Interviews
mai 7, 2025The questions of the interviewer are in bold. F.L. stands for François Lafond. The questions were sent to François Lafond in April 2025, while the Serbian student social movement was taking place.
First of all, could you briefly introduce yourself and tell us how you came to work in and on the Balkans?
F. L.: In the framework of the French Foreign and Cooperation policies, in order to strengthen its national strategy towards the Western Balkans, the French government has proposed to these countries to put at their disposal “technical experts” to accompany them in their European trajectories.
In 2017, I did apply to a job description offer looking for an “European expert”. Among other candidates, I was chosen to be deployed at Skopje in the cabinet of the Macedonian Deputy prime minister for European Affairs. I stayed in North Macedonia for 4 years, before applying to a new position “Adviser for Public administration Reform” in Serbia in 2021. I spent two years at Belgrade as French expert in the Ministry for Public administration and local collectivities and in cooperation with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA).
Before these two experiences, I was quite “candide” concerning the complex political, economical and social situation of the Western Balkans. However, I am a convinced “European promoter” since my master’s degrees, amplified then by an internship at the European Commission few months after the Berlin Wall fall. After that, all my professional experiences were colored by the European footprint, wherever I was, in France, in Italy or in the UK. The new opportunity to experiment “live” the Southeastern Europe was quite attractive that could be summarized by few questions I had in mind: How the European Union could become a global power if we are not able to fix the situation in the Western Balkans? How less than 18 million inhabitants could stay apart the European well being evolution, with bilateral disputes continuing and allowing potential instability spreading around neighbors, members of the EU?
Regarding the slowness of the integration process, do you think that all the Western Balkan countries could enter the EU at the same time?
F.L.: Let’s start from the current situation in the region. Three countries have started the negotiations (Montenegro in 2012 , Serbia in 2014 and more recently Albania in 2024), one is still stuck in a nationalist/populist mood refusing a new compromise in order to start effectively the negotiations (North Macedonia), one is risking to fall apart as a nation (Bosnia-Herzegovina), one (Kosovo) is candidate but is still not recognized as a sovereign state by five EU members states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). The process is effectively slow for many reasons. The first is due to the exercise in itself, meaning assimilation of the enormous “Acquis Communautaire” (dozen of dozens of thousand pages of technical legislation and rules) to be adopted by the candidate countries in order to integrate in a smooth way the internal market and participate in a fair manner to the different communitarian policies. The second reason is linked to the historical trajectory of these countries, reluctant to share elements of their “fragile” sovereignty to supranational institutions or to implement reforms that may constraint their governance system and well established “local habits”. Democratic reforms, respect of the rule of law, free judiciary branch and independent media, protection of minorities, open market economy are some basics principles which are still a work in progress. In principle, what we consider the “Copenhagen principles” are a pre-condition to open the negotiations, but their real implementation is still far from basic expectations.
As the EU membership acceptance final decision owns to each Member States (signature and then ratification), it seems difficult today that all the Western Balkan countries will get in at the same time. Some EU member states, because of their domestic political situation, may block for one or another reason. And the unanimity principle is applying for any new member. We did it in 2004 for 10 countries and for very specific timely reasons, but it seems improbable that the Members States want to reproduce the same move, without modifying the Treaties and in particular the current decision-making process. Even if the pressure from the exceptional geopolitical situation (Ukraine and Moldova) may change the current common thinking (own merit-based process), the “regatta” method will prevailed and surely be privileged. Montenegro and Albania may be the first next members of the EU in few years time. For the others, it will depend on the determination of the governments to accelerate the reforms…as their singular EU roadmaps are very clear.
In case of a new EU enlargement to the Western Balkan countries, which consequences are to expect for the EU stability and economic activity?
F.L.: Even more than ever, this is difficult to anticipate geopolitical and economic consequences for events that are not certain to happen in the short term. In particular with the current erratic Trump administration. Without drawing comprehensive scenario, let’s be frank: the EU cannot leave this region in the current middle way situation. The credibility of the European Union is closely linked to the stabilization and the prosperity of the Western Balkans. In several domains, such as foreign policy alignment (and sanctions), industrial defense production, migration contribution, economic growth and green transition, we must convince them to be onboard. Even before becoming full EU members, the gradual accession model that is today on the table, promoted by the EU institutions, gives each of the 6 countries the possibility to play a positive role, agreeing on our society model (values) and contributing to the “European strategic autonomy”.
What does the election of Donald Trump change in the Western Balkan region, as internally as with the relations with the EU?
F.L.: As everyone can see in Washington DC, this is presumptuous to anticipate which specific orientation will be taken. But let me give you two elements of contextualization. During his first mandate, for a short period, a special envoy of President Trump (Richard Grenell) was quite active in the region on a “business and economic mode”, without always coordinating with the State department… Most of the European chancelleries were not used to such an expeditive and individualistic approach. Without any concrete result. Secondly, during the Biden Presidency, on the contrary, both side of the Atlantic were working in real syntony and in particular the “EU special representative for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and other regional issues concerning the Western Balkans” was systematically backed by the US administration. The Europeans were in charge, the Americans supporting. Without better success. What will be the attitude of the Trump 2.0? Eventual real estate interests in Albania and in Serbia? Beyond the differentiated taxes, suspended for 90 days, (Serbia, 37%, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 35%, North Macedonia, 33% and the three others 10%), this is still not so clear how much attention the new US administration will give to the Western Balkans, considering the other wars going on elsewhere and its China’s obsession.
According to you, does the EU have the diplomatic strength to soothe the tensions in the region?
F.L.: The EU has an obligation to succeed. There is no alternative. We shall be obliged to change again the enlargement method, as the new methodology decided in 2019 has not given any expected positive result. We may decide to be more “proactive” with each of these countries if the EU membership is still their real national priorities. Why to do not propose for each of them a more constraining roadmap with specific measures to be implemented with a precise timeline and a strictly monthly monitoring by a quartet of EU representatives (a representative from the EP, from the European Commission, from the Court of Justice and from the Strasbourg ECHR)? A step-by-step approach targets with concrete benefits once the reform initially agreed done. Let’s learn from the process that we have used ten years ago to keep in the Eurozone Greece with the economic successes that we can observe today. The “Troika” was not greatly appreciated by citizens (sovereignty lost) and it has constrained Alexis Tsipras and its government to implement difficult measures. But the economic results of such therapy are today undisputable. Let’s be clear: the European Union implies sovereignty shares or sovereignty transfers. This is maybe this issue which has still to be explained and understood in order to make real progress.
How can you describe the position of Serbia as it seems taken between EU integration and Russian influence?
F.L.: A choice needs to be clearly made by the current President Vucic, who is still stuck in the non-alignment posture of the ex-Yugoslavia. The mirage of the third way…Beyond this historical reference, there are also concrete elements that explains this continue determination to do not take any sanctions against Russia, after the start of the war in Ukraine. Orthodox religion brotherhood, gas dependence (and till today a very good price contracted), and more important, Russian UN security council seat… in order to block any international decision on Kosovo’s recognition. President Vucic is entertaining in a permanent way the ambiguity, claiming that EU membership is the priority of Serbia without acting to prove it, and considering that he is the only one in capacity to know what is good for his country. This is why he wants to stay in power as long as possible. A characteristic that all autocrats in the world are sharing…
__
François Lafond is the former France’s special counselor in Serbia and has a long experience in working with CEE countries’ administrations. Before that, he was lecturer for the Center of European Studies at Sciences Po (2013-2016) and researcher at the Center Robert Schuman of the European University Institute of Florence (1992-1999). […]
Lire la suite…
mars 31, 2025By Sergiu Mișcoiu, Babeș-Bolyai University, interviwed on 29/03/2025.
This interview was first published in adevarul.ro. Link to the original interview in Romanian: De ce nu vrea România să trimită trupe în Ucraina? „Există teama că Rusia ar putea găsi un pretext, un casus belli”| ANALIZA | adevarul.ro.
The coalition of European countries that want to help Ukraine has given up on the idea of sending peacekeeping troops and has come up with a new formula: reassurance troops. Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu explains the difference between the two concepts and the effects for Romania of the refusal to send troops.
The European leaders met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on Thursday, March 27, to discuss ceasefire negotiations and military support for Kiev.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and his Estonian counterpart Hanno Pevkur signaled their willingness to help secure peace in Ukraine with ground troops, at least in theory, Politico reports.
Estonian Defense Minister Pevkur stressed the importance of clarifying the mandate under which the troops will be deployed: “When our troops are there – German, Estonian, French, British troops – then these troops will be fixed there and there will be a temptation for Russia to immobilize us there and then test us elsewhere,” Pevkur said.
However, in the face of Russia’s categorical refusal to accept peacekeeping troops, the Coalition of states willing to help Ukraine has found an alternative – the so-called reassurance troops, which President Macron emphasized are not « peacekeeping troops. »
In the context of maintaining a sustainable truce in Ukraine, which type of troops do you think would be more effective, peacekeeping troops or reassurance troops?
It depends on what the agreement will look like. We are still very far from a peace agreement. We don’t know what it will look like. We don’t know what Russia will accept. These reassurance troops are the option when Russia is not very open to accepting peacekeeping troops.
They appear as a form of guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. But if there is a peace plan and this peace plan works, it would be much more logical to have peacekeeping troops rather than reassurance troops.
It is still very, very early to discuss the plan itself because it has not yet been accepted by Russia, and we do not know its details. For now, Europeans are preparing scenarios and possible options, but it is clear that there is no unanimity regarding the sending of troops, the idea of sending troops in itself, and how they should look and what mandate they should have.
Why was the decision made to move from peacekeeping troops, which were initially discussed, to reassurance troops?
Because of Russia’s outright opposition, which has repeatedly stated that it would not want Western troops on this demarcation territory, and more importantly, Russia has also stated multiple times that it would prefer an international peacekeeping force, meaning troops from other parts of the world, similar to the UN’s « Blue Helmets. » These would have a different mandate and behavior, not having a pro-Ukrainian stance, as Russia suspects Western troops would have had if they were on Ukrainian territory. Therefore, Russia’s hostility towards the presence of troops from NATO member countries, even if they were called peacekeeping troops, led to this second plan, which is much more realistic regarding Ukraine’s security than peacekeeping.
Why do you think some countries, including Romania, do not want to send either reassurance troops or peacekeeping troops?
Because Romania, but also Poland, for example, feels doubly vulnerable, having a large border with Ukraine and thus being at the forefront of exposure to Russia. They fear that, for example, incidents that could occur between peacekeeping troops, in which Romanians or Poles might participate, and the regular army, civilians, or pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine, could lead to drastic measures from Russia. Russia could find a pretext to threaten Romania’s national security. It could be a pretext, a casus belli (reason for war) with Romania and Poland directly, which is much harder to happen with countries that are far away, without a direct border to the conflict zone. I believe this is primarily where this caution comes from.
Do you think this refusal, so to speak, comes with diplomatic costs?
No, I believe this continues the way Romania has had a relationship with the war in Ukraine over time, showing support for Ukraine but maintaining considerable caution regarding direct exposure to the conflict. And consequences, if Romania were the only country in this position, of course, there could be some repercussions from Western countries. But Romania is not alone; for example, the Dutch parliament voted against similar measures, and other countries are in the same situation.
I think the French and the British, who are the main supporters of this « Coalition of the Will, » as it is called, will consider things in a more realistic manner, so I don’t think there will be major consequences.
__
Sergiu Mișcoiu is a professor and researcher at Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania, specialist of nation-building processes, political transitions and transformations in CEE and francophone Africa. He is also Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and of the Centre for African Studies. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 28, 2025Interview led by Vladmir Mitev and Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat in November 2024 with Georgi Stefanov, an expert on transition issues and climate change-related policies for 15 years in European institutions.
This interview was first published in Cross-border Talks and is used with the agreement of the interviewers. Link to the original interview : Georgi Stefanov: Due to permanent political crisis, Bulgaria just cannot deliver the green transition reforms – Cross-border Talks.
V. M. : Vladimir Mitev, M. K. F. : Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat and G. S. : Georgi Stefanov.
M. K. F. : You co-authored a document called Mission Energy Transition, in which you listed many potential challenges and problems for a just transition in Bulgaria – from the national roadmap to a number of issues at the local level. One year after the publication, what are your thoughts? Which of the challenges have been solved or are on a good way to be solved. What has changed for the better and what has not changed at all?
G. S. : That’s a very difficult question, because we are in a permanent political crisis. This has also affected the institutional and political ambitions of the transformation of the coal regions in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, after the transformation process started about four or five years ago, we are not really moving forward at the moment.
We have an agreement with the European Commission that they will only approve the Bulgarian transition plans if we manage to implement the reforms under the national Resilience and Recovery Plan, which are linked to decarbonisation of the whole Bulgarian economy. But we also have a very large amount of EU public funds from different sources involved in the decarbonisation process. Apart from the national Resilience and Recovery Plan, these are operational programmes and modernisation funds. In total, we have more than seven billion euros for this process for the current program period and the coming years.
However, last year we failed three times to adopt the so-called climate roadmap, the key reform under the Resilience and Recovery Plan. So far, the European Commission has not said anything about Bulgaria’s just transition plans. Given the aforementioned failure, I am afraid that they would not allow Bulgaria to open up the measures related to investments.
Only two parts of the Just Transition plan are currently operational. The first is the mapping of the skills of workers who would be affected by the transformation of the coal sector. In this part, money is going indirectly and directly to the trade unions to map the skills and wishes of workers, particularly in the coal regions. The other measures are the energy efficiency measures and the renovation of buildings. All the other measures, which were to create new jobs and new economic activity, are not in operation, but we expect some new measures to start in the spring of 2025. Especially important are those that create new jobs. A few weeks ago the management committee of the regional development programme, which is basically responsible for the implementation of all the cohesion funds or the regional development plus the Just Transition Fund here in Bulgaria, started again to change the objectives and milestones of the Just Transition Fund, as well as the timing of transition-related activities.
As a result, workers and the entire local communities, especially in Pernik and Bobov Dol – our two smaller coal regions – are suffering a lot. They have been relying on the potential funds and programmes for their regions. And while the just transition funds go directly to the coal regions and might be used to fund dedicated activities, the municipalities cannot use them, because the National Assembly has not adopted the climate roadmap. In September 2024, the government tried again to adopt the climate roadmap through the National Assembly – but they failed again.
We really need a clear direction and a clear commitment. We need to know what is going to be done year by year. Only this way the measures applied within the just transition framework would be properly aligned with everything else. And then nobody will be left behind in the process of decarbonising the coal region. Instead, we see right-wing populist parties using the issue of just transition to make a political scandal. They are stopping the process and we are nowhere in the process of reviewing and changing the just transition plans, indicators and milestones. They should be proposed by Bulgaria. So far this process has only taken the opinion of stakeholders. I’m 90% sure that they haven’t finished it and sent it to the Commission.
M. K. F. : Is there no pressure from the European Commission on Bulgaria to meet its commitments?
G. S. : This may change as soon as in January 2025 – because we are talking about losing money. The Just Transition Fund is structured separately from modernisation or Cohesion Fund. We may lose money again, because we have a specific budget for each year for all the coal regions, not just for Bulgaria. This is how this money is structured. And what is Bulgaria doing? There is not even a chance of forming a government after the last elections we held, not to mention any political ambitions.
M. K. F. : If there is an unwillingness on the part of politicians to move forward, is there any kind of pressure from below, for instance from the private or from the civil society? After all, the private sector involved in coal regions must be aware that change is imminent?
G. S. : Not really. The only progressive and ambitious representatives of the various stakeholders are the environmental NGOs. But they are not powerful enough. At the same time, the trade unions are playing quite irrational games, trying to create a kind of scandal that the European Green Deal is dead. They say we don’t need to phase out coal, that climate change is a global conspiracy. They put a kind of spice on the story from all sides. And in the end it seems that they only want to have the money – I’m talking about 150 million leva from the JTF.
M. K. F. : Is no one interested in reskilling the workers in the coal regions so that their potential is not lost? These are educated people with a technical background. Alternative branches of industry could have been developed instead of coal-related activities. This is one of the essential moments of the just transition concept…
G. S. : So far, in order to shut the trade unions up, the Ministry of Regional Development has tasked the trade unions with reskilling the workers and also granted them direct funding to accomplish the task. The trade union structures are to do it – and we are talking about thousands of interviews with people to be potentially reskilled – of course with external support.
However, the biggest power of the trade unions in Bulgaria is in their membership, especially in the Stara Zagora region. And if we count how many members they have and how much they get per year from their membership fees, we see that the Ministry of Regional Government has given the trade unions the equivalent of membership fees for the next 10 years.
In fact, the trade unions have also failed the people. They failed many times to help unemployed people to get jobs. They have spent hundreds of millions in recent years building training centres in regions with high unemployment. These efforts did not bring about a substantial change and, based on these experiences and previous results, I claim they are going to fail at the reskilling task, too. I am involved in a number of Facebook groups, where miners and trade union people are also present, and I discover there is a lot of propaganda and populism there. At the COVID-19 times, these groups grew a lot. Many times I saw people there laughing at the risk-taking and roadmapping of the skills of miners.
This will mean that Bulgaria will lose 5% of the total amount of just transition funding. That is what I expect.
V. M. : Aren’t the trade unions different in their positions? Podkrepa is usually seen as more conservative and eurosceptic, if you like, but KNSB seems to be more open to the transition.
G. S. : They changed their position after they received the 150 million leva for mapping the skills of the workers.
I was also a trade union leader for three years in my previous job. In Bulgaria trade unions and the Church are the two structures that are not required to fill in financial reports. They cannot be responsible under the financial law, so they are independent from the state – a state in the state. Nobody can keep track of what happens with the funding they received. And while KNSB claims to do their best in reskilling, they have never seriously tried to explain to their members that climate change is real and that we all had to act because there is a threat to people and nature, like the European, and also global, unions explain and trying to protect their members from the biggest crisis – climate change.
Instead, conspiracy theories about climate change not being real flourish in Bulgaria. And the politicians do not want to touch it, because they are afraid of being attacked by right-wing populist parties. Nobody puts climate change on the agenda. Nobody even wants to say that the commitment for the ETS sector for 2030 is minus 62%.
If this was said to the people in a clear way, they would have understood the situation. I am sure of that – based on my experience. I have been working for 18 years on climate change issues and almost 10 years on just transition issues. I have explained the reform process aimed at cutting 40% of CO2 emissions, being at that time the head of the political cabinet of the deputy prime minister for climate policy in Bulgaria. All the ambitious reforms included in The National Resilience and Recovery Plan of Bulgaria, which should modernise Bulgaria’s economy and decarbonise the carbon-intensive sectors, has passed through my hands. In May 2022, when Ursula von der Leyen came to Bulgaria, she said that Bulgaria’s National Resilience and Recovery Plan was the most ambitious and the greenest – in the whole of Europe.
V. M. : Which is no longer the case…
G. S. : Of course. After the changes in the plan, it is no more the most ambitious and the greenest. And the ambitious changes are still left to be done. 56% of the money from the National Resilience and Recovery Plan should be spent in different sectors of the economy to help the decarbonisation processes. The coal story is just the core, the main problem in terms of emissions levels, but definitely not the difficult part.
It should be said at this moment that Bulgarian coal mines are low energy valued, with low energy production capacity. It is quite a technical miracle that any energy is produced from them! And still, I do not think that dealing with the coal sector is the hardest task that we will face. The hardest part will come when the government starts to deal with the so-called Social Climate Fund, which basically means reducing CO2 emissions from cars and buildings and supporting poor people. That will affect close to half of the Bulgarian population.
V. M. : How easy is it for ordinary people to build their own home solar systems and connect them to the grid?
G. S. : We are very far from that. At the EU level, there are major legislative changes called energy reform packages. Each package is a set of directives and regulations that will transform the energy and industrial sectors in Europe.
The 1st liberalisation package was adopted in the distant year 1998 and it aimed to break up the monopolies of the energy producers. At that time, all over Europe, there existed big energy companies, big state-owned companies, and everything was big energy infrastructure. The first liberalisation package actually provided for the breaking up of this state monopoly and the creation of the possibility to have independent suppliers and producers. Then in 2005-2007 there came the second phase, accepted by Bulgaria. It was the introduction of an emissions trading system. The third phase included the setting of green transition targets for the first time. Then comes the fourth phase, which is actually a clean energy package that was included during the Bulgarian presidency of the EU in 2018.
And now, with the Green Deal and the Fit for 55 targets, we are in the 5th phase. A lot of money, a lot of pressure, a change in the conceptual model. Meanwhile in Bulgaria, we have not even done the things related to the 1st liberalisation package.
V. M. : What, specifically, has been neglected?
G. S. : Bulgaria has not allowed the market into this sector. The energy monopolies have not been broken. This means that there are no energy producers, no opportunities to develop investments in the sectors and no investors who would be market participants. Instead, the state offers generous subsidies to the coal mining sectors. The state is transferring billions to a lost sector of the economy.
If we do not apply the 1st liberalisation package which is nearly 30 years old, we will be stuck. The energy supply will probably be good, but only the big energy companies will be doing big projects, with no one thinking about the social aspects, no space for new business creation, no start-ups, no decarbonisation. Everything will remain as it is now – everyone plays a role and the state gives billions in subsidies, hidden or public.
Even if the Bulgarian government tried to apply the 5th liberalisation package, especially the targets for 2030, things cannot happen, because the foundations have not been laid. Metaphorically speaking, the car cannot move because there are no tyres.
Do you remember the first government of Boyko Borisov and why it fell back in 2013?
V. M. : Yes, the winter energy protests.
G. S. : Yes. People started to get upset, because Boyko Borisov wanted to break this liberalisation package. He announced it, he planned it, the Russian proxies and the unemployed came out, and then he put this issue aside.
The Energy Union Regulation, which is the basis for the energy transformation and the goals for 2030, was adopted in Sofia on 18 June 2018, during the Bulgarian presidency. Nevertheless, Boyko Borisov came out two years later and said that he was not going to do the reforms. The regulatory reforms still have not been implemented.
This is a political root of the problem, which concerns the economic growth, poverty of many people and the continuing deficit in the state. The state does not earn the money it could have gained. In the last 2-3 years,due to the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine, there were exorbitant revenues from the high cost of emissions. Since this year this is no longer the case. It is clear that it is more convenient for us to import cheap green energy from our neighbours than to operate the power stations. And yet Borisov hid all these issues during his three mandates.
The people will get the blame, as the Bulgarian proverb goes. All of us, as consumers, will have to pay, especially the people in the southern regions, whose power stations will be closed. How much will the state pay for compensation mechanisms or artificial subsidies that the European Commission will not even approve in the end? And in the context of what is still missing – let us not forget the new financial instrument, the Social Climate Fund and the social climate plans that need to be developed and ready. Again, nothing has been done in this aspect in Bulgaria.
The social climate plans are related to the new emissions trading scheme, which includes the emissions from the transport sector, from all our drivers, and the emissions from buildings and energy shortages. There are 2,6 billion euros there and Bulgaria could have gotten a large percentage, based on GDP and population indications. What must be done is to plan how this Social Climate Fund will define energy scarcity and how it will be a financial instrument to help the decarbonisation process become socially acceptable.
What will happen if nothing is done in the end, and the most acute question arises for several million Bulgarians and several million old and energy inefficient buildings? There will be more than a scandal – there will be a revolution. This is a much greater problem than the Just Transition Fund and the closure of the inefficient coal power plants.
V. M. : If you compare how the process of just transition is progressing in Romania and Bulgaria, what can be learned from the Romanian approach?
G. S. : That if there is a political will, there are opportunities to deliver things. In Romania there is a will to use the available financial instruments to modernise and create new jobs, including in the rural areas. I may also bring here a positive example from Poland – another country which treats the just transition challenge in a serious manner. Poland has been developing geothermal technology – not a new thing, but a technology that miners understand very well. Something underground that brings heat and steam and produces electricity and heat – when you talk to the miners about this, they just feel it is in their blood, in their DNA as workers. If you tell the miners that they could become programmers, agronomists or interpreters, they will not believe. They were trained to work with machines and energy. They need to see solutions they can see as feasible, solutions they could implement with their own work. If such solutions are not offered in the course of the transition process, the whole thing will fail.
Coming back to Romania – unlike there, in Bulgaria the ecological problems are of highest gravity. We have the biggest pollutants with serine dioxide, pollutants that emit half of the Mendeleev table. Bulgaria has not been implementing the best available technologies and practices in the field of cleaning during the combustion of coal. There is no social, nor ecological thought in Bulgarian politics. And everyone will suffer from it.
__
Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian and Romanian-speaking journalist. He is correspondent of Radio Romania for Bulgaria and is an editor at the Romanian section of Radio Bulgaria.
Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat is a Poland-based journalist who focuses on social changes and political life in Central and Eastern Europe. She particularly works on social movements, labour and human rights. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 28, 2025Interview led by Vladmir Mitev on the 28th of February 2025 with Florian Marin, a Romanian trade union leader and economist.
This interview was first published in Cross-border Talks and is used with the agreement of the interviewer. Link to the original interview : Florian Marin: We cannot talk about achievements when we talk about just transition in Romania – Cross-border Talks.
V. M. : Vladimir Mitev and F. M. : Florian Marin.
V. M. : Mr Marin, first of all, officially just transition has been going on for some time. But how would you describe the degree of achievement and successes of just transition in Romania so far?
F. M. : The Just Transition Mechanism is an instrument that can be considered as a step forward, but it is not enough to solve problems as complex as Just Transition. Reorienting whole areas economically and socially is a process which, first of all, takes a long time and requires, among other things, societal will and political will.
First of all, from the point of view of the absorption of funds made available to Romania through the Just Transition mechanism, Romania’s performance is mediocre to poor. Why am I telling you this?
There is a capacity problem in ensuring the proper management of these resources. There is also a vision problem with regard to the future of the mining areas or areas which are eligible under the just transition mechanism and, in addition to this, we are seeing structural deficiencies which are more to do with the relationship with the workers.
First of all, there is no coherence or timing linking the exit from certain sectors that harm the environment and the integration of workers into other sectors considered to be more environmentally friendly. Let me be very clear and specific. It is hard to believe that a miner will get a job as a barber or a confectioner after the Just Transition Mechanism has financed some business.
Why am I telling you this? We are saying that the mechanism should create jobs when they are needed because it is useless to fire a miner and provide him with a job after 2 years when the European funds will generate some concrete results in the economic environment. No one in Romania has thought to correlate these things.
Another element that is a big barrier to the success of the just transition concerns the wage gap. Because it is hard to believe that an individual who has worked for 4000-5000 lei per month will get a job for 2000 lei per month. There is no correlation between the level of income that this individual had while working in a sector that was not friendly to an environment and in correlation with future jobs implicitly with the future income that these workers could possibly earn.
These structural deficiencies, not only are they barriers, they are serious management problems at the level of the Just Transition mechanism. At least from the worker’s perspective, I see these elements as important.
If we are talking about just transition as a European policy, and here I am referring to the Green Deal and other policies that are adjacent to the Green Deal, the trade union area also needs to understand better what this transition means, and it needs to be explained better, more coherently. After researching the collective agreements in force in companies in various economic sectors, we found that there are no chapters or clauses in these collective agreements that deal with just transition.
We are not talking about fair or unfair transition, but about transition itself. Because one of the fears that the trade union area has with regard to transition is that transition means a lot of investment. Either there’s the need for investment felt by companies to be able to operate in an environmentally friendly way risks affecting wage costs or a potential increase in revenue.
Because a company will come and say I don’t have the financial resources to increase your wages, because I need to invest in more environmentally friendly technologies, because it’s kicking us all out. And so, from that perspective, it is not very clear to me what protection mechanisms, in the end, the Romanian state is delivering to the labor force, so that the correlation between the wage level and the standard of living is real and fair in the context of just transition. We cannot find an answer to this question at the moment.
Another element that is again important for the trade union area, which is not addressed at all in Romania, at least on the public agenda, concerns the need to reduce poverty in order to support the climate agenda. Because the transition, be it green or digital, cannot succeed in the context of growing poverty.
And I’ll give you a concrete and very childish example, but it’s clear to understand. If I don’t have the money to heat my home, I’m going to cut down a tree in the forest. For the simple reason that the price of electricity is very high and then I won’t be able to afford it. Or the price of food, the price of clothes, because these also have a significant impact on the environment.
So the problem of poverty is an unresolved one in Romania, but also at European level, and this has a significant impact on the discussions on supporting the transition. At European level, we always mention that there is no green deal without a social deal. Europe has delivered a green deal, but it has not delivered a social deal. And if you look at the way this mandate of the European Commission regulates, you will see that the social pact still does not exist. Competitiveness is back on the European agenda. Of course, motivated by the geopolitical dynamics of recent times. However, in the end, all these discussions at European level also directly affect the situation in Romania.
V. M. : I understand some considerations or problems in the way the just transition is taking place in Romania, perhaps also at European level. But what role do Romanian trade unions play in this just transition? How do they relate not only in rhetoric but also in action?
Because in Bulgaria, for example, the KNSB, I suppose you know, even though there was some resistance from them as well, actually embraced just transition thinking that the money that is being given to certain segments of the just transition fund could be used for the benefit of the workers. And, for example, worker skills mapping is happening, as far as I know, because KNSB has embraced that process and, in fact, is actually managing it.
F. M. : I understand your question and thank you for it. Now, when we are talking about transition management or transition governance, because that is what you are directing the question towards – the trade unions in Romania have a role in the sense that the mechanism for just transition. Romania has a monitoring committee and the monitoring committee includes trade union representatives.
We have the National Tripartite Council, where elements relating to just transition are also addressed, and the trade unions are also part of that. But trade unions have a natural role in supporting just transition. Why am I telling you this?
If you look at the guiding principles of this mechanism, the leaving no one behind part, the unity part, the investing in environmentally friendly technologies, in skills, in competences, the balance part, but also the poverty reduction part, all of these are trade union concerns. In Romania too, trade unions are concerned in this respect. I give you the example of the National Trade Union Bloc.
The National Trade Union Bloc directly addresses this element, this transition, through training courses, through research, through technical assistance in dealing with green clauses in collective employment contracts, but also through monitoring collective employment contracts. At the same time, trade unions are part of several structures that target several operational programs at the level of cohesion policy or the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, both of them bringing the achievement of just transition, because just transition is not only the mechanism for just transition but practically all European funds target this approach through the thematic focus that the European Commission draws the Member State. From this perspective, trade unions are highly integrated, and here I am referring to the National Trade Union Bloc, the confederation where I work.
Like Bulgaria. But I come back, this is the situation all over Europe, for the simple reason that what Just Transition wants falls within the primary sphere of activity of any trade union organization. Even state aid schemes that specifically target certain companies or certain areas related to ensuring the transition are sometimes carried out with the support of trade union organizations.
In Romania, several state aid schemes have been operationalized aimed at providing the necessary funding to make certain companies more environmentally friendly. So trade unions have an active role to play, on the one hand, in relations with the government, with employers, but also at company level through collective agreements.
V. M. : At this stage, what stage has the just transition reached? I know that, for example, this small and medium enterprise segment has already been rolled out. I know that Romania is on its way to grant some money for micro-enterprises related to this aspect of just transition, but nevertheless, what is the stage of transition more concretely? What has been achieved so far in terms of realization? Or can we even speak of certain achievements?
F. M. : We cannot talk about certain achievements. From my point of view, the achievements delivered so far are insignificant in relation to the scale and the needs of society. We cannot speak of a concrete achievement when we put nothing in place.
In other words, the people in question do not have a clear perspective on the future of their jobs, the future of the city or region where they work. From my point of view, the situation is quite worrying, as we do not see some concrete achievements, and people’s confidence in this mechanism and in this transition is decreasing. And it is also decreasing, on the one hand, against the background of the increasingly prominent Eastern propaganda.
We see that the US has, for example, pulled out of the Paris agreement. Of course, in this context, in addition to the geopolitical aspect of this situation, we can see that we are still dependent on gas and we are still dependent on coal to support, in the end, economic production at European level, but also in Romania. So we are not talking about compliant achievements which would strengthen confidence in this mechanism.
V. M. : If we take a closer look at the situation in the Valea Jiului, from the point of view of the workers and the trade union aspect, but also economically, what is happening there as a process? Including the just transition, what kind of transformation is happening there?
F. M. : Frankly, other than some compensation payments that will be delivered to those workers that are deserved after all, from a certain point of view, we don’t see a clear vision. I don’t know what the Ji Valley will look like in 10 years or 15 years. Neither the County Council or County Councils, but neither the Romanian Government, apart from some strategies that sound good on paper, we have not seen a new factory built, we have not seen some new high quality jobs created.
All these things, of course, raise some question marks about the success of these funds in ensuring the economic and social transition of these regions. I think that rather, if I look at the workers in the Ji Valley, they are fighting to keep the mines open so that they keep the current economic situation and not necessarily fighting for transition. And that says a lot socially.
I mean they see their transition not as an opportunity, as it should be, but rather as a penalty that Brussels is delivering to these regions. So, from my point of view, I would answer your question more concretely, but apart from some compensatory payments and some redundancy programs, I have not seen any other notable things worth addressing in the Jiu Valley.
V. M. : Energy Minister Sebastian Burduja, immediately after Donald Trump became US president, took an anti- or skeptical line at addressing the green transition. What can we expect from this turn in Romanian state policy? That is, what concrete forms will this distancing, renegotiation or redefinition of the green transition and just transition take?
F. M. : I have followed his statements on this element. It is exactly what I was telling you earlier. It is politically difficult and he has a responsibility to do this, to explain to a population that has access to energy resources that it is paying the highest price for energy. Also, if you look at the skepticism about the climate transition, it is growing at European level.
Especially in a context where both the Draghi report and other documents, for example the Leta report, talk a lot about the competitiveness area. Since several countries have publicly expressed this dissatisfaction, Romania has chosen a part in which it wants to renegotiate certain elements of the climate transition. In fact, this is the turn which I think the Minister is taking, namely that I do not know whether we can afford at the moment to abandon the climate transition, but rather we want to have a softer approach in terms of climate targets.
And here I am referring in particular to the 2030 targets and the European Commission’s ambition to become a climate neutral economy by 2050. So I think that this is the framework in which the Minister made his statement, certainly also motivated by the fact that Europe is currently losing competitiveness and you need energy to develop. The Draghi report has also mentioned this, and there are some clear specifications in that report regarding the price that a European pays for energy and the price that an American, for example, or other people from other countries, pays.
Within this whole framework, the need to have cheap energy, or to have energy that benefits from more efficient production processes, and here I am referring specifically to gas, at least in the case of Romania, and coal, of course, after all, these are the areas that we know about, there are resources and we would like to use them to make up for the competitiveness deficit in relation to China and the United States, because, yes, the climate transition is affecting energy prices, at least in the short term, and implicitly it is also affecting a certain capacity to deliver economies of scale.
And then, from that context, the Minister’s reaction was rather, I interpret it as a political one. But the climate transition should not be abandoned, because it, as a principle and as a way of development, is right in many respects.
V. M. : You also have many contacts at European level, in Brussels, and in general in trade union circles and so on in Europe’s social and economic institutions. What kind of change can we expect in the Trump era on green transition and just transition? I mean I suspect what you’re talking about, that a kind of wave of renegotiation-seeking is influencing your policies, but how in the name is it influencing you? What concretely have you changed?
F. M. : The situation is not a clear-cut one, in the sense that the United States has no direction either, or at the very least has not provided the predictability of a strengthened relationship with Russia at the expense of Europe or with Europe at the expense of Russia, for example. And then I could not answer. However, the fact that the United States is out of the Paris Agreement, the fact that the United States benefits from important energy resources, and here I am referring in particular to liquefied gas, but not only, gives it a privileged position in the global context.
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the United States has for decades stockpiled oil in order to have energy resources in critical situations. At the moment, at least globally, we can categorize this situation as critical, first of all, because the demand for electricity will increase greatly.
So global competitiveness depends on access to energy resources and the ability to sustain high energy consumption. At the same time, if we look at China’s energy needs to maintain its economic growth trajectory, China needs significant energy resources. So, again, this energy need of China, but also the competition, at least economically, if we look at the tariffs or the tariff barriers that are imposed, we see that the geopolitical situation is one that is not yet clear, but the war, at least at the moment, seems to be an economic one, leaving aside the situation in Ukraine.
And in this context, Minister Burduja mentioned the fact that when you need energy and you have energy at your disposal, especially in Romania, not to use it seems rather like shooting ourselves in the foot. I understood that this was also the expression he mentioned. So I think that, at least in the short term, the discussions on the energy and climate transition are not being abandoned, but they are, somehow, being put in a different place in the hierarchy, much lower down than they were in the past.
And our statement is also based on global progress at the COP. But when we look at the concrete progress delivered by these global conferences on climate transition finance, we will see that progress is still limited. So while the principle is correct, there is not enough political will and not enough global concern to make this transition a reality.
Not to be misunderstood, it is a mistake, at least strategically, for future generations who will really suffer if we fail to act. And trade union organizations, in this perspective, must support the energy transition and the climate transition, because, after all, access to resources is also becoming an important issue, and I am not only talking about energy, we can easily add water.
I can give you even more examples, because resources are dwindling. Hence the battle, if you see, they are having the clearest possible discussions about mineral resources, access to rare metals, discussions about Greenland or other areas that have not been exploited so far. The battle over resources is becoming more and more prominent.
And the climate transition, in this context, is losing ground because it has so far failed to deliver on immediate expectations. But it needs to be understood that transition is essentially not a policy or development framework that delivers immediate results. We cannot expect energy transition to deliver results in 5 years, for example. It is a process that requires, after all, a social synergy, a social contract that is oriented towards this area. We have not worked on these approaches. And the trade union area, although it could have played an important role so far, although it has been involved, cannot resolve this issue on its own. I was telling you that the National Trade Union Bloc has implemented concrete measures visibly of this transition. Unfortunately, it is just one confederation among many.
V. M. : As you mentioned, there is a fight for resources, but Romania, from several rankings, has a better degree of energy sovereignty. In other words, Romania has energy resources. Also, in the current context, Romania also has ambitions in the energy space, to be the largest producer of natural gas in Europe, to build more nuclear power blocks, to build more wind power stations and so on.
And here I would like to ask you, because there is usually a division between capital and labor, when the balances in the economy evolve, to what extent does this high degree or relatively high degree of energy sovereignty, of energy resources benefit, that is, benefit the Romanian population, citizens, workers, energy consumers and so on? And to what extent do they benefit corporations?
F. M. : Very good question! From my perspective, I think that the population benefits far too little, and the workers benefit far too little from the advantages that Romania enjoys in terms of energy resources. Look at the price we pay.
And corporations benefit significantly more. Because, unfortunately, we have seen a political class which has protected the area of capital rather than the worker. This approach is also justified by Romania’s economic model, which, unfortunately, has been the same for 30 years and needs a fundamental change.
I therefore believe that companies benefit more from Romania’s energy resources. I will give you an example: if we want to compare the way in which Norway, a poor country before it discovered oil, managed their energy resources with the way in which Romania managed their energy resources, we will see that, in Norway, we can say that the benefits of these resources were also directed towards the citizens. Unfortunately, we do not see this in Romania.
We can see that the main companies are foreign and the state, of course, collects some dividends, but it also collects money from excise duties. And if we look at Neptune Deep, we also see that there is a joint venture with other companies. And in this context it is also important to note that there is not a lack of transparency about how these resources are being used.
Let me give you a concrete example. It concerns gas deposits in Romania. In other words, if the minister assured us before the holidays that we had gas deposits to get us through the winter, there is currently an inquiry into how these stored gas resources have been used because they have been falling very quickly.
So clearly we don’t have the transparency and we don’t have a concern as a society to direct these resources in a framework where we convert them into benefits for the citizens primarily.
V. M. : You mentioned that Romania’s economic model has not changed for 30 years and now I can’t avoid asking you what will happen if a sovereignist president is elected, to what extent is there an alternative vision for Romania’s economic development and to what extent can the problems that you mentioned be addressed by a rather sovereignist kind of government or president?
F. M. : If he knows what he has to do with Romania, Romania is a rather complex country in terms of resources. I would remind you that Romania currently has the greatest biodiversity in the European Union, in the sense that we have mountains, we have the sea, we have plains, we have a fair amount of water. It is one of the richest countries in terms of water resources, energy resources and so on. Why am I telling you this? Because you can afford a development model internally, in the sense that it has a great diversity of resources that can support a reduction in imports. Romania is not in a similar situation to other countries that have only plains or only mountains.
This is not the case here. I think this creates an advantage. However, the resources, not only energy resources, the resources which Romania benefits from, are not necessarily exploited in the interests of Romanian citizens.
I think that, from this perspective, Romania has some advantages. And now, any president, after all, sovereignist or non-sovereignist, must certainly exploit these elements. The economic model in Romania has rather favored foreign capital and has been based on low wages and well-paid labor.
In the context of foreign capital taking those resources out of the country, in one form or another. I don’t know if we can afford such a model any more, given that 5 million people are working in other countries and we no longer have that well-trained and cheap labor force. Globalism essentially has some ideological problems and we see it shrinking easily.
V. M. : Yes, let’s say you’ve answered that. Because if there is an alternative model, it probably needs to be articulated and discussed in society and perhaps trade unions should have a role in preparing that model. But I also assume from your answer that this has not happened.
F. M. : Whether we are talking about a sovereignist or a non-sovereignist president, so far there has been no economic development vision delivered that coherently manages all the challenges facing Romania. This is why I believe that it is necessary, and the trade unions want or need to be part of this process of establishing a long-term development vision.
But what I can tell you is that after 1990 the market economy was largely supported by workers or by the factor of production in labor. And now we are reorienting the economic model which can be supported or should be supported by the capital factor of production, or we see that this is not happening. Because the economic model has been based more on an extractive principle. That is to take resources, extract them, take them to other countries.
But even all this sovereignist propaganda is based on the fact that the resources are not exploited in the Romanians’ interest and that the comfort of others is based on the Romanians’ poverty. Precisely because we had an economic model that rather favored this rhetoric. This is surely a mistake both of the unions and of the political fact. But in principle of the political fact.
V. M. : We are in a region which, from Poland to Bulgaria, the whole area of Central and South-Eastern Europe, has had a relatively similar experience relatively at the same time it joined NATO and the European Union. It was previously part of the Eastern bloc. Now the challenges are still similar with just transition including and green transition and the problems you are talking about with foreign capital and local capital and the dependence of our area on foreign capital.
I would like to ask you what kind of collaboration, exchange of experience, joint action there is in trade union circles in our area when it comes to subjects such as just transition or other subjects of this kind related to transformation, modernization?
F. M. : There are quite a lot of tools in this respect and they are being used. I am actually one of the experts who are recommended by the European Commission, in that platform of experts who can provide technical assistance to regions that want to access European funds for just transition. There is the European Commission which also provides technical assistance.
At the same time, the trade union movement is organized in a way that not only enables, but also achieves transfer of best practices including on just transition. We have the European confederation, we have the international confederation, under these institutions meetings, debates, technical discussions are held on the transfer of good practices.
We have regions which were dependent on the mining sector and which are now not so dependent on the mining sector. We are looking at regions in Poland, which are reorienting the economic model used in certain regions and ensuring a shift to a service-based economy so that the mining sector is no longer so prominent.
__
Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian and Romanian-speaking journalist. He is correspondent of Radio Romania for Bulgaria and is an editor at the Romanian section of Radio Bulgaria. […]
Lire la suite…
mars 12, 2025By Sergiu Mișcoiu, Babeș-Bolyai University, interviwed on 12/03/2025.
Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu says that he was relieved to receive the CCR’s decision. Călin Georgescu cannot run in the presidential elections in May. The Sovereignist Pole is looking for a candidate for Cotroceni. Three names are currently being circulated. Among them, the one who has been sending pro-Kremlin messages for almost two decades stands out. Russia will adapt depending on the decision that will be made at the AUR level and the discussions with Mr. Georgescu. Russia will not support a candidate who scores very low, political scientist Sergiu Mișcoiu tells RFI.
Sergiu Mișcoiu: I received the CCR decision with relief, but it was to be expected. I looked with joy at the decision made by the BEC. It is an encouraging signal that other institutions, besides the Constitutional Court, have mobilized to fulfill their role, their mission. Beyond the status of the chamber, registration, candidacies, here we will have to discuss a reform of the AEP, the BEC system and, of course, the entire institutional system, so that mechanisms from these that allow for better supervision of the elections and the entire process leading to the election of the President of Romania, but also of the Parliament and local elected officials, can be put into operation from the moment the previous election is practically over. After all, we had a major vacuum in Romania in relation to this supervision of the entire process leading to the election, not the election itself. And it seems that now the institutions have woken up and we have a form of democratic vitality that we are rediscovering and that we should take to the end through a more concerted action to clean up public institutions and orient them towards modernization.
Reporter: Călin Georgescu’s first reaction, after the announcement of the CCR decision, was that he considered his mission accomplished. « I have exposed the demon in all his ugliness ». What did he actually mean?
Sergiu Mișcoiu: It is the part of the messianic, millenarian, savior discourse that he has accustomed us to. Mr. Georgescu positioned himself from the start as an anti-system candidate, showed all the strengths of the system from his point of view and demonstrated to his voters – at least this is his desire to present things to us – that the entire political, institutional, judicial system opposes him, because he has a totally different message from the others for the country and represents the true solution. It is exactly the type of populist discourse, with messianic overtones, that we find in other parts of the world. But in Romania, at least since Corneliu Vadim Tudor, we have not had such a type of discourse, and here we are encountering it after almost 25 years.
Reporter: Later, he returned with a message in three languages in which he said that while America is becoming great again, Europe and Romania, under dictatorship, have become small and corrupt and he assured that things will not stay that way. What do you think is next?
Sergiu Mișcoiu: I think that between the two messages, his attention was drawn to the farewell message. Basically, the first was a message that demobilized the electorate. Now, at the moment, the demobilization of the electorate is not very welcome. Insofar as a presidential election is coming up and today we will have a decision that will be made regarding the candidate supported by the Sovereignist Pole, especially by AUR, but also with the blessing of Mr. Georgescu, and I think that the second aggressive message had two types of objectives. The first is to place himself in the wake of MAGA, in the wake of the Trump administration, trying to get closer to the Washington speech once again to benefit from support from that side and, secondly, to mobilize the troops, to show that Georgescu’s spirit is still present, even if he will no longer be a candidate. And once again we have a messianic image, as if detached from the two bodies of the sovereign, one that is physical and that can no longer move forward. But the spirit of Mr. Georgescu will continue to breathe in all of us, through, of course, the movements that his successor will continue to make as a candidate. I think these were the objectives and, of course, it should be noted that through short and very clear messages, Mr. Georgescu has the ability to give food for thought to his opponents and, perhaps, to set things in motion among his supporters.
Reporter: Russia has spoken through the voices of several officials in recent days about the elections in Romania, in support of Călin Georgescu. Now, Călin Georgescu is out of the game. Are we to believe that Russia is waiting for another name to be pulled from the hat or does it already have someone in mind?
Sergiu Mișcoiu: Russia will adapt depending on the decision that will be made at the AUR level and in the discussions with Mr. Georgescu today. I am convinced that Russia will act opportunistically, it will not support a candidate who scores very low. We saw how it still managed to push a candidate forward, in November 2024, and then it will focus its efforts on supporting, perhaps not so obvious, perhaps a little more discreet, but perhaps precisely for that reason quite effectively, a candidate who has a chance, the candidate of the Sovereign Pole. On the other hand, it must be emphasized how ridiculous it is that a state like Russia – which mimics the organization of elections, practically organized only one more liberal election after 1991, when the USSR collapsed, and otherwise the elections were organized in a completely undemocratic manner – now has to give lessons regarding the elimination of presidential candidates in European Union states, which, whatever they may be, are in a democratic, functional state, which has nothing to do with the one in Russia.
Reporter: George Simion goes to Călin Georgescu with three presidential options. He himself, although he has repeatedly said that he does not want to enter the race for Cotroceni, Dan Dungaciu and Dan Puric. The Adevărul newspaper reported today that the controversial political consultant Anton Pisaroglu has also announced his candidacy for the Presidency of Romania, saying that his main objective is the resumption of free elections under international supervision. Well, Anton Pisaroglu helped Călin Georgescu…
Sergiu Mișcoiu: If Pisaroglu enters this race, we will have a different turn of the campaign. Then Mr. Georgescu will probably manage to convince Mr. Simion that there is no official AUR candidate and to support Mr. Pisaroglu. But this move would be one that, from the perspective of Mr. Pisaroglu’s low notoriety, from the perspective of his affiliation, would harm the score of the sovereignist pole. I think that the two options currently being considered are rather George Simion, who was actually preparing this move for a long time, but Mr. Georgescu’s attitude remains unknown, because Mr. Georgescu seems not to have been so convinced of plan B, which should have gone in parallel with plan A. With Mr. Simion, subsequently taking the flag from Mr. Georgescu’s hand and moving forward in these elections, he would not be so thrilled because he would lose control over the electoral flow and over the decision to run per se. And the second option, which I think is worth considering, is Dan Puric, who has been consistent for almost two decades, at least 15 years, in this position of critic of liberal democracy, having as a defect, let’s say, the still too great proximity he has to the Kremlin’s discourse, which he has not hesitated to praise on several occasions, which not even Mr. Georgescu has done in the same transparent manner. I think that the two options have benefits and drawbacks. As we have seen, Mr. Simion is not able to bring all the votes that Mr. Georgescu can bring, but he is still in a fairly favorable position, having already significant electoral capital. Mr. Puric has this ability to rise rapidly, because he already has significant public notoriety and a discourse that is more compatible with that of Mr. Georgescu than with that of Mr. Simion. So he would be a better fit as Mr. Georgescu’s legal successor. But the unknown will be how mobilized those in gold will be and how mobilized this electorate would be less eager to support a project that can be much more clearly identified with Moscow’s stamp on it.
__
Sergiu Mișcoiu is a professor and researcher at Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania, specialist of nation-building processes, political transitions and transformations in CEE and francophone Africa. He is also Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and of the Centre for African Studies.
This interview was conducted by the RFI’s Romanian section and the content was translated and provided by the interwee himself.
Link to the original interview in Romanian : Polul Suvernist caută candidat pentru Cotroceni. Rusia se va adapta, nu va susține un candidat care să facă un scor mic (Analist) […]
Lire la suite…
mars 12, 2025By Sergiu Mișcoiu, Babeș-Bolyai University, interviwed on 11/03/2025.
Călin Georgescu has been a controversial figure in Romanian politics from the beginning. His messages and actions in the public space have provoked heated reactions in society in such a way that he went, between November 2024 and March 2025, from the status of favorite in the presidential elections to that of rejected candidate. This transition was due to a combination of political, legal and institutional factors, which culminated in his exclusion, at least temporarily, from the race for Cotroceni.
From candidacy to exclusion
In the canceled presidential elections, Călin Georgescu surprised the political scene after he managed to attract a significant number of supporters who sent him to the second round, alongside Elena Lasconi, the leader of the USR. His speech, based on sovereignty, anti-system rhetoric and vehement criticism of the political establishment, resonated strongly with a part of the electorate dissatisfied with the direction and decisions of the authorities. Although the elections were canceled and his candidacy was invalidated, Călin Georgescu’s supporters continued to proclaim him « the elected president ». The fact that he might not reach Cotroceni seems, in their eyes, just further evidence of the conspiracy against him. According to university professor Sergiu Mișcoiu, Georgescu’s success in a certain social segment was due to both natural factors – the attraction that his speech exerted on a part of the electorate – and artificial factors, including external interventions.
The invalidation of Călin Georgescu’s candidacy in the presidential elections was an anticipated moment, given the controversial circumstances that marked his rise and, later, his political decline. According to political scientist Sergiu Mișcoiu, state institutions acted coherently, given that Diana Șoșoacă’s candidacy had previously been rejected on similar grounds.
« The fact that Mr. Georgescu came first in November 2024 was certainly due to some factors, as we know, natural, in the sense that a part of Romanians was seduced by his speech, but also to some artificial factors, external interventions, and this transition from the candidate who comes first to the candidate who fails to enter the presidential race was somehow anticipated from the moment when the cancellation of the presidential election was decided on December 6. It was clear that the entire institutional system, if it wanted to be coherent with itself, could not admit Mr. Georgescu’s candidacy given that it had previously rejected Ms. Șoșoacă’s candidacy and annulled the elections due to anti-constitutional activities committed by Mr. Georgescu and which are now the subject of criminal investigations, » analyzed Sergiu Mișcoiu for Ziare.com.
In this political landscape marked by polarization and increasingly heightened tensions, the invalidation of Călin Georgescu’s candidacy in the presidential elections by the BEC generated strong reactions among his supporters. Prof. univ. dr. Sergiu Mișcoiu analyzed this phenomenon from a deeper perspective of Romanian society: the extreme fragmentation of public opinion and the lack of a consolidated civic culture. « Of course, in public opinion and especially among its supporters, the spirit has not been lost on the contrary, it has intensified, and here is a big problem of Romanian civic culture, of the way in which we have educated our citizens, we enable them to participate in collective decisions, to be part of the same society. » « Basically, we have pieces of society in the divided Romania that are confronting each other, it is a problem of longer and much deeper reflection, but, apart from this phenomenon that we cannot immediately treat with strictly institutional means, it was clear that there could be no question of Mr. Georgescu being able to run, just as Mrs. Șoșoacă could not run and probably neither could other citizens who would embrace a discourse like that of Mr. Georgescu and Mrs. Șoșoacă for the reasons invoked in a manner, I believe, ultimately, with all the awkwardness of expression and communication,it was a legitimate decision of the Constitutional Court, » Sergiu Mișcoiu told Ziare.com.
Just a few days before the deadline for filing candidacies for the 2025 presidential elections (March 15), the Romanian political scene is in a whirlwind of tense events. The rejection of Călin Georgescu’s candidacy has forced the sovereignist pole to urgently recalibrate its strategy, and all indications show that George Simion is ready to enter the race. Names such as Dan Dungaciu, who denied the story surrounding his candidacy, or Cristela Georgescu, excluded by important voices in AUR, have also been circulated. There are feverish calculations in the sovereignist party, which is trying to anticipate the impact of the new electoral dynamics if Călin Georgescu’s invalidation remains definitive at the CCR. Analysts say that the rejection of Georgescu’s candidacy was anticipated, and the strategy of the sovereignist pole seems to have already been outlined months ago. Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu, from the Faculty of European Studies of Babeș-Bolyai University, explained to Ziare.com that a « plan B » was already prepared, and this could involve the candidacy of AUR leader George Simion.Plan B: George Simion, the reserve candidate. The rejection of Călin Georgescu’s candidacy at the BEC was not an insurmountable blow for the sovereignist camp, but only an obstacle that could be overcome through a well-developed strategy. Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu believes that this change in strategy is not accidental, but part of a plan thought out since the winter. The analyst points out that, although George Simion and Călin Georgescu had different visions in the past, they have come closer again due to a common interest.
« I think there has already been a plan B since January, if not since December. This plan B is for Mr. Simion to run instead of Mr. Georgescu, I think he already has the signatures collected and is only waiting for the Constitutional Court to decide today to reject Mr. Georgescu’s challenge so that Mr. Simion can assume this task. It will be a surprise if it is not Mr. Simion and if it is someone else from this pole, of course there are other options, but the one with somewhat higher electoral chances is Mr. Simion. Going by the following consideration: in the past they did not have the same vision, but the two visions have come closer, the most radical of Mr. Georgescu and the somewhat more moderate one in the past of Mr. Simion. They have merged into a sovereignist pole that considers that Mr. Georgescu has been done a great injustice », Sergiu Mișcoiu told Ziare.com.
Călin Georgescu’s role in the electoral strategy
Even if he does not run for president, Călin Georgescu would not disappear from the political foreground. According to analyst Sergiu Mișcoiu, he will most likely be proposed for the position of prime minister. In the long term, he could be « pushed » to play a significant role in nationalist politics in Romania. « Călin Georgescu will be proposed for the position of prime minister, he will probably be pushed forward later, but at the current stage, all nationalist energies will have to gather around a candidate from the AUR ranks and, most likely, as I was saying, Mr. Simion, who would end up winning the first round, which they would like, which is not at all excluded, and who would pose big problems in the second round for his opponents, » Sergiu Mișcoiu also opined for Ziare.com.
__
Sergiu Mișcoiu is a professor and researcher at Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania, specialist of nation-building processes, political transitions and transformations in CEE and francophone Africa. He is also Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and of the Centre for African Studies.
This interview was conducted by Ziare.com, and the content was translated and provided by the interwee himself.
Link to the original interview in Romanian : Cum a ajuns Călin Georgescu de la „președintele ales” la candidatul respins […]
Lire la suite…