By Sean Hanley, University College London.

This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.

More than a century ago Czechoslovakia’s future founder-president wrote of the Problem of Small Nations in the unfolding European crisis of World War I. For him Central Europe was a region of small and medium sized states and societies, which need balance national sovereignty and identity with integration into larger political and economic structures capable of delivering security and prosperity. Caught between Germany and Russia with an absent isolationist USA, things ultimately didn’t work out so well.

Post-1989 transition and subsequent EU accession and NATO membership seemed finally to solve this dilemma. But recent developments suggest this vision is running of steam. Russia’s aggression, the collapsing reliability of the United States as a security guarantor, and the spread of illiberal populism within the Union itself puts question marks over this ‘post-Wall’ settlement. The EU may not be the democratic soft power superpower that it once was – or, at the very least, that it will need to walk a careful line to adapt to geopolitical changes while preserving its core values.

Shifting centre of gravity

The centre of gravity in European politics may shift away from EU institutions. As security and defense issues become pressing, the rise of “coalitions of the willing” outside formal EU structures may become more common, especially if illiberal governments such as Hungary’s—and potentially Slovakia’s or Czechia’s—can hold up decisions in key areas needing unanimity.

The recalcitrant non-EU Brits with their large military establishment are newly important. Even with the EU there may be compromises on rule of law and liberal values, if populist governments, seeing they can’t have their cake and east, knuckle down and align with the EU’s broader security priorities. Poland’s previous nationalist-populist government, despite democratic backsliding, maintained a strong pro-Ukraine stance. Italy’s far-right led government is similarly positioned.

Central Europe’s influence in shaping these dynamics looks limited. Suddenly, the dynamics of European politics seem all about larger states and great powers – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia – in a way that would have been all too familiar to Masaryk.

Democratic backsliding has been a global – but not a universal trend. Until recent Central Europe was laboratory and testing ground for such illiberal governance. The assumption that institutions would bed down and safeguard democracy proved overly optimistic. And in Central Europe democratic erosion was driven by mainstream political actors rather than radical movements rising from the fringes. But radicalisation and illiberalism post-communist Europe have exhibited a greater ideological fluidity than their Western European counterparts, blending left-wing, right-wing, and technocratic elements in ways that defy simple classification. Contemporary populist movements are less defined by coherent ideological position and more by their ability to fire out memes and adapt messaging based on public opinion.

Things have moved fast in Central Europe because parties and institutions tended to be less deeply rooted in society than their counterparts in Western Europe and – we would have said until a few years back – North America. And they moved fast because the region has lost the compelling narrative that once framed its politics catching up with and emulating Western Europe. However, economic convergence has been slow, and full parity with Western European living standards remains elusive. The European Union and Western societies are no longer perceived as models to be imitated.

Initial enthusiasm for European integration has given way to more critical attitudes, with illiberal actors framing Western Europe as a declining civilization that can no longer serve as a reference point. Hardline national populists are looking to the model of Trump’s second administration as blueprint on how to take down EU institutions and big up “states’ rights” in a ‘reset’ and renamed Union. For USAID read, the European Commission.

Central Europe’s bumpy ride

The political trajectories of Slovakia and Czechia illustrate Central Europe’s bumpy ride in terms of both democratic and undemocratic development. Slovakia’s Fico government, returned in 2023, is taking aggressive steps to undermine independent public institutions. But this isn’t simple one-off crisis of democratic backsliding. Slovakia has been a cycle in which liberal political forces gained power, struggled to govern effectively, and being eventually replaced by resurgent nationalist-populist forces. A similar pattern may be about to occur in Czechia, though with differences in timing and scale as billionaire-populist Andrej Babiš seems set to win upcoming 2025 Czech parliamentary elections.

But with Czechia’s PR system, handsomely topping the poll isn’t enough. The role of smaller parties will be decisive. In 2021 Babiš lost power because small left-wing and populist parties, who would have been his natural coalition partner, missed the five percent threshold – and if they clear it, the high effective thresholds in some regional constituencies can squeeze their representation badly. From the polls none of the smaller Babiš-inclined parties – not Tomio Okamura’s radical right SPD, nor the Communist-backed Enough! bloc, nor the dead-in-the-water Social Democrats, nor right-wing populist Motorists’ Party, led by former racing driver Filip Turek, which has a vibe which is half manosphere, half TV shopping channel, are a sure fire thing.

So Babiš’s ANO movement – operating in pretty much permanent campaign mode – is focused on maximising its vote share by consolidating support a few big constituencies to ramp up its representation without killing off potential allies too much. Babiš, it is rumoured, may also include the Social Democrats (SOCDEM) on his electoral list to expand his vote. Having failed to clinch a deal with the Communist-backed left populist Enough! bloc, SOCDEM may well be grasping for such a lifeline. Some analysts, including me, even wonder if we might gradually end up as Trojan Horse for the eventual “social democratization” of the movement if and when Babiš exits politics.

And minor party allies don’t come through, there’s always a plan B: Babiš could opt not to be prime minister if such a move would secure a coalition agreement with parties from the current governing coalition. ANO’s number two Karel Havlíček is currently the bookies’ second favourite to take over as premier.

Czechia 2025: when Babiš is back?

What would a second ANO-led government mean for Czechia? Illiberal populist parties tend to be much more prepared and determined when they return to power after a period in opposition. However, the extent of their ambitions varies. Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico faced immediate legal and political threats that incentivised a more radical approach to consolidating power.

By contrast, Babiš, who was acquitted in high profile but low value Stork’s Nest case, does not face the same level of personal legal risk. Fico’s premiership has also been shaped by personal experiences, including an assassination attempt, which have contributed to his increasingly paranoid and confrontational political style. That said Babiš bears considerable enmity towards the liberal media and Czech public TV and radio, and like so many political leaders simply bypasses traditional media entirely, using social media and direct communication to engage with supporters while avoiding scrutiny. Czech public media which would be vulnerable to political strong-arming by populist government with requisite parliamentary support.

The last question to the panel was what advice we would leave the young and up-and-coming Czech and Slovak audience for when they to grapple with steering their societies. Our advice: pay attention to local on-the-ground realities and local politics, it provide new avenues for democratic renewal; look for new ideas and political models moving beyond the binary framework of catching up with or rejecting the West; and – very Masarykian – aim to tell the truth and spot when other aren’t.

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Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe.