Opinions
juin 16, 2025By Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University.
We usually understand war as organized mass violence, justice as an ethical category, and politics as the “art of the possible” and a way of living together, despite our differences. Their combination is always a great test of reason and morality.
The war in Ukraine has put to the test the world order established as a result of the United Nations’ victory over Nazism and fascism in 1945. This new world order integrates new principles of international law, but above all the principles of respect for human rights and compliance not only with treaties, but also with international norms of justice.
In the decades since, international relations, without changing their anarchical nature (lack of a central world authority), have nevertheless been institutionalized through the creation of a huge number of international organizations and the signing of countless new interstate treaties. In many cases, states honor their obligations, but in many cases, they act selfishly and sometimes behave like brigands outside the law and morality.
The war in Ukraine is discussed more than ever today in light of the glimmering hopes for its termination. One can see the exhaustion of the combatants, fatigue among their allies, even its banalization that always comes after two or three years. How it can end has become the central topic of many political debates.
I think that a certain coldness in analyzing the possibilities for such an end is not only useful, but increasingly imperative. If the debate manages to free itself from categorical statements that do not accept any other point of view, from something like both epistemological and axiological fundamentalism, it is possible to find a solution. A solution that will necessarily be some kind of fragile or temporary balance between the power, the justice, and the possible. Because the biggest risk is that this war will become indefinite or subside like the Korean War (1951-1953), where the North and the South are still officially at war, even though they signed an armistice.
What have we learned about Ukraine?
One of the propaganda theses of Russian nationalists is that Ukraine is an “artificial state”, somehow accidentally created by historical circumstances on a territory previously called Little Russia and New Russia. I would be surprised if any current state is not “artificial”. State borders are not geology, but conquests and politics, there is nothing “natural” about them.
Can we say that the current borders of Ukraine were drawn fairly? After World War II, Ukraine expanded to the west with part of Galicia, Volhynia, Carpathian Ruthenia, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Budzhak, and in 1954, by decision of Nikita Khrushchev, with Crimea. Was it fair? I don’t know, but at the time it was accepted as such, and Ukraine was among the countries most affected during the war (the front passed to the east, and then to the west, twice through the country), as well as in Belarus and Poland. That is why both countries post-soviet during the Cold War each had one additional vote in the UN General Assembly, even though they were part of the USSR (also with one vote).
Today we cannot easily dispute borders – the principle of respecting the territorial integrity of states and their borders is firmly established in international law. Ukraine’s borders are legitimate by virtue of uti possidetis juris – its administrative borders upon the dissolution of the Soviet Federation. Therefore, the history of the creation of the independent Ukrainian state cannot be a basis today for redrawing its borders.
On the other hand, there is the question of who owns certain territories. Formally, each belongs to a certain state, but in fact we must admit that the territories belong primarily to their permanent inhabitants. Therefore, any territorial dispute that does not take into account the demands of the permanent inhabitants of the territory is an imperialist division, but not one seeking a fair solution. And therefore, if today we are talking about Donbass or Crimea, it is best to take into account in the plans what their permanent inhabitants want, and what they want freely, and not under someone’s dictate. Here, however, we are faced with another phenomenon – separatism, but also the right of peoples to self-determination. Is the second always a legitimate argument for the first? Is the demand for separation into an independent state of Catalonia legitimate in a democratic Spain, where the region has de facto autonomy? And what is the difference with Scotland, where they also wanted separation from the United Kingdom, an old democracy. And did the Northern League in Italy legitimately demand the separation of Padania as a separate state? In Catalonia and Padania, separatism was of the rich provinces against the rest, while in Scotland, separatism was for the preservation of the welfare state against the neoliberal policies of the central government. But in all three cases, the central government did not send the army against the separatists but sent negotiators.
In Ukraine, the interim government in 2014, mainly under pressure from the far-right Svoboda party declared an anti-terrorist operation against the protesters in Donbas. Although at that time these separatists only wanted a “special status” for their region, not even autonomy. It is true that they also received support from Russia, which makes them very different from the examples of Catalonia, Padania or Scotland. But the decision of the central government to choose force from the very beginning turned out to be wrong. This only exacerbated the conflict, and the separatists declared two unrecognized republics (April-May 2014). When the then newly elected President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko introduced a special status for Donbas in October 2014, it was already too late. In fact, the war began, although initially between private and irregular military formations (« Azov », « Aydar » and volunteers from « Right Sector » on the Ukrainian side ; separatists and Russian volunteers and mercenaries in “Wagner” on the other side, including Chechens, before becoming interstate war eight years later.
What are the scenarios for the end of the war?
The war in Ukraine can end in different ways. But each of them has a different price, requires different conditions for its implementation. It is the consequences of one or another “end of the war” that are important in order to assess which of them is at least slightly better than the others.
A just peace
It would undoubtedly be fair to restore the territorial integrity of the country, for the aggressor to take responsibility and retaliate for the damage caused, and for those responsible for starting the war to be brought to justice. Fair, but unattainable, unless we just imagine that the war could end in a way described as a “victory for Ukraine”. Unless, also, those supporting Ukraine decide to help by openly entering the war against the Russian Federation, something that no one in the EU, the US, or NATO even thinks about. Because the consequences will be much worse than if this does not happen. Because of the unacceptable maxim “Fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus” (“Let justice be done, even if the world perishes”), because the price of justice cannot be higher than the survival of the world. Therefore, a just peace will probably have to wait for things to change over time.
The military solution
We should not rule out ending the war by force, if one or the other side prevails over the other and imposes its conditions on it. Despite the determination of the Ukrainians to resist aggression, their resources undoubtedly remain limited (demographic, mobilization, territorial) in front of the three times more populous Russian Federation, which also has a significant geographical landscape.
Some observers have already expressed the opinion that if Ukraine had not given up Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory in 1992, it would not have been attacked now. Because it would have used them against the aggressor. Although I cannot imagine a Ukrainian government (unless it is exclusively far-right) that would decide to do this. At least because of the risk of international isolation, but also for moral reasons. Not to mention the risk of retaliation and monstrous consequences far exceeding those of Chernobyl.
Russia, it seems, is also not in a position to prevail, at least not in the near future. Its attempt to achieve immediate success in a week initially failed due to Ukrainian resistance. Unexpected for the Russians, who very wrongly imagined that they would be greeted as “liberators” in Kiev (in some of the abandoned armored personnel carriers to Kiev, parade uniforms were found!).
In military terms, a stalemate is emerging – an impossible victory, at least in the near future, for either side. Thus, the war risks ending like the Korean one – a 70-year-long ceasefire, but an official state of war. This would be a very bad option for Europe, too, because it would be an eternally smoldering war.
Peace through strength
This formula has been repeatedly uttered by European leaders, but they refrain from deciphering it in detail. In short, the idea is that by providing military assistance to Ukraine, it will gain a better position in the negotiations for a ceasefire with Russia. Theoretically, this is justified, but it requires certain conditions. Most importantly, time during which the balance of power will change, but also a certain armistice so that these forces can be accumulated. The risk is that this time will also be used by Russia to accumulate forces. And if military actions continue, then the time may be extended too much and ultimately prove to be insufficient. In essence, the formula envisages the continuation of the war, although possibly with less intensity. Here, another risk is the mutual weakening of the parties, and it is not certain that Ukraine will do so more slowly. Even vice versa, Russia may continue to advance during this time, albeit slowly.
To support Ukraine militarily in order to have the power to negotiate seems completely legitimate from the point of view of justice. But war and military force are legitimate only if they are kept within the limits of proportionality, and therefore – within the limits of justice. Because the end never justifies the means. Weapons usually kill, but some are already banned by international conventions, so the supply to Ukraine of banned anti-personnel mines, banned cluster munitions and the like, even if the other side also uses them, is unacceptable. The border can easily be crossed with chemical and biological weapons (also banned), as well as nuclear ones.
Compromise: not a very fair peace
Now comes the turn of compromises, which can in no way be necessarily and perfectly fair. Initially, there is talk of a ceasefire under certain conditions, later of a lasting peace settlement and a peace treaty. All of this now seems so difficult, and so impossible, although it is some way out of a situation of perpetual war.
Several issues are being discussed: Ukraine’s membership in NATO and in general guarantees for the country’s security, possible territorial changes for Donbas and Crimea, the possibility of deploying peacekeeping forces in Ukraine and along the ceasefire line… But also the prospects for Ukraine’s membership in the EU.
Especially after the election of Donald Trump as US president and his initiative for immediate peace in Ukraine, the country’s membership in NATO no longer seems to be on the agenda. But if it is understandable why Ukraine wants this (security guarantees), it is more difficult to answer why NATO wants it?
Will Ukraine have to cede territories? It is not fair, no doubt, but if it gives it a chance to recover from the war, it can probably be discussed. The issue of territories in general can be postponed, especially for Crimea (which President Zelensky himself has already mentioned).
It is completely unclear what kind of peacekeepers can be deployed between the two armies. Russia categorically rejects this being European forces (they are part of NATO), but allows non-European, for example, Chinese peacekeepers under the UN flag. Whether Ukraine will accept it is not clear. And for how long, how far along this long line of contact? With what forces, how many and for what exactly? Will such a force be able to prevent the renewal of the war? These questions, obviously, cannot be answered now. But isn’t a bad peace better than any war? At least because it prevents new victims and destruction.
What do we do when we cannot achieve justice?
In 2020, the streets of Sofia and other major cities in the country were flooded with civil protests demanding the resignation of then-Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and then-Prosecutor General Ivan Geshev. These demands became a reality, but after seven consecutive parliamentary elections, hardly anyone will confidently say that justice has prevailed. Simply because the supporters of the “end of the GERB model” did not have the resources and power to achieve it. What did society do? Well, it accepted the situation as it is, with the possible hope that in the future it will change (which, in turn, no one can guarantee).
In 1940, Stalin ordered the Red Army to launch an attack on neutral Finland to correct the joint border. This long-standing “hidden war” in Soviet historiography ended with Finnish territorial concessions, which are still valid today. This was not fair at all, especially for the Finns, but they accepted it because after 1945 they had neither the strength nor the support to change it, and because their potential allies were aware that changing this reality by force would produce much more negative results than simply accepting it. But Finland ultimately won because it developed and modernized as a neutral country during the Cold War, although it was a member of NATO.
There are many more examples of wars that ended unjustly, the results of which were accepted by the international community for the above reasons. Did the Korean War end justly – no, because ultimately no one was responsible for starting it. Did the 1967 war in the Middle East, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights in Syria, as well as the entire city of Jerusalem, end justly, and this continues to this day? No, but the rest accept (for now) the situation, because changing it by force would have worse consequences.
After 1945, Poland was reshaped – it ceded to the Soviet Union the territories that are now western Belarus and western Ukraine, but received in return the former German territories of Pomorie (Pomerania), Śląsk (Lower Silesia) and part of East Prussia. And today’s University of Wrocław (old Breslau) is the successor to the Polish University of Lviv (now a Ukrainian city). Was that fair? I don’t know, but the Poles from Lviv were moved (?) to the west, and the Germans from Śląsk were deported to Germany. Ethnic cleansing? Undoubtedly, but by today’s standards, it seemed acceptable at the time against the backdrop of war-torn Europe, where the blame was entirely attributed to the Germans.
Was the division of Germany after World War II fair? On the one hand, many were convinced at the time that Germans as a whole were to blame for what had happened and had to bear the consequences. But all Germans? And those born after 1945? It is obvious that this division was not fair, it was imposed by new circumstances – the division of Europe and the world according to the logic of the Cold War. But the Germans, and the rest, waited before Germany was reunified. No one even thought of doing this by force, for the reasons above.
What is possible?
This is precisely the challenge for politics, since war (a continuation of politics by other means) and morality (restrictions on politics by other means) cannot achieve the desired goal by themselves – the restoration of justice. At least not immediately.
But moral considerations are always important. Because a war that completely ignores moral restrictions (to spare civilians, not to kill prisoners of war, not to shoot doctors and journalists…), such a war is just mass murder without political goals. And politics that completely ignores moral considerations is simply organized crime. We misread Machiavelli, who advises the ruler not to ignore morality, but to set aside his own moral understandings if this prevents him from preserving the life and well-being of his subjects. Machiavelli preaches a hierarchy of moral commitments, not the abandonment of morality in politics.
Therefore, in seeking solutions to the war in Ukraine, it is good to be aware of two things in order to restore dialogue on this issue. You are not a warmonger if you are concerned about the war ending with a just peace. You are simply putting justice at the forefront, but to some extent underestimating the conditions for its realization and the price for it. You are not encouraging the aggressor if you want an immediate end to the war, even under not very fair conditions. You simply believe that even a bad peace is better than a good war, leaving aside the need for a comprehensive just solution.
The danger in this case is if we are misled by historical analogies. It is true that as humans in new situations we rely on our previous experience. But today, when it is said that we are almost in the situation of 1939, when concessions to Hitler only encouraged him to start a devastating war, this can greatly mislead us. What could the leaders of democracies do then against Hitler’s intentions? A preventive war? Or instead of the “strange war” after September 1, 1939 – a decisive offensive? But they did not have the strength to overcome the “Siegfried Line” on the Rhine and had to pass through neutral Belgium and the Netherlands. Would they have done it, as Hitler later did? I do not believe it.
And today, could a large-scale war in Ukraine have been prevented by a preemptive attack? No, of course. Or the rapid admission of Ukraine to NATO back in 2008? Under Viktor Yanukovych, then Prime Minister of Ukraine? And would this not have immediately provoked an aggressive reaction from Russia and an “agreed-upon occupation”? Who knows, but the risk would be great. The danger is that historical analogies mislead us.
Justice versus real possibilities – an extremely difficult choice, but still a choice. A classic choice between desire and possibilities. It seems that there is no possibility of achieving a truly just peace immediately. But continuing the war is also not just. Where the measure is, I don’t know, but it is worth looking for.
One can start with a ceasefire (a fragile truce), followed by an agreed more permanent truce and distancing of the belligerents, possibly with the deployment of peacekeepers for observation. As well as accepting (for now) the territorial reality (Donbass and Crimea under Russian control). Which does not necessarily mean accepting the situation as just.
This also does not mean not seeking justice. One can even start by simply prosecuting the crimes committed on the ground. Because behind each one, not least, there is a specific perpetrator who cannot justify himself with “I was following orders.” But the crimes on both sides, starting in 2014: not only Bucha, not only the murders of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war, but also the fire in Odessa and the deaths of civilians in Donbass due to the fault of formations such as the Azov or Aidar regiments (then repeatedly indicated by Amnesty International as responsible for this).
An effort for restorative justice for not the most serious crimes is probably also possible. Such organized actions have the chance to restore confidence among the victims, and among public opinion, that some justice is possible after all. Even before the major perpetrators of the tragedy are brought to justice. By the way, if we talk about President Putin’s responsibility, there are probably many Russians in Russia itself who would hold him accountable – they deserve to be helped. This will also contribute to reduce hatred between Ukrainians and Russians – they will remain neighbors and, in the future, they will have to find ways to reconcile (France and Germany can certainly help in this regard with their successful attempt at reconciliation).
Finally, the restoration of Ukraine will come. But if this means that the richest will win again and the poorest will become poorer again, as is usual in such situations, if this turns into “business as usual” for accumulating profits and supporting the oligarchs, it will be very risky. Because it will kill any hope for justice.
Also, effective actions to limit the use of small arms by civilians – after every war, the uncontrolled dissemination of weapons among the population is a great danger to societies. Ukraine is not the USA, but a European country, it can safely adopt legislation like the UK, which is extremely restrictive in this regard.
Ukraine can seriously begin to build a society that will integrate into the EU: a rule of law, respect for minorities (including Russian-speaking ones), resolute isolation of far-right nationalists, respect for diversity. Such a promise could enthuse Ukrainians no less than the defense of their independence.
Imagine!
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Antony Todorov is a political scientist and a professor at the New Bulgarian University. He was visiting teacher at ULB (Brussels) and at the University of Bucharest and president of the Bulgarian Political Science Association from 2001 to 2012. His research interests lie in democracy, party politics, and the study of elections. […]
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juin 5, 2025By Cristian Preda, University of Bucharest.
This article was first published in the review Comunitatea liberală 1848, on the 2nd of June 2025. Link of the original article in Romanian: De la Nicușor la președintele Dan – Comunitatea Liberala.
It happened the same way back in 1996: during the campaign and on the night of victory, the crowd in the public square chanted “Emil! Emil!”, only for the elected man to become President Constantinescu a few days after the vote. Three decades later, the chant “It won’t be easy, / It will be Nicușor!” was set aside, and after the swearing-in ceremony, (almost) everyone began referring to him as President Dan.
I was present at the ceremony myself. After pointing out the urgent matter that would occupy the first weeks of his term — forming a stable majority to reduce the deficit — the new head of state listed the goals of his mandate across eleven domains, in the following order: administrative reform, the economy, health, education, justice, environment, culture, equal opportunity, foreign policy, the relationship with Moldova, and Romanians in the diaspora. His tone was far from fiery; the speech did not seek to stir public emotion, but rather to define an action plan. N. Dan will act as a kind of super-prime minister, much like Ion Iliescu during his 1992–1996 term, Emil Constantinescu, or Traian Băsescu in 2005–2007 and again in 2009–2012.
Nothing illustrates his approach to forming a government better than the way he’s gone about it: before holding the formal “consultations” required by the Constitution to nominate a prime minister, President Dan held “informal discussions” with the parties to gauge their intentions and their stance on the Cotroceni agenda. He also convened a working group to begin drafting a governing program. The process is just beginning, and it’s hard to imagine what it will produce. Dragoș Anastasiu, one of the advisors N. Dan inherited — at least until the end of June — from Ilie Bolojan, used a vivid but vague phrase: “we’re still throwing puzzle pieces onto the table.”
The fact that the new president wants to steer the executive branch became clear in how he handled the crisis at the Praid Salt Mine, caused by the recent flooding in Harghita. Nicușor Dan went to the site himself, sleeves rolled up, while the interim prime minister and his team arrived 24 hours later.
N. Dan’s authority is acknowledged by the PNL, USR, and UDMR — but not by AUR, SOS, POT, or PSD. Under its new — for now, interim — leader, the Social Democrats continue to maintain the same ambiguous posture they took between the two rounds of voting. If, ahead of the Dan-Simion final, Ciolacu and his inner circle refused to clearly encourage members to vote, now that Dan has been elected president, Grindeanu is again shifting the decision about entering government onto the shoulders of the party members. On the surface, this seems like a way of dodging responsibility, but at its core, it’s more about political gamesmanship — aimed at signaling that the direction of policy is set not by the president, but by “the PSD people,” as the phrase once went.
We’ll see in a few days whether the pressure from PSD pays off or not.
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Cristian Preda is a professor in political science at the University of Bucharest and a former MEP (2009-2019). His research areas are large, from political regimes, to political history, elections and party politics. […]
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avril 14, 2025By Johannes Heidecker, former economic advisor for North Macedonia’s PM.
How should governments react on the recent US tariff announcements? Retaliate with similar tariffs – like China? Propose negotiations to drill some small holes in the tariff wall – many governments have announced this, and the president is ready to negotiate « if countries offer something phenomenal ». Tit-for-tat, like for jeans, whiskey and motorcycles? Start a broader consultation – like the EU with their strategic talks to different sectors? Wait, because the US government may just reverse their decision? Or just better prepare for a world with more insecurity?
Abstract: For the Western Balkan countries, the US market per se is not very relevant, only indirectly via the economies they sell to. They have little to offer for any kind of negotiation, at least not officially, except for Zero tariffs on US goods.The recommendation is to focus on new markets, regional and EU first, to improve the Commerce organizations and to strengthen their own economies. This will make them more resilient whatever happens in the US.
Government Advisors are usually useless, because smart people do not need them while others do not listen. But there is an exception: A sudden crisis. As the US government only finalized its strategy in the last few hours before « liberation day », no other government had a ready response, all just knew they had to do something. This is the time to turn to advisors and ask for a detailed suggestion, due in the few hours preceding the evening news. Suggestions are difficult, because the situation may have changed before the written suggestions are finalized. Still, here is a proposal.
Basics first:
No one likes theory, but you should be knowledgeable about economy basics. Let us start with Adam Smith and his invisible hand. He describes in his « Wealth of Nations » « that governments do not normally need to force international traders to invest in their own home country. » Later, Paul Samuelson popularized the use of the term “invisible hand” to « refer to a more general and abstract conclusion that truly free markets are self-regulating systems that always tend to create economically optimal outcomes, which in turn cannot be improved upon by government intervention« . In other words, the market always wins. If you do not believe, take a look at prohibition when the US banned alcohol during 1920 – 1933. Far from converting citizens to teetotalers, it created a secondary, illegal, market for alcoholic beverages to the benefit of the Mafia. The same was true before 1989 in COMECON countries when not everyone could get consumer goods according neither to their needs nor to their regular salary, as opposed to those with access to foreign convertible cash who could afford everything at the detriment of the ‘regular’ economy.
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The second person to remember is David Ricardo who came up with the theory of « comparative advantage« . In modern times, he would have argued that it does not make sense for the US to make sneakers that can be imported when this limits the chances to sell medical electronics to Vietnam.
The third person worth mentioning is George C. Marshall. He got the peace Nobel prize, not for his military successes, but for his ideas that started the « Marshall plan » and the conviction that « the division of labor is the basis of modern civilization« , and that if the US wants to sell something abroad, it needs to give the buyer a chance to earn his money, by buying from him as well. And that, without this, « there can be no political stability and no assured peace« .
The last thought, that trade will ensure peace, has been challenged in the last years, specifically with the war of Russia against Ukraine. It should be added that Russia is able to wage this war because it can trade with other partners like China or Iran.
To this set of three theories that have been validated for quite some time, should be added the knowledge of the base accounting scheme for a country. There is trade, services and financial flows and the
Trade balance: import and export of goods; raw materials and energy are important factors
Service balance: services bought and sold, this includes tourism
Financial transfers: remittances from citizens from or to their families abroad, foreign investment in- and outflows, credit in-and outflows, international assistance
www.ClearIAS.com
Only these three together mold the balance of payments. Which may or may not go against a reserve if a country has piled up some cash, like Russia or Norway from former oil sales. If a country has a negative balance of payments, it has a problem – like Venezuela or Argentina. Balancing the (Trade + Service) volume is sound economic policy, all while watching the financial balance as well. But watching the trade balance alone is nonsense. This is easier to understand for tourist destinations like the Seychelles that will never intend to produce their own buses, but a little bit more difficult for industrial nations with a mercantile past where the service import was mostly represented by slaves who got traded against some glass pearls.
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The last hypothesis here is not standard knowledge, yet based on reasonable grounds: Economic growth does not correlate with democracy. We currently have countries with impressive economic growth like China, but no democracy so to speak. We have democratic countries which levy a huge toll on their economy for defense like Israel. But we can link economic growth to values like stability or rule of law. Even the most autocratic leaders tried to establish a secure system to ensure the safe back and forth transit of merchandise and its counter value. In a way, it can be argued that countries like Yugoslavia were better at achieving economic growth through rule of law than many of their successor countries with more corrupt judges and public purchasing organizations.
Second: the current situation
Before jumping to conclusions, like simply copying the recipes from 1947, countries need to consider some current issues like
Digitalisation:
Value may be created outside the country borders, e.g. when tourists booking via Airbnb send 1/3 of the revenue off shore and outside the country taxation. Add the advertising revenue by Facebook & Co. or the trade profits of online dealers like Amazon. Add licensing, e.g. for the right to use the name Starbucks, that adds tax revenues in tax havens at the detriment of the countries that produce or serve the coffee.
Any economic policy needs to integrate these effects. The fact that most of the big digital companies are based in the US makes the required policy more complex, with a higher need for innovation and risk-taking. The US has already acknowledged this, as demonstrates the line-up of the big digital players behind the current president.
Structural balance of payment issues.
A Lack of strategic input factors like raw materials or energy, or raw earths for industrial countries, creates a need for compensation revenues. While each country is responsible for its own balance and will thus have to find an individual solution, large imbalances are not sustainable. In economic limbo, Terms of Trade, the amount you pay for imported goods in relation to the price of your export goods, do play a role. But even if we assume fair terms because of international competition, a country cannot just let go of a (trade + service) deficit for a long time.
Yugoslavia made this experience after 1989 when no one was ready to lend money on favorable terms for global strategic reasons; the breakup was one of the consequences as the relatively richer Slovenes and Croats did not want to continue to pay for their poorer fellow states. The Euro zone mastered the Greek crisis in 2009+ but clearly showed that there are limits if there is no economic incentive for those lending funds.
As Europe has much less energy available compared to the US – selling their LNG and maybe oil is high on the wish list of the current US government – the energy strategy needs to be integrated, especially if Russia or the Middle East are not good political alternatives.
Another factor is that the US has a very export-oriented agriculture while Europe tries to keep some autarky, another area of conflict yet also opportunity: last time, a deal « soy beans against champagne » could be struck even though the then and current president prefers McDonald’s food & drinks.
Any US government should realize that in case of a balance of payments (trade + services) deficit, the shortfall has to be covered by foreign money, either through investments or by obtaining loans.
And this is true not only to finance the federal deficit. Also consider that the US borrows money from other countries for their industry and private households. As Ursula von der Leyen recalled at the World Economic Forum, « European household savings reach almost € 1.4 trillion, compared to just over € 800 billion in the United States. € 300 billion of them are invested abroad every year. » Without the savings and trust of Europe, but also Japan and China, the US could not lead the economic policy that it currently does. The tariff increase is supposed to solve this, assuming that it works. In other words, assuming that the US treasury gets more money from import tariffs than it loses from reduced purchasing power and linked economic effects through the induced price increase.
US policy background and options
The US tariff policy does not come down from heaven, and is not an AI suggestion generated last week. And the US has some more options that the president may implement.
Increasing tariffs has been a long-term goal – for some
Analysts hint that tariffs are the one constant policy of the current president, a policy opinion rendered public in 1987 when he was running ads in the largest newspaper (The Atlantic). Changes or deals are possible on other issues but this is a tough one. Not sure for his potential successor, though, if the policy shows no results by the 2026 mid-term elections.
Possible US$ devaluation
A devaluation of the US$ may help US exports but will make imports more costly. Money lenders will lose interest in the US$ while loans will become more costly for the US treasury. This will raise interest rates, which is bad for the US economy. Again, the tariff increase will have to bring in lots of money to compensate these effects. Devaluating the US$ on purpose – as thought by some – is possible yet risky, a catch-22.
US Tariff vs. tax trade-off
Can the US compensate the price effect of tariffs by lowering taxes on companies and citizens? The current president is confident and points out a situation when 120 years ago not only the US, but also countries like Germany were financed by tariffs, not income taxes. This question is not easy to answer: Some countries still finance their governments that way, like Russia, the Gulf countries or some tax havens like Panama. Russia and the Golf countries perceive their income from energy exports, related royalties and export tariffs, not by import tariffs. Micro-countries like Andorra do not really serve as good examples for larger states. What can be said: if there is a large import volume as compared to the citizen base, it may work – e.g. for a Caribbean island. But if the majority of the GDP is created by the internal market, like in the EU, taxing only imports will not suffice. It could work for Alaska if very few inhabitants benefit from royalties on energy exports, become rich from attracting Silicon Valley businesses so that they can afford the tariffs on their imports. With a larger population and a rising state share, be it for education, health or social transfers, this does not seem an option.
Now, the current US tendency is to increase tariff revenue and reduce taxes and the share of the state in the GDP. How far this can go remains to be assessed. As a consequence, if tariffs rise, the US market for international exporters will become smaller.
www.Economist.com
US share in international trade
The shrinking importance of the US in international trade is not only a prediction. According to the Economist, it is already a fact: from 20 % in 2000 it shrank to under 15 % in 2023. EU + « open market allies » like Canada, Australia and others have a 1/3rd of the global trade, more than double the US. If this trend continues, the US will become – on a global level – « economically irrelevant« . Like today’s Russia after they started the war.
These are strong words, and of course apply differently whether you sell sport utilities or snails. But it gives a clear view of the options: focus on growth sectors, and reduce your engagement in shrinking sectors.
Negotiation tactics
Keep in mind that long before even considering presidency, the mandate current holder wrote a book that became a no. 1 national bestseller entitled “The Art of the Deal”. The front page announces “He makes one believe in the American Dream Again”. The back page cites him as “the personification of hustle”. Many of his moves could just be part of a deal strategy, like making an announcement that crashes the stock market, buying cheap, withdrawing the announcement and benefiting from the stock market gains.
Governments can take advice from him directly:
Art of the DealDownload
These tactics are not common knowledge, yet not new. Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Putin with his sidekick Sergey Lavrov act just alike. People with less speculative minds know how to integrate a more long-term view. Would you use 1/3rd of your salary to rent an apartment in a Trump Tower if you do not know whether the rent doubles next week? You may see it differently if you get a three night bargain at hotel Trump, but not if you are trying to house your family for the next five years. So the “good news” of the reduction of a 33 % tariff down to 10 % should not let you forget that the next “Foreign Pollution Free Act” with a 37 to 100 % additional tax is already in the Congress.
Acting individuals on the US side
A short look at the bio of four key players in the current administration besides the “PotUS” can also be helpful:
TE 4 TariffEscalationPlayersDownload
The Western Balkans situation
Having said all this, what needs to be added for the Western Balkans?
At first glance, the importance of exports from the Western Balkans to the US is minimal, ranging from 0,1 to 1,1 of the GDP while the US share in the total exports ranges between 1 – 14,6 %.
Let us take a look at each country separately, as their situations are quite different. (Trade data is from OEC.world in US$ mio and 2023 if available)
Albania
Albania’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,4 % of the GDP.
Albanian politics tend to be friendly to the current US president, be it for ideological reasons or because of business relations. Albania’s Democratic Party PDSH is like-minded, Prime Minister Rama and his Socialist Party PSSh have exceptionally granted full development rights of Albania’s Sazan Island to Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. “Rama has begun a pilgrimage across Europe to tell Europeans what a blessing it is that Trump was elected US President.” A complete shift of opinion on his part as in 2016, Edi Rama “explicitly said in two media appearances that Trump was a threat to Albanian-American relations, as well as a threat to America itself.”
The benefit: Albania got away with a 10 % tariff in the last tariff round.
Of 4,25 bil. $ Albanian exports, the US represents a meager 1,9 % with 80,8 mio $, consisting for 19,5 % of plants for perfumery, pharmacy or insecticides and 25 % textiles and shoes.
Albania imports for 8,76 bil $, 1,9 % or 158 mio $ from the US, mainly cars, aircraft parts, energy and poultry. The positive US balance should keep the US happy. The real economic impact for Albania is tourism, with 11,7 mio foreign visitors that should have generated some 4 bil $ of income. Americans accounts for a mere 3 % of the total, although their number has been growing by 11 % a year in the last seven years.
US FDI in Albania is small, around 200 US$ (Tirana Times)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,4 % of the GDP.
Bosnian-Herzegovinian foreign policy does not usually make much noise, the reason being that the two entities act more separately than as a country. Srpska Republika’s boss Milan Dodik has been criticized by Marco Rubio, so he is not such a close friend of the current US administration as he is Putin´s.
The country exports 9,67 bil. $ of which the US gets 1,7 % or 163 mio $. Details are only available for 2022: gun cartridges account for 18,5 %, furniture and clothes/shoes have some importance.
Of the 15,8 bil. $ imports, the US has a share of 3,2 % or 512 mio $, of which 73,8 % to bituminous coal.
Bosnia got a 35 % tariff (before the pause) and you may wonder if you look at these OEC (American) numbers: why? To understand, you need to know the intricacies of the trade data: goods that leave from or arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina e.g. via a Croatian port to go to or come from the US may be counted differently as Bosnian or Croatian. The US Census sees the trade data in 2023 as US > Bosnia-Herzegovina with 25,3 mio $ and Bosnia-Hercegovina > US with 158,8 mio $, suggesting that the Bituminous coal does not show as US export in the US data for some unknown reason. (It could also be that it is a US company doing the trade and paperwork, but the origin is in another country).
Kosovo
Kosovo’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 1,1 % of the GDP, the highest of all Western Balkan countries. But Kosovo also has the lowest estimated amount of exports of the region.
Kosovo has been a very US-friendly country since Bill Clinton supported its independence, there is still his statue in Pristina. The Kosovar AmCham has suggested to remove unilaterally the 10 % tariff on US goods hoping that the US will reciprocate, something that did not work for Israel or Switzerland.
The Kosovo government thinks about developing a skiing area in Brezovica, and at some point the idea was taking hold that the current US president could be personally interested to invest 500 mio $ there. A possible compensation could be to name a lake after him, “Lake Trump”, as special envoy Richard Grenell named it.
As Kosovo is in a complicated situation, trade data is difficult to get and OEC does not even list the country. A reason is that the north, very closely linked to Serbia, has no interest in participating in any statistic and Serbia does not see this trade as international.
Kosovo is told to have exported 889 mio € in 2024 while it imported 6 bio. €. Major export goods, after electricity, were door and window items, iron bars and furniture (Telegrafi.com).
Tirana Times estimates Kosovo’s exports to the US at 130 mio $. in 2022, roughly in line with US Census that came up with a huge deficit of 123,9 mio that same year. Things turned bad in 2024 when the US notes 49,4 mio $ exports to and 34,0 mio $ imports from Kosovo, thus the US trade has a surplus and the country only got a 10 % tariff. (Which suggests a regular adaptation of the US tariff model when supply chains change?)
Montenegro
Montenegro’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,1 % of the GDP, the lowest of all WB6 countries.
Montenegro is another tourism country with rare appearances on the international political scene, at least outside the Western Balkans.
Of 1,56 bil. $ exports of Montenegro, the US share amounts to 1 % or 15,2 mio $, of which 53 % is hard liquor. Out of 4,78 bil. $ of imports, the US represents 1,6 % or 77,9 mio $., coal, cars and a mix of other stuff to the liking of the current US government. The US sees slightly less exports, maybe again coal, but still has a trade surplus and therefore only applies a 10 % tariff.
North Macedonia
North Macedonia’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,3 % of the GDP.
North Macedonia’s current government is very close to the current US government. The Prime Minister was in Washington during the presidential inauguration, not in the White House but in a stadium where the Republican Party held an event.
Add to this several visits of closer friends of the current president like Richard Grenell or Chris Pavlovski, mostly to discuss business. But none of the projects, from data center to potential energy investments, would result in higher exports to the US.
The fact that a 33 % import tariff (before the pause) is to be applied to Macedonian goods has been declared by the government as “some kind of mistake” and the government hopes for a correction, if not for a free trade agreement or similar, although some tariff was expected.
The data comes from three different sources and there exists a detailed analysis. In essence, of the 10,1 bio $ exports of North Macedonia, the US accounts for 2,7 % or 273 mio $, 74 % of which are buses from a single Macedonian factory being built specially for the US market (i.e. unsellable elsewhere) based on US engines and transmissions. The imports are 257 mio $ from the US or 2,1 % of a total of 12,4 bio $, which gives a slight deficit of 16 mio $ according to OEC. The US Census sees this differently and estimates a 228,7 mio $ deficit in the same 2023 year; North Macedonia itself counted the buses as export to Belgium where they are driven to receive the final preparation till mid-2024.
Serbia
Serbia’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,7 % of the GDP.
Serbia has had long ambiguous foreign relations with nearly all countries in the world since 1945, always trying to balance their relation between the West, Moscow and now China. Serbia has a free trade agreement with Russia and privileged relations with China. Serbia also has close relations to the family of the current US president whose son was in Belgrade a few days ago. Serbia has offered his “memorial to US bombing”, a destroyed military building in the center of the city, to the president’s family to build a hotel.
The biggest country in the Western Balkans exports 32,6 bil. $, of which the US counts for 2,2 % or 707 mio $. The 2022 OEC data shows a mixed package of products and fire arms (“AK 47”) representing 10 % as a very popular import item in the US. Of the 39 bio $ imports, the US counts in 2023 for 1,4 % or 545 mio $ with a variety of products, resulting in a trade deficit. The US sees the exports to Serbia 300 mio $ less in 2023 and a deficit of 600 mio $ in 2024, justifying a tariff of 37 %, the highest of all Western Balkan states.
Add to this that US FDI in Serbia is huge, around 4 bil. US$ (Tirana Times)
Overview about trade figures of different sources:
In addition, the proposed 2025 Foreign Pollution Free Act , if enforced, will affect all countries, Western Balkans included. This means an addition of tariffs of 50 % on Iron and Steel, of 40 % on Aluminum, of 55 % on Aluminum Articles, of 48 % on Glass & Cement, of 69 % on Fertilizer or Hydrogen, of 100 % on Solar Products and 37 % on Battery Inputs. Now, Montenegro’s aluminum plant does not work anymore, US steel has ended their activity in Serbia and these goods are not key products anyway. But Solar products or Battery inputs could be future products and e.g. Serbia exports iron and aluminum products. Bauxite, the raw material needed for aluminum, is mined in Serbia.
Conclusion of the present situation for the Western Balkans:
While the policies of the six countries of the Western Balkans are quite different, from very pro-current US government in Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia to neutral and slightly problematic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro, the trade numbers show a similar picture:
the USA, at least directly, is not a relevant trade partner
in several countries the numbers between the country, the US and from an international perspective differ
the tariffs did not take any “political proximity” into account, just the US Census statistics
potential business projects with US partners do not involve trade but rather investments in tourism or energy.
In comparison to the free trade agreements and the close exchange that the Western Balkan countries have with the EU, there is neither potential for significantly higher US exports nor any major importance of the US market for the countries in general, except for the very few specific factories like the Serbian rifle or the Macedonian bus manufacturers. These could be hit very hard as they hardly have alternative markets on hand.
On the other hand, all countries are very much dependent on the EU economy, so if there is an economic crisis in the EU, there will be less exports and less jobs for Balkan manufacturers. Some countries can compensate with tourism, others are not able to do so, at least not in the next three years. Measures for tourism can have an effect within a few weeks/months. Establishing new supply chains, looking for new customers or offering new products takes years.
Recommendations to the Governments of the Western Balkans
Negotiations with the US
In the Western Balkans the first reaction was to negotiate with the US government to get a better deal. The arguments differ, from “there is an error that will be corrected” to “we abolish our tariffs, they will abolish theirs”. No one is mulling a “phenomenal” offer, at least not in public.
Different countries have different strategies towards negotiations. China has acted without negotiation, set tariffs themselves and sold US treasury bonds in higher amounts. The US has reacted with increasing the tariffs even further. The UK and Japan have been first in line for negotiations. UK Prime Minister even handed an envelope with… an invitation by King Charles. US President admitted to lacking time to handle the many talks already waiting in line. Others, like the EU, have first started consultations with their own industries, before coming up with offers that may not be acceptable to voters, like to allow the chlorine cleaning of food.
The Western Balkan countries may be well advised to wait a little bit and use the time to consult with one another before negotiating, individually or together. In a few weeks, the US administration may feel the first effects, as occurred when the bond market moved so much that the US president paused the additional reciprocal tariffs.
If some countries get a deal, this could map a path to others to in turn achieve similar agreements. Offering a zero % tariff for industrial goods comes up as a standard offer. With some luck, some or all of the Western Balkans could get some favorable treatment even though their trade balance remains negative in the US view: the total amounts are not really significant. Not being in the EU, the Western Balkans may be more flexible on product standards: it does not really matter if vehicles that fulfill the US windshield standard FMVSS 205 do not fulfill the EU ECE R43 standard because any new vehicle will be safer than the many old clunkers that drive along the Balkan roads.
Governments are advised to check where they should lobby and with whom they have to negotiate. The EU trade envoy Maroš Šefčovič just found out that talking to US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick (a “personal friend“ of the Prime Minister of North Macedonia) or US Trade representative Jamieson Greer was not helpful to avoid any tariff escalation since the one pushing the president for higher tariffs is the presidential advisor for trade and manufacturing Peter Navarro.
There could be phenomenal deals available “in private”, as the “Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions” Richard Grenell is quite familiar with the region and projects are flying around. Chances are better to achieve a small exception for one/a few specific custom codes of one specific party with good lobbying than a general agreement that even large countries with no trade deficit like the UK could not achieve since Brexit, with or without the current president being in office. Unless, of course, the current US government changes its mind.
Following the US statement that they had to slap tariffs on an island inhabited by Penguins only “to close absurd holes in the system”, tariffs are favored over checking the customs documentation to find that a rock without harbor or inhabitants cannot export 1,4 mio $ mechanical and electrical products. The time it takes for the first ‘phenomenal’ deal to occur will indicate if and when more deals are possible. The US has been very consistent in the last weeks: they want more production to move to the US, and less non-tariff barriers for US goods in the world. Offering only zero percent tariffs – when present tariffs are not so high anyway – may not suffice.
Focus on other markets
The direct importance of the US market is rather small for the Western Balkan countries, except for a few companies like the exporters of coaches in North Macedonia, ‘household’ AK 47 rifles in Serbia, perfume ingredients in Albania, hard liquor in Montenegro or cartridges in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Add to this textiles, shoes and furniture for all countries. These goods can however be sold anywhere in the world. The US represents 15 % of the world trade. A good market, a profitable market, yet small as compared to the rest of the world. And the rest of the world may have no such tariff barriers.
The first market to look at is the EU itself. Its potential is far from being exhausted. Regional trade only with the surrounding countries Greece, Bulgaria and Romania gives the Western Balkans a market with more inhabitants than their home market, comparable purchasing power, tastes, and within a few hours drive. Using tourism and the diaspora, additional markets in the EU can be reached with food products, and near shoring becomes even more important. The potential is huge for further exchanges, be it services, tourism or goods. Neither China nor Latin America have the luck to have so many “trade ambassadors” in a target market to explain how to cook with Ajvar, why rafting in Albania can be an adventure or that having the accounting done in Herzegovina is a viable alternative to Germany.
Growing trade with other parts of the world, from the Middle East over to Africa and Asia, seems like a good idea. But keep in mind: if a country is not able to adapt Ajvar to the local taste of Denmark despite the help of its huge diaspora, how will they conquer the Kenyan market with far less cultural and personal links.
A few countries already have special trade agreements and there is potential. Serbia has some with Russia and China, Slovakia with South Korea. No big impact on exports but some help in getting FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) from China. Add the shorter connections via the Greek ports compared to shipping goods via the Netherlands to Asia. Again, this will be easier for some countries but politically difficult for others. Focusing on the EU may be the faster option, although no opportunities should be neglected.
It is necessary is to focus on how customers are currently hit by the US sanctions. North Macedonia will have issues exporting a high-tech alloy beam to Germany if a third of these beams end up in electric vehicles sold in the US and this number is decreasing. Especially North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and somewhat Serbia should reconsider the cluster risk of being dependent on passenger car manufacturers for their exports and refocus on commercial vehicles, agricultural machinery and machine parts instead. They are very often similar to manufacture as passenger car parts, in the same quality but with lower volumes. Which makes those supply contracts within better reach of existing manufacturers, local or foreign.
Attention should also be paid to the defense industry, specifically by the NATO members Albania, North Macedonia and to some extent Montenegro. Demand is rising and production capacity is scarce. There is no reason why Macedonian welding structures could not be attractive as part of a European military vehicle if a similar structure becomes unsellable for a coach intended for the US.
Strong international commerce organizations
Switching the trade (and service export) focus needs a strong international commerce organization, strong chambers of commerce, good collaboration between different industries (e.g. food export and incoming tourism) and a professional management.
While such organisms exist, their practical value has a huge need for improvement. WB6-CIF Chamber Investment Forum has taken some steps. Their market access database exists. But it is a far cry from AliBaba that allows every European to access a digital supermarket. The good news: proposals for such digital tools are in the drawers and funding would be available. The bad news: the dust on such proposals takes more space in the drawer than the proposals themselves.
Another issue is the collaboration of national institutions with one another. Take the example of North Macedonia: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade with his economic counselors, the Invest in North Macedonia agency with its export promotion task, the SKSM chamber with its export club, the SSK, MASIT and OEMVP chambers with their export support together with 14 different trade missions from different countries all try to promote the export of Ajvar, textiles or steel beams. And this does not include the Agency of Promotion for Tourism. If a request for a Macedonian supplier of plastic fixtures comes in, it takes a lot of luck to route it to the potential supplier. Even though the country supplies the plastic shells of Kinder chocolate egg gifts worldwide – except to the US where they are illegal.
In Serbia, a few months ago CEBAC, an association of all associations and chambers, was created. The Austrian way to combine most of the functions under a single organization has been praised. Yet to be seen how such an idea can be realized in countries like the confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo.
Activities can be joined, at least for some countries. The “Open Balkan” Belgrade “Wine Vision” is an example thereof, despite excluding wine-producing Kosovo and placing the by far largest producer and exporter, North Macedonia, just as “number two” on the fair. Likewise, ideas for common tourism marketing exist since years. The latest CEFTA agreement now allows travel agencies to drive their buses from one country to another, however still excluding tour guides who have to stay home: a Serb from Vranje is not allowed to explain to a Japanese visitor the history of the 50 km-neighboring Macedonian town of Kumanovo.
To sum up, there are opportunities, and there is the political reality. Countries can at least strengthen their own national organizations. Serbia is an example of what can be achieved.
Strengthening of the home market
The EU has made it a goal for the Western Balkan countries: strengthen the local economy. They have put money behind it, 6. bil. € in the RGF “Reform and Growth Facility”. The first payouts have been made.
In essence, it would not be necessary to export to the US or anywhere else if the local population would consume the products and services produced in the country. With the twist that good jobs and lifestyle may reduce emigration, and more inhabitants increase the market for local sales.
This even is an official reasoning for the US tariffs, buried deep in the Executive order in para 11:
« Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic policies and practices of our trading partners, including currency practices and value-added taxes, and their associated market distortions, that suppress domestic consumption and boost exports to the United States. This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent). »
In essence, the US is saying
Your policies take away too much money from the consumers, so we cannot sell enough to them.
and this is also valid for the Western Balkans. This is especially true for cars, where the VAT adds to the tariffs. A US vehicle like the Dodge Hornet sells for 30 854 € in the US including the 6 % GST Sales Tax in Michigan. The essentially identical Alfa Romeo Tonale would sell, including motor vehicles tax and 18 % VAT, for 42 300 € in North Macedonia, the net income for the manufacturer being the same. No wonder that most imports are used vehicles and smoky used cars raise the pollution of Skopje to 69 PM10, far above the 25 PM10 level that car-intensive Los Angeles records according to the WHO data at a given point.
The lower growth and consumption are probably a consequence of a higher stake of the state in the GDP, increasing labor cost and taking away purchasing power through taxes. It makes sense to increase efficiency through digitization and cutting red tape. A goal that the EU has already set by asking to cut regulations in the RGF.
The S3 Smart Specialization Strategy gives recommendations on how to achieve higher economic growth, and the EU has made S3 mandatory for all European regions. Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia already work on Smart Specialization plans, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in preparation. Government administrations, academia and companies are supposed to work together to focus on the economic development, regulations and research in promising sectors only.
Education comes as another focal point. Different countries face different situations, but the high unemployment of University graduates shows problems in the system. Vocational education is on the rise, which is good. Smart Specialization may step in. Bear in mind that a good vocational education should dedicate over 50 % of the time to professional learning in the company. To become a successful baker, it is more important to be a guru of pastry variation than to know what national heroes thought who ate them some centuries ago. The “number of anthroposophy graduates that Czech Republic needs” (to cite the Czech president) is much lower than the number of English-speaking accounting graduates, some ‘economic steering’ and interlocking with the job market, e.g. via mandatory traineeships, can thus help.
Investments in infrastructure will strengthen the countries. But before starting a high-speed rail from Skopje to Blace, it would make better sense to repair the road to Vizibegovo. A high quality but cheap intercity bus network, conveniently named “Student Agency”, has done more for public transport in the Czech Republic at close to zero public cost than all plans to realize a railway line from Prague to Nuremberg or Munich. Sometimes, a sense of what can be done with a quick return in money and time should prevail over “politically correct” ideas that will take years and millions of Euros but risk to end up like the Bagdad railway: a good basis for literature and movies, but nothing for public transit.
However, this does not mean that an optimized economic mix between airline, rail, clean buses and clean cars plus skates, bikes and pedestrian options cannot improve life in the Western Balkans tremendously.
Investments in Health are an issue for the Western Balkans. Probably it will need more means. It would be wise to immediately implement new approaches like in Denmark where the focus is to spend more on prevention thus less on the recovery of sick people. Errors from the Western European countries can be avoided. Not every pregnancy requires six ultrasounds, at least not for medical reasons. Privileging the contact to the doctor or community nurse (male/female) and less “let’s buy machinery and scan them all” should help to keep the costs down. Newer EU members like the Czech Republic and Poland have shown that health systems can be run more efficiently than in Germany. Tele-medicine is another solution to bring solutions everywhere, including in every mountain village. Digitalization can keep costs down. Everyone complains about the lack of staff, while they explain that they spend half their time on paperwork. In our time of digitalization, « time on person » target should be 90 % and logging the potty result of grandma and grandson alike should be left to technology.
In this context, elderly and juvenile care can also benefit from attention. The family network up to the “zadruga” is much stronger in the Western Balkans than in Western Europe. The “system” should use this, from family taxation to flexible work possibilities. Here as well, a system of community nurses (male/female), the establishment of social enterprises and many more competences can help to keep the youngest and oldest in the community instead of storing them in old age camps like it happens in other countries for those not fortunate enough to pay for private care.
That energy and climate preservation need action is no news. The Western Balkans have to increase their production of renewable energies. They are blessed with plentiful sun. Opportunities exist from photovoltaics to hydrogen, this latter could flow through existing pipelines to buyers “gore”, further up north. Governments should be aware that the state has no money for all these investments, not even for the necessary power transmission lines. Activating private capital is key. While some countries are fast to implement, others are lagging behind and pay the price with higher electricity cost and higher pollution from coal.
The same goes for recycling or waste management. The concept that every village will have their own waste or water treatment company that conveniently employs all friends of the acting mayor may be tempting from a political perspective, the sad reality however is that water treatment plants are as rare in the Western Balkans as illicit dumping in the nature is plenty. Private management is required to run things efficiently. Other new EU members could settle the problem within a generation. Hint: it is a necessity for tourism, which can bring more money to poorer regions than the waste/water management costs. Just take a look at Austrian or Swiss mountain areas that were much poorer than Skopje or Belgrade 100 years ago.
Conclusion
To sum up, negotiation, alternative markets with the help of strong commerce organizations and strengthening the home market are the three options. Negotiations do not really seem a promising option to solve the general problem of export dependency, not so much directly to the US but rather to the EU, with special regard to passenger car suppliers.
Touristic countries withstand somewhat better and seem to be more resilient. Developing tourism is within reach of every country.
The internal market, not only within WB6 but also with the EU, shows far more potential. If Estonia started at a comparable level to that of North Macedonia in 1990 and has now doubled its GDP per capita in purchasing power, so can North Macedonia by making the most of its home market and benefiting from its ties to the EU. Other continents may be opportunities, but need preparation and at least a medium-term strategy. Going via FDI attraction seems a safer bet than hoping that Macedonian rice cookers become a hit in India or Japan.
We may think that what happens on the other side of the Atlantic is not relevant. But we should be aware of its impact on Europe that trickles down to the economically weaker Western Balkans. People may vote with their feet and just emigrate. Citizens in the Western Balkans can endure a lot. Yet the current unrest in Belgrade and elsewhere shows that their patience is not endless, the Balkans have known revolutions before.
The Western Balkan countries are not (yet) part of EU, but definitely in Europe. Unlike the current US policy, Europe does not want to re-balance its trade to the detriment of the Western Balkans. But in times of war in Ukraine, the capacity and the means of Europe are not endless, and each Western Balkan 6 country competes with Ukraine and Moldova, both eager to outpace them for their mere survival.
The Western Balkan countries will be hit harder by the indirect impact of US tariffs via the slower economy of their EU partners than by any reduction of direct exports to the US. Using existing market potential within their own economies, the region, the EU and the remaining 85 % of world trade left in the rule-based WTO trade sphere offers enough compensation for what they risk to lose. Staying open, tourist and trade-friendly and caring for the wealth of their own citizens remains the best choice to deal with #TariffEscalation.
Further Sources:
Richard Baldwin, Trump Tariffs and the World Trade System
Simon Evenett, Marc-Andreas Muendler: Evidence from Tariff Laffer Curves – Tariffs cannot fund the government
Simon Evenett: Briefing on US Tariff Pause
Tommaso Giardini, Svenja Bosard: Geopolitical Tensions in Digital Policy
Shuting Pomerleau, The New US Carbon Tariff Proposal: A Brief Overview
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Johannes Heidecker was manager in different industries with a long-time experience in several Central and Eastern European countries. In the last four years, he was economic advisor to the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. […]
Lire la suite…
avril 4, 2025By Sean Hanley, University College London.
This contribution is drawn from an article written by Sean Hanley on his webiste. Be sure to subscribe to it if you want to be informed of his future contributions and to support his work.
Tony Barber’s weekly FT (Financial Times) column rounds up and examines Eastern Europe’s latest round of civic protest in Slovakia, Romania, Georgia, Serbia. It’s a mixed bag of regimes and issues. Two in the EU, two aspiring to join by stalled by illiberal governments, one with (Georgia) with the looming presence of Russian influence right next door and thousands of kilometres distant from the European heartlands.
The key takeaway, Barber says, is that there are countervailing liberal forces resisting various Kremlin-aligned illiberal governments – and doing so persistently – at least the nations’ capitals and cities. What’s more liberal civic nationalism is alive and well. But Barber is astute in noting, as academic researchers have, that this similar looking, urban middle class civic mobilisation is subtly different in countries which are, both politically and geographically in, different places.
Are watershed elections and the EU enough?
In Serbia, protests erupt over corruption and shrinking civic freedoms. These demonstrations are large but leaderless, demanding systemic reform rather than outright regime change. Protesters distrust opposition parties and electoral politics, avoiding engagement in formal structures. Unlike in other countries, they do not carry EU flags, reflecting a scepticism toward European institutions of a stalled candidate state. The government remains stable, bolstered by the EU’s preference for regional stability over democracy. The lesson is that politics so much more than just winning some future watershed election and “turning the tide of populism’ (tides always comes back in). Targeting the post-communist deep state, the oligarchical power structures is the wickeder problem.
In Slovakia, resistance has focused on Prime Minister Robert Fico’s autocratic drive against independent institutions following 2023 comeback: the winding up and re-forming of public TV, and pressure on NGOs. Protests see elections as a crucial battleground for change, unlike in Serbia, although as ever the precise vehicle capable of defeating Fico remains uncertain. Demonstrators strongly support the EU, aligning themselves with Europe’s perceived democratic norms. But public opinion remains split, with some backing NATO and European integration, while others favour neutrality or a more Russia-friendly stance of the kind backed by Fico.
Hungary’s protests, though smaller than those in Serbia, challenge Viktor Orbán’s deeply entrenched system of electoral autocracy and opposition suppression. Midway between Serbia and Slovak patterns, the opposition still engages in elections with the new TISZA party the strongest challenge to Orbán in years, but under an uneven playing field that fuels scepticism about whether real change is now possible through the ballot box. With Orbán’s control over the judiciary, security forces, and media, Hungary is unlikely to see a Poland-style opposition victory in 2025, as the system is designed to keep him in power. The EU is critical of Orbán, yet Hungarian protesters do not display the strong EU alignment seen in Slovakia, perhaps chastened by the years of failed EU leverage
Georgia faces unrest over rigged elections, creeping authoritarianism, and powerful Russian influence. Protests target the ruling Georgian Dream party, and while elections were rigged, opposition forces still see them as worth contesting. As in Slovakia backsliding is relatively new and illiberalism less entrenched. Protesters take the strong pro-EU stance, common would-be members state far from membership although the EU and (less surprisingly) the US have been largely inactive in offering support. With weak international backing, Georgia remains highly vulnerable to Russian interference, making its democratic future perhaps the most precarious.
Historical analogies fail to inform
Less convincing – or thought through – are FT’s tired historical analogies:
people [writes Tony Barber] are massing on the streets in the name of liberal ideals and national self-determination — seen as hijacked by bullying, self-serving autocrats — in a manner that recalls 1848 and also 1989, the year of the pro-democracy revolutions against communism.
History matters, but the existence of strong civic minded publics with a liberal national vision isn’t reason to reach for the history books.
We’ve been here before – and to very mixed effect.
1989 was itself compared to the 1848 “Springtime of Nations”, but its liberal revolutions – at least for a long interlude – succeeded while those of 1848 were snuffed out. The 2011 Arab Spring was compared to both 1989 and 1848 but largely lacked the liberalism and depended less on geopolitics than domestic authoritarian retrenchment.
Unlike 1848, today’s protests are unlikely to be directly crushed by external military intervention, and unlike 1989, they lack clear leadership and effective Western backing and are pushing back against democratic backsliding, not pushing for democracy in a situation of authoritarian collapse. Indeed, today’s autocrats are in many ways products of 1989, well entrenched and well capable of faking and manipulating democratic forms for deeply autocratic purposes, not the exhausted dynasts or communists of the past.
Historical parallels with 1848 and 1989 fall short. We are in new political territory. The shifting nature of democratic pushback—where mass protests, electoral struggles, and international disengagement intersect—suggest a different kind of contest, which – even if democratic defence leads to full blown democratic renewal – does not fit neatly into past revolutionary cycles.
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Sean Hanley is a full-time professor at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College of London. His research focuses on the transformation of established parties and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. […]
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mars 26, 2025By Cristian Preda, University of Bucharest.
This article was first published in the review Comunitatea liberală 1848 on the 4th of March 2025. Link to the original publication, in romanian: Să venim împreună și să facem un push mare – Comunitatea Liberala.
Even if she was in the spotlight for only a few days, Anamaria Gavrilă left us with something very precious. No, I’m not referring to her 112 call asking the police for help to escape the group of journalists who wanted to find out whether she was still running for president. The POT (Partidul Oamenilor Tineri; Romanian Youth’s Party) leader gave us something far more valuable for understanding the era we live in.
The gem lies within the words she uttered in a phone conversation. She was called by Realitatea TV —recently self-proclaimed as « the people’s television »— to explain whether she was withdrawing from the race for Cotroceni. Well, in response to this simple question, Gavrilă said the following: “I know it’s delicious to talk about positions, but this is about making all Romanians, even those from the other side, understand that it’s a difficult situation for Romania. We all need to come together and make a big push to restore constitutional order and freedom in Romania. We all need to go beyond parties and any discussion.”
What caught people’s attention was her use of so-called « Romgleza, » a mix of words from two languages as different as Romanian and English. Expressions like “this is about,” “to come together,” or “to make a big push” reveal an evolution in speech that extends beyond the political sphere. A superficial Americanization of our public life, which has taken place since 1989, has changed the way our fellow citizens express themselves. While the nationalist generation of C. Vadim Tudor and George Pruteanu still upheld the ideal of a correctly spoken Romanian language, the recent nationalist wave writes without diacritics and sprinkles Americanisms among words recorded in the official Romanian dictionary (DEX). The fantasy of a connection to Dacian or Getic origins completes the picture.
But that’s not the most important takeaway from the POT leader’s intervention. What truly matters is her project to establish constitutional order without parties and without too many words. No one has expressed this totalitarian dream more clearly since King Carol II, who abolished political parties by decree and then created the National Renaissance Front, which he legitimized in 1939 through elections where all deputies and senators wore uniforms. Gavrilă is the bearer of a project that undermines democracy.
She asks us to unite “for a big push,” meaning to trample on freedom of association, the right to free speech, and political competition.
No, thank you much, we do not need așa ceva… (No, thank you very much, we don’t need that…; editor’s note).
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Cristian Preda is a professor in political science at the University of Bucharest and a former MEP (2009-2019). His research areas are large, from political regimes, to political history, elections and party politics. […]
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mars 19, 2025By Johannes Heidecker, former economic advisor for North Macedonia’s PM.
The Balkans are geographically located in Europe. Is this to say that they should necessarily become part of the EU? History brings no clear answer, or does it? A view on the perspectives, opportunities and difficulties.
When we say Europe today, many think “European Union”, the idea of Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer or Jean Monnet who thought of the German-French reconciliation as a base for peace; of Walter Hallstein, Johan Beyen or Alcide de Gasperi, who pushed for a common market as a stability pole in this union; of Winston Churchill who thought that democracy was a necessary base; of Joseph Bech and Paul-Henri Spaak who started with the BeNeLux Customs Union, of Charles de Gaulle who pushed for more European independence, and of Sicco Mansholt with his focus on a common agricultural policy for food self-sufficiency. Later, the common Euro currency, the Schengen borderless travel, common foreign policy and, a short while ago, the common vaccination research and procurement as well as defense were added to the European idea.
Europe grew from an initial nine countries to encompass the western part of the continent. The South with the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, Cyprus and Malta, the North with Sweden and Finland, and Central Europe from Estonia to Bulgaria followed. In the Balkans however, only Slovenia and Croatia, that have long-time links to the European core, are members.
How come? The former Yugoslavia is said to have tossed the idea around 1990, when the country was economically and politically in a better shape than Baltic countries like Latvia. Internal conflicts however soon prevailed over the interest for Europe. Hardly any politician in the Balkans discusses “peace zones”, “common regional markets” or even “free border crossing”, although this existed within the former Yugoslavia. The names we remember are those of the warlords that launch conflicts, starting with Milošević.
Had it not been concerned with stability, Europe could have lost interest. The intensity of the conflict led to the use of military force in Bosnia & Herzegovina since 1992, in Kosovo since 1999 and in today’s North Macedonia in 2001 – this latter quite successfully as an extension of the turmoil could be avoided with much less effort and damage. Still, in the mind of most Europeans, except maybe for their close neighbors, the word of Bismarck echoes “that the Balkans are not worth the bones of a (German) grenadier.”
It was not always so. In the Roman empire, the area was an integrated part, much less exposed than were Germania and other border areas. The location of the region shifted from central to peripheral with the division of the Roman Empire. The north remained linked to the western countries while the south was connected to today’s Istanbul. This is where the different religions, administrative structures and other elements come from, that distinguish the region from most of the current EU countries. While states with central governments emerged in Western Europe, the Ottoman empire governed by sending local governors, yet allowing local communities to regulate their own affairs in the “millet” system: as long as taxes were paid, a Jewish, Christian or Muslim community could self-govern in whatever social, trade or other matter. If this sounds like a perfect democratic solution, specifically in multi-ethnic situations, it should be kept in mind that the population had to comply with the central government’s requirements as to conscription and tax money, usually taken from those opposing the least resistance, namely the weakest. Confidence in the central government was consequently always low. Meanwhile Westerners were guided by the ideas of enlightenment kings like Frederick of Prussia who saw himself as “first servant of the country” and some base state principles dating back to the Magna Carta in 1215.
Is a different history an obstacle that can be overcome?
Whoever doubts this should remember that there were far more reasons to doubt in 1950 that Germany could become a democracy, that countries like Spain or Greece have had non-democratic governments till a few years before joining the EU and that several members of the EU are still monarchies without this being any issue in their daily political life. A region that combines politically stable countries like the Netherlands with younger democracies like Bulgaria is bound to experience internal tensions.
Let’s rather consider what a common vision may bring as advantages. It is far easier to integrate a culture with similar educational or consumer habits than say, Sri Lanka or Nigeria. As a Russian said “Europe is everywhere where people are moved when listening to Beethoven”.
When the EU decided to integrate Romania, the country was poor and it will remain a net receiver of funds for many years to come. But it currently ranks 12th in the EU by nominal GDP, 7th by purchasing power adjusted GDP, and has grown from an average of 44 to 72 % in the GDP per capita classification of European countries since 2007 when it joined the EU, with potential for more. If we imagine the world as competing regions, today with China and India, tomorrow possibly with South-East Asia, Latin America or Africa, it may be a good idea to integrate the geographically close Balkans in the economic space before they potentially turn into a zone of foreign influence and its load of problems. Europe can look for sunshine in Mauritania to produce hydrogen, but the pipeline connections to the Balkans already exist and the sun there is plentiful, too.
The Balkans are an interesting touristic region at affordable cost and can be reached with far less CO2 than Turkey or Egypt. Albania has just been ranked as the country with the highest tourism growth in the world.
From a security perspective, having Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia as NATO partners may not be the biggest gun in the NATO arsenal, but it is a better contribution than to have to station troops like in Kosovo or Bosnia & Herzegovina. Likewise, the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria is already substantial, be it to extend the rocket shield of Europe against Iran or to produce ammunition to support Ukraine. The first ministries to declare themselves fans of the Western Balkans are the ministries of interior: stable Western Balkans mean less criminality infiltrating the richer European countries, and a better control of migration streams.
And last but not least the Balkans can contribute to science and technical progress. It can be discussed if Tesla was a Croat or a Serb, but he was definitely from the Balkans. Porsche has just recently transferred some of their technology development to Rimac in Croatia, a convincing example of what a sunny climate and an innovative culture can contribute in this field.
It is precisely this very opportunity for enrichment that must guide the European countries when they consider the Balkans. Efforts of enlargement, from Iceland to Ukraine, the integration of Canada into the EEA or an increased cooperation with countries like Morocco should of course be pursued as well. However, geographic proximity induces closeness in many other ways.
At the same time, the European ideas and ideals, so dear to a Western Europe torn by wars and eager not to repeat past errors, still have to be planted, nurtured and grown in the many regions that were not part of this movement 75+ years ago. They cannot be replaced by the technocratic requirements of the ‘acquis’. “One sees clearly only with the heart. What is essential is invisible to the eye” – said Saint-Exupery and this also applies to the European values in the Balkans.
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Johannes Heidecker was manager in different industries with a long-time experience in several Central and Eastern European countries. In the last four years, he was economic advisor to the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. […]
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