shadow of the Ottoman Empire (and then Turkey), also looked at Russia with sympathy.
Consequently, people in this region are more skeptical about propagandistic statements which suggests that “Russia would invade the whole of Europe” or that “the Ukrainians are fighting for us all”. From this point of view, Orbán is more pro-Putin than pro-Russia, while the latter would apply to wider segments of the population in Slovakia, Serbia and Bulgaria. Leaders like Slovak prime minister Robert Fico and Croatian president Zoran Milanovic won elections (and reelection) while it was widely known what views they held about Russia and the war in Ukraine.
Presidential elections in Moldova (2024) and Romania (2024-25) also put a divided society on display. The shock result of the aborted 2024 presidential election of Romania should not be explained by a single factor. However, it is almost certain that among several other issues (regional underdevelopment, anti-elitist sentiment, Tik-Tok influence etc…) public aversion to dominant foreign policy posture of wartime Romania in certain parts of the country did help shifting support behind the maverick Călin Georgescu first, and then the far-right AUR leader George Simion in the Spring period.
Besides, the Romanian and Croatian examples also indicate that in (direct) presidential elections many people participate who do not necessarily take part in the parliamentary elections, and the preferences of these incremental voters can differ from the mainstream, especially on foreign policies. In such circumstances the presidential election can be an opportunity to send a message to the entire political class and bring forward a kind of anti-systemic political opinion, without the need to develop such views into proper governmental alternatives.
The question of EU membership
Since 2022 Ukraine has been candidate for EU membership. While this was originally seen as a gesture and an encouragement to fight the war against Russia, the European Commission kept the ball rolling, and political actors including governments had to form a position. Ukraine’s EU membership has also become a major theme in Hungary’s domestic politics. So much that Orbán organized a “national consultation” about the topic. This was to further raise, if possible, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the country, which would help uniting his camp and dividing the opposition.
Ahead of the 2024 European Parliament (and municipal) elections, a new populist party emerged in Hungary (Tisza) under the leadership of a former Fidesz-apparatchik, Péter Magyar. Tisza joined the EPP group in the European Parliament, which has been consistently supportive of the war in Ukraine. Once emerging as a political leader, Magyar quickly visited Ukraine, although his original rhetoric did not deviate much from Orbán’s regarding the origin and the nature of the war (referring to the conflict of two Slavic nations turned into a proxy war).
The reported outcome of Orbán’s consultation was 95% rejection of Ukraine’s EU membership, which Orbán announced on the eve of the European Council meeting in June 2025. This was not a surprise, since in the “information campaign” that accompanied the consultation only the costs and risks of a possible accession were emphasized, and not a word was spoken about the potential benefits for the EU. The rejection of Ukraine’s EU membership became a main theme of Orbán’s subsequent public speeches on foreign policy. In order to deflect this offensive, Magyar has avoided echoing the talks about fast tracking Ukraine’s EU membership. While Fidesz continued to use Ukraine’s future membership in the EU for scaremongering, the whole opposition preferred to sideline the issue hoping that the significance of the issue in domestic political debates would diminish.
Meanwhile inside Ukraine the share of those hoping for NATO and EU membership declined sharply, and the broader EU debate on further Eastern enlargement has also changed. Historically, West European countries developed enlargement fatigue after the 2004 “big bang”, while Easterners remained enthusiastic in order to bring in their aspiring neighbors. In 2022, there was consensus in the EU about turning Ukraine and Moldova into candidates. Since then, the earlier asymmetry seemed to turn around completely.
The West became more pro-enlargement for geopolitical reasons, while neighbors of Ukraine developed some skepticism, basically for 3 reasons. One is the dispute on grain import from Ukraine with potential consequences in case of an accession. The second is the expected effect of Ukraine on the EU budget (especially cohesion and agricultural policy). And the third one is the specific historic grievances (the case of the Volhynian massacres standing out and putting a shadow over Polish-Ukrainian relations). For these reasons, Orbán appears less and less as an outlier what concerns opinions on Ukraine’s future EU membership.
Conclusions
Orbán already on previous occasions claimed that he was not isolated among EU leaders, but he was ahead of the curve. Being an outlier for him is sometimes a badge of honor, as long as he can later say that he is often a maverick who becomes a trend setter at a later stage, once developments prove that he had more foresight than many other leaders.
Since the Alaska meeting of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Orbán has been using this argument again in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. He can claim that he had been right all along, and the outcome of the conflict would be decided at the negotiating table and not the battlefield. He was practically excommunicated for this view, but this is how things turned out – this will now also form part of the Fidesz campaign rhetoric ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections.
All this just means that while history teaches a lot of lessons to all nations, it has a limited power to explain current developments and motivate actions and reactions. Primarily, we should rely on the sense of international law to understand why Vladimir Putin’s aggression has to be condemned, and why the rulers of the Kremlin have to be held responsible for the tremendous bloodshed and destruction in Ukraine as well as its consequences for the rest of Europe and around the world.
As the world is moving towards multipolarity, there are broader lessons here for the wider European public as well. After the Russo-Ukrainian war, the EU will need a new Eastern policy, for security but also to reduce the costs of warfare. Such policy can be informed by historic experience but ideally without propagandistic distortions of Central and Eastern European history. Sound geostrategic analysis would need to play a greater role.
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László Andor is a senior fellow at Hertie School, Berlin and former European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2010-2014). After stepping out of the Commission, he became Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies. […]
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juin 23, 2025By Sarah Bomba, Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), Paris.
The dynamics of institutional transformation in Poland after 1989 have led to a gradual erosion of its democracy. Following 1989, the Polish state increasingly embraced the principles of the free market, characterized by a significant reduction in taxes and a growing influence of multinational corporations on public affairs, all under the guidance of a steadily intensifying policy of deregulation. Neoliberalism in Poland solidified in a dogmatic form, what could be called the « dogma of the infallibility of the free market », where private interests prevail over the common good. An analysis of these evolving processes reveals a reconfiguration of social relations reminiscent of a return to feudalism after 1989, with liberal hegemony evoking the dominance of the Polish nobility over other social classes in the 16th century, resulting in a progressive weakening and marginalization of the state.
Poland is sinking into a political and economic polarization that can be deconstructed by referring to its feudal past, indicative of a class-based dimension in social relations that persists to this day. Critical literature on Polish serfdom, prior to the partitions, allows for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. These writings, which denounce aristocratic domination while highlighting the popular history of Poland, began to emerge about a decade ago and have resonated strongly in a society that, since 1989, has been rewriting its history by marginalizing the working classes, departing from the historical policy of the People’s Republic of Poland, which instead emphasized the central role of peasants and workers in national history and identity. The political and economic dominance of the Polish nobility once led to the weakening of the state and its disappearance. The defence of private interests and the disregard for the common good caused a socio-political breakdown, the echoes of which are still felt today. Currently, we are witnessing the emergence of a new privileged class, that of entrepreneurs and higher middle-class professionals, who follow the American myth of the self-made man, aiming to introduce Western neoliberal standards in Poland.
A new aristocracy: the businessmen
On April 4th, 2025, members of the Sejm voted in favour of reducing health insurance contributions for entrepreneurs. The law aimed to reverse the effects of the « Polski Ład » (Polish Deal), that according to the liberal parties had provoked the closure of companies. The results were as follows: 213 in favor, 190 against, and 25 abstentions. The Law and Justice party, along with the Left, voted against the measure, while the Civic Coalition and liberal groups (including the far-right Konfederacja) supported the new law.
This decision will reduce healthcare funding by around (some experts say about 6 bln) 4.6 billion PLN, at a time when the system is already lacking an estimated 20 billion PLN just to function properly. Medical appointment waiting times stretch over several years. Politically, this decision represents a partial privatization of the healthcare system, with the main beneficiaries being the wealthier segments of the population, even though Poland is one of the EU countries that spends the least on healthcare (around 5% of GDP). Public reaction has also been muted. Poles seem to have adopted a form of fatalism toward the privileges that have gradually taken root since 1989.
Privatization had already begun much earlier with two essential public sectors: housing policy and urban planning. These changes led to capital concentration and strengthened the dominance of property developers, entrepreneurs, and other free-market actors. This process fostered the rise of various oligarchies, including figures such as InPost CEO Rafał Brzoska, whose open involvement in public affairs illustrates this phenomenon. He currently chairs an advisory council to the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, tasked with “deregulating” the Polish economy. Understanding this process requires deconstructing it in light of the systemic transformation and the adoption of radical liberalism, which was, in many ways, an illusory response to the social crises of the late 1980s.
The new political elite, emerging from the Solidarność movement, managed to make a major ideological shift: it ceased fighting on behalf of workers and began speaking in the name of future entrepreneurs and private employers. Polish elites were haunted by the idea that the foundation of democracy lies in the privatization of state assets. This belief was later reflected in the creation of national investment funds, through which public assets were sold off. It is important to emphasize, however, that although liberals advocate against state interference in the private sector, that same sector is still heavily supported by public funds – through various state subsidies, tax advantages over the public sector, and many other liberal mechanisms introduced during the “shock without therapy” of 1989, which continues to this day.
Ideological (yet liberal) polarization and the weakening of the State
The political simplification of economic processes has inevitably led to an ideologization of public interest. Indeed, any regulation that goes against the post-1989 order, particularly measures aiming to strengthen the role of the state in citizens’ lives is perceived as a step backward, a return to a centralized economy. As a result, all political parties, including those with socialist traditions, face ideological pressure and cannot fully express their convictions for fear of being labeled as “communist” by the electorate. This is also why public debate in Poland is dominated by moral issues at the expense of economic or social ones. Heightened discussions on abortion, family, education, or civil unions while deepening polarization, serve as an escape for both voters and elected officials from the old communist–anti-communist dichotomy, although moral issues often reproduce this categorization.
The sacralization of private property has further encouraged behaviors aimed at creating social barriers. These can be explained through the lens of the theory of the leisure class. The social group in question differentiates itself from lower classes through ostentatious consumption and leisure habits, be it clothing style, preferred pastimes, or musical tastes, always exaggerated to display symbolic capital. This is why it is more relevant to analyze Polish capitalism not through the lens of production, but through the lens of consumption, by referencing Veblen’s work The Leisure Class, which seems especially pertinent in the context of the artificial class distinction that emerged in a previously classless society after 1989. As such, any criticism of the lifestyles of the wealthier classes is framed as communist rhetoric, and in extreme cases could even be interpreted as the “promotion of a totalitarian system,” which is prohibited by law.
The phenomenon discussed also raises philosophical questions about Polish politics, particularly regarding its relationship with human rights. One could argue that the post-1989 shifts have called into question the gains associated with second-generation human rights, which focus on state intervention and the welfare state. This concept has been completely equated, especially by post-1989 liberals, with real socialism, seen by many as a totalitarian ideology. Therefore, it can be assumed that in terms of human rights, Poland has become divided between proponents of first-generation rights, which align with the early capitalist phase (essentially Poland’s post-1989 condition), and advocates of third-generation rights, borrowing Guy Haarscher’s term, “the inflation of demands”. This dynamic leads to the state’s withdrawal from public life, promoted not only by the elites but increasingly by citizens who, through their votes, demand stronger liberalism.
In conclusion, attention must be drawn to the issue of representativity, with a significant political role now played by unelected individuals, as well as the growing influence of CEOs in the legislative process – both symptoms of democratic erosion in the country. Poland’s post-1989 transformation profoundly redefined the role of the state, aligning it with a dominant liberal ideology that marginalizes any push for public intervention. This shift has led to ideological polarization, where moral debates obscure deep social and economic divides. By sacralizing private property and glorifying ostentatious consumption, a new social hierarchy has emerged, making any form of critique suspect of communist nostalgia. This retreat of the state is accompanied by a drift in the conception of human rights, increasingly reduced to individualistic logic at the expense of collective solidarity.
We can enumerate among others : Leszczynski Adam, Ludowa Historia Polski; Rauszer Michal, Ludowy antyklerykalizm: niedopowiedziana historia; Janicki Kamil, Panszczyzna Prawdziwa historia polskiego niewolnictwa; Kuciel-Frydryszcak Joanna, Chlopki: opowieść o naszych babkach.
Neoliberalism as a « trickle-down economy » ideology refers to a set of economic beliefs that emphasize free markets, limited government intervention, and the idea that benefits given to the wealthy or businesses will eventually « trickle down » to the rest of society.
It is worth noting here that Law and Justice seems to have changed its voting discipline during the debate (Kaczynski requested a five-minute break). Initially, Law and Justice was in favour of reducing the contribution, but after Marcelina Zawisza’s speech, who is MP from Together Party which is in opposition to the government, they changed their position. Despite this, some of them – but check the voting results – voted in favour.
Pakulski Cezary, « Obnizenie skladki zdrowotnej? Ten plan trzeba porzucić », OKO.Press, 01.10.2024.
Drweski Bruno, Zagrabiona historia Solidarnosci. Został tylko mit, Warsaw 2020, p. 453.
Art. 256. – – Kodeks karny. Dz.U.2025.383 t.j.
This commitment is reflected in the increasing support for Sławomir Mentzen, a central figure of the Konfederacja party, who advocates for a radical stance of total state disengagement. According to him, the state should only intervene in core functions such as security and justice, leaving other areas—healthcare, education, and the economy—to the free play of the market. He rejects any social or redistributive model, associating them with authoritarian socialism. This discourse resonates with a segment of the entrepreneurial youth, seeking autonomy and individual success.
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Sarah Bomba is a Phd student at the INALCO in Paris. Her Phd thesis is about religious lobbyism in Poland after 1989. […]
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mai 16, 2025By Michał Kuryłowicz, Jagiellonian University, Poland.
Poland’s presidential campaign is nearing the end of its first round. Although the most important candidates were already known last December, its full momentum came five weeks before the date of elections. Of course, it was to be expected that it would be the finale of the race for Poland’s presidential seat that would prove to be the most hotly contested, with most excitement expected after the TV debate with all the candidates, set for May 12. In the meantime, however, the previous pattern, in which public television is the platform for exchanging blows between all the candidates, has been broken. Rafal Trzaskowski’s spontaneous proposal to his main rival Karol Nawrocki in early April to duel in front of the cameras of major television centers set off a whole avalanche of unexpected reactions. Other participants in the race reacted immediately, including Szymon Holownia, who announced that he would appear at the site of the planned debate.
Much about the specifics of the Polish elections is told by the location of the said duel. Rafał Trzaskowski invited Karol Nawrocki to Końskie. This small town in central Poland became a symbol of the key to electoral success years ago thanks to the words of one Civic Platform politician: « Elections are won in Końskie. » Arguably, Trzaskowski wanted this way to break the impotence of the liberal elites, who cyclically perform poorly in the provinces, concentrating their support in large agglomerations. However, that idea backfired for several reasons. Already the ignoring of the other eleven candidates was resisted by them and poorly received by the public. What’s more – the private TV station Republika, which is associated with the Law and Justice milieu and was omitted from the duel’s organizers, also protested against the debate formula. Representatives of this medium put forward the idea of organizing their own debate with the participation of all candidates, also in Końskie, two hours before the originally scheduled duel between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki. Trzaskowski thus suffered a double defeat. He ruled himself out of the confrontation on Republika TV (which he accuses, as does Left candidate Magdalena Biejat, of violating journalistic standards), while at the same time he had to accommodate the participation of all other participants in the electoral race in « his » debate. The cumulative confrontation in Konskie, which lasted six hours, turned out to be a victory for the less important participants in the race, especially Szymon Holownia and Magdalena Biejat. These politicians, representing the smaller partners of the current ruling coalition, showed their clarity. Szymon Holownia is helped by his extensive media experience. Magdalena Biejat, on the other hand, was able to take the leftist arguments out of Rafal Trzaskowski’s hands. This is symbolically demonstrated by her taking over the flag of the LGBT community, handed to a restrained Rafał Trzaskowski by Karol Nawrocki during the debate.
The double debate in Konskie has breathed new life into the hitherto inconspicuous campaign of the Law and Justice-backed candidate. Karol Nawrocki has clearly improved his preparation for media appearances in the meantime. Nawrocki’s ratings began to move upward after April 11, approaching Law and Justice’s poll support (25-28%). Thus was resolved the main « duel » of the first stage of the electoral race: who would enter the second round of elections as Rafal Trzaskowski’s challenger. After April 11, it became clear that the potential of the Confederation’s representative, Slawomir Mentzen, had been largely exhausted. His strength has so far been in confronting only those who support him at election meetings, without needing to enter into an argument. However, the final weeks of the campaign were dominated by media interviews and the aforementioned debates, in which Mentzen performed unconvincingly. His ratings dropped to 11-15%. Karol Nawrocki’s staff, on the other hand, clearly buoyed by success in Konskie, tried to discount this success. In late April, Nawrocki traveled to the United States and soon the media circulated a joint photo of him with Donald Trump, who was supposed to say the words to Nawrocki « You’ll win. »
The meetings in Końskie initiated a real festival of live televised debates (by May 12 there were five similar confrontations). Although both Rafal Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki were well prepared for each successive one, the main winner of the aforementioned marathon turned out to be representatives of left-wing groups. Voters only realized in April that there were as many as three candidates of social-democratic groups in the presidential race, who are capable not only of effectively attacking the main contenders, but also of entering into interesting and program-based discussions among themselves. It’s paradoxical, but both Magdalena Biejat, who defended her participation in a government coalition with little of the Left’s program, were received in an authentic way. Adrian Zandberg was similarly persuasive, explaining why his Together (Razem) grouping had moved into opposition to the government. The real hit of the debates turned out to be Joanna Senyszyn, who so far has marginal support. This politician, the oldest participant in the electoral race at 76 years old, paradoxically found it easiest to gain contact with the youngest part of the election observers. As it seems, her strength is the spontaneity of her statements, differentiating her from the smooth formulas served by the main contenders for the presidential seat, prepared by the electoral staffs. Moreover, Joanna Senyszyn clearly dissociates herself from the main axis of the political division of the last two decades (Law and Justice vs. PO). This was evident in the light-heartedness of her reaction to the hostile right-wing audience of the Republic TV debate. It is also evident in the language of her speech, which recalls the less polarized Polish reality before 2005. Paradoxically, therefore, it was Senyszyn, identified with the post-communist left of the 1990s, who managed to win the favor of the youth. She has become the heroine of Internet memes favorable to her, while her statements reach viral status.
At the finish of the campaign, Leftist candidates reach a total of 12-13% support. This does not seem like much, given their number (3), but it is definitely more than their support at the threshold of the campaign and the electoral results of the Left, which was united just a year ago. Clearly, then, the Left is emerging from the long shadow of Donald Tusk’s centrist party.
Both the televised debates and the general focus of the media centers on the election campaign and on individual candidates have restored meaning to discussions about the stability of the Polish political system, based over the past two decades on the rivalry between Civic Platform and Law and Justice, and personally on the showdown between Donald Tusk and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Just before the first round of elections, it seems that the ability to further sustain the aforementioned polarization is diminishing. The candidates of the two largest parties have a combined support of less than 60% of respondents in the polls, while in 2020, for example, the representatives of this duopoly collected a combined 74% of votes in the first round.
This decline is explained to some extent by the fact that it was not the leaders of the two parties who decided to run for the office of president, delegating to this role persons less prominent in public life (in the case of Karol Nawrocki, even a person not directly associated with a political party). The other parties did the same: the Left Party delegated a less recognizable politician, the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) gave up designating its candidate altogether, supporting Szymon Holownia, the leader of the coalition Poland 2050 (Polska 2050), in the election. The Confederation (Konfederacja) did not put forward the far more recognizable Krzysztof Bosak, designating Slawomir Mentzen to take part in the electoral race. Hidden in these decisions is a certain paradox of the Polish political system: presidential elections are the most personalized vote, meanwhile, the head of state thus elected has few significant powers beyond the ability to sign or veto government laws. Thus, presidential elections are every time a test of the popularity of the government and the parties supporting it, and less about a specific candidate.
At the finish of the campaign, political polarization and the tendency to focus attention on the two strongest candidates took the upper hand again. This is well illustrated by the case revealed in recent days by the Onet.pl portal of the apartment, seized years ago in unclear circumstances by Karol Nawrocki from an elderly person, in addition to being in conflict with the law. Of course, this again cast an unfavorable light on the past of the candidate supported by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). At the same time, both major parties allowed the focus of attention on the duel between two individuals and two clashing political visions, relegating to the sidelines the attention of the other candidates, still, after all, participating in the presidential election.
Finally, it is worth paying some attention to the strength of the aforementioned polarization. Polish political scientists, including Rafał Chwedoruk (a professor at the University of Warsaw) point out that the stability of this almost two-party political system is the aftermath of Poland’s good economic situation. Over the past two decades, the country has avoided sudden economic shocks, including the 2008 crisis or the pandemic crisis. The Polish economy is showing resilience even to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has been ongoing for more than three years. In this situation, there is no crisis situation that could shake the support of particular groups of voters for either of the two largest parties and emerge a new party alignment. There is, of course, the « potential » for voter discord with the aforementioned duopoly. This is well illustrated by the successive presidential elections. Beginning in 2005, there was always a candidate who received support above 10% and tried to discount his success by founding a new or strengthening an existing party. This was always accompanied by the hope of breaking the dominance of the Tusk and Kaczynski parties. In 2005 it was Andrzej Lepper of Samoobrona, in 2015 it was Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz ’15), and in 2020 it was Szymon Holownia (Poland 2050). However, the fate of the groupings they created was always similar: they were gradually neutralized and absorbed by the main protagonists of the Polish political scene. If Sunday’s vote differs from the pattern described above, it is mainly due to the lack of a new and fresh candidate who would contend to break up the PIS-PO duopoly. Slawomir Mentzen, who for a while threatened Karol Nawrocki’s second position, has clearly lost in the polls; after all, he represents a grouping that is already well established in the Polish political system. Szymon Holownia, who is given no more than 8% support by polls, has lost the sheen of novelty, an aftermath of his participation in the current government coalition. Perhaps it is for this reason that voter interest in the vote is far lower than in the case of the corresponding election in 2020 or the last parliamentary election of 2023. It is the turnout that is the biggest conundrum of this coming Sunday.
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Michał Kuryłowicz is a researcher at Jagiellonian University, Poland. He is specialized in the study of Eurasian politics with a focus on relations of Eurasian countries towards Russia. He also studies history of the Eurasian region, from Poland to Central Asia. […]
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mai 6, 2025By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.
Introduction
Polish–French relations have been complex and multifaceted throughout the centuries and in recent decades. Despite tensions and differences, both sides have consistently nurtured their relationship, much like in a true friendship. Only after years of efforts, struggles, disputes, misunderstandings, and mutual disappointments does the moment arrive when the value of a partner is recognized and appreciated. After 106 years of official diplomatic relations, a new stage of cooperation between Poland and France is set to be symbolically sealed with the signing of a “Treaty of Friendship” on May 9, 2025, in Nancy, on Europe Day. Friendship treaties play a special role in French foreign policy as a tool for building long-term bilateral ties with key European partners. France has already signed similar treaties with Germany (Élysée Treaty – 1963, Aachen Treaty – 2019), Italy (Quirinal Treaty – 2021), Spain (Barcelona Treaty – 2023), and the United Kingdom (Lancaster House Treaty – 2010, focused mainly on defense and security). The contemporary geopolitical context – the war in Ukraine, a return to great power rivalry, shifting U.S. policy toward Europe, and the unpredictability of decisions by Donald Trump’s administration – makes it clear that both Warsaw and Paris need a « new beginning, » a « new momentum » (as Prime Minister Donald Tusk said), and a « historic agreement » (in the words of President Emmanuel Macron). Today, Poland has become a key strategic partner for France, just as France is for Poland – not only at the state level but also in terms of social and national connections.
A History of « Asymmetry of Feelings »
Bronisław Geremek aptly described Polish–French relations as an « asymmetry of feelings. » For decades, Poland sought recognition and respect from France, often facing disappointment, detachment, or misunderstanding. France, on the other hand, showed periodic interest in Poland but tended to see it as a peripheral country located on the eastern fringes of Europe.
The new treaty will be signed in Nancy – a symbolic place that has long connected the histories of both nations. In 1733, Stanisław Leszczyński became King of Poland, but after the War of the Polish Succession, he lost the throne. Though France attempted to help him regain it, he ultimately returned to France and settled in Nancy as Duke of Lorraine and Bar, where he lived from 1738 to 1766. His daughter Maria married King Louis XV of France and became the mother of future French kings. Leszczyński was also a scholar, writer, translator, and patron of science and culture – a symbol linking Poland and France not only through blood ties but also shared values and intellectual ideals. Polish–French relations fit within the realist paradigm of international relations, in which the state is the central actor. Despite geographic distance, the two countries have forged lasting political, cultural, and social ties. In 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte created the Duchy of Warsaw, rekindling Polish hopes for independence. His romantic involvement with Maria Walewska added a symbolic dimension. In the 19th century, the Great Emigration – including figures such as Chopin, Mickiewicz, and Norwid – strengthened Poland’s intellectual presence in France. During World War I, the Blue Army of General Haller was formed in France (1917).
In the 20th century, one cannot overlook the role of Jerzy Giedroyc and his journal Kultura, the visit of Charles de Gaulle to Poland in 1967, or the founding of the French Civilization Center in Warsaw by Michel Foucault. Despite the challenges of the communist period, France maintained ties with Polish opposition movements and provided humanitarian support (notably through the France–Poland Solidarity Association). In 1989, on the eve of democratic transformation, President François Mitterrand awarded General Wojciech Jaruzelski the Legion of Honour – a politically controversial gesture, but one that symbolized a new chapter in bilateral relations. Two years later, Lech Wałęsa received the same honor.
From Historical Hopes to Strategic Partnership
Diplomatic relations between Poland and France officially began in 1919. In 1921, the first declaration of friendship was signed in Paris, including a military protocol with a mutual assistance clause in case of German aggression. Another milestone was the Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity signed on April 9, 1991, in Paris. This treaty marked a breakthrough, signed during a period of major geopolitical transformation – after the Cold War and the collapse of the Yalta system. It gave new quality to bilateral relations by formalizing a strategic partnership rooted in democratic values, solidarity, and multidimensional cooperation. It had a long-lasting impact on the direction and pace of bilateral relations. Above all, it symbolized Poland’s return to the family of Western democracies and France’s willingness to act as a patron and partner in this historic transition.
Subsequent agreements followed in areas such as internal affairs (1996), defense (2002), culture and education (2004), science and technology (2008), and classified information (2008). Since 2004, regular intergovernmental consultations have taken place. Another important step was the Polish–French Strategic Partnership (2008), which was renewed and updated in 2013. During President Emmanuel Macron’s first official visit to Warsaw in 2020, bilateral relations were reaffirmed through a new cooperation program. This was followed by a visit to Paris by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in 2021 and celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Weimar Triangle. Macron returned to Warsaw in 2024, and bilateral ministerial exchanges – particularly in European affairs, defense, and foreign policy – intensified.
In the 1990s, France adopted the “PECO” concept (Central and Eastern European Countries), viewing Poland as a regional leader. The Weimar Triangle, launched in 1991, aimed to support integration with Western institutions. Not all French politicians were supportive – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was skeptical of EU enlargement, though François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac gradually shifted France’s position. Poland joined NATO in 1999. In 2003, it signed the so-called « Letter of Eight, » supporting the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which provoked a harsh reaction from France – Jacques Chirac criticized Poland for its lack of judgment, straining relations. Another source of tension was the Bolkestein Directive and the “Polish plumber” stereotype in French debates on the EU labor market. Nonetheless, cooperation continued. The 2008 strategic partnership was updated in 2013. In 2016, Poland withdrew from the planned purchase of Caracale helicopters manufactured by Airbus France, leading to the cancellation of President François Hollande’s visit to Warsaw – a gesture perceived in Paris as a breach of trust. In 2020, President Macron resumed political dialogue during a visit to Warsaw, which was repeated in 2024 amid intensified ministerial contacts.
Cooperation Despite Differences: Political, Economic, and Cultural Dimensions
Polish–French cooperation spans multiple domains. France is Poland’s fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest source of imports. Poland is France’s 10th-largest trading partner and the largest in Central Europe. In 2016, Polish investments in France reached €660 million, and more than 1,300 companies with French capital operated in Poland. Regional cooperation (e.g., twin cities) and inter-institutional ties are also robust.
In the cultural and educational spheres, relations remain strong. Poland has long been inspired by francophonie. Institutions such as the Institut Français, Alliance Française, and the Center for French Culture and Francophone Studies at the University of Warsaw actively promote the French language and culture. Poland has held observer status in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie since 1997. Academic exchanges (e.g., PHC Polonium), joint degrees, and scientific cooperation are well established. In France, Polish culture is promoted by the Polish Institute, the Polish Library in Paris, and the Polish Academy of Sciences Research Center.
Conclusion
Does 2025 mark a genuine new chapter in Polish–French relations or just another phase of a traditionally complex partnership? In light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the redefinition of the international order, and Poland’s presidency of the EU Council, the answer is of strategic significance. The leaders of both countries speak of a partnership built on mutual respect, a shared commitment to European strategic autonomy, and support for Ukraine. France has provided substantial military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and the effective delivery of that aid, including training, requires cooperation with Poland. Amid the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s potential return to power, a Polish–French dialogue on security has become essential. As the eastern frontier of NATO and the EU, Poland has increased defense spending (4.7% of GDP in 2024), and France sees this as an opportunity for industrial cooperation, including the Orka submarine program and possibly the construction of a nuclear power plant. The question of extending France’s nuclear umbrella to Central Europe remains unresolved.
Perceptions are also changing. The French increasingly see Poland as an equal strategic partner, while Poles are moving beyond past frustrations. Today’s cooperation is built on complementary needs, shared visions, and a growing sense of responsibility for Europe’s future. As former French ambassador to Poland Pierre Buhler noted, the idea for a new treaty stems from a “need to make up for lost time.” This agreement underscores the importance of renewed mutual understanding and cooperation in confronting the challenges of today’s world – peace, security, and solidarity.
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Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe. […]
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avril 29, 2025By Wojciech Albert Łobodziński, journalist.
This article was first published in Cross-border Talks on the 24th of April 2024. Find the original article here : Polish Presidential Elections: How Mainstreaming of the (Far) Right Continues – Cross-border Talks.
Less than a month before the first round of presidential elections in Poland, Rafał Trzaskowski, a candidate close to the ruling liberal-social-democrat coalition, leads the race with 28% support. He is followed by Karol Nawrocki, the candidate backed by sovereignists of Law and Justice, who holds 22%. Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation party comes third, polling at 15%. Szymon Hołownia of the centre-right Poland 2050 party trails behind them with 7% support. Adrian Zandberg of the social democratic Together party follows with 6%, while his former party colleague Magdalena Biejat, now representing the centre-left New Left, garners just 4%.
Yet one must ask: does a simple division of electoral percentages truly capture the underlying political reality in Poland?
Don’t be dismayed by the high support for the ‘progressive’ Rafał Trzaskowski or the supposedly liberal Szymon Hołownia – while the more hardcore right may seem weaker in the polls, their ideology is leaving a powerful mark on the campaign and on the programmes of nearly everyone in the race, the left-leaning candidates being the only exception.
The 2025 Polish presidential election is marked an unmistakable turn toward nationalism
A development that transcends party boundaries and permeates nearly every corner of the political discourse. This nationalist shift, however, does not follow a single trajectory. Instead, it has manifested itself in two mutually reinforcing forms: cultural exclusion and economic individualism.
On the one hand, there is an increasingly explicit rhetoric of xenophobia and suspicion, especially toward migrants. What was once a moment of national pride — Poland’s open-armed response to Ukrainian refugees in 2022 — has given way to open hostility. The narrative has shifted: Ukrainians are no longer “guests in need” but alleged opportunists, accused of exploiting Polish hospitality. Political actors who previously emphasized humanitarian principles are now scrambling to appeal to a fearful and fatigued electorate. This applies to Rafał Trzaskowski too. Yes: Donald Tusk and his party, once vocal critics of the Law and Justice government’s repressive border policies, now boast about deportation numbers and pledge to shield Polish society from an undefined, foreign threat.
In recent days, this narrative has taken on a new form, with the liberal government stating that it is time to repolonise the Polish economy — until now, such concepts were the domain of the far right.
📍Operacja: #repolonizacja. O co chodziło @donaldtusk? W koalicji konsternacja – https://t.co/wDK9X5VtNDPiszemy z @grzegorzosiecki. https://t.co/nQSUbzQoVU— Tomasz Żółciak (@tzolciak) April 24, 2025Translation: Operation: #repolonization. What was @donaldtusk all about? In the coalition consternation.
This shift is not confined to the political right. It has become mainstream.
Neoliberalism in Nationalist Clothing
While the cultural form of this nationalism is rooted in exclusion, its economic variant takes the shape of a renewed — and radicalized — neoliberalism. Most of the candidates, with the two exceptions on the left, have embraced what can only be described as a deregulated vision of the state. Calls for low taxes have been repeated like mantras, up to proposals to constitutionally ban certain forms of taxation altogether. What we are witnessing is neoliberalism unrestrained — stripped even of the modest social interests that once characterized Polish economic discourse.
The effect of that was seen in April, when the majority of the Tusk’s government, except the New Left, voted for lowering health insurance contributions for entrepreneurs. The simple majority was possible thanks to the abstention of the far-right Confederation. This means that full-time employees, who earn less on average, will pay higher contributions than entrepreneurs. The cost of this? PLN 4.6 billion, or just over EUR 1 billion. All this at a time when the public health system is struggling with a budget deficit of around PLN 20 billion, or around EUR 5 billion. A deficit that is growing month by month. Now, the bill is awaiting the president’s signature and Senate’s approval.
In this context, both the Law and Justice’s model of “social-faced nationalism” and the Civic Coalition’s intermittent gestures toward housing as a public good have disappeared from the debate. The policy space has narrowed to a point where redistributive or solidaristic proposals are viewed as electoral liabilities.
The Radicalisation of the Center
Some authors attribute it to an amoral, individualistic turn — one resembling the thesis of Edward C. Banfield from his famous book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society — stating that such turns are common in the situations of prolonged crisis and general uncertainty. While others add vigilantly that such a turn would be impossible if the Polish state fulfilled its promises in terms of healthcare, education and general social policy.
At the same time others point out that this nationalist and individualist shift is not simply a reaction to external events. It is the result of structural failures within the political system — particularly on the part of the democratic opposition. For years, the Polish right has not only dominated the political narrative but also systematically dismantled the legitimacy of alternative platforms. The opposition, instead of developing its own communicative tools, ceded space — both rhetorical and institutional. The cost of that passivity is now evident.
The complete surrender of the Polish post-communist left, described in a truly masterful way by Maria Snegovaya in her book When the Left Moves Right, ended up with the left no longer existing today in a meaningful way, and left-wing economic ideas enjoying the support of only a few percent of the population – apart from pro-social measures in the form of benefits, which enjoy strong support, but not for ‘outsiders’.
At the same time, the protest movements in Poland were crushed or ostensibly ignored, and the trade unions suffer from an extremely restrictive laws limiting the actions they could take and making organisation of protests really challenging. As my colleague, Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat, commented: “A generation of voters, raised in a climate of political resignation and atomized interest, has internalized the lesson that collective action is futile. They see no incentive to engage with systems that ignore them. Today, this generation shapes the political landscape — not through protests or reformist energy, but through a hardened belief in self-preservation.”
From Solidarity to Scapegoating
Among the most alarming developments of the campaign is the degree to which anti-immigrant narratives have targeted Ukrainian refugees. The language once reserved for fringe voices has entered the mainstream. For a brief but telling period, nearly every major political force, except for the Left and Poland 2050, adopted positions indistinguishable from those of the far-right Confederation party — a group known for its ultranationalist and pro-Russian stance.
One of the more prominent proposals, supported implicitly or explicitly by multiple candidates, is to restrict the 800+ child benefit program by excluding unemployed Ukrainians. This proposal is not only discriminatory but factually unfounded. The benefit is already conditional on school attendance and having a legal residency title. The money is never transferred abroad, nor is it exploited by foreign beneficiaries en masse.
Contrary to the far right propaganda, approximately 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland are employed. Others are either seeking employment or work informally due to administrative barriers (and dishonesty of the employers). These are the highest rates of labour market integration among refugee populations in the European Union. Nonetheless, the political utility of the scapegoat has proven irresistible.
Political Calculus
This narrative shift is not driven solely by ideology. It reflects a calculated political response to evolving public sentiment. Three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, fatigue has set in. The emotional solidarity that defined early 2022 has eroded. A recent poll by the Mieroszewski Centre illustrates the change: only 25% of respondents express a positive view of Ukrainians, while 30% hold a negative one. The largest group — 41% — remain neutral. But the trajectory is clear. Sentiment is cooling, and political actors are adjusting accordingly.
The implications of this shift are profound. Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric not only damages bilateral relations and undermines regional stability but also obstructs the long-term integration of refugees — a policy failure that will have social, economic, and demographic consequences for years to come.
Institutional Illusions
In contrast to the toxicity of the migration debate, Poland’s economic outlook has been surprisingly positive. In 2024, real wages increased by 9.5% — the fastest pace since the early years of the post-communist transformation. This growth, driven by statutory increases to the minimum wage and significant rises in the public sector, served as a form of delayed compensation for the inflation shock of 2023, which had briefly exceeded 18%.
Poland’s GDP growth — approximately 3% — placed it near the top of EU rankings for 2024, and forecasts for 2025 remain similarly optimistic. Yet these facts have not led to a more constructive or nuanced economic debate. On the contrary, candidates from across the political spectrum have treated the economy as a stage for posturing rather than policymaking.
What makes this even more paradoxical is that the Polish president has only limited influence over economic policy. While the office has the power of legislative initiative and veto, fiscal decisions are made by parliament and executed by the government. Still, presidential candidates continue to campaign on economic visions that far exceed their institutional remit.
In part, this is due to public misunderstanding. Many voters simply do not grasp the limits of presidential authority. But there is a deeper reason: Polish presidential elections are not just contests of personality. They have turned into referenda on the kind of state people want to live in — including its economic character.
A Legal System Under Stress
Beyond political rhetoric and campaign slogans, a more serious threat looms: the potential invalidation of the election results. In a context where electoral victories are decided by narrow margins, even minor irregularities carry significant weight. In recent years, both presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland have hinged on small vote differentials. This fragility makes the system vulnerable to legal and procedural contestation.
More concerning is the broader legitimacy crisis that underpins this risk. For over a decade, Poland has been locked in a political and constitutional standoff. Competing parties no longer recognize each other’s legitimacy. Institutions are not seen as neutral arbiters but as instruments of partisan warfare. The consequences have been corrosive: the Constitutional Tribunal has lost its credibility, and the ordinary judiciary has been politicized.
Against this backdrop, the electoral process itself is now at risk. One plausible scenario is already being floated: should Rafał Trzaskowski narrowly defeat his PiS-backed opponent, supporters of the losing side may file formal challenges with the Supreme Court. Their argument? That the ruling coalition, by withholding public subsidies from the opposition, distorted the electoral playing field.
These funds — amounting to tens of millions of złotys — would have bolstered PiS’s campaign infrastructure. If the court rules the election invalid, and the ruling coalition refuses to accept that verdict, the crisis could deepen. At that point, Poland would face not just a contested election, but a constitutional rupture.
Polarization as Policy
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this campaign is the sheer absence of political will to prevent such a crisis. Initiatives aimed at depolarization or electoral safeguards have been neglected. No party is actively seeking compromise. Dialogue has been replaced by escalation. Polarization has ceased to be a by-product of partisanship and has become the objective itself.
This nihilism is not limited to institutional politics. It is reflected in Poland’s broader political culture. The erosion of Polish-Ukrainian relations is not simply a diplomatic failure. It is a symptom of a society increasingly unwilling to sustain long-term commitments or pursue inclusive strategies. The shift from solidarity to suspicion has not only harmed refugees — it has weakened Poland’s international standing and soft power.
Much will depend on whether political narratives continue to focus narrowly on denying specific benefits — such as child support — to unemployed Ukrainians, or whether they evolve into broader attempts to restrict access to the welfare state altogether. Despite its limitations, the Polish welfare system still offers certain universal provisions, including access to public healthcare. In this context, Karol Nawrocki has already pledged to give Polish citizens priority in medical queues — a proposal that signals a more systemic exclusionary approach.
The current situation is already cause for concern. What happens if, following the end of the war in Ukraine, millions more people seek to relocate to Poland? A poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre and the Democratic Initiative Foundation in January this year shows that 21% of Ukrainians plan to leave after the war ends, while an increasing number of those already in the country express the desire to remain permanently. In 2022, every second Ukrainian wanted to return to their country, and in 2025, every sixth Ukrainian wanted to return. Given the likely postwar dynamics — including the risk of capital-driven “colonisation” of Ukraine and the persistence of a frozen conflict — it is reasonable to expect that far more Ukrainians will arrive than current estimates suggest.
In the end Poland was once viewed as a regional leader in humanitarian response. Today, it risks becoming a cautionary tale.
A Campaign Without a Center
The 2025 presidential election has revealed not just a crisis of governance, but a crisis of representation. This is the most ideologically extreme campaign since 1989. The far-right has shaped the discourse to such an extent that even moderate liberals now appear defensive, hesitant, or silent on basic questions of human rights and democratic norms.
As said our editorial colleague, Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat: “Voters on the left — as well as centrist liberals who value open borders, civil liberties, and inclusive governance — are now effectively disenfranchised. Their preferences are not reflected in the public debate. Their candidates are marginalized. Their language — the language of rights, solidarity, and democracy — has become foreign to the mainstream.”
The second round of the election will likely intensify this trend. As candidates vie for the most radical votes, moderation will be treated as weakness, not virtue. The electorate is being mobilized not toward deliberation or reform, but toward entrenchment and antagonism.
The costs of this approach will not be felt on election day. They will be felt long after — in the institutions that are further hollowed out, in the communities that grow more divided, and in the opportunities that are lost to fear, fatigue, and political short-sightedness.
What about the left?
The Polish left is struggling for political survival. Following its split at the end of last year, the coalition fractured into two separate entities: Together and the New Left. Only the latter remains part of the governing coalition. While the government has recently promoted measures such as subsidies for housing loans and supported a reduction in health insurance contributions — after previously introducing a range of tax breaks for entrepreneurs — there has been no movement on key progressive issues. Liberalisation of abortion laws or the legal recognition of same-sex unions remain absent from the legislative agenda. Broader social policy goals, such as strengthening the public healthcare system or expanding state-led housing initiatives, have seen only limited progress or have definitely been pushed aside.
Simultaneously, the New Left — composed largely of post-Socialist personnel and institutions — has allowed its long-time leader Włodzimierz Czarzasty, a figure whose political career dates back to the Socialist times, to appoint his proteges into senior positions within the government. The consequences have been politically damaging. The (now former) Minister of Science, drawn from Czarzasty’s camp, has been accused of using his office to promote allies and undermine public institutions — including IDEAS NCBiR, a research centre critical of the government’s approach to science and innovation policy. As the liberal outlet Oko.press reported: “the minister came to symbolize the worst aspects of political life: nepotism, cronyism, and a disregard for ethical boundaries.”
Another minister to be dismissed was Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, accused in the media of assaulting a woman, being drunk while on duty, harassing party staff and other pathological behaviour. The case has not yet been clarified, but it is telling that the accusations were led by his own party structures in the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship.
Social democracy entering the game?
The Together party, by contrast, continues to fight for political relevance — seeking to establish its own electorate, identity, and voice within the Polish political system. Since its founding in 2015, when it secured 3% of the vote and thus qualified for public subsidies, the party has faced persistent difficulties gaining visibility in mainstream media. Liberal elites largely blamed the Together party for the electoral collapse of the post-communist left that year. Under the D’Hondt method used to allocate parliamentary seats, the fragmentation of the left contributed directly to Law and Justice securing a legislative majority.
In 2019, the young party aligned themselves with post-communist forces for the parliamentary elections, repeating this strategy again in 2023. Yet despite running on a joint ticket, the Together party was ultimately sidelined during coalition negotiations. None of the party’s demands were included in the coalition agenda, and their presence in the Sejm and Senate — a modest total of ten seats — proved irrelevant to the formation of the new government. The machinations of Tusk and Czarzasty led to the party splitting in two, and the ringleader of this split, Magdalena Biejat, ultimately became the presidential candidate for the New Left.
If the result of Together party candidate Adrian Zandberg is higher than Biejat’s, as polls suggest, it could mean a new beginning for the left in Poland. A formation free from cronyism and a history of corruption, which is synonymous with a lack of trust for most working-class voters, as shown by Maria Snegovaya. Any result above 5% will be the starting point for building a party that will be able to exceed this level in parliamentary elections, thereby gaining independent representation in the Sejm.
Major realignment ahead
The 2025 Polish presidential election is not merely a contest between candidates. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a reflection of a more profound structural realignment, one which involves a concurrent strain on political language, institutional integrity, and civic trust. The concept of nationalism, once considered marginal, has evolved into a language of consensus. Neoliberal dogma has re-emerged with renewed intensity, cloaked in populist rhetoric. The center – both in its institutional and ideological sense – has effectively collapsed under the pressure of strategic short-termism and systemic neglect.
The resultant landscape is one of fragmentation. The right commands the narrative, the liberals capitulate to its terms, and the left fights for its very survival. It is fractured, marginalised, yet not without potential. Should the Together party succeed in establishing itself as a credible force, independent of the legacy of cronyism and elite accommodation, it could present the beginnings of a new political alternative. However, the validity of this assertion is contingent upon the attainment of a definitive outcome in a single presidential contest, a scenario that is unlikely to materialise. The restoration of trust among those who have long since withdrawn from public life will be the most crucial element. In order to achieve this, there will need to be organisation and long-term strategy.
The most perilous outcome of this election may not be very figure of the president (even though many voters can sincerely feel unrepresented by any candidate), but the fate of Polish democracy in the period following the campaign. In a political climate where dialogue is replaces with political escalation and collective ambition with moral fatigue, the costs will be measured not in poll numbers, but in the hollowing out of democratic norms and the quiet withdrawal of citizens from a system they no longer believe in.
Whether the second round will serve to consolidate these trends or offer a respite from them remains to be answered. It is evident that the mainstreaming of the (far) right has already occurred. This shift has not manifested abruptly; rather, it is a gradual process of erosion that has gradually eroded the boundaries that once delineated the democratic consensus.
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Wojciech Albert Łobodziński was a former correspondent from France, Italy and Poland, writing about foreign policy, climate change, labor rights, but also new social phenomena for Cross-border talks, publishing in English. He is now Generation Climate Europe’s new Membership Coordinator. […]
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avril 26, 2025By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.
Introduction
The National Deterrence and Defence Project “Eastern Shield” (2024–2028) is a comprehensive initiative aimed at strengthening Poland’s defensive capabilities along its eastern border. The programme was developed in response to the deteriorating security environment in the region, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which highlighted the need to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. The “Eastern Shield” initiative is of strategic importance—it has been designated by the Polish government as the largest operation to fortify Poland’s eastern frontier and, simultaneously, NATO’s eastern boundary since the end of World War II. Its significance has also been acknowledged internationally—on March 12, 2025, the European Parliament recognized “Eastern Shield” as a flagship security project of the European Union (EU). This recognition was reaffirmed by the European Commission a week later, which underscored the European dimension of the initiative. This analysis outlines the main assumptions behind the programme, its strategic context, and its significance for the security of Poland, EU, and the NATO.
Description and Objectives of the “Eastern Shield” Programme
The “Eastern Shield” programme envisions the establishment of a 700 kilometers belt of defensive installations along Poland’s eastern and northeastern borders, extending up to 50 kilometers into Polish territory, according to the official programme website. Its primary objective is to enhance deterrence and defence capabilities through the expansion of military infrastructure along the borders with Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast) and Belarus. The programme is designed to serve a deterrent function and, in the event of conflict, to increase the safety of both civilian populations and Polish armed forces.
The plan is being implemented on four complementary levels: (1) Enhancing resilience to surprise attacks—expansion of surveillance systems, including the development of satellite intelligence, camera and sensor networks along the border, and unmanned observation systems; (2) Restricting adversary mobility—construction of extensive fortifications, engineering obstacles, and terrain impediments (e.g., anti-tank ditches, anti-vehicle barriers), as well as deliberate landscape modifications (wetlands, forestation) in the border area; (3) Ensuring mobility of friendly forces—establishment of specialized infrastructure (roads, bridges, bases) to facilitate rapid deployment and supply of Polish forces; (4) Protection of own forces and civilians—construction of shelters and concealment facilities to increase survivability and continuity of defence operations.
These elements form a coherent defensive system designed to address the possibility of a large-scale conventional conflict. The “Eastern Shield” reflects lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and anticipates scenarios resembling those of World War II more than high-tech limited engagements. The planned fortifications include physical anti-tank barriers (ditches, steel hedgehogs, concrete obstacles), barbed wire fences, and preparations for future mine deployment (mines are to be stored and deployed only in the event of war). The programme also encompasses the development of advanced surveillance and early-warning systems, such as aerostat and satellite observation platforms, and air defence and anti-drone systems to monitor Polish airspace.
Importantly, “Eastern Shield” is not limited to technical infrastructure—it also includes the training and structural preparation of personnel. In 2024, a dedicated training and testing center was established in Orzysz (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship), tasked with preparing engineering units for fortification construction and testing new materials and technologies. In autumn 2024, the first military exercises showcasing elements of the “Eastern Shield” were conducted, attended by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Defence. By the end of that year, the first segment of fortifications on the Kaliningrad border was completed. These developments demonstrate that the programme is moving from planning to tangible implementation.
The initiative is multi-annual in scope, with implementation scheduled for 2024–2028 and an allocated budget of approximately PLN 10 billion.
The “Eastern Shield” in the Context of NATO’s Eastern Flank
The “Eastern Shield” must be viewed within the broader context of NATO’s eastern flank security strategy, encompassing countries bordering Russia and Belarus (Poland, the Baltic States, and further south, Romania and others). Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has significantly increased its presence and readiness along its eastern periphery. At NATO summits (Warsaw 2016, Madrid 2022, Vilnius 2023, Washington 2024), decisions were made to strengthen the Enhanced Forward Presence, establishing multinational battle groups in Poland and the Baltic States and expanding defence infrastructure.
As the largest country in the region, Poland plays a pivotal role in this strategy—hosting allied forces (10,000 American soldiers are stationed in Poland) and coordinating defensive actions along the northeastern flank. Polish Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has emphasised that the “Eastern Shield” is a strategic operation from the perspective of Poland and the entire Alliance.
From NATO’s standpoint, strengthening the eastern flank through initiatives like the “Eastern Shield” enhances the credibility of deterrence policies. It signals that frontline states—supported by the entire Alliance—are prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. Notably, the scale of the Polish initiative is unprecedented in postwar European history: according to government declarations, it is the largest fortification project on NATO’s eastern frontier since 1945. It can be compared to Cold War-era defensive lines in Western Europe, with the key difference that Poland’s national efforts are now supplemented by allied support (rotational NATO troop deployments, joint exercises, system interoperability).
Poland’s Cooperation with the Baltic States (Baltic Defence Line)
Given the geographical and strategic coherence of the threat landscape, Poland maintains close cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in strengthening defence capabilities along the northeastern corridor. In parallel to Poland’s “Eastern Shield,” the Baltic States are implementing their own initiative known as the “Baltic Defence Line.” Its goals are analogous—constructing fortifications along the borders with Russia (and Lithuania’s border with Belarus) to maximally delay potential invasion forces. These governments have openly declared their intention to link their national efforts with Poland’s system, ultimately creating a unified NATO and EU defence line stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians.
In practice, the Baltic Defence Line incorporates both natural barriers and artificial engineering obstacles. Lithuania has announced a 20-kilometers-wide border zone where deforestation will be banned—fallen trees and dense vegetation are intended to impede enemy manoeuvres, particularly on roads and river crossings. Latvia and Estonia are planning multi-layered anti-tank barrier systems (steel hedgehogs, “dragon’s teeth” concrete blocks, etc.) and minefields, with explosives stored during peacetime and deployed only under imminent threat. Estonia has also announced plans to build approximately 600 field bunkers for border defence. These investments have already commenced—Lithuania, for example, allocated €32 million in 2024 for its segment of the Baltic line.
Coordination between Poland and the Baltic States in these parallel projects is crucial for regional defence coherence. The so-called Suwałki Gap—a narrow corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus linking the Baltic States with the rest of NATO and the EU—is of particular concern. It represents both a vital logistical connection and a potential chokepoint vulnerable to Russian military action. Strengthening this corridor through joint Polish-Baltic fortifications significantly raises the cost of aggression: the adversary must reckon with delayed advances due to a network of obstacles, mines, and defences prepared in depth. In essence, the Baltic Defence Line and the Eastern Shield are mutually reinforcing, forming a single protective barrier shielding NATO’s interior. This cooperation extends beyond engineering concepts and includes joint military exercises and coordination of allied support requirements (e.g., intelligence, logistics). It exemplifies practical solidarity within NATO—frontline states enhancing each other’s security and, by extension, that of the entire Alliance.
The Strategic Relevance of the ‘Eastern Shield’ in the Context of the War in Ukraine and the Russian Threat
The Russo-Ukrainian war constitutes the direct backdrop for the emergence of the « Eastern Shield » concept. Analyses of combat operations in Ukraine have unequivocally demonstrated that traditional field fortifications, engineered obstacles, and extensive logistical-defensive systems have regained relevance in the face of conventional warfare against a well-equipped adversary. Russia’s invasion—with its scenes of trenches, minefields, and fortifications in the Donbas—served as a wake-up call for NATO countries bordering Russia. Observing the war on its immediate eastern frontier, Poland has drawn critical lessons and proactively prepared for the possibility of a similar scenario. Consequently, the « Eastern Shield » is being developed in an explicitly conventional manner, prioritizing territorial defence with anti-tank barriers, artillery, and layered protection, rather than relying solely on rapid manoeuvre warfare or cyber operations. This reflects a conscious return to historically proven methods of delaying and complicating large-scale enemy offensives.
An equally significant factor shaping the programme is the direct threat posed by Russia and Belarus. Since 2022, Moscow has repeatedly employed hostile rhetoric towards Poland, including nuclear threats and accusations of aggression (e.g., support for Ukraine). In 2023, Russia deployed part of its tactical nuclear arsenal to Belarus, where Wagner Group mercenaries had previously operated—developments that heightened the sense of threat along Poland’s border. Already in 2021, Poland experienced a hybrid assault on its border with Belarus, when the Minsk regime—encouraged by Moscow—orchestrated a mass migrant crossing, triggering a border crisis. These events prompted Warsaw to accelerate investments in physical border security (such as the steel barrier completed in 2022) and integrate border protection with broader national defence strategy. Accordingly, the « Eastern Shield » is intended not only to prepare Poland for open military aggression but also to bolster its resilience against sub-threshold actions—hybrid warfare, sabotage, provocations, and limited border incidents. The deployment of sensors, drones, and permanent observation posts along the border is expected to hinder enemy reconnaissance and special operations within Polish territory, while the expanded military infrastructure will provide the Polish Armed Forces with spatial and temporal advantages in the event of sudden threats.
Ultimately, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » also carries considerable psychological and political weight: it strengthens public confidence in national security and signals the state’s resolve to defend its territory. In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, such resolute preventive action enhances Poland’s credibility as a state committed to safeguarding its citizens. It also serves a deterrent function vis-à-vis the Kremlin, demonstrating that Poland is preparing for worst-case scenarios and thereby raising the cost of any potential aggression. Without question, the war in Ukraine and the persistent threat from Russia provided the impetus for both the creation and the design of the « Eastern Shield, » making it a central component of the new security architecture in Central and Eastern Europe.
Poland’s Defence Policy: Expenditures and Military Expansion
The execution of such an ambitious defence initiative as the « Eastern Shield » is made possible by a fundamental shift in Polish defence policy following 2022. Poland has significantly increased its defence spending and launched an expansion of its armed forces to levels not seen since the Cold War. The Homeland Defence Act, adopted in March 2022, guarantees a gradual increase in defence expenditures to at least 3% of GDP; in practice, however, Poland already allocated approximately 4% of its GDP to defence in 2023. In absolute terms, this reflects a sharp rise in the military budget: the financial plan for 2025 envisages defence spending of PLN 186.6 billion (approximately 4.7% of GDP). These substantial resources enable simultaneous funding of army modernisation and large-scale infrastructural projects such as the « Eastern Shield. » Simultaneously, the Polish Armed Forces are undergoing numerical expansion. The government has officially declared its goal of increasing the total number of troops—including regular forces and the Territorial Defence Forces—to 300,000 by 2035. Poland is already considered to possess one of the largest land forces in the European Union. This status stems from rapid recruitment and the creation of new military units, including additional divisions in eastern Poland. Massive investments are also being made in the acquisition of modern weaponry. Since 2022, contracts have been signed for U.S. M1A2 Abrams tanks, self-propelled howitzers and HIMARS rocket systems, fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and South Korean K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, Chunmoo rocket launchers, and FA-50 light combat aircraft. This equipment is gradually being delivered to Polish units, significantly enhancing the army’s combat potential. Notably, a substantial portion of the newly acquired arms is being deployed specifically in eastern Poland, where new units are being formed and equipped with Abrams and K2 tanks (e.g., the 1st Warsaw Mechanised Division). As a result, Poland is poised to soon possess one of the strongest land forces in Europe in terms of both size and modernity.
It is also worth highlighting the broader philosophy of Polish defence policy, of which the « Eastern Shield » is a core element. Poland pursues strategic autonomy and deterrence through strength—investing in capabilities that discourage aggression by their mere presence. This includes the development of air and missile defence (e.g., Patriot systems, the « Narew » programme with CAMM missiles), as well as plans to create a missile shield and reinforce cyber defence forces. This comprehensive military modernisation, combined with the construction of the « Eastern Shield, » aims to make Poland militarily robust enough that the prospect of conflict becomes a deterrent in itself.
Poland as the Border of NATO and the EU: Leadership in Regional Security
Poland’s geopolitical position renders it a frontline state for both NATO and the European Union. Its eastern borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region constitute both the EU’s external frontier and NATO’s eastern line of defence. This confers a dual responsibility and leadership potential upon Poland: any action it undertakes to strengthen its security directly enhances the safety of the entire Euro-Atlantic community. In recent years, Poland has increasingly asserted its role as a security leader in Central and Eastern Europe, initiating or supporting key defence initiatives in the region. A prime example is its promotion of the « Eastern Shield » and the « Baltic Defence Line » as a common protective barrier for NATO/EU frontline states.
Polish diplomacy and government authorities are actively advocating for eastern flank security to be prioritized on the EU’s agenda, especially during Poland’s current Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2025). From Warsaw’s perspective, the EU must intensify its engagement in defence matters, investing in infrastructure and military capabilities of eastern member states. Evidence of the effectiveness of these efforts includes the March 12, 2025, resolution of the European Parliament recognizing the « Eastern Shield » as a flagship EU security project and calling for its financial support. On March 19, 2025, the European Commission echoed this position, describing the initiative as a model for strengthening EU resilience and prioritizing it in future budgetary plans. Although largely political in nature, these decisions reflect a growing European consensus that the security of Poland and the Baltic States is inseparably linked to the security of the entire Union. In short, Poland is successfully articulating its role as the EU’s bulwark—the fortified frontier whose protection serves the common interest.
In NATO, Poland also plays an active role in advocating the reinforcement of the eastern flank. Within the framework of the Bucharest Nine (a group of nine eastern NATO members), Warsaw co-authors joint positions and recommendations for the Alliance, calling for greater allied troop presence on its territory and more robust collective defence planning against potential Russian aggression. Many of these demands have been reflected in NATO decisions—such as enhanced readiness of forces in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of additional equipment stockpiles in Poland. Poland has earned the reputation of being the « European advocate of deterrence, » persistently reminding Western allies of the threat posed by Moscow’s imperial ambitions and the need for unity.
Beyond political measures, Poland sets an example for neighbouring states through its own actions—both via elevated defence expenditures, which serve as a benchmark, and direct support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Warsaw has become a major supplier of military aid to Kyiv, providing tanks, artillery systems, and ammunition, and facilitating the logistics of Western deliveries. Although these actions fall outside NATO’s formal remit, they enhance security across the eastern flank by weakening the adversary before it can threaten NATO territory. Poland argues that by supporting Ukraine while simultaneously rearming and fortifying its own territory, it creates a regional security buffer for all of Europe. This logic is gaining increasing recognition—reflected in the EU’s growing willingness to treat Polish defence initiatives as integral components of its broader security strategy.
Conclusion
The National Deterrence and Defence Programme « Eastern Shield » (2024–2028) represents a groundbreaking initiative that integrates Poland’s territorial defence efforts with NATO and EU security objectives. Encompassing extensive military infrastructure, surveillance systems, and deep fortifications along the eastern border, the programme responds to the realities of a new cold war in Europe—marked by Russian aggression, the lessons of the war in Ukraine, and the strategic unpredictability of the new Trump administration. The « Eastern Shield » strengthens NATO’s eastern flank, complements similar efforts by the Baltic States, and forms part of a collective deterrence strategy. Simultaneously, it reflects Poland’s determination to safeguard its national security through record-high defence spending and the development of the largest land army in the EU. Its designation as a flagship EU security project underscores the initiative’s transnational importance—its success is in the interest of all of Europe. In the coming years, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » will be closely watched by allies and adversaries alike. Its completion by 2028 will significantly raise the security threshold on the eastern flank, complicating any potential Russian aggression. More broadly, Poland’s deterrence and defence model may serve as a blueprint for other NATO border states seeking to address contemporary threats—combining traditional defensive measures with modern technology and robust political backing. The « Eastern Shield » cements Poland’s role as a regional security pillar and demonstrates that Central and Eastern Europe is capable of initiating and executing projects vital to collective defence. In the face of continued instability beyond the EU’s eastern borders, such a proactive approach constitutes a meaningful contribution to building a more secure future for the continent as a whole.
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Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe. […]
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avril 9, 2025By Michał Kuryłowicz, Jagiellonian University, Poland.
There are five weeks left until the first round of Poland’s presidential elections, but the election campaign is only now beginning in earnest. Few remember already the first – autumn – stage of the battle for the presidential palace, that is, the selection of candidates of the two largest parties: Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Although Donald Tusk’s party’s indication of Rafal Trzaskowski seemed obvious for a long time (he already ran in the 2020 elections and won almost half of the votes), unexpectedly the Civic Coalition decided to hold party primaries. Their purpose was twofold: first, to show voters that the selection of a candidate is fully democratic. Second: Trzaskowski’s challenger, current Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, had strong cards in hand. He is internationally recognized, and he also fits better into the main axis of the election campaign, which is related to the security theme.
With the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and uncertainty over Donald Trump’s policies, Radoslaw Sikorski could, as a potential president, strengthen the « Polish » voice in Europe and vis-à-vis the United States. However, the party primaries resulted in a victory for Trzaskowski, suggesting that for members of the Civic Coalition, Radoslaw Sikorski is still an outsider (he once served as Defense Minister in the Law and Justice government in 2005-2006). What’s more – the support for Trzaskowski, clearly betting on equality discourse, says a lot about the leftward turn of the largest party in the current parliamentary term. However, even Rafał Trzaskowski, a natural peacetime candidate, has had to adjust to the demands of a campaign taking place in « pre-war » times (according to Donald Tusk’s metaphor) and has begun to pay more attention to state security and preparing Poland for a possible defense war against Russia.
No less difficult a choice faced Law and Justice. Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s party, weakened by its defeat in the 2023 parliamentary elections (it won the most seats in those elections, but failed to form a government and ceded power to the opposition after eight years), decided to field a little-known candidate: the incumbent president of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), Karol Nawrocki. Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s calculation was probably to avoid fielding too strong a candidate, who is likely to lose to Rafal Trzaskowski anyway. However, betting on Nawrocki – a person hardly recognizable even to Law and Justice voters – turned against the party. Nawrocki has no political experience, in addition, the media point to his former ties to the criminal world in Poland. As a result, his position in the polls oscillates between 23-25%, clearly below the ratings of Law and Justice.
One of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s calculations was that he hoped Donald Trump’s victory in the US would also strengthen the conservative camp in Poland, reversing the unfavorable poll trend for him. However, this did not happen, and it was mainly the US president himself who contributed to this. The enthusiasm of Law and Justice politicians after Trump’s victory became incomprehensible to at least some Polish voters, as the US president began to suggest after his inauguration the need for a reset in relations with Russia. Security issues thus re-entered the presidential campaign in Poland, but did not strengthen the Law and Justice party, known for its anti-Russian rhetoric. Slawomir Mentzen, the candidate of the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), appeared to be the beneficiary of the situation.
Starting in November 2024, Slawomir Mentzen’s popularity is recorded to have increased dramatically. By March 2025, polls were already giving him around 20% support, causing the media to consider his entry into the second round of the presidential election (in which he would face Rafal Trzaskowski). His popularity is explained by at least several factors. The most significant of these is the apparent weariness among a significant portion of voters with the two-decade-long dominance of two political parties: Civic Platform and Law and Justice. The dispute between them, often reduced to a personal conflict between the leaders of the two parties, Donald Tusk and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, increasingly reflects the political views expressed by Poles.
Another reason for Mentzen’s « phenomenon » is the progressive « Trumpization » of Polish politics: a significant shift of the axis of political discussion and sentiment to the right, an emphasis in public debate on the importance of national security, and an increasingly cooler attitude toward the conflict in Ukraine. The colonialist attitude of Donald Trump and members of his administration toward Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Ukraine, although it crippled the previous international narrative of Law and Justice, at the same time strengthened the Confederation distancing itself from Ukraine and Slawomir Mentzen personally. The latter has begun to transfer the American argumentation against Kyiv to Poland: in his view, Ukraine should show more gratitude to Poland for the assistance it has provided since the beginning of the conflict, and it should engage in peace talks with Russia.
Mentzen’s strength also turns out to be the far-reaching mediatization of the ongoing election campaign. Thanks to it, Mentzen, who makes abundant use of social network promotion, is gaining popularity for his views, especially among the youngest part of Polish society. It is worth noting that it is for this social group that the previous dispute between Tusk and Kaczynski seems most anachronistic. From the point of view of young Poles, Slawomir Mentzen seems to go beyond the familiar set of slogans of the two biggest protagonists of the Polish political scene with his radical slogans.
What was the Confederation candidate’s strength at the beginning of the presidential race may hurt him at the finish of the campaign. The final weeks of the election battle are forcing him to go beyond individual meetings with voters and promotion through social networks. Slawomir Mentzen, but also the other candidates, have to answer journalists’ questions more often, and a TV debate with all registered participants in the race is planned for the week before the election. Slawomir Mentzen already has to explain the slogans he preached in 2019 (the so-called Mentzen Five): « we don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the European Union. » Such a set of views, of course, finds support from a part of the Polish electorate, but it does not exceed 10%. It seems, therefore, that the Confederation’s candidate has now reached the maximum of his poll potential. Going beyond this ceiling already requires a softening of rhetoric, meanwhile the traditionally conservative electorate has already been cultivated by Law and Justice.
The meaning of elections in Poland goes far beyond the possibilities facing a future president. Antoni Dudek, a Polish historian and political scientist, points out, moreover, that the presidential campaign in Poland is largely a „deception of voters”. This is because the highly personalized election campaign forces candidates to make a series of specific proposals and address detailed questions from the media. Meanwhile, the political position of the Polish president gives him representative powers and the ability to block laws created by the government and approved by parliament. The presidential legislative initiative is rarely used in practice, especially under cohabitation conditions, when the head of state has no certainty that his bill will be passed by the Sejm.
The real stakes of the May elections, however, are the comfort of the current government and a possible overhaul of the party system in Poland. In the event of a victory by Rafał Trzaskowski, Donald Tusk’s government will have the opportunity to fulfill a number of its 2023 election announcements, so far blocked by Andrzej Duda (including, in particular, an accounting of Law and Justice’s actions, from its 2015-2023 period in power). Even more important is who will come in second place and enter the second round of elections, announced for June 1. A weak result for Law and Justice candidate Karol Nawrocki, or his potential drop to third place, will not only strengthen his rival on the right (the Confederation). It could also set in motion a process of disintegration of the party itself, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. A potential split of Law and Justice into two factions, a moderate one and a radical one, would change the current party structure in Poland. The extreme faction would likely take up a partnership with the Confederation. The moderate fraction could be a convenient partner for the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), a center-right party, today a member of Donald Tusk’s government coalition. This scenario is therefore unfavorable from the point of view of the current prime minister and at the same time head of the Civic Coalition. It could lead to the situation in which Law and Justice found itself two years ago: although the Civic Coalition wins the elections, it is unable to form a government.
In this situation, it may be in the interest of Donald Tusk’s party to frontally criticize the Confederation’s candidate. Weakening Slawomir Mentzen and the Confederation behind him helps to reassure voters that the most important political dividing line is still between the pro-European Civic Coalition and the eurosceptic (but notorious for its actions) Law and Justice. Such tactics also allow Donald Tusk to convince the Polish People’s Party to continue working together in government. The latter party supported the current Speaker of the parlament, Szymon Holownia, in the presidential election, but did so without conviction. At the beginning of the election campaign, Holownia hoped to score above 10% and come in third in the elections. However, he was overtaken by Slawomir Mentzen. Polish election observers argue that Holownia (who is currently supported by 6-8% of voters) and Mentzen are competing for the same voter, who supports free-market reforms. Stronger support for the Confederation’s candidate would, in this situation, be a « red card » for a government that fails to deliver on its promises. Donald Tusk, aware of these changing electoral preferences, decided to support one of his coalition partner’s flagship proposals: lowering the health taxes for entrepreneurs. In early April, the Parlament passed a law on the issue, but so far this has not translated into election polls. However, these actions confirm that the real stakes of the presidential election are both the balance of power in the government coalition and more broadly: the balance of power in the entire Polish party system.
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Michał Kuryłowicz is a researcher at Jagiellonian University, Poland. He is specialized in the study of Eurasian politics with a focus on relations of Eurasian countries towards Russia. He also studies history of the Eurasian region, from Poland to Central Asia. […]
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avril 4, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
Tony Barber’s weekly FT (Financial Times) column rounds up and examines Eastern Europe’s latest round of civic protest in Slovakia, Romania, Georgia, Serbia. It’s a mixed bag of regimes and issues. Two in the EU, two aspiring to join by stalled by illiberal governments, one with (Georgia) with the looming presence of Russian influence right next door and thousands of kilometres distant from the European heartlands.
The key takeaway, Barber says, is that there are countervailing liberal forces resisting various Kremlin-aligned illiberal governments – and doing so persistently – at least the nations’ capitals and cities. What’s more liberal civic nationalism is alive and well. But Barber is astute in noting, as academic researchers have, that this similar looking, urban middle class civic mobilisation is subtly different in countries which are, both politically and geographically in, different places.
Are watershed elections and the EU enough?
In Serbia, protests erupt over corruption and shrinking civic freedoms. These demonstrations are large but leaderless, demanding systemic reform rather than outright regime change. Protesters distrust opposition parties and electoral politics, avoiding engagement in formal structures. Unlike in other countries, they do not carry EU flags, reflecting a scepticism toward European institutions of a stalled candidate state. The government remains stable, bolstered by the EU’s preference for regional stability over democracy. The lesson is that politics so much more than just winning some future watershed election and “turning the tide of populism’ (tides always comes back in). Targeting the post-communist deep state, the oligarchical power structures is the wickeder problem.
In Slovakia, resistance has focused on Prime Minister Robert Fico’s autocratic drive against independent institutions following 2023 comeback: the winding up and re-forming of public TV, and pressure on NGOs. Protests see elections as a crucial battleground for change, unlike in Serbia, although as ever the precise vehicle capable of defeating Fico remains uncertain. Demonstrators strongly support the EU, aligning themselves with Europe’s perceived democratic norms. But public opinion remains split, with some backing NATO and European integration, while others favour neutrality or a more Russia-friendly stance of the kind backed by Fico.
Hungary’s protests, though smaller than those in Serbia, challenge Viktor Orbán’s deeply entrenched system of electoral autocracy and opposition suppression. Midway between Serbia and Slovak patterns, the opposition still engages in elections with the new TISZA party the strongest challenge to Orbán in years, but under an uneven playing field that fuels scepticism about whether real change is now possible through the ballot box. With Orbán’s control over the judiciary, security forces, and media, Hungary is unlikely to see a Poland-style opposition victory in 2025, as the system is designed to keep him in power. The EU is critical of Orbán, yet Hungarian protesters do not display the strong EU alignment seen in Slovakia, perhaps chastened by the years of failed EU leverage
Georgia faces unrest over rigged elections, creeping authoritarianism, and powerful Russian influence. Protests target the ruling Georgian Dream party, and while elections were rigged, opposition forces still see them as worth contesting. As in Slovakia backsliding is relatively new and illiberalism less entrenched. Protesters take the strong pro-EU stance, common would-be members state far from membership although the EU and (less surprisingly) the US have been largely inactive in offering support. With weak international backing, Georgia remains highly vulnerable to Russian interference, making its democratic future perhaps the most precarious.
Historical analogies fail to inform
Less convincing – or thought through – are FT’s tired historical analogies:
people [writes Tony Barber] are massing on the streets in the name of liberal ideals and national self-determination — seen as hijacked by bullying, self-serving autocrats — in a manner that recalls 1848 and also 1989, the year of the pro-democracy revolutions against communism.
History matters, but the existence of strong civic minded publics with a liberal national vision isn’t reason to reach for the history books.
We’ve been here before – and to very mixed effect.
1989 was itself compared to the 1848 “Springtime of Nations”, but its liberal revolutions – at least for a long interlude – succeeded while those of 1848 were snuffed out. The 2011 Arab Spring was compared to both 1989 and 1848 but largely lacked the liberalism and depended less on geopolitics than domestic authoritarian retrenchment.
Unlike 1848, today’s protests are unlikely to be directly crushed by external military intervention, and unlike 1989, they lack clear leadership and effective Western backing and are pushing back against democratic backsliding, not pushing for democracy in a situation of authoritarian collapse. Indeed, today’s autocrats are in many ways products of 1989, well entrenched and well capable of faking and manipulating democratic forms for deeply autocratic purposes, not the exhausted dynasts or communists of the past.
Historical parallels with 1848 and 1989 fall short. We are in new political territory. The shifting nature of democratic pushback—where mass protests, electoral struggles, and international disengagement intersect—suggest a different kind of contest, which – even if democratic defence leads to full blown democratic renewal – does not fit neatly into past revolutionary cycles.
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Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
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avril 3, 2025By Wojciech Albert Łobodziński, journalist.
This article was first published in Cross-border Talks. Link to the original article: Donald Tusk’s Vision for Poland: Unlocking the Future or Selling It Short? – Cross-border Talks.
Since his return to power, Donald Tusk has sought to project the image of a moderniser, a pragmatic leader who will untangle the bureaucratic web that is supposedly strangling Polish business. His political philosophy, however, seems to be based on a controversial belief that minimal state spending is optimal. Believing that a business-friendly government will propel Poland into the future, Tusk seems to ignore the potential erosion of state authority, institutional robustness and collective trust in public goods. And this is a price that may prove too high for a country still struggling with inequalities and a fragile social fabric.
This philosophy was on full display on 10 February when Tusk, alongside Finance Minister Andrzej Domański, unveiled his economic strategy at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Held under the evocative symbolism of Poland’s millennium of statehood, the event was designed to convey a sense of historical momentum — a return to the courage and boldness of Boleslaw the Brave, Poland’s first king. But beyond the spectacle, the underlying message was clear: deregulation would be Poland’s way forward, just like it is under Trump & Musk in the US.
The star of the event was not a government official but a businessman — Rafał Brzoska, the founder of InPost, whose parcel locker network revolutionised Poland’s delivery market. It was possible largely due to the weaknesses of the underfunded and mismanaged state postal service. Presented as Tusk’s equivalent of Elon Musk, Brzoska was publicly tasked with deregulating the Polish economy. This gesture, which Brzoska accepted with a theatrical ‘challenge accepted’, underlined Tusk’s belief in outsourcing economic leadership to private capital.
Brzoska’s credentials as a disruptive entrepreneur are well known, and his methods raise questions about the kind of society such a vision fosters. His views on work-life balance are extreme; he expects employees to devote their lives to their work. Labour flexibility, often celebrated by proponents of deregulation, in the Polish practice usually means precariousness and the erosion of workers’ rights protection. Moreover, InPost’s rapid expansion exploited regulatory loopholes — parcel lockers springing up in chaotic, unplanned locations became a meme, symbolising both convenience and urban degradation. Brzoska, on the other hand, became an idol for Poland’s managerial elite — a symbol of raw, unfettered market success.
While Brzoska’s rise exemplifies entrepreneurial energy, it also highlights the tension in Tusk’s vision. Poland’s development cannot rely solely on deregulation and flexible labour markets. The most successful societies balance market efficiency with robust public services, social protection and strategic state intervention. Tusk’s invocation of the World Happiness Report as a benchmark for Poland’s aspirations was particularly revealing — and ironic. The top countries in this ranking, including Finland, Denmark and Norway, are welfare states with comprehensive public services and high levels of equality. Their secret is not deregulation, but rather the strength of their institutions and the safety net they provide.
The Vision
Tusk’s concrete proposals, though ambitious on paper, betray the same bias. His government plans to invest PLN 180 billion in railway infrastructure and PLN 65 billion in expanding the energy transmission network. In addition, capital market reforms aim to support high-risk ventures, raise limits on retirement savings accounts (IKZE), reduce capital gains tax and promote ETFs. Deregulation, both narrowly (reducing administrative burdens) and broadly (Brzoska’s systemic reform), is the linchpin.
However, when juxtaposed with the World Bank’s recent recommendations for Poland, critical gaps emerge. The Bank emphasises sustainable urban development, the digitalisation of public services and the integration of local investments into global value chains. It urges Poland to increase citizen participation and empower local governments to improve operational efficiency. While Tusk’s strategy focuses on transport and energy, it lacks a comprehensive vision for urban planning, smart cities and participatory governance. There is little mention of using digital technology to modernise local government, not to mention increasing public participation in decision-making.
Equally, glaring is the absence of a robust social agenda. Tusk’s reliance on business dynamism sidesteps the pressing issues of income inequality, labour market insecurity and poverty. His government talks about cutting red tape, but is silent on improving protection for vulnerable workers. The Polish labour market remains characterised by precarious contracts and low wages for many, especially in sectors outside the major urban centres.
Underfunded Ambitions
These concerns are compounded by the chronic underfunding of Polish science and research. Despite ambitions to increase spending on innovation, the reality remains stark: Poland consistently ranks among the lowest in the European Union in terms of R&D spending. In 2022, R&D spending amounted to just 1.46% of GDP, well below the EU average of 2.27%. This underinvestment stifles the potential for home-grown technological breakthroughs and limits the ability of Polish universities and research institutions to compete internationally.
While countries like Germany, France and even Estonia are aggressively positioning themselves as AI innovation hubs, Poland has yet to articulate a coherent strategy for harnessing AI for economic growth. Without significant public and private investment in AI research and development, Poland risks becoming a technology consumer rather than a creator, perpetuating its reliance on foreign innovation. While at the same time is one of the major exporters of IT specialists, so far, it could not create a sustainable environment for them at place — it seems that this will not change.
Polish Success Story
This emphasis on deregulation and market solutions is all the more puzzling given the fact that, on macroeconomic terms, Poland’s post-Socialist history, and especially the last two decades are, after all, a success story. Between 1990 and 2020, Poland’s GDP per capita grew by more than 600%, exceeding $18,000 by 2022 (World Bank). Exports rose from $14 billion in 1991 to more than $355 billion in 2022. The country’s poverty rate fell from 16% in 2005 to less than 5% in 2021. Infrastructure development is a measurable reality: Poland now has more than 4,800 kilometres of motorways compared with just 400 kilometres in 1990. These gains were driven not by deregulation alone, but by a mix of strategic public investment, EU funds and social policies that lifted millions out of poverty.
It was precisely this state-led development model — combining market dynamism with public investment and EU support — that underpinned Poland’s success. Deregulation had its place, but it was not the sole driver. The risk now is that Tusk’s government, in its zeal to emulate Anglo-American models, forgets the formula that worked for Poland.
Short-term Success
There is also a political subtext to Tusk’s rhetoric. By aligning himself with Brzoska, he seeks to bind the business elite to his coalition, thereby insulating his fragile parliamentary majority. This alliance may provide short-term stability, but it risks alienating voters who expect more from the state than just efficiency slogans. The controversy over flood relief, where celebrity endorsements masked operational failures, is a case in point. Optics trumped substance; victims were left behind.
Ultimately, Tusk’s challenge is not just to simplify regulations or woo entrepreneurs. It is to articulate a vision that combines market dynamism with social cohesion and institutional resilience. Poland’s future prosperity depends on more than parcel lockers and stock market announcements. It requires investment in people, cities and public services — building on the hard-won successes of the past three decades.
The risk is that Tusk’s government, fixated on short-term media wins and market orthodoxy, will miss this opportunity. And in an increasingly unstable world, where social trust and state capacity are vital assets, that is a gamble Poland can ill afford.
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Wojciech Albert Łobodziński was a former correspondent from France, Italy and Poland, writing about foreign policy, climate change, labor rights, but also new social phenomena for Cross-border talks, publishing in English. He is now Generation Climate Europe’s new Membership Coordinator. […]
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avril 2, 2025By Wojciech Albert Łobodziński, journalist.
This article was first published in Cross-border Talks. Link to the original article: Take back control? On the new Polish migration strategy – Cross-border Talks.
At the Civic Coalition convention in Warsaw on Saturday 12 October 2024, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the Polish migration strategy. In his speech on the project with the resonant name ‘Take back control, ensure security’, Tusk said that: ‘the Law and Justice party for eight years built a system, partly corrupt, which allowed the uncontrolled influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants (…) All this led to Law and Justice bringing hundreds of thousands here, which the state may not have wanted to see come to Poland at all,’ he said. At the same time, he stressed that ‘the state must regain 100 per cent control over who enters and leaves Poland’, and therefore ‘illegal migration will be reduced to a minimum’. But everyone remembered only one sentence of Prime Minister Tusk: ‘One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand in Europe the right to recognise this decision’. After a second, he emphasised this by adding: ‘If someone wants to come to Poland, they must accept Polish standards. They must want to integrate.’
Undoubtedly, this speech will go down in history, the question is, of what: the European Union or extremely catchy political PR?
But the whole story of Poland’s harsher stance on migration starts a lot earlier than that. On 31 August 2023, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki dismissed Piotr Wawrzyk from his post as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was only the beginning of a major scandal involving the Polish foreign service. According to the liberal opposition, foreign ministry employees were selling Polish visas, going so far as to allow the sale of signed papers at an outdoor stall in an unidentified African country.
According to some, the entire affair involved a significant part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others say it involved about a dozen people. There was also disagreement over the number of visas allegedly sold. The opposition said 300,000, while the Foreign Ministry admits that no more than 300 to 400 documents were wrongly allocated.
A parliamentary committee has been set up to investigate the so-called visa scandal, which has uncovered irregularities in the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely evidence of lobbying by third parties to increase the number of visas or temporary work permits that were later to be cancelled. The legal consequences of this are to be borne by the politicians of the previous government, or at least that is what the current power camp is preparing for, probably closer to the presidential elections — which will be about ‘difficult and troubled (geopolitical) times’. Whoever demonstrates that the other side is unfit to lead in such times will win.
Interestingly, however, anonymous voices from within the committee pointed to another dimension of the affair. Namely, that there is a forceful private sector lobby in Poland calling for more cheap labour immigrants in the country. This is a thread that a committee does not want to pull because of the potential political costs. After all, big business is behind Poland’s two hegemonic parties, both of which are right-wing. Nevertheless, expert voices from all sides of the political argument have forced the new government to act — at the end of the day, Polish politicians have never created any migration strategy, leaving everything to fate, or rather, business actors.
Already in February 2024, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration launched work on the development of a comprehensive, responsible and safe Polish migration strategy for 2025-2030. A timetable of activities was set, according to which a draft of this strategy should be developed in October-November 2024, following public consultations.
‘Take Back Control’
On 15 October, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the strategy ‘Take Back Control. Ensure security. Comprehensive and responsible migration strategy of Poland for 2025-2030’. On 17 October, the 36-page document was published by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and submitted to the public.
According to the assumptions presented, the final version of the draft migration strategy will be prepared in December 2024. The draft will then be discussed by the Council of Ministers. On this basis, new draft laws will be prepared between January and June 2025. This will include a new law on foreigners. Nevertheless, now we know where the new strategy leads.
The Polish migration strategy proposed by the government of Donald Tusk marks a significant shift in response to evolving national and regional needs. The main focus of the strategy is to outline changes in eight key areas of migration policy. These include the development of a rapid response model to counter provocations — so-called hybrid war — from neighbouring Russia and Belarus
Firstly, a key component of the strategy is the introduction of employer declarations for the hiring of foreign nationals, initially limited to citizens of three and then six Eastern European countries. In addition, the plan emphasises the digitalisation of migration processes in order to streamline the processing of residence permit applications and reduce staff turnover in migration offices.
The government also proposes:
Introduction of a points-based system to regulate the entry of foreign workers, tailored to Polish labour market needs
Implementation of student admission limits in specific academic fields
Adjustment of absenteeism policy, shifting from an annual to a semi-annual assessment
Creation of special visas for grant-funded international researchers to attract global scholars
Development of enhanced policies to encourage diaspora return
Establishment of a structured pathway for the rapid and effective integration of foreign children into the Polish education system
Secondly, the strategy also emphasises the elimination of exploitative practices and legal loopholes in migration and employment systems. This includes targeting temporary employment agencies that break the law or exploit workers, and closing loopholes that allow fictitious student enrolment to secure residence in the EU.
Addressing the illegal practices document focuses on measures dedicated to eliminating irregularities in the visa system, preventing abuse of visa application procedures and tackling the misuse of company shares by foreigners to circumvent formal employment rules. The strategy also aims at eliminating intermediaries who exploit legalisation procedures for residence, thus ensuring that only genuine applicants benefit from migration policies.
Finally, the document calls for:
Restoration of border controls
Implementation of digital processing for residence legalisation applications
Adaptation of government offices to meet the needs of foreign nationals
Alignment of migration policies with market and state needs
Increased role for the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Minister of Internal Affairs
Strengthening border cooperation with Schengen Area countries
At the same time, following the ‘visa scandal’, work on a visa policy is still in progress; this has only been outlined in the form of potential practices within the above document, but the specific diplomatic activities and framework in which they are to operate still need to be worked out, subsequently becoming part of the Migration Strategy 2025-2030. It is planned, however, that it will be based on two criteria: country of origin and foreigner profile.
Another moral panic?
So what was it about Tusk’s words that everyone remembered? Donald Tusk’s remarks about suspending the right to asylum caused a bit of a stir. Not only did coalition partners have questions, but so did party members. The same went for the media, experts, activists in one or another way connected to the broader liberal camp — which used to fight gainst the Law and Justice’ ‘fascist’ government and its anti-immigration measures. Some said to wait for the strategy to be published, while others were quick to change their rhetoric on the migration issues right away. Leading to many revolting U-turns rhetorically aimed at yesterday’s allies.
The Prime Minister was quickly facing backlash from legal and humanitarian groups. They sent him a letter reminding him that the right to asylum is guaranteed by the Geneva Convention, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Polish Constitution.
‘Denying migrants the right to asylum is not only against Polish law and international agreements. It’s just cruel,’ commented Magdalena Biejat, who is the Deputy Speaker of the Senate, at the time one of the leaders of Razem party, after a U-turn now one of the turncoats that switched sides, joining the camp of Tusk’s government.
The Marshal of the Sejm, Szymon Holownia, leader of Poland 2050 party, wrote on Facebook on Monday that his party backs stronger border security, but also thinks that the right to asylum is a fundamental right. He noted that the Prime Minister was only expressing his opinion, as the strategy wasn’t part of the coalition agreement. So what was the Tusk’s aim in making such a revolting statement?
Tusk tends to play politics with moral panics that focus all the attention on him and not on concrete actions or solutions — which can be infinitely far from what he himself has said. This was also the case here; a few days later, Tusk himself began to soften his own remarks.
The overheated statement on asylum may also have been a prelude to the two-day European Council summit in Brussels, which began on Thursday 17 October. Migration is supposed to be one of the main topics of the meeting, and such a radical stance would have improved the negotiating position of Poland — which does not want to accept any migrants apart from those from Ukraine or Belarus.
In Poland, the declaration on asylum would change the tone of the migration strategy. Although the whole point of the document is to regulate and de facto limit immigration, the right wing is presenting it as the opposite — mainly because of the plan to open more than 40 centres for foreigners, which can hardly be considered anything apart from the restoration of the state’s competence in the field of migration. So far, it has not existed.
Thanks to Tusk’s words, there is a good chance that right-wing audiences will not notice the PiS’s spin, but the outrage in liberal circles over the prime minister’s anti-immigrant tones. In media leaks, activists from parties that are part of the Civic Coalition indicate that, in their view, the prime minister’s words may have been a deliberate excursion into right-wing territory. They were intended to divert attention from the actions of the still-powerful Law and Justice, and also to strengthen the Civic Coalition ahead of the presidential elections – whose main themes are supposed to be security and hard times. Stepping into the right-wing’s shoes seems ideal, especially since, after taking over the public media, they have all the machinery at their disposal to highlight it.
End product
There’s been a big decline in the number of babies being born in Poland recently. The latest figures from the country’s Central Statistical Office (GUS) show that just 259,000 babies were born between August 2023 and July 2024. That’s the lowest number since World War II. July 2024 saw a slight rise in the number of live births, with 23,500, but this is still well below the 19,000 recorded in June. The numbers are still way down compared to previous years, with 272,000 births in 2023 and 305,000 in 2022.
This decline in the number of births is partly due to a smaller number of women of childbearing age (15–49), which has fallen to 8.6 million, nearly a million fewer than in 2010. There has also been a decline in the number of children born per woman, which fell to 1.16 in 2023. The combination of low birth rates and a natural population decrease – 148,000 more deaths than births in the past year – is a worrying trend for Poland’s future. It raises concerns about whether the population will be sustainable in the long term.
Meanwhile, Poland is facing a rapidly ageing population, with demographic trends showing a declining birth rate and an increasing life expectancy. As younger generations shrink, the proportion of older adults grows, placing pressure on social services, healthcare, and the workforce. The latest data indicates that the number of people over 65 is projected to rise significantly, exacerbating challenges in providing adequate support and resources for the elderly. This demographic shift raises concerns about economic sustainability and the capacity of social systems to handle a growing elderly population.
Poland’s demographic policy should be multifaceted and include not only issues that directly encourage people to have children, but also migration, housing and health policies, among others. However, all the indications are that in the current situation, any political issue, even if it is the demographic crisis, the literal extinction of a nation, can only be addressed if it can be used to attack an opponent. This is also the case with the current migration policy. It is difficult to see bold solutions, difficult to find concrete solutions. You could say that we are talking about everything and nothing at the same time. What will it look like in the end when the strategy has been refined? Nobody knows. But it is possible that in many respects it will be too late to come up with a strategy.
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Wojciech Albert Łobodziński was a former correspondent from France, Italy and Poland, writing about foreign policy, climate change, labor rights, but also new social phenomena for Cross-border talks, publishing in English. He is now Generation Climate Europe’s new Membership Coordinator. […]
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mars 31, 2025By Jacek Wojnicki, Warsaw University.
This article has already been published in Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (Polish Review of Constitutional Law), 2020, 5 (57), 481-499. doi: 10.15804/ppk.2020.05.35.
Introduction
The analysis looks at the evolution of the systemic position of the Prime Minister of Hungary both in the context of existing legal and constitutional regulations and the developed constitutional practice. It covers the period after the beginning of the 1989 political and systemic transformations and the first contested election to the National Assembly in March and April of 1990. At the same time, the traditions of the institution of the government and its head in successive systemic orders from the mid-19th century (the Spring of Nations and the formation of Austria-Hungary institutions) have been included. It is noteworthy that the institution of the Prime Minister and the government has functioned in different systemic models – constitutional monarchy, parliamentary monarchy, the authoritarian system developed during the regency of M. Horthy (1919-1944), the parliamentary cabinet system (1945-1949), the system of a single state power dominated by the communist monoparty (1949-1989), and the peaceful transition towards the parliamentary model after 1989. A significant milestone in Hungary’s modern political history is 2010 when the ruling party, FIDESZ, won a constitutional majority in the National Assembly. The hypothesis of the article is as follows – the institution of Hungary’s Prime Minister has been affected to a larger extent by the tradition of shaping this institution than by direct constitutional regulations. This trend was particularly evident in the interwar period (the so-called regency) and the period of political transitions after 1990. The personality of a Prime Minister has significantly affected the political position of the head of government (the case of I. Bethlen, M. Rákosi, I. Nagy, J. Kádár, J. Antall or V. Orbán). Here, it is worth quoting the opinion of a Hungarian political scientist referring to the political changes introduced after 2010 by the FIDESZ government: The number of fundamental changes introduced in the public sphere alone makes it difficult to describe them even superficially and to characterize the government’s policy. But it can be summed up as a desire to confer more power (economic and legislative) on the executive in relation to other state agencies and institutions.
2. A historical overview
During the Spring of Nations, Lajos Kossuth, as the head of a delegation of the parliament’s lower chamber, presented in Vienna a programme of political-systemic and social-economic reforms. He demanded the establishment of an autonomous Hungarian government that would be accountable to the parliament (elected by taxpayers with voting rights). On 18 March 1848, the Austrian emperor decided to accept the presented demands and consequently appointed Count Lajos Batthyány as Prime Minister. He set up a government composed of liberal Hungarian politicians. At the same time, the parliament convened in Pozsony (now Bratislava) amended the constitution, establishing a constitutional monarchy. The parliament had a two-chamber structure – with an upper chamber composed of aristocracy and appointed dignitaries, while deputies elected for a three-year term sat in the lower chamber. After the Spring of Nations was defeated by the imperial forces in 1849, the Monarch revoked the 1848 regulations concerning Hungarian institutions (the parliament and the government).
A settlement was reached in February 1867 under which Hungary became a constitutional part of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was given a separate parliament and government, joint (Hungarian-Austrian) ministries of foreign affairs, military affairs and treasury were established. The so-called delegation was created, whose task was to agree on common matters involving the relationship between Budapest and Vienna.
The Hungarian constitutional act consisted of the April and December 1867 acts and many other legal regulations relating to more than 1,000 years of history of independent statehood. The Hungarian government carried out its decisions through the administrative apparatus and local autonomous authorities. These included counties and cities authorized to enact local laws. By 1918, there were 67 counties and 25 cities with legal autonomy in Hungary. The government of the Kingdom of Hungary – in accordance with the adopted model of parliamentary monarchy – was politically accountable to the parliament. In the area of the so-called common matters, in turn, „imperial-royal” ministers who did not belong to the Austrian or Hungarian government were in charge. The common ministers were accountable to the so-called delegations elected by the parliaments – the Austrian and the Hungarian – and to the Emperor.
After the Hungarian Soviet Republic was overthrown in the summer of 1919, Hungary’s system was de iure a form of constitutional monarchy. The functions of the head of state were performed by the regent while the royal throne remained vacant. The Act no I from 1920 established a tripartition of power – the legislative one was exercised by the parliament, the executive one by the regent, and the judicial one by the tribunals. The regent had the right to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and – at the request of the head of government – appoint individual ministers. The appointment of a Prime Minister did not require searching for a majority parliamentary coalition around their candidacy. Relevant regulations stipulated that a Prime Minister appointed by the regent automatically became the leader of the ruling faction – the Unity Party, regardless of his previous political affiliation. Moreover, a Prime Minister could not be dismissed by the deputies without prior consent of the regent.
According to the constitutional act passed on 31 January 1946, Hungary was proclaimed a republic. The President of the Republic exercised executive power through ministers accountable to the National Assembly. The head of state had the right to appoint and dismiss a Prime Minister after hearing from the Assembly’s political committee. In this regard, he acted according to the principle of parliamentary majority. The President appointed and dismissed ministers – at the request of the head of government. The appointed government was obliged to present its action programme in the parliament within 8 days. Before the government was approved, the head of state could not dissolve the National Assembly. Every presidential decree and regulation required a countersignature of the head of government and the responsible departmental minister. (art. 13 of the Constitution)
The president’s competences included appointing government officials above the fifth service group as well as all the judges – at the request of the head of government and the relevant departmental minister. (Art. 14 of the Constitution)
The constitution of 20 August 1949 proclaimed the Hungarian People’s Republic as a state of people’s democracy. The Council of Ministers was defined as the supreme body of state administration. Its structure and tasks were specified in the fourth chapter – the Supreme body of state administration. The Council of Ministers was composed of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, ministers without portfolio and ministers in charge of individual departments. The authority of requesting an appointment and dismissal of individual members of the Council of Ministers was taken over by the Presidential Council. The members of the government, who were not deputies, could also take part in parliament sittings and have their say in discussions (par. 23 of the Constitution). It is worth noting the new name of the governmental body, the Council of Ministers, which had not previously existed in Hungarian legislation.
The government was accountable to the National Assembly and reported to it on its activity. The Hungarian legislator also established the responsibility of the Prime Minister individually and of individual ministers for the orders they issued and their public activity. The government could act directly or through a specific ministry in the areas falling within the competence of the Council of Ministers. It could also take state administration branches under its direct supervision and create special bodies to this end.
In April 1972, the National Assembly passed a comprehensive amendment to the 1949 constitution. Hungary was proclaimed a „socialist state”, rather than a „state of people’s democracy” as before. New legal regulations relating both to the institution of the government and the entire state administration were introduced then. The supreme body of state administration reverted to its traditional name – the „Council of Ministers”, which had been replaced in November 1956 by the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government. The legislator broadened the tasks of the Council of Ministers by adding the following to the existing catalogue – protecting and securing the state system, the social order and the rights of citizens; managing the activity of field councils and exercising supervision over the lawfulness of their actions; determining the development directions in science and culture and providing the necessary human resources and material conditions for it; creating the system of social provision and health care, and securing material resources for these objectives.
The democratic transition launched in Hungary in the late 1980s resulted in the hammering out of a comprehensive amendment to the existing constitutional act from August 1949 by negotiators from the government’s side and representatives of the political opposition gathered at the „Triangular Table”. The fundamental constitutional principle was based on a joint declaration of building a democratic state and the rule of law. The constitution was amended in October 1989 and on 23 October 1989 – the 33rd anniversary of the outbreak of the People’s Revolution – the Republic of Hungary was proclaimed (marking the country’s return to its name from 1946-1949).
As Hungarian constitutional scholar Adam Antal emphasized when analyzing the model of government developed in Hungary at the time, „the system of government can be classified as a parliamentary republic. The situation and position of the new authorities, i.e. the President of the Republic, the government and the parliament, as well as relations between them, are largely determined by the traditions of parliamentarianism. The President of the Republic has not been equipped with the right of arbitration”. The key task of the head of state is to carry out the mission of cooperation and balance from the point of view of the parliament and the government. The parliamentary cabinet model was based on three elements of its structure: 1/a unicameral parliament elected by universal suffrage; 2/a separation of the tasks of the President of the Republic and the head of government, and 3/a non-separation of the executive power which was assigned to the government. Witold Brodziński emphasizes that the Hungarian political elites recognised the division and balance of powers as the essential guarantee of the democratic system. This allowed for the development of a bipolar system of government where the key levers of state power included the parliament and the government. Inside the government, ministry heads received significant competences.
Under the 1989 regulations, the government consisted of the Prime Minister and the ministers. It returned to the traditional name of the executive body, the name the Council of Ministers was scrapped. The post of Deputy Prime Minister was notably skipped. At the same time, the Hungarian legislator declares that the Prime Minister is replaced in their duties by a minister designated by the head of government. New rules for electing the Prime Minister and the government were introduced. The President of the Republic obtained the right to present a Prime Minister candidate to the National Assembly. Then the parliament needs to take a stand on the submitted candidacy. The Prime Minister is elected by a majority of votes of the statutory number of deputies. As the Prime Minister is elected, the National Assembly expresses its views on the issue of approving the government’s programme. Ministers, in turn, are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic. But he acts in this area at the request of the Prime Minister. The government is created when its ministers are appointed. At the same time, after the government has been formed, the members of the government are obliged to take an oath before the parliament (par. 33 of the Constitution). In the view of Hungarian constitutional scholar Nóra Chronovski, the constitutional position of the President of the Republic represents the features of the head of state in a parliamentary democracy. The constitutional definition of the President emphasizes ”representing the unity of the nation and safeguarding the democratic functioning of the organization of the state”. One can only agree with Bogusław Pytlik that the order of chapters established in the autumn of 1989 (chapter III – the head of state, chapter VII – the government) does not reflect the real constitutional position of these authorities of state power. The President of Hungary ranks among the weakest heads of state in Central Europe in the political and constitutional realities after 1989.
In the 1997 amendment, the chapter on the government’s structure and rules of operation was rephrased. Par. 33 was amended by adding points a and b. They relate to cessation of the powers of the government and its individual ministers. The legislator declares that the powers of the government cease: 1/after a new parliament has been installed; 2/after the head of government has died; 3/in the event the Prime Minister has lost voting rights; 4/in the event incopabilitas is established by the Prime Minister; 5/after a constructive no-confidence motion has been passed and a new head of government has been elected. (par. 33/A)
In the case of a minister, on the other hand, it was determined that their powers expired in the event of: 1/a cessation of the government’s powers; 2/resignation; 3/dismissal; 4/death; 5/a loss of voting rights, and 6/when incopabilitas is established by a government member. (par. 33/A) As noted by Bożena Dziemidok-Olszewska, the system of parliamentary government developed in the Republic of Hungary in the early 1990s had its origins in the Austro-Hungarian times. It resulted indirectly from the tradition of the political and legal culture of the Hungarian society and its attachment to a special position of the parliament among the supreme bodies of state power.
3. The constitutional regulations
First of all, it is worth analyzing the constitutional regulations relating to the institution of the government and its relations with the legislative power on the one hand and the President of the Republic on the other.
The Basic Law of Hungary of 11 April 2011 devotes to the government one section in the chapter The State – containing articles 15 to 22. The Hungarian legislator precisely defines the tasks of the government and its place in the structure of other bodies of power. The government is referred to as the main executive authority whose scope of responsibility and competences encompass all the areas of activity, except for those constitutionally transferred to other authorities. It is an example of a negative definition. It was declared at the same time that the government is politically accountable to the parliament. The government is the supreme body of public administration which, by law, can create state administration bodies. The government is authorized to issue regulations – acting within its competences, on issues ungoverned by laws, or based on statutory authorization. The Hungarian legislator declares that a government regulation must not contradict other legal acts (art. 15 of the Constitution).
The position of the Prime Minister is underlined in the constitutional regulations relating to government formation. The make-up of the government is determined through categories of its members – the Prime Minister and the ministers. But the Prime Minister, by way of a regulation, can designate one or more Deputy Prime Ministers from among the ministers, it is therefore their discretionary power. The procedure of appointing the Prime Minister also points to his role in the government and is similar to solutions applied in the chancellor model of government. The Prime Minister is elected by the deputies at the request of the President. It is necessary to obtain an absolute majority of votes for an election to be effective. The head of government takes office upon election. The election of the Prime Minister takes place in two circumstances – at the inaugural meeting of the National Assembly and within 15 days after the Prime Minister’s mandate has expired. Such expiration can occur in the following circumstances: resignation, death, establishing the existence of a conflict between the office of Prime Minister and the functions they perform, a failure to meet the necessary conditions to be elected Prime Minister, a no-confidence motion. In the event a candidate submitted by the head of state fails to be elected Prime Minister, the President is required to present another candidate within 15 days. Ministers, on the other hand, are appointed by the President at the request of the head of government (art. 16 of the Constitution). In addition, it should be noted that the Hungarian legislator stipulates that the Prime Minister determines the main directions of the government’s policy. Within the main directions of the government’s policy, the ministers independently run the public administration departments under their control and subordinated bodies and also carry out the tasks assigned by the government and the Prime Minister (art. 18 of the Constitution).
The Hungarian legislator precisely defines the circumstances when the Prime Minister’s mandate expires. These include: the installation of a newly elected parliament; an expression of no confidence in the Prime Minister; the parliament’s failure to express confidence at the request of the Prime Minister; resignation; death; when a conflict is established between the function exercised and other public functions performed; when the conditions necessary to elect them Prime Minister no longer exist. The constitution states it is up to the parliament to decide that the conditions necessary for the Prime Minister’s election no longer exist and that there is a conflict between the Prime Minister’s function and other public functions they perform. A two thirds majority of the voting deputies is required to issue the decision in question (art. 20 of the Constitution).
As already mentioned before, the Hungarian regulations draw on the experiences of the chancellor model. They are apparent when the no confidence procedure is discussed. The measure envisaged by the Hungarian legislators includes a constructivist element with a requirement to simultaneously submit the name of a candidate for the next head of government. A relevant request can be made by a group of at least one fifth of deputies to the National Assembly. An absolute majority of the statutory number of deputies is required to take an effective decision. The Prime Minister has two more instruments in relation to the parliament. First; they can call a confidence motion. The National Assembly does not express its support for such a request if no more than half of the statutory number of deputies support it in a vote. Second; the head of government can link the issue of confidence in their cabinet with the fate of a specific government submission. In such a situation, the parliament, by refusing to express its support for a governmental proposal submitted for vote, also takes a stand on the issue of no confidence in the cabinet (art. 21 of the Constitution). Wojciech Orłowski points out that the system of government shows several similarities to the chancellor model found in Germany, with the president equipped with limited competences, indirect election by the parliament, as well as the procedure of electing the Prime Minister by the parliament at the request of the head of state.
4. The constitutional practice
It is worth analyzing the issue of who has occupied the Prime Minister’s seat in Hungary after 1990. The time frame begins with the first free and democratic parliamentary election in Hungary since 1945; it naturally ends in 2020 (the moment the article was written).
Table 1 – PMs of Central and Eastern European countries after 1990
No.CountryName and surnameFactionThe mandate’s duration1HungaryJózsef AntallMDFVII 90-XII 932.HungaryPéter BorossMDFXII 93-VII 943.HungaryGyula HornMSzPVII 94-VII 984.HungaryViktor OrbánFIDESZVII 98-V 025.HungaryPéter MedgyessyMSzPV 02-IX 046.HungaryFerenc Gyurcsány**MSzPIX 04-IV 097.HungaryGordon BajnajBezp.IV 09-V 108.HungaryViktor Orbán***FIDESZV 10-
MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum ; MSzP – Hungarian Socialist Party ; FIDESZ – The Federation of Young Democrats.
Source: the author’s compilation
Seven heads of government have been in office in Hungary in the analyzed period. Politicans have been Prime Ministers twice: Ferenc Gyurcsány and Viktor Orbán four times. It is noteworthy that one (i.e. the first) term of V. Orbán is interrupted by an eight-year period in parliamentary opposition (the years 2002-2010). However, Hungary has not seen a single case of an interim government, nor have there been any early elections to the National Assembly, which is a sign of certain stabilization of the political system as well as consolidation of the party system. But it does not mean that all the governments have survived entire four-year parliamentary terms.
The government has been most often headed by the leader of the victorious political party (the casus of MDF, MSzP, FIDESZ). There have been four such Prime Ministers out of a total of seven, including one who was first the head of government and only during that period became the leader of the ruling party – Ferenc Gyurcsány. One of the Prime Ministers replaced a deceased head of government late in the parliament’s term – in December 1993. That was the case of Peter Boross, interior minister in the first democratic government of Jozsef Antall. After two years of participation in the government, the politician joined MDF and even became its vice-chairman. One of the Prime Ministers took office following a vote on a constructive no confidence motion – G. Bajnaj at a meeting of the National Assembly on 14 April 2009.
Alternation of power occurred in Hungary already in the first contested election to the National Assembly (1990), in the first period the main sociopolitical division differentiating the political scene involved historical issues, along the lines anticommunist opposition–postcommunist parties. In Central and Eastern European countries, the historical division first lost its importance in Slovakia (in March 1994), with Hungary following suit (July 1994). A governing coalition was then formed between the postcommunist MSzP and the social-liberal SzDSz originating from the Budapest democratic opposition (it formed the parliamentary basis of the cabinet of G. Horn). That coalition was again formed in 2002 (the cabinet of Péter Medgyessy and the first government of Ferenc Gyurcsány) and once more in 2006. In the latter case, however, the coalition did not survive a full term, after the ministers recommended by SzDSz stepped down in 2008 due to their disapproval of the social and economic policy pursued.
Table 2 – The length of a Hungarian PM’s time in office after 1990
No.countryName and surnameThe mandate’s durationFaction1.HungaryViktor Orbán165 monthsFIDESZ2.HungaryFerenc Gyurcsány55 monthsMSzP3.HungaryGyula Horn48 monthsMSzP4.HungaryJózsef Antall43 monthsMDF5.HungaryPéter Medgyessy28 monthsclose to MSzP6.HungaryGordon Bajnaj13 monthsclose to MSzP7.HungaryPéter Boross7 monthsMDF
Source: the author’s compilation
It follows from the data presented in table 2 that Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán has served as Prime Minister for the longest time, more than 165 months in total, or over 13 years and 9 months by April 2020 (taking into account his four terms including the current one, yet to be completed at the time of writing this article). There have been different reasons why the head of government’s mission was terminated – the PM’s faction lost the next parliamentary election four times (P. Boross, G. Horn, V. Orbán, G. Bajnaj), in one case the Prime Minister died in office (in April 1993 – J. Antall), internal conflicts in the MSZP leadership were the reason twice – 2004 – Péter Medgyessy, and five years later – Ferenc Gyurcsány.
The sociodemographic structure of Hungarian heads of government is as follows. Notably, only men have been heads of government, a woman has only served as Deputy Prime Minister. The youngest Prime Minister at the time of his election was V. Orbán, 35 in July 1998, 47 when he took the office of Prime Minister again. The oldest Prime Minister at the time of his election was P. Boross – he was 65 then. Hungary has also had two heads of government in their 40s – Ferenc Gyurcsány (45) and Gordon Bajnaj (41). Those in their 60s included Gyula Horn (62), P. Medgyessy (60). In turn, the first democratic Prime Minister after 1990, J. Antall, was 58 years old at the time of his election.
When it comes to education, it should be noted that all Hungarian PMs completed university studies. Four of them graduated in economics (G. Horn, F. Gyurcsány, G. Bajnaj and P. Medgyessy). In addition, two of them could boast of holding a PhD degree – J. Antall in history and G. Horn in economics. J. Antall (philology and history), V. Orban (law and philosophy of politics) and F. Gyurcsány (pedagogy and economics) studies at two faculties. In the context of their political (as well as government) career, it should be noted that two PMs were members of the communist governments before 1990 – G. Horn headed the department of diplomacy in the last MSZMP cabinet led by M. Nemeth (1989-1990), while P. Medgyessy headed the finance ministry (1987) and was Deputy PM for economic affairs in the governments of K. Gross and M. Nemeth. He was also in charge of the finance ministry again in the cabinet of G. Horn (1996-1998). Those who had experience in government administration before taking office as PMs also include P. Boross (interior minister in the government of J. Antall), F. Gyurcsány (minister of youth and sport in the government of P. Medgyessy) and G. Bajnaj – head of the department of regional development and local government as well as minister of economy and national development in the cabinet of F. Gyurcsány (2007-2009).
Andrzej Antoszewski points out that the potential and real power of Prime Ministers in the discussed region is growing. This stems from several premises – the process is connected with the consolidation of democratic systems, but it has come with an increase in some undemocratic tendencies (the case of Hungary); the position of Prime Minister constitutes a key link in the political system; heading a government is increasingly connected with party leadership which is evidenced by examples not only from the discussed region of the Old Continent. This practice has emerged in full swing in Hungary, beginning with the government of J. Antall. Heads of government who weren’t party leaders at the same time were exceptions. They were appointed during deadlocks in political elites of the ruling factions (usually leftist -MSZP). A particular strengthening of the political position of the head of government can be seen on the example of Viktor Orbán, beginning with his first term after 1998. An increased tendency to consolidate power around the instruments subordinated to the Prime Minister has been seen since 2010. In this context, it is worth quoting an opinion of a columnist familiar with Hungary: Orbán appears to be benefitting from Hungarians being accustomed to strong leaders who rule for many years. If we take into consideration the past century alone, only three leaders have ruled the country over 70 years: the regent Miklós Horthy, the communist first secretary János Kádár, and Orbán. Although only the last of them was elected in democratic elections.
5. Summary
In summary, it should be noted that we can see an evolution of the institution of the Prime Minister in Hungary since 1989. According to the adopted model of government (largely modelled on parliamentarianism, with some exceptions in regulations and constitutional practice since 2012), the position of the head of government is a key post for the leaders of political factions. Ambitious politicians with leadership qualities have sought to head the government, becoming the most influential politicians in the country (the case of Jozsef Antall, Gyula Horn, Viktor Orban). Those who held office for the longest time have spent more than 100 months in the Prime Minister’s chair (the case of V. Orban). The real power of the head of government is at its weakest when the Prime Minister is not in the chair of the ruling party’s leader, which is a direct result of the adopted constitutional and systemic solutions (the case of P. Medgyessy and G. Bajnaj).
A particular strengthening of the Prime Minister’s power has been seen since 2012. It has resulted from several reasons – the victorious political camp, de facto FIDESZ, holding a constitutional majority in the parliament, carrying out a constitutional change which additionally strengthened the position of the government and its head against the parliament, also by reducing the influence of the parliamentary opposition on the legislative and supervisory process towards the cabinet and state administration. As a Hungarian political scientist depicted the dilemma: A two thirds majority means higher expectations of voters and a greater burden of responsibility on the ruling parties. That’s because all the actions will be assessed more strictly when the rulers do not face any serious opposition that could be a counterweight in legislative work. From this point of view, what matters is not the constitutional threshold, but the fact that the rulers can ignore dissenting voices, which may create an impression of a deficit of democracy. The columnist’s conclusion offers an afterthought: While they have held a constitutional majority for a large part of this decade, the country hasn’t seen profound systemic or social changes. The new constitution enacted in 2011 did not fundamentally change the system, but it made institutional corrections in favour of FIDESZ instead. It was similar with the amended electoral law, which was remodelled to benefit the candidates of this party. What merits particular attention is a weakening of the supervisory functions performed by the parliament. It is a core element of the parliamentary cabinet system.
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END NOTES
See M. Szabó, Państwo i demokracja: świat jako wola, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016, p. 132
See M. E. Ducreux, Czechy i Węgry w monarchii habsburskiej w XVIII-XIX wieku, Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, J. Kłoczowski, Lublin 2000, p. 401; W. Felczak, Historia Węgier, Wrocław 1983
See J. Reychman, Dzieje Węgier, Łódź-Warszawa 1963, p. 61
See T. Kopyś, Historia Węgier 1526-1989, Kraków 2018, p. 303
See I. Romsics, Historia Węgier, Poznań 2018, p. 312 and J. Kochanowski, Węgry: od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Series: Historia państw świata w XX wieku, Warszawa 1997
See H. Donath, Przemiany ustrojowo-prawne 1939-1949, Wrocław 1978, p. 14 et seq. And J. R. Nowak, Węgry 1939-1969, Warszawa 1971, p. 18
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1949, p. 214
Ibidem. See B. Pytlik, Prezydent Republiki Węgierskiej, Prezydent w państwie współczesnym. Modernizacja instytucji, J. Osiński, Warszawa 2009, p. 698
See B. Kovring, Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár, Stanford University 1979, p. 234 et seq.; J. Kochanowski, Węgry: od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. …, op. cit., Communism in Eastern-Europe, T. Rakowska-Harmstone, London 1979
See Nowe konstytucje państw europejskich. Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, L. Gelberg, Warszawa 1950, ps. 44
See T. Szymczak, Ustrój europejskich państw socjalistycznych, Warszawa 1983, p. 256 and L. Szamel, Le système étatique de la République Populaire Hongroise, Budapest: Institut des Sciences juridiques et politiques de l’Académie des Sciences de Hongrie et l’Association des Juristes hongrois 1966
The amendment should be seen in the context of similar amendments in other Central and Eastern European countries in the 1960s and 1970s. See I. Kovács, New elements in the evolution of socialist constitution, Budapest 1968
See Konstytucja Węgierskiej Republiki Ludowej, A. Gwiżdż, Wrocław 1975 and E. Zieliński, J. Zieliński, Rządy w państwach Europy, Warszawa 2007, p. 283
See Rebirth of democracy. 12 constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Coucil of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 1996 and The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, J. Elster, University Of Chicago Press 1996
See A. Antal, Le rôle de la Constitution en Hongrie, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001, p. 116
ibidem
See W. Brodziński, System konstytucyjny Węgier, Warszawa 2003, p. 55
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, H. Donath, Warszawa 1992
See N. Chronovski, The Head of State in the Hungarian Constitutional System, Ten Years of the Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, K. Działocha, R. Mojak, K. Wójtowicz, Lublin 2001, p. 350
See B. Pytlik, Prezydent Republiki Węgierskiej, Prezydent w państwach współczesnych…, op. cit., p. 706
See Konstytucja Republiki Węgierskiej, W. Brodziński, Warszawa 2002
ibidem
See B. Dziemidok-Olszewska, System polityczny Węgier, Systemy polityczne państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W. Sokół i M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005, p. 584
See Ustawa zasadnicza Węgier, W. Brodziński, Seria: Konstytucje państw świata, Warszawa 2012
ibidem
Viktor Orbán was twice elected Prime Minister under the new Hungarian constitution – at the first meeting of the National Assembly after the 2014 and 2018 elections. A request to approve the Prime Minister candidate was submitted by the President of the Republic – János Áder. He was elected by the National Assembly on the first ballot.
ibidem
ibidem
A constructive no-confidence motion has been voted on once in the Hungarian political practice – on 14 April 2009, when Gordon Bajnaj was elected to replace Ferenc Gyurcsány (still under the previous constitutional act).
See W. Orłowski, Republika Węgierska, Ustroje państw współczesnych. Tom 2, E. Gdulewicz, Lublin 2002, p. 291. See Emergence of East Central European Paliaments: The First Steps, A. Agh, Budapest 1994
See M. Grzybowski, Pierwsze wolne wybory parlamentarne: Polska, Czechy, Słowacja: w poszukiwaniu adekwatnego systemu, „Ad Meritum”, 1995, nr 1; R. Chruściak, Wolne i demokratyczne wybory powszechne w 1990 roku w Europie Wschodniej (Bułgaria, Czechosłowacja, Węgry, Rumunia), Transformacja ustrojowa państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, E. Zieliński, Warszawa 1996; A. Agh, The Politcs of Central Europe, London 1998; Post-Communist Transition. Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, A. Bozóki, A. Kőrősényi, G. Schőpflin, London-New York 1992
See J. Debreczeni, Viktor Orbán, Warszawa 2015 and https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Orb%C3%A1n
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C3%A9ter_Boross
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Bajnai
See A. Antoszewski, Partie i systemy partyjne na przełomie wieków, Toruń 2009; K. Sobolewska-Myślik, Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej po 1989 roku, Kraków 1999; J. Wojnicki, Kształtowanie się systemów wielopartyjnych w Europie Środkowowschodniej, Pułtusk 2004; Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne: zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2005
See A. Czyż, S. Kubas, Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej – od Jánosa Kádára do Viktora Orbana, Katowice-Sosnowiec 2011; J. Fitzmaurice, Politics and government in the Visegrad countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Basingstoke: Macmillan 2002; The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press 1999
This refers to Deputy Prime Ministers dr Mónika Lamperth (in office V 2002-2004) and Kinga Gőncz (VI 2066-IV 2009). Both served in centre-left cabinets formed by MSZP and SZDSZ – P. Medgyessy and F. Gyurcsány.
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%C3%A9gorie:Premier_ministre_de_Hongrie
See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%C3%A9gorie:Premier_ministre_de_Hongrie
See A. Antoszewski, Potencjalna i realna władza premiera w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, W kręgu nauki o państwie, prawie i polityce. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żmigrodzkiemu, B. Dziemidok-Olszewskiej, W. Sokoła i T. Bichty, Lublin 2012, p. 38
It is worth noting, however, that Viktor Orbán gave up party leadership in May 2000, wishing to focus all his attention on running the government. After the lost election in 2002, he returned to the leadership post in FIDESZ, which he has held up to the present day, combining it from V 2010 with the duties of a ministry head.
See A. Sadecki, Orbán w koronie, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 2020, nr 16, p. 46
See F. Hőrcher, Większość konstytucyjna bez opozycji: ciężar czy szansa? Po wyborach 2014 roku, Przekraczając uprzedzenia i entuzjazm. Druga kadencja Viktora Orbána, J. O’Sullivan, K. Póczy, Kraków-Budapeszt 2016, p. 316
See A. Sadecki, op. cit., p. 46
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Jacek Wojnicki is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Warsaw University (UW), head of the Department of Political Systems. His research interests are centered around the issues of political and administrative systems in Central Europe and the Balkans. […]
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mars 27, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
Credits : Gage Skidmore, all rights reserved.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was a slightly unexpected new addition to yesterday’s Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington. US conservative and MAGA audiences have long embraced Hungary’s national-populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as a poster boy for the kind of authoritarian change they seek in the US. Czechia’s mercurial billionaire populist Andrej Babiš has also thrown in his lot with Orbán’s Patriots for Europe alliance and has appeared at a CPAC regional events in Budapest.
But Fico — who has always positioned himself as a tough, socially conservative Central European social democrat — was perhaps the most obvious new figure at yesterday’s Trump-fest in Washington. Socially conservative and nationalist thinking on the fringes of the European left is, of course, nothing new. Nor is the reluctant (and sometimes not so reluctant) conclusion that the left must do business with the radical populist right, or the unhealthy fascination some figures have with Donald Trump and MAGA. Fico has included radical right parties in his coalition governments since the mid-2000s. Czech “conservative socialist” intellectuals have drawn similar conclusions. The British Labour parliamentarian Lord Maurice Glasman, intellectual guru of the Blue Labour movement, is a J.D. Vance admirer and attended Trump’s presidential inauguration.
In his speech, Fico tried to present himself to the US conservative and MAGA audience as a right-wing populist in the mould of Viktor Orbán, completely airbrushing out his left-wing and communist background. It was an unmemorable, wooden speech delivered without much panache — Fico’s English wasn’t quite good enough to reproduce his hard-hitting speaking style in Slovak. It ticked off standard socially conservative themes on gender and rehashed anti-Ukrainian, Kremlin-aligned talking points that Fico shares with Trump.
The speech also struck some odd notes. Listeners probably understood — or cared — little about Fico’s complaints of political “persecution” while in opposition. His evocation of Slovakia’s anti-fascist traditions, by mentioning Slovaks who fought in the US Army in WWII, may have been intended more for a domestic US audience than for CPAC attendees. His brief plea about tariffs toward the end of the speech struck a bathetic note, at odds with the anti-liberal bombast. It only underscored the reality that the existence and interests of small Central and Eastern European countries count for little — and probably don’t register at all — with a Trump administration inclined to sideline the EU entirely and carve up the world into spheres of influence.
As the Slovak press was quick to note, Fico did get a name-check from Trump at CPAC, along with various US state-level politicians and other foreign guests. But the speech is likely to have very limited — if any — political impact and seems oddly belated. Anyone on the US right looking for a Central European representative of MAGA-style populism will continue to favour the better-known, more established, and more ideologically heavy-hitting Orbán, whose total dominance of Hungarian politics means he has real achievements under his belt. Despite aggressively dismantling Slovakia’s public broadcaster and special anti-corruption prosecutor’s office, Fico’s shaky left-nationalist coalition has done far less — and certainly won’t win any prizes from Elon Musk for “moving fast and breaking things.”
With a Trump 2.0 presidency now taking shape, the period when the US MAGA right, in opposition, was interested in foreign models and supportive European leaders is well and truly over. Compared to Orbán — or even Czech President Miloš Zeman, who backed Trump as early as 2016 — Fico has arrived too late to the party.
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Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
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mars 26, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
More than a century ago Czechoslovakia’s future founder-president wrote of the Problem of Small Nations in the unfolding European crisis of World War I. For him Central Europe was a region of small and medium sized states and societies, which need balance national sovereignty and identity with integration into larger political and economic structures capable of delivering security and prosperity. Caught between Germany and Russia with an absent isolationist USA, things ultimately didn’t work out so well.
Post-1989 transition and subsequent EU accession and NATO membership seemed finally to solve this dilemma. But recent developments suggest this vision is running of steam. Russia’s aggression, the collapsing reliability of the United States as a security guarantor, and the spread of illiberal populism within the Union itself puts question marks over this ‘post-Wall’ settlement. The EU may not be the democratic soft power superpower that it once was – or, at the very least, that it will need to walk a careful line to adapt to geopolitical changes while preserving its core values.
Shifting centre of gravity
The centre of gravity in European politics may shift away from EU institutions. As security and defense issues become pressing, the rise of “coalitions of the willing” outside formal EU structures may become more common, especially if illiberal governments such as Hungary’s—and potentially Slovakia’s or Czechia’s—can hold up decisions in key areas needing unanimity.
The recalcitrant non-EU Brits with their large military establishment are newly important. Even with the EU there may be compromises on rule of law and liberal values, if populist governments, seeing they can’t have their cake and east, knuckle down and align with the EU’s broader security priorities. Poland’s previous nationalist-populist government, despite democratic backsliding, maintained a strong pro-Ukraine stance. Italy’s far-right led government is similarly positioned.
Central Europe’s influence in shaping these dynamics looks limited. Suddenly, the dynamics of European politics seem all about larger states and great powers – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia – in a way that would have been all too familiar to Masaryk.
Democratic backsliding has been a global – but not a universal trend. Until recent Central Europe was laboratory and testing ground for such illiberal governance. The assumption that institutions would bed down and safeguard democracy proved overly optimistic. And in Central Europe democratic erosion was driven by mainstream political actors rather than radical movements rising from the fringes. But radicalisation and illiberalism post-communist Europe have exhibited a greater ideological fluidity than their Western European counterparts, blending left-wing, right-wing, and technocratic elements in ways that defy simple classification. Contemporary populist movements are less defined by coherent ideological position and more by their ability to fire out memes and adapt messaging based on public opinion.
Things have moved fast in Central Europe because parties and institutions tended to be less deeply rooted in society than their counterparts in Western Europe and – we would have said until a few years back – North America. And they moved fast because the region has lost the compelling narrative that once framed its politics catching up with and emulating Western Europe. However, economic convergence has been slow, and full parity with Western European living standards remains elusive. The European Union and Western societies are no longer perceived as models to be imitated.
Initial enthusiasm for European integration has given way to more critical attitudes, with illiberal actors framing Western Europe as a declining civilization that can no longer serve as a reference point. Hardline national populists are looking to the model of Trump’s second administration as blueprint on how to take down EU institutions and big up “states’ rights” in a ‘reset’ and renamed Union. For USAID read, the European Commission.
Central Europe’s bumpy ride
The political trajectories of Slovakia and Czechia illustrate Central Europe’s bumpy ride in terms of both democratic and undemocratic development. Slovakia’s Fico government, returned in 2023, is taking aggressive steps to undermine independent public institutions. But this isn’t simple one-off crisis of democratic backsliding. Slovakia has been a cycle in which liberal political forces gained power, struggled to govern effectively, and being eventually replaced by resurgent nationalist-populist forces. A similar pattern may be about to occur in Czechia, though with differences in timing and scale as billionaire-populist Andrej Babiš seems set to win upcoming 2025 Czech parliamentary elections.
But with Czechia’s PR system, handsomely topping the poll isn’t enough. The role of smaller parties will be decisive. In 2021 Babiš lost power because small left-wing and populist parties, who would have been his natural coalition partner, missed the five percent threshold – and if they clear it, the high effective thresholds in some regional constituencies can squeeze their representation badly. From the polls none of the smaller Babiš-inclined parties – not Tomio Okamura’s radical right SPD, nor the Communist-backed Enough! bloc, nor the dead-in-the-water Social Democrats, nor right-wing populist Motorists’ Party, led by former racing driver Filip Turek, which has a vibe which is half manosphere, half TV shopping channel, are a sure fire thing.
So Babiš’s ANO movement – operating in pretty much permanent campaign mode – is focused on maximising its vote share by consolidating support a few big constituencies to ramp up its representation without killing off potential allies too much. Babiš, it is rumoured, may also include the Social Democrats (SOCDEM) on his electoral list to expand his vote. Having failed to clinch a deal with the Communist-backed left populist Enough! bloc, SOCDEM may well be grasping for such a lifeline. Some analysts, including me, even wonder if we might gradually end up as Trojan Horse for the eventual “social democratization” of the movement if and when Babiš exits politics.
And minor party allies don’t come through, there’s always a plan B: Babiš could opt not to be prime minister if such a move would secure a coalition agreement with parties from the current governing coalition. ANO’s number two Karel Havlíček is currently the bookies’ second favourite to take over as premier.
Czechia 2025: when Babiš is back?
What would a second ANO-led government mean for Czechia? Illiberal populist parties tend to be much more prepared and determined when they return to power after a period in opposition. However, the extent of their ambitions varies. Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico faced immediate legal and political threats that incentivised a more radical approach to consolidating power.
By contrast, Babiš, who was acquitted in high profile but low value Stork’s Nest case, does not face the same level of personal legal risk. Fico’s premiership has also been shaped by personal experiences, including an assassination attempt, which have contributed to his increasingly paranoid and confrontational political style. That said Babiš bears considerable enmity towards the liberal media and Czech public TV and radio, and like so many political leaders simply bypasses traditional media entirely, using social media and direct communication to engage with supporters while avoiding scrutiny. Czech public media which would be vulnerable to political strong-arming by populist government with requisite parliamentary support.
The last question to the panel was what advice we would leave the young and up-and-coming Czech and Slovak audience for when they to grapple with steering their societies. Our advice: pay attention to local on-the-ground realities and local politics, it provide new avenues for democratic renewal; look for new ideas and political models moving beyond the binary framework of catching up with or rejecting the West; and – very Masarykian – aim to tell the truth and spot when other aren’t.
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Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
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mars 24, 2025By Juraj Marušiak, Institute of Political Science of Slovak Academy of Science, Bratislava.
In addition to the sharp polarisation of society between the government camp and the opposition, which concerns the issue of the state’s relationship with civil society, as well as the attitude towards the EU and the war in Ukraine, Slovak politics has been paralysed by several months of government crisis. The coalition of the two nominally social-democratic parties, Direction – Social Democracy and Voice – Social Democracy , and the national-conservative, pro-Russian Slovak National Party (SNS), formed after the September 2023 parliamentary elections, has only a narrow majority of 79 votes out of 150 in parliament. Slovakia has faced a government crisis since October. However, with the appointment of Samuel Migaľ as the new Minister of Investment, Regional Development, and Informatization on March 19, the government appears to have restored its narrow parliamentary majority (Prezident Slovenskej republiky).
The policies of Robert Fico’s fourth government have been the subject of protests practically since its establishment. Initially, opposition to the government’s approach to cultural institutions and public media, as well as its attempt to gain control over commercial media through economic means, dominated the debate. However, the protests, held regularly every two weeks, escalated after the statements of Tibor Gašpar, the deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, who in January 2025, after a visit to Moscow, together with five other coalition MPs, admitted the possibility of Slovakia’s withdrawal from the EU. Although the more pro-European Hlas-SD coalition rejected such an alternative, as did President Peter Pellegrini, Prime Minister Robert Fico stood up for T. Gašpar. Although Fico also denied any thoughts of Slovakia leaving the EU, the protests have mobilised a significant number of citizens and are taking place not only in large cities such as Bratislava or Košice, but also in smaller towns, including those considered to be electoral strongholds of Smer.
However, the protests themselves do not pose a threat to the government. The destabilisation of the ruling coalition was a much greater risk. The first contradictions were already evident after Peter Pellegrini’s victory as president of the Slovak Republic. When he resigned from his previous post as President of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on June 1, 2024, the most minor coalition partner, the SNS (Slovenská Národná Strana, Slovak national party), began to claim the post, which the Hlas-SD party, founded by Pellegrini, rejected. As a result, the Slovak parliament did not have a speaker until March.
The most vulnerable place is the SNS parliamentary caucus. Representatives of several smaller groupings and independent personalities were on its candidate list, but thanks to the system of preferential voting, they managed to enter the National Council. Thus, it happened that only one member of the ten-member SNS club was a member of the party: the party’s chairman and also the deputy chairman of parliament, Andrej Danko. However, he had only limited possibilities to influence the work of the other « his » MPs for the above reason. Yet in October 2024, a group of three deputies led by Rudolf Huliak, who are members of the National Coalition, a minor far-right party, left the SNS parliamentary club. The reason for their decision was dissatisfaction with SNS staff appointments, especially in the environmental field. Huliak, who defends the interests of hunters and criticises the Green Deal and the work of nature conservationists, was one of the candidates for the post of minister of this department in 2023. Still, his statements questioning Slovakia’s membership of the EU were one of the reasons why he did not become a minister in the end. With the departure of this trio, the SNS parliamentary caucus has effectively disintegrated, as its membership has fallen below eight. It was only saved by the transfer of a close Fico associate, Dušan Muňko, from the Smer-SD club, making the SNS a satellite of the strongest coalition party.
Another problem arose within the Hlas-SD party, as four of its MPs began to question the government’s policy in public and criticized the party’s rapprochement with Smer-SD. In doing so, the Hlas-SD was formed in 2020 by splitting from this party. Members of the group around R. Huliak openly stated that they were demanding a place in the government or positions in the state administration, which would, in practice, mean the recognition of their group as the following coalition partner. This was vehemently opposed by the SNS, on whose list they were elected. However, the dissatisfied Hlas-SD members criticised the government’s policies towards cultural institutions and NGOs, as well as its foreign policy rhetoric.
In particular, the group’s unofficial leader, former journalist Samuel Migaľ, declared the need to support Ukraine’s struggle, thus differentiating himself from the rhetoric of government officials. Some of them refused to support the coalition in the vote to remove the leader of the strongest opposition party, Michal Šimečka, from the post of parliamentary speaker. Although parliament was paralysed several times as rebels from coalition parties failed to speak, preventing the session from starting, key government bills were still passed. At the same time, both groups declared that they did not wish to see the government fall. Migaľ and one other deputy were expelled from the Hlas-SD at the January 24, 2025, working congress, which President Pellegrini attended. Another one left the party on his own and joined Huliak’s group. A fourth declared his loyalty to the Hlas-SD party.
Not only did the opposition discuss possible early elections, but Prime Minister Fico also threatened them. However, this would mean the end of the political activity of both groups of discontented people. At the same time, Fico initiated direct negotiations with the rebels without the mediation of the presidents of SNS and Hlas-SD. He stripped the two smaller coalition partners of their ministries. R. Huliak thus became the new Minister of Sport and Tourism, while S. Migaľ was appointed Minister of Investment, Regional Development, and Informatisation. These nominations were already given to them as Smer nominees. The rebels from the Voice lost their parliamentary mandate, which opened the way for the former head of Migaľ’s ministry, Richard Raši, to become speaker of the parliament. In return for the ministerial seat, Migaľ, of course, overnight forgot all his critical remarks about the current government.
Migaľ announced the founding of a new party. If he takes such a step, a unique phenomenon in Slovakia will emerge – an extra-parliamentary ruling party without a single MP. So far, governments led by Smer have been characterised by a certain degree of professionalism, even in the case of coalition partners. This has been one of the sources of Smer-SD’s political strength. However, the new government appointments have brought into the government individuals without the necessary political and professional competence to hold the positions mentioned above. The members of Migaľ’s group do not even have a relevant political background; in terms of preferential votes and influence in their former party, they were marginal figures until the end of 2024.
Fico used the crisis to strengthen his position in the coalition. At the same time, however, he does not want a complete collapse of his partner parties. He is aware that he will need partners to govern after the next elections. So far, he has criticized the governments of his opponents for organizational instability and incoherence, as the coalitions without Smer-SD participation in 2010-2012 and 2020-2023 were composed of four or more parties. At present, however, his government is a de facto coalition of five parties. The leaders of the partner parties Hlas-SD and SNS feel humiliated. Although they are more concerned with the government’s survival than before, they are making their discontent known. Moreover, they will be in government together with former members of their parties, which will certainly not be a stabilising factor for the current coalition.
Especially the people around S. Migaľ have done the almost impossible. Despite the intense polarisation of Slovak society, both segments of it have managed to agree that they are despised. Solving the government crisis is only putting out an acute fire. Fico’s willingness to make far-reaching concessions to preserve the government’s majority is a signal to other potential coalition MPs that it may be worthwhile to challenge the government and secure ministerial posts in this manner. The government will thus have to spend more and more of its efforts fighting for its own survival rather than implementing policies.
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Juraj Marušiak is a senior research fellow at the Slovak Academy of Science. His research fields lie in political regimes and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe and contemporary history of Slovakia. […]
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mars 6, 2025By Michel Perottino, Charles University, Prague.
It is an understatement to say that Trump’s arrival was expected: finally, a president who lives up to the expectations of Czech conservatives, especially at a time when the space on the right is becoming particularly (too) full. Trump´s victory was supposed to support certain political lines (put the weaknesses of the European Union into perspective and possibly propose a sovereignist alternative, strengthen climate scepticism, and clarify the need for an austerity policy) but also to see more clearly who is who, and who is with whom on the right. The advantage was a priori on the side of those currently in government, logically on the front line in the event of a direct connection with the White House.
The government coalition Together (Spolu) already included the conservative right (ODS, the Civic Democratic Party), the pro-European right (TOP 09) and the Christian Democrats in need of recognition of “traditional” values (KDU-ČSL). While these three parties each claim to be politically conservative, it is the ODS that best corresponds to the definition of this political family, especially since it is led by Petr Fiala (since 2014 and now Prime Minister), who sometimes cites not only Reagan or Thatcher but other more classical authors. While Fiala is less of a Eurosceptic today, he is nonetheless a constant and systematic critic of the EU and is also one of the main pillars of the conservative alliance in Europe.
Credits: Michel Perottino, all rights reserved.
An ultra-conservative turn took by Babiš since 2022.
ANO 2011, led by Andrej Babiš, had already changed its tune and for some time now they have been presenting themselves as the representatives of the true conservative right, even though the parties in government continue to stigmatize them as being “left”. ANO 2011 and its president had indeed succeeded after the 2017 elections in emptying the social democrats and even the communists of their electoral substance. At that time ANO 2011 was a member of Renew Europe. Nevertheless, Andrej Babiš, let us remember, had made the liberals jump and threatened to exclude him from Renew Europe after his participation in the ultra-conservative CPAC conference organized by V. Orban in Budapest in 2023; a shift already undertaken on the occasion of the Czech presidential campaign in late 2022-early 2023.
Finally, a newcomer broke the bank in the 2024 European elections: the Motorists for themselves (Motoristé sobě), a new Klausian party claiming to be the most unbridled neo-conservatism, between Klaus, Milei and the AfD… against the ODS criticized as being too weak and increasingly distant from its founding father, V. Klaus.
Let us recall that today the ODS is a member of the Party of European Conservatives and Reformists, while ANO 2011 and the Motorists are part of Patriotes.eu. (an affiliation of ANO 2011 that has still not been taken into account in the Czech Republic).
At one time, Petr Fiala’s ODS seemed to be the best candidate for the conservative game by displaying Giorgia Meloni, Mateusz Morawiecki, or Janez Janša as early allies. Let us recall that at the instigation of the latter, the Slovenian (Janša), Polish (Morawiecki) and Czech (Fiala) prime ministers courageously made the first official trip of European representatives to Kyiv, shortly after the start of the Russian aggression, thereby criticizing the EU’s inaction of its representatives with too little legitimacy.
Trump’s victory seemed to be going in the right direction, that of Euro-Atlanticism more Atlanticist than European. That of an Atlanticism clearly posted against Russia and Putin´s aims of reconstituting the Soviet empire (the one that goes all the way to the former borders of the Eastern bloc… including the Czech Republic). Trump’s first kicks in the Euro-Atlantic alliance allowed the hawks to cry victory: finally Europe was backed into a corner, a weak Europe without a leader… In this specific understanding of the change, Trump allowed the EU to take stock of its shortcomings and weaknesses and lead it to finally react. The “time for awareness” would then have come. But Trump has gone much further. For the moment, much too far: humiliating Zelensky in a trap in the Oval Office has already caused doubt among government conservatives. The presentation of Putin as the good guy (and Zelensky as the dictator) and the pause in military aid to Ukraine has caused their consternation.
In doing so, Trump has made his choice between the line of the conservatives in power, fiercely anti-Russian (and pro-American) on the one hand, and on the other that of the partisans of Russian “peace”, those who want immediate peace, to the detriment of the aggressed, as in the case of Babiš or Turek. The facts do not matter: the same appeal to “common sense” hits the mark.
The memories of a heavy past do not matter, that of Munich in 1938, when Czechoslovakia, abandoned by the British and the French, had paid the price of Hitler’s need to expand its living space… with the support of the mediator Mussolini. Without the Czechoslovaks, it must be remembered, absent from these negotiations. The nail was hammered home by the Motorist´s MEP, Turek, who refuses to call Putin an aggressor, because “one cannot offend the one with whom one wants to make a pact”. Turek was also present at the CPAC conference in Washington (as well as one of Fiala’s lieutenants, Alexandr Vondra of the ODS) where he met Musk and reported on the Czech political scene that the Nazi outstretched arm is a symbol of the left (Hitler and his party being left-wing since they were national, but above all “socialists”…).
Trump’s policy, however, comes at a bad time: the Czech Republic will hold its elections to the Chamber of Deputies in October 2025. The support of the Czech population for Ukraine has declined and that for Andrej Babiš and his party is hovering far above that of the Together coalition. The pro-Russian camp is growing stronger, from ANO 2011 to the national « communist » coalition Enough! (Stačilo!), including the Motorists. All the more so since the allies were also making mistakes, even faults, which cast doubt on the vitality of the Union and its ability to overcome the crisis without American support, such as organizing a conference on security in Europe without certain Europeans (for example, E. Macron forgot, among others, to invite the Czechs at the end of February 2025, reinforcing the Eurosceptic stance).
The ODS and Together currently seem to be denied in their very foundation by the one in which they had based many hopes. However, there remains the criticism of Russia as cement and the hope that the United States, which has remained upright in their pro-Israeli position, will reverse the decision to leave Europe to its fate. Luckily for these conservatives, this hope is ultimately a form of realism, since Trump can, as we have seen in recent weeks, change his mind overnight.
« Luckily » for the ODS, there also remain cultural themes, in particular the fight against Islamist terrorism (present in Germany, but so far luckily absent from the Czech Republic), the rejection of « wokeism » and « cancel culture » (just as absent), the call for the free market and an economically strong Czech Republic (benefiting in particular from investments in the Czech arms industry). And, of course, the rejection of any form of environmental policy, in particular that of the hated Green Deal.
The ultra-conservative alternatives, ANO 2011 and Motorists, however, take advantage of their rejection of military spending (it will be necessary to cut social spending on which part of the ANO 2011 electorate depends since 2017 – only one problem here: the decision taken by the current government to buy the very expensive Boeing F-35s) and their pro-Russian foreign policy (slammed on that of R. Fico in Slovakia and V. Orban in Hungary… supposed assurance of cheaper Russian raw materials, oil and gas in particular, among the Klausians a long-known orientation) and beyond the recognition of the right of the strongest, dear to the neo-realists. It is always safer to be on the side of the handle… even if it means changing your speech or even your mind later.
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Michel Perottino is an associate professor and researcher at Charles University, Prague. He is head of the Political Science Department since 2015, his main research interests are Czech politics and political parties. […]
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