By Kinga Torbicka, University of Warsaw.
Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine triggered a lasting “securitization” of public debate in Poland: issues of defense, national resilience, and deterrence have become the core of state policy. There has been an unprecedented increase in defense spending (over 4.7% of GDP in 2025, with projections reaching 4.81%[1] in 2026), positioning Poland as a NATO leader in defense expenditure relative to GDP[2]. There is a broad cross-party consensus on the need to strengthen the national defense and security in line with Titus Livius’ maxim: Timor externus maximus concordiae vinculum (“External fear is the greatest bond of unity”).
The war has also materialized in the form of concrete defensive and border infrastructure projects. The Eastern Shield program (2024–2028) represents a multi-layered system of engineering barriers, ISR infrastructure, and anti-drone measures along the borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast[3]. The project has become a symbol of a new deterrence and resilience strategy, as well as an element of a broader European debate on joint defense initiatives[4]. Politically, it reinforces the narrative of Poland as the pillar of security on NATO’s eastern flank.
At the same time, the “frontline state” policy has revealed its costs: growing vulnerability to hybrid actions (sabotage, drone provocations)[5], which have become both campaign issues and governmental priorities, as well as episodes of tension with Kyiv—most notably the dispute over grain imports following trade liberalization[6]. This dispute fueled farmers’ mobilization and sharpened the rhetoric of segments of the opposition (especially the far right). These topics resurfaced during the 2023 parliamentary and 2025 presidential elections, deepening polarization between advocates of “hard security” and groups emphasizing socio-economic sensitivity to the war’s consequences.
Finally, the war shifted the axis of Polish foreign policy toward “status-seeking” leadership in Central Europe[7] and a hardline stance toward Russia, strengthening Warsaw’s voice within the EU and NATO—so much so that “Warsaw has become the capital of European security.[8]” However, Poland has also become a natural testing ground, regularly subjected since 2014 to “stress tests” ranging from information resilience to managing defense costs and support for Ukraine.
An important aspect remains the impact of the war in Ukraine on the perception of the EU and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In the first months after the invasion, support for European integration and the EU’s response reached record levels; however, between 2023 and 2025, it normalized, reflecting war fatigue and the pressure of rising living costs. Polling data show that while overall support for EU membership remains strong, it has declined compared to 2022. There is also a clear gap between general European values (high willingness to provide humanitarian aid and accept refugees) and issues particularly sensitive for Poland (the agricultural market, transit). In other words, support remains broad but more conditional[9].
Among political elites, Poland—after the 2023 elections—tightened its pro-European course in the areas of rule of law and EU policy while emphasizing the European dimension of security (ammunition production, air defense, financing of joint projects), as reflected during Poland’s EU Council Presidency. Debates on the EDIP and the EU White Paper on Defense, as well as on integrating the Eastern Shield project into the EU framework, show that the perception of the EU has evolved from that of a “brake” to that of a “capability multiplier”—provided that financial and industrial support reduces national strategic costs[10]. This pragmatism coexists with the risk of frictions (e.g., over agricultural policy or secondary sanctions), making Polish elites simultaneously more “European” and more assertive in defending sectoral interests.
From a societal perspective, NATO’s importance as a “guarantor of hard security” has grown (supported by 89% of Poles, compared to 73% who see the EU as a guarantor of security), while the EU continues to be viewed as a useful economic and institutional framework for policies toward Ukraine (refugee assistance, funding, sanctions). Surveys indicate that a majority of Poles consider allied support in the event of a threat to be realistic, which correlates with acceptance of rising defense spending and, albeit to varying degrees, continued support for Ukraine[11].
The war in Ukraine, unfolding just beyond Poland’s eastern border, has consolidated the “security paradigm” along the Vistula as the core of both domestic and European policy: high defense expenditures, infrastructure projects such as Eastern Shield, deeper anchoring in NATO, and a more instrumental—but still positive—perception of the EU. At the same time, it has revealed social and sectoral costs, which have become subjects of political contestation. The future direction will depend on Poland’s ability to Europeanize the burdens (defense financing and industry) while maintaining public support for actions strengthening the security of both Poland and Europe.
[1] Projekt ustawy budżetowej na rok 2026, przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów 26 września 2025 roku, przekazany do Sejmu RP, Ministerstwo Finansów, https://www.gov.pl/web/finanse/projekt-przekazany-do-sejmu-rp4.
[2] Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025), Communiqué de Press, NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2025/8/pdf/250827-def-exp-2025-en.pdf .
[3] East Shield, https://tarczawschod.wp.mil.pl/en/; https://views-from-central-and-balkan-countries.eu/the-borders-of-the-european-union-as-lines-of-defence-the-strategic-relevance-of-the-eastern-shield-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-ukraine-2/
[4] European Defense Readiness 2030, White Paper, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White paper for European defence – Readiness 2030.pdf
[5] Torbicka K. (2025). « La sécurité de la Pologne au XXIe siècle : défis, stratégies et perspectives”, Fondapol, https://www.fondapol.org/.
[6] Neighbourly feuds. The problem with Ukrainian grain on the Central European markets, OSW, 2023, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-10-26/neighbourly-feuds-problem-ukrainian-grain-central-european? .
[7] Sus, M. (2025). Status-seeking in wartime: Poland’s leadership aspirations and the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481251329767.
[8] Torbicka, K (2025). « La sécurité de la Pologne au XXIe siècle : défis, stratégies et perspectives”, Fondapol, https://www.fondapol.org/.
[9] Standard Eurobarometer, spring 2025, Poland, Eurobarometer_Standard_STD103_Spring_2025_factsheet_pl_en.pdf.
[10] Korzystny przełom w negocjacjach dotyczących finansowania przemysłu zbrojeniowego, 2025, https://defence24.pl/przemysl/korzystny-przelom-w-negocjacjach-dotyczacych-finansowania-przemyslu-zbrojeniowego.
[11] Polacy o NATO i ewentualnej budowie przez kraje UE wspólnych sił zbrojnych, CBOS, Komunikat z badań, 27/2025, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2025/K_027_25.PDF?.
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Kinga Torbicka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Her main areas of research include security in the EU and NATO – geopolitical and military dimensions; comparative analysis of the national security systems of EU countries – particularly the systems of Poland and France; Central and Eastern Europe; and the strategic culture of France and Europe.