By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.

Introduction

The National Deterrence and Defence Project “Eastern Shield” (2024–2028) is a comprehensive initiative aimed at strengthening Poland’s defensive capabilities along its eastern border. The programme was developed in response to the deteriorating security environment in the region, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which highlighted the need to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. The “Eastern Shield” initiative is of strategic importance—it has been designated by the Polish government as the largest operation to fortify Poland’s eastern frontier and, simultaneously, NATO’s eastern boundary since the end of World War II. Its significance has also been acknowledged internationally—on March 12, 2025, the European Parliament recognized “Eastern Shield” as a flagship security project of the European Union (EU). This recognition was reaffirmed by the European Commission a week later, which underscored the European dimension of the initiative. This analysis outlines the main assumptions behind the programme, its strategic context, and its significance for the security of Poland, EU, and the NATO.

Description and Objectives of the “Eastern Shield” Programme

The “Eastern Shield” programme envisions the establishment of a 700 kilometers belt of defensive installations along Poland’s eastern and northeastern borders, extending up to 50 kilometers into Polish territory, according to the official programme website. Its primary objective is to enhance deterrence and defence capabilities through the expansion of military infrastructure along the borders with Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast) and Belarus. The programme is designed to serve a deterrent function and, in the event of conflict, to increase the safety of both civilian populations and Polish armed forces.

The plan is being implemented on four complementary levels: (1) Enhancing resilience to surprise attacks—expansion of surveillance systems, including the development of satellite intelligence, camera and sensor networks along the border, and unmanned observation systems; (2) Restricting adversary mobility—construction of extensive fortifications, engineering obstacles, and terrain impediments (e.g., anti-tank ditches, anti-vehicle barriers), as well as deliberate landscape modifications (wetlands, forestation) in the border area; (3) Ensuring mobility of friendly forces—establishment of specialized infrastructure (roads, bridges, bases) to facilitate rapid deployment and supply of Polish forces; (4) Protection of own forces and civilians—construction of shelters and concealment facilities to increase survivability and continuity of defence operations.

These elements form a coherent defensive system designed to address the possibility of a large-scale conventional conflict. The “Eastern Shield” reflects lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and anticipates scenarios resembling those of World War II more than high-tech limited engagements. The planned fortifications include physical anti-tank barriers (ditches, steel hedgehogs, concrete obstacles), barbed wire fences, and preparations for future mine deployment (mines are to be stored and deployed only in the event of war). The programme also encompasses the development of advanced surveillance and early-warning systems, such as aerostat and satellite observation platforms, and air defence and anti-drone systems to monitor Polish airspace.

Importantly, “Eastern Shield” is not limited to technical infrastructure—it also includes the training and structural preparation of personnel. In 2024, a dedicated training and testing center was established in Orzysz (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship), tasked with preparing engineering units for fortification construction and testing new materials and technologies. In autumn 2024, the first military exercises showcasing elements of the “Eastern Shield” were conducted, attended by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Defence. By the end of that year, the first segment of fortifications on the Kaliningrad border was completed. These developments demonstrate that the programme is moving from planning to tangible implementation.

The initiative is multi-annual in scope, with implementation scheduled for 2024–2028 and an allocated budget of approximately PLN 10 billion.

The “Eastern Shield” in the Context of NATO’s Eastern Flank

The “Eastern Shield” must be viewed within the broader context of NATO’s eastern flank security strategy, encompassing countries bordering Russia and Belarus (Poland, the Baltic States, and further south, Romania and others). Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has significantly increased its presence and readiness along its eastern periphery. At NATO summits (Warsaw 2016, Madrid 2022, Vilnius 2023, Washington 2024), decisions were made to strengthen the Enhanced Forward Presence, establishing multinational battle groups in Poland and the Baltic States and expanding defence infrastructure.

As the largest country in the region, Poland plays a pivotal role in this strategy—hosting allied forces (10,000 American soldiers are stationed in Poland) and coordinating defensive actions along the northeastern flank. Polish Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has emphasised that the “Eastern Shield” is a strategic operation from the perspective of Poland and the entire Alliance.

From NATO’s standpoint, strengthening the eastern flank through initiatives like the “Eastern Shield” enhances the credibility of deterrence policies. It signals that frontline states—supported by the entire Alliance—are prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. Notably, the scale of the Polish initiative is unprecedented in postwar European history: according to government declarations, it is the largest fortification project on NATO’s eastern frontier since 1945. It can be compared to Cold War-era defensive lines in Western Europe, with the key difference that Poland’s national efforts are now supplemented by allied support (rotational NATO troop deployments, joint exercises, system interoperability).

Poland’s Cooperation with the Baltic States (Baltic Defence Line)

Given the geographical and strategic coherence of the threat landscape, Poland maintains close cooperation with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in strengthening defence capabilities along the northeastern corridor. In parallel to Poland’s “Eastern Shield,” the Baltic States are implementing their own initiative known as the “Baltic Defence Line.” Its goals are analogous—constructing fortifications along the borders with Russia (and Lithuania’s border with Belarus) to maximally delay potential invasion forces. These governments have openly declared their intention to link their national efforts with Poland’s system, ultimately creating a unified NATO and EU defence line stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians.

In practice, the Baltic Defence Line incorporates both natural barriers and artificial engineering obstacles. Lithuania has announced a 20-kilometers-wide border zone where deforestation will be banned—fallen trees and dense vegetation are intended to impede enemy manoeuvres, particularly on roads and river crossings. Latvia and Estonia are planning multi-layered anti-tank barrier systems (steel hedgehogs, “dragon’s teeth” concrete blocks, etc.) and minefields, with explosives stored during peacetime and deployed only under imminent threat. Estonia has also announced plans to build approximately 600 field bunkers for border defence. These investments have already commenced—Lithuania, for example, allocated €32 million in 2024 for its segment of the Baltic line.

Coordination between Poland and the Baltic States in these parallel projects is crucial for regional defence coherence. The so-called Suwałki Gap—a narrow corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus linking the Baltic States with the rest of NATO and the EU—is of particular concern. It represents both a vital logistical connection and a potential chokepoint vulnerable to Russian military action. Strengthening this corridor through joint Polish-Baltic fortifications significantly raises the cost of aggression: the adversary must reckon with delayed advances due to a network of obstacles, mines, and defences prepared in depth. In essence, the Baltic Defence Line and the Eastern Shield are mutually reinforcing, forming a single protective barrier shielding NATO’s interior. This cooperation extends beyond engineering concepts and includes joint military exercises and coordination of allied support requirements (e.g., intelligence, logistics). It exemplifies practical solidarity within NATO—frontline states enhancing each other’s security and, by extension, that of the entire Alliance.

The Strategic Relevance of the ‘Eastern Shield’ in the Context of the War in Ukraine and the Russian Threat

The Russo-Ukrainian war constitutes the direct backdrop for the emergence of the « Eastern Shield » concept. Analyses of combat operations in Ukraine have unequivocally demonstrated that traditional field fortifications, engineered obstacles, and extensive logistical-defensive systems have regained relevance in the face of conventional warfare against a well-equipped adversary. Russia’s invasion—with its scenes of trenches, minefields, and fortifications in the Donbas—served as a wake-up call for NATO countries bordering Russia. Observing the war on its immediate eastern frontier, Poland has drawn critical lessons and proactively prepared for the possibility of a similar scenario. Consequently, the « Eastern Shield » is being developed in an explicitly conventional manner, prioritizing territorial defence with anti-tank barriers, artillery, and layered protection, rather than relying solely on rapid manoeuvre warfare or cyber operations. This reflects a conscious return to historically proven methods of delaying and complicating large-scale enemy offensives.

An equally significant factor shaping the programme is the direct threat posed by Russia and Belarus. Since 2022, Moscow has repeatedly employed hostile rhetoric towards Poland, including nuclear threats and accusations of aggression (e.g., support for Ukraine). In 2023, Russia deployed part of its tactical nuclear arsenal to Belarus, where Wagner Group mercenaries had previously operated—developments that heightened the sense of threat along Poland’s border. Already in 2021, Poland experienced a hybrid assault on its border with Belarus, when the Minsk regime—encouraged by Moscow—orchestrated a mass migrant crossing, triggering a border crisis. These events prompted Warsaw to accelerate investments in physical border security (such as the steel barrier completed in 2022) and integrate border protection with broader national defence strategy. Accordingly, the « Eastern Shield » is intended not only to prepare Poland for open military aggression but also to bolster its resilience against sub-threshold actions—hybrid warfare, sabotage, provocations, and limited border incidents. The deployment of sensors, drones, and permanent observation posts along the border is expected to hinder enemy reconnaissance and special operations within Polish territory, while the expanded military infrastructure will provide the Polish Armed Forces with spatial and temporal advantages in the event of sudden threats.

Ultimately, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » also carries considerable psychological and political weight: it strengthens public confidence in national security and signals the state’s resolve to defend its territory. In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, such resolute preventive action enhances Poland’s credibility as a state committed to safeguarding its citizens. It also serves a deterrent function vis-à-vis the Kremlin, demonstrating that Poland is preparing for worst-case scenarios and thereby raising the cost of any potential aggression. Without question, the war in Ukraine and the persistent threat from Russia provided the impetus for both the creation and the design of the « Eastern Shield, » making it a central component of the new security architecture in Central and Eastern Europe.

Poland’s Defence Policy: Expenditures and Military Expansion

The execution of such an ambitious defence initiative as the « Eastern Shield » is made possible by a fundamental shift in Polish defence policy following 2022. Poland has significantly increased its defence spending and launched an expansion of its armed forces to levels not seen since the Cold War. The Homeland Defence Act, adopted in March 2022, guarantees a gradual increase in defence expenditures to at least 3% of GDP; in practice, however, Poland already allocated approximately 4% of its GDP to defence in 2023. In absolute terms, this reflects a sharp rise in the military budget: the financial plan for 2025 envisages defence spending of PLN 186.6 billion (approximately 4.7% of GDP). These substantial resources enable simultaneous funding of army modernisation and large-scale infrastructural projects such as the « Eastern Shield. » Simultaneously, the Polish Armed Forces are undergoing numerical expansion. The government has officially declared its goal of increasing the total number of troops—including regular forces and the Territorial Defence Forces—to 300,000 by 2035. Poland is already considered to possess one of the largest land forces in the European Union. This status stems from rapid recruitment and the creation of new military units, including additional divisions in eastern Poland. Massive investments are also being made in the acquisition of modern weaponry. Since 2022, contracts have been signed for U.S. M1A2 Abrams tanks, self-propelled howitzers and HIMARS rocket systems, fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and South Korean K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, Chunmoo rocket launchers, and FA-50 light combat aircraft. This equipment is gradually being delivered to Polish units, significantly enhancing the army’s combat potential. Notably, a substantial portion of the newly acquired arms is being deployed specifically in eastern Poland, where new units are being formed and equipped with Abrams and K2 tanks (e.g., the 1st Warsaw Mechanised Division). As a result, Poland is poised to soon possess one of the strongest land forces in Europe in terms of both size and modernity.

It is also worth highlighting the broader philosophy of Polish defence policy, of which the « Eastern Shield » is a core element. Poland pursues strategic autonomy and deterrence through strength—investing in capabilities that discourage aggression by their mere presence. This includes the development of air and missile defence (e.g., Patriot systems, the « Narew » programme with CAMM missiles), as well as plans to create a missile shield and reinforce cyber defence forces. This comprehensive military modernisation, combined with the construction of the « Eastern Shield, » aims to make Poland militarily robust enough that the prospect of conflict becomes a deterrent in itself.

Poland as the Border of NATO and the EU: Leadership in Regional Security

Poland’s geopolitical position renders it a frontline state for both NATO and the European Union. Its eastern borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region constitute both the EU’s external frontier and NATO’s eastern line of defence. This confers a dual responsibility and leadership potential upon Poland: any action it undertakes to strengthen its security directly enhances the safety of the entire Euro-Atlantic community. In recent years, Poland has increasingly asserted its role as a security leader in Central and Eastern Europe, initiating or supporting key defence initiatives in the region. A prime example is its promotion of the « Eastern Shield » and the « Baltic Defence Line » as a common protective barrier for NATO/EU frontline states.

Polish diplomacy and government authorities are actively advocating for eastern flank security to be prioritized on the EU’s agenda, especially during Poland’s current Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2025). From Warsaw’s perspective, the EU must intensify its engagement in defence matters, investing in infrastructure and military capabilities of eastern member states. Evidence of the effectiveness of these efforts includes the March 12, 2025, resolution of the European Parliament recognizing the « Eastern Shield » as a flagship EU security project and calling for its financial support. On March 19, 2025, the European Commission echoed this position, describing the initiative as a model for strengthening EU resilience and prioritizing it in future budgetary plans. Although largely political in nature, these decisions reflect a growing European consensus that the security of Poland and the Baltic States is inseparably linked to the security of the entire Union. In short, Poland is successfully articulating its role as the EU’s bulwark—the fortified frontier whose protection serves the common interest.

In NATO, Poland also plays an active role in advocating the reinforcement of the eastern flank. Within the framework of the Bucharest Nine (a group of nine eastern NATO members), Warsaw co-authors joint positions and recommendations for the Alliance, calling for greater allied troop presence on its territory and more robust collective defence planning against potential Russian aggression. Many of these demands have been reflected in NATO decisions—such as enhanced readiness of forces in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of additional equipment stockpiles in Poland. Poland has earned the reputation of being the « European advocate of deterrence, » persistently reminding Western allies of the threat posed by Moscow’s imperial ambitions and the need for unity.

Beyond political measures, Poland sets an example for neighbouring states through its own actions—both via elevated defence expenditures, which serve as a benchmark, and direct support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Warsaw has become a major supplier of military aid to Kyiv, providing tanks, artillery systems, and ammunition, and facilitating the logistics of Western deliveries. Although these actions fall outside NATO’s formal remit, they enhance security across the eastern flank by weakening the adversary before it can threaten NATO territory. Poland argues that by supporting Ukraine while simultaneously rearming and fortifying its own territory, it creates a regional security buffer for all of Europe. This logic is gaining increasing recognition—reflected in the EU’s growing willingness to treat Polish defence initiatives as integral components of its broader security strategy.

Conclusion

The National Deterrence and Defence Programme « Eastern Shield » (2024–2028) represents a groundbreaking initiative that integrates Poland’s territorial defence efforts with NATO and EU security objectives. Encompassing extensive military infrastructure, surveillance systems, and deep fortifications along the eastern border, the programme responds to the realities of a new cold war in Europe—marked by Russian aggression, the lessons of the war in Ukraine, and the strategic unpredictability of the new Trump administration. The « Eastern Shield » strengthens NATO’s eastern flank, complements similar efforts by the Baltic States, and forms part of a collective deterrence strategy. Simultaneously, it reflects Poland’s determination to safeguard its national security through record-high defence spending and the development of the largest land army in the EU. Its designation as a flagship EU security project underscores the initiative’s transnational importance—its success is in the interest of all of Europe. In the coming years, the implementation of the « Eastern Shield » will be closely watched by allies and adversaries alike. Its completion by 2028 will significantly raise the security threshold on the eastern flank, complicating any potential Russian aggression. More broadly, Poland’s deterrence and defence model may serve as a blueprint for other NATO border states seeking to address contemporary threats—combining traditional defensive measures with modern technology and robust political backing. The « Eastern Shield » cements Poland’s role as a regional security pillar and demonstrates that Central and Eastern Europe is capable of initiating and executing projects vital to collective defence. In the face of continued instability beyond the EU’s eastern borders, such a proactive approach constitutes a meaningful contribution to building a more secure future for the continent as a whole.

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Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe.