By Sarah Bomba, Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), Paris.
The dynamics of institutional transformation in Poland after 1989 have led to a gradual erosion of its democracy. Following 1989, the Polish state increasingly embraced the principles of the free market, characterized by a significant reduction in taxes and a growing influence of multinational corporations on public affairs, all under the guidance of a steadily intensifying policy of deregulation. Neoliberalism in Poland solidified in a dogmatic form, what could be called the « dogma of the infallibility of the free market », where private interests prevail over the common good. An analysis of these evolving processes reveals a reconfiguration of social relations reminiscent of a return to feudalism after 1989, with liberal hegemony evoking the dominance of the Polish nobility over other social classes in the 16th century, resulting in a progressive weakening and marginalization of the state.
Poland is sinking into a political and economic polarization that can be deconstructed by referring to its feudal past, indicative of a class-based dimension in social relations that persists to this day. Critical literature on Polish serfdom, prior to the partitions, allows for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon[1]. These writings, which denounce aristocratic domination while highlighting the popular history of Poland, began to emerge about a decade ago and have resonated strongly in a society that, since 1989, has been rewriting its history by marginalizing the working classes, departing from the historical policy of the People’s Republic of Poland, which instead emphasized the central role of peasants and workers in national history and identity. The political and economic dominance of the Polish nobility once led to the weakening of the state and its disappearance. The defence of private interests and the disregard for the common good caused a socio-political breakdown, the echoes of which are still felt today. Currently, we are witnessing the emergence of a new privileged class, that of entrepreneurs and higher middle-class professionals, who follow the American myth of the self-made man, aiming to introduce Western neoliberal[2] standards in Poland.
A new aristocracy: the businessmen
On April 4th, 2025, members of the Sejm voted in favour of reducing health insurance contributions for entrepreneurs. The law aimed to reverse the effects of the « Polski Ład » (Polish Deal), that according to the liberal parties had provoked the closure of companies. The results were as follows: 213 in favor, 190 against, and 25 abstentions. The Law and Justice party, along with the Left, voted against the measure, while the Civic Coalition and liberal groups (including the far-right Konfederacja) supported the new law[3].
This decision will reduce healthcare funding by around (some experts say about 6 bln) 4.6 billion PLN, at a time when the system is already lacking an estimated 20 billion PLN just to function properly. Medical appointment waiting times stretch over several years. Politically, this decision represents a partial privatization of the healthcare system, with the main beneficiaries being the wealthier segments of the population, even though Poland is one of the EU countries that spends the least on healthcare (around 5% of GDP)[4]. Public reaction has also been muted. Poles seem to have adopted a form of fatalism toward the privileges that have gradually taken root since 1989.
Privatization had already begun much earlier with two essential public sectors: housing policy and urban planning. These changes led to capital concentration and strengthened the dominance of property developers, entrepreneurs, and other free-market actors. This process fostered the rise of various oligarchies, including figures such as InPost CEO Rafał Brzoska, whose open involvement in public affairs illustrates this phenomenon. He currently chairs an advisory council to the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, tasked with “deregulating” the Polish economy. Understanding this process requires deconstructing it in light of the systemic transformation and the adoption of radical liberalism, which was, in many ways, an illusory response to the social crises of the late 1980s.
The new political elite, emerging from the Solidarność movement, managed to make a major ideological shift: it ceased fighting on behalf of workers and began speaking in the name of future entrepreneurs and private employers. Polish elites were haunted by the idea that the foundation of democracy lies in the privatization of state assets. This belief was later reflected in the creation of national investment funds, through which public assets were sold off. It is important to emphasize, however, that although liberals advocate against state interference in the private sector, that same sector is still heavily supported by public funds – through various state subsidies, tax advantages over the public sector[5], and many other liberal mechanisms introduced during the “shock without therapy” of 1989, which continues to this day.
Ideological (yet liberal) polarization and the weakening of the State
The political simplification of economic processes has inevitably led to an ideologization of public interest. Indeed, any regulation that goes against the post-1989 order, particularly measures aiming to strengthen the role of the state in citizens’ lives is perceived as a step backward, a return to a centralized economy. As a result, all political parties, including those with socialist traditions, face ideological pressure and cannot fully express their convictions for fear of being labeled as “communist” by the electorate. This is also why public debate in Poland is dominated by moral issues at the expense of economic or social ones. Heightened discussions on abortion, family, education, or civil unions while deepening polarization, serve as an escape for both voters and elected officials from the old communist–anti-communist dichotomy, although moral issues often reproduce this categorization.
The sacralization of private property has further encouraged behaviors aimed at creating social barriers. These can be explained through the lens of the theory of the leisure class. The social group in question differentiates itself from lower classes through ostentatious consumption and leisure habits, be it clothing style, preferred pastimes, or musical tastes, always exaggerated to display symbolic capital. This is why it is more relevant to analyze Polish capitalism not through the lens of production, but through the lens of consumption, by referencing Veblen’s work The Leisure Class, which seems especially pertinent in the context of the artificial class distinction that emerged in a previously classless society after 1989. As such, any criticism of the lifestyles of the wealthier classes is framed as communist rhetoric, and in extreme cases could even be interpreted as the “promotion of a totalitarian system,” which is prohibited by law[6].
The phenomenon discussed also raises philosophical questions about Polish politics, particularly regarding its relationship with human rights. One could argue that the post-1989 shifts have called into question the gains associated with second-generation human rights, which focus on state intervention and the welfare state. This concept has been completely equated, especially by post-1989 liberals, with real socialism, seen by many as a totalitarian ideology. Therefore, it can be assumed that in terms of human rights, Poland has become divided between proponents of first-generation rights, which align with the early capitalist phase (essentially Poland’s post-1989 condition), and advocates of third-generation rights, borrowing Guy Haarscher’s term, “the inflation of demands”. This dynamic leads to the state’s withdrawal from public life, promoted not only by the elites but increasingly by citizens who, through their votes, demand stronger liberalism[7].
In conclusion, attention must be drawn to the issue of representativity, with a significant political role now played by unelected individuals, as well as the growing influence of CEOs in the legislative process – both symptoms of democratic erosion in the country. Poland’s post-1989 transformation profoundly redefined the role of the state, aligning it with a dominant liberal ideology that marginalizes any push for public intervention. This shift has led to ideological polarization, where moral debates obscure deep social and economic divides. By sacralizing private property and glorifying ostentatious consumption, a new social hierarchy has emerged, making any form of critique suspect of communist nostalgia. This retreat of the state is accompanied by a drift in the conception of human rights, increasingly reduced to individualistic logic at the expense of collective solidarity.
[1] We can enumerate among others : Leszczynski Adam, Ludowa Historia Polski; Rauszer Michal, Ludowy antyklerykalizm: niedopowiedziana historia; Janicki Kamil, Panszczyzna Prawdziwa historia polskiego niewolnictwa; Kuciel-Frydryszcak Joanna, Chlopki: opowieść o naszych babkach.
[2] Neoliberalism as a « trickle-down economy » ideology refers to a set of economic beliefs that emphasize free markets, limited government intervention, and the idea that benefits given to the wealthy or businesses will eventually « trickle down » to the rest of society.
[3] It is worth noting here that Law and Justice seems to have changed its voting discipline during the debate (Kaczynski requested a five-minute break). Initially, Law and Justice was in favour of reducing the contribution, but after Marcelina Zawisza’s speech, who is MP from Together Party which is in opposition to the government, they changed their position. Despite this, some of them – but check the voting results – voted in favour.
[4] Pakulski Cezary, « Obnizenie skladki zdrowotnej? Ten plan trzeba porzucić », OKO.Press, 01.10.2024.
[5] Drweski Bruno, Zagrabiona historia Solidarnosci. Został tylko mit, Warsaw 2020, p. 453.
[6] Art. 256. – [Propagowanie nazizmu, komunizmu, faszyzmu lub innego ustroju totalitarnego] – Kodeks karny. Dz.U.2025.383 t.j.
[7] This commitment is reflected in the increasing support for Sławomir Mentzen, a central figure of the Konfederacja party, who advocates for a radical stance of total state disengagement. According to him, the state should only intervene in core functions such as security and justice, leaving other areas—healthcare, education, and the economy—to the free play of the market. He rejects any social or redistributive model, associating them with authoritarian socialism. This discourse resonates with a segment of the entrepreneurial youth, seeking autonomy and individual success.
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Sarah Bomba is a Phd student at the INALCO in Paris. Her Phd thesis is about religious lobbyism in Poland after 1989.