Western Balkans
septembre 15, 2025By Neira Sabanovic, Free University of Brussels.
This article was first published on the French website Le Rubicon on the 11th of July 2025. Link to the original article in French: Milorad Dodik face à la justice : la Bosnie-Herzégovine dans l’impasse – Le Rubicon.
The conviction of Milorad Dodik, president of the Serb entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS), on February 26, 2025, has plunged the country into one of the most severe political crises since the end of the war in 1995. He was found guilty of disregarding rulings from the Constitutional Court and decisions of the international High Representative. Following the verdict, arrest warrants were also issued for several senior RS officials, including Dodik himself, Radovan Višković (Prime Minister of RS), and Nenad Stevandić (Speaker of the RS National Assembly). For the first time in the country’s history, judicial action has triggered a direct institutional confrontation between the Serb entity and the central state, raising serious questions about the authority of the judiciary within Republika Srpska. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has endured recurring political crises over the past three decades, it is important to distinguish these cycles of instability from the current unprecedented crisis, which Dodik has fueled through the adoption of controversial laws directly threatening the country’s territorial integrity.
Milorad Dodik, a divisive political figure in a deeply complex system
Bosnia and Herzegovina is defined by one of the most intricate institutional systems in the world, enshrined in Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the 1992–1995 war. The state structure rests on a consociational model of ethnic federalism, characterized by multiple territorial and institutional divisions in which ethnic identities are formally embedded into the very fabric of the country. The state is effectively split into two territorial entities whose boundaries—the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)—reflect wartime territorial gains: the Serb entity, more commonly known as Republika Srpska, and the Bosniak-Croat entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), alongside a “multiethnic” district, Brčko. While this complex system was originally designed to reduce the risk of renewed conflict, in practice it has perpetuated ethnic divisions, embedding them into governance and public administration.
The country is led by a tripartite presidency, composed of one representative from each of the three constituent peoples. Alongside the central parliament, each entity has its own parliamentary assembly with specific competencies. One of the most visible consequences of this system has been the dominance of ethnonationalist parties since the first postwar parliamentary elections in 1996. However, electoral fraud has tainted several elections, helping these parties to maintain power. The Central Election Commission (Centralna Izborna Komisija – CIK) and its members, for instance, came under political pressure and verbal attacks from Dodik after the cancelation in 2021 of local election results in Srebrenica and Doboj due to fraud. Such manipulation continues to reinforce the grip of nationalist parties over the political scene, creating the impression that citizens endlessly re-elect the same leaders.
In the absence of ideological opposition within RS, all political parties in the entity are characterized by nationalist agendas defending the national interests of the country’s Serbs. A similar situation exists in the FBiH, where nationalist parties representing Bosniak and Croat interests also generally secure a large share of the vote, even though so-called “civic” parties, and therefore non-nationalist, have managed to gain ground in that entity. This phenomenon reflects a growing desire among certain segments of the population to break free from the heavy and complex institutional framework in favor of a state without territorial entities—one that could allow the country to overcome political paralysis. It is also crucial to highlight the role of the “Ostali” (“others”), namely citizens who do not identify with the country’s three constituent communities. Although often marginalized in political discourse, they play a significant role in promoting an inclusive political identity and challenging the current institutional system. In a society like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the institutional framework has entrenched conflicts over interethnic relations, the emergence of new political cleavages remains highly complex.
This political and institutional structure helps explain the current political crisis facing the country, and in particular the system in which Milorad Dodik operates. Since 2006, Dodik has established himself as the dominant figure on the Serb political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over time, he has imposed an increasingly radical secessionist rhetoric in the public sphere, aimed at declaring the independence of the Serb entity and thereby endangering the very existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This shift marked a sharp break from the early days of his political career. Elected to parliament in 1996 with strong backing from the international community—especially the United States—Dodik was then perceived as a liberal political figure, in stark contrast with the nationalist leaders of the 1992–1995 war. At the time, Dodik openly acknowledged the responsibility of the Republika Srpska Army in the genocide of Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995. Following Montenegro’s declaration of independence in 2006, however, his discourse shifted drastically, adopting an increasingly virulent Serbian nationalist rhetoric centered on questioning the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik became Prime Minister of RS after the 2006 general elections, president of the Serb entity in 2010, and a member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency in 2018. Throughout his political career, Dodik has steadily consolidated power by eliminating any form of political opposition within the Serb entity. His party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata – SNSD), rapidly became the sole dominant force in RS, marginalizing rivals and dismantling all ideological alternatives after seizing control of most institutions at every level.
Milorad Dodik’s secessionist rhetoric in the shadow of a heavy historical legacy
Dodik’s rhetoric is built on the idea that coexistence with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)—composed mainly of Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholics)—is unsustainable due to ongoing disputes over the division of powers between Banja Luka, the political and economic center of RS, and Sarajevo, the capital of the central state. He multiplies incendiary statements against central institutions, which he accuses of seeking to “destroy” Serb identity and the achievements of the Dayton Peace Accords. His discourse is also structured around a victimhood narrative, portraying Bosnia’s Serbs as the forgotten victims of the 1990s wars, while simultaneously denying or downplaying war crimes—particularly the Srebrenica genocide, recognized by international courts. This stance is accompanied by openly Islamophobic and xenophobic declarations, associating Bosniaks with Islamic radicalism and terrorism, which further deepen and sustain ethno-religious divisions. For nearly two decades, his secessionist threats have resurfaced cyclically, often around election periods, but have never culminated in a unilateral declaration of independence. This pattern is particularly revealing: it suggests that his secessionist rhetoric, which lies at the very core of his political message, is not truly intended to lead to independence, but rather to justify the continued existence of his party and its political relevance. While Dodik frames RS’s independence as a fundamental right of the Serb people, he consistently postpones the moment of secession, keeping it as a perpetual promise. Nonetheless, his statements, the laws he has introduced, and above all, the political support of allies such as Serbia and Russia, have weakened state institutions, blocked reforms, and perpetuated a climate of chronic instability in a country where governance is already extremely complicated due to its institutional structure.
The conviction of Milorad Dodik, a first in the country’s history
On February 26, 2025, a political earthquake shook Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milorad Dodik was sentenced by the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to one year in prison and six years of disqualification from holding any public office. This decision came after his deliberate refusal to comply with the rulings of the international High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt, in office since August 1, 2021. Schmidt had blocked two controversial laws adopted by RS authorities, laws that directly challenged the legitimacy of state institutions.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an international authority created by the Dayton Peace Accords to oversee the civilian implementation of the agreement and guarantee the country’s political stability. Appointed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the High Representative wields extensive powers—especially those granted at the 1997 Bonn Conference—which allow him to impose laws, dismiss political leaders, and issue binding decisions to ensure compliance with the peace accord and preserve stability, particularly in the face of secessionist threats and the challenges of Bosnia’s multipartite governance. However, Dodik contests Schmidt’s legitimacy, a position supported by Russia and China.
This represents an unprecedented moment in the country’s post-Dayton history: never before had a leader of one of Bosnia’s entities been sentenced to prison by a national court for openly defying the institutional framework established by the Dayton Accords. The two laws adopted in Banja Luka and suspended by the High Representative were crucial: one annulled the obligation for the Serb entity to recognize and implement rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the other modified procedures for publishing laws in the RS Official Gazette, thereby preventing any external oversight by the central state or the High Representative. Despite the explicit ban on their implementation, Milorad Dodik and Miloš Lukić, then acting director of the Official Gazette, pushed forward with their adoption, openly defying the High Representative’s authority. While Lukić was acquitted, Dodik was found guilty. Far from softening his stance, he immediately delivered a fiery speech in Banja Luka before a crowd of supporters, denouncing what he called an “attack on RS and the Serb people.” This victimhood narrative, built on the construction of a sense of persecution, is part of Dodik’s long-standing secessionist and identity-driven discourse, as well as of Serbian nationalism in the region since the breakup of Yugoslavia, which allows him to frame any attack on him personally as an attack on the entire Serb community of Bosnia.
Towards an open rupture with state institutions?
Tensions escalated further on March 12, 2025, when three arrest warrants were issued by the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Milorad Dodik, Radovan Višković (Prime Minister of RS), and Nenad Stevandić (Speaker of the RS National Assembly), for failure to appear at a hearing and for violating the constitutional order. On March 17, 2025, the State Court ordered nationwide enforcement of the warrants, obliging all police forces in the country to cooperate in carrying out the arrests. In response, the RS National Assembly—dominated by SNSD deputies—passed a series of laws blocking the jurisdiction of state institutions (the courts, the Prosecutor’s Office, SIPA—the state-level police agency—and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council) on RS territory. Although these laws were temporarily suspended by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 6, Dodik declared they would be enforced in the entity no matter what.
Dodik has not yet been arrested, partly due to the risk of escalation such an arrest could trigger, but also because he is constantly protected by RS police. Although Sarajevo requested EUFOR intervention to safeguard the country’s security, Brussels reportedly refused, fearing an aggravation of tensions and stressing that the arrest of criminals does not fall directly under EUFOR’s mandate.
Since the issuance of the warrants, several international trips by these political figures have raised questions about the RS police forces’ and border authorities’ willingness to cooperate. On March 15, Nenad Stevandić traveled to Belgrade, where he expressed support for a counter-student demonstration backed by Aleksandar Vučić, aimed at breaking the university blockade and student protests that have gripped Serbia since October 2024. A few days later, on March 24, Dodik attended the annual commemoration of the 1999 NATO bombings in Belgrade alongside Vučić, reaffirming his strong political solidarity with the Serbian president. Dodik also traveled to Israel, where he took part in an anti-antisemitism conference hosted by Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv, expressing his support for Israel by declaring that “Serbs and Jews are two peoples who faced repeated attempts at total eradication and survived them, which is why we stand together.” He later visited Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin.
These trips, undertaken despite active arrest warrants, highlight both Dodik’s apparent impunity and his geopolitical alignment with powers challenging the Western-led international order. His ability to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina while under warrant raises serious doubts about the willingness or capacity of RS police to detain him. This problem was further illustrated on April 24, 2025, when RS police prevented Bosnian state authorities (SIPA) from serving Dodik with an arrest warrant. While in East Sarajevo (RS territory), Dodik refused to leave the RS government building. He was shielded by special anti-terrorist police units wearing uniforms marked with Serbian flags—raising questions about Belgrade’s role, although Serbia’s Interior Minister Ivica Dačić denied involvement, claiming it was a “general Serbian symbol.” Once again, Dodik managed to evade justice and SIPA forces thanks to the protection of RS police.
International reactions: between concern and support for Milorad Dodik
International reactions came swiftly. Although Dodik enjoys political backing within the European Union, notably from Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the EU expressed deep concern and emphasized the need to impose sanctions against Dodik, viewing the situation as a serious attempt to undermine the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several European countries, including Poland, Germany, and Austria, went further by banning him from entering their territory. In the United States, Secretary of State Marco Rubio also reacted by voicing support for the Bosnian state and stressing that “this situation cannot bring about the collapse of the country or any new conflict” and that Dodik “threatens the country’s stability and security.” Dodik also faced criticism from the United Kingdom, which reiterated its support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability, unity, and NATO integration efforts. In response to the deteriorating security situation, the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) was reinforced as early as March 2024. EUFOR (European Union Force) has been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 2, 2004, under Operation Althea, to maintain peace.
Yet the picture is complicated by the explicit support Dodik continues to receive from several regional leaders. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić remains one of his key political allies, despite officially cautious rhetoric. Vučić defended Dodik and his “struggle” for Bosnia’s Serbs, calling the verdict “a shameful ruling against Milorad Dodik—illegal, undemocratic, aimed at undermining Republika Srpska and weakening the position of the Serb people.” Still, his support is increasingly fragile as Vučić faces a period of deep unpopularity amid mounting internal crises in Serbia, marked by student mobilizations and anti-government protests denouncing his regime’s authoritarianism. This loss of legitimacy has limited his ability to act on the RS issue, making his support for Dodik more symbolic than strategic. For Vučić, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political turmoil mainly serves as a convenient distraction from Serbia’s domestic political crisis.
Croatian President Zoran Milanović also voiced support for Dodik, calling him “the most popular politician among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and denouncing the ruling as “an attempt to sideline from political life a democratically elected representative of the Serb people simply because he disobeyed an order from a colonial administrator, a German politician long retired.” While this is not the first time Milanović has defended Dodik or criticized the “dysfunction” of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central institutions, these remarks were widely perceived as tacit encouragement of Dodik’s separatist rhetoric. Croatia itself plays a destabilizing role in Bosnia, where nationalist claims for the creation of a third Croat entity and parallel Croat political institutions remain a pressing reality.
Finally, Vladimir Putin reaffirmed his support for Dodik, describing the ruling as a “political decision.” The Russian president “condemned such moves, warning they could have negative consequences not only in RS but also across the Balkans.” This alliance strengthens Dodik’s anti-Western stance and situates him within a broader dynamic of geopolitical destabilization, in which Russia exploits Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal divisions to weaken the influence of the EU and NATO in the region. Indeed, in the current Bosnian context, the Kremlin’s involvement raises particular concerns, especially following Dodik’s claim that “Putin stated that Russia, as a guarantor of the Dayton Accords, will advocate for the termination and cessation of international institutions’ work, especially that of the false High Representative, or as he calls him, the illegitimate representative.”
Appeal confirmation and the political consequences of Dodik’s actions
Following the initial verdict against Milorad Dodik, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political crisis deepened further in the summer of 2025. In early August, the Court of Appeals of Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld the one-year prison sentence and six-year ban from holding public office handed down to Dodik for refusing to comply with the rulings of the Constitutional Court and the High Representative. However, under the provisions of the Bosnian Criminal Code, his prison sentence was commuted to a fine of around 36,500 convertible marks (about €18,660), which Dodik promptly paid. Paradoxically, this episode marked a de facto recognition of the authority of the state judiciary, even as Dodik continued to reject its political legitimacy.
Shortly after the ruling was upheld, the Central Election Commission (CIK) revoked Dodik’s mandate as president of Republika Srpska. Despite this institutional decision, Dodik refused to step down, claiming that his legitimacy derived from the support of the entity’s parliament rather than institutions based in Sarajevo. As a show of defiance, he engineered a government reshuffle in Republika Srpska, pushing Prime Minister Radovan Višković to resign and appointing Savo Minić as his successor. This maneuver, widely criticized as unconstitutional by the opposition since his mandate as RS president had been revoked, highlights Dodik’s determination to maintain control over the entity’s political apparatus.
At the same time, Dodik pushed the RS National Assembly to approve the organization of a referendum set for October 25, 2025. The referendum is intended to allow voters to express their views on the validity of the verdict against him, the High Representative’s decisions, and the revocation of his mandate. This initiative represents not only a direct challenge to the authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central institutions, but also a symbolic reaffirmation of Dodik’s strategy of resorting to plebiscitary tools to bolster his political standing.
In response to this institutional standoff, the Central Election Commission announced the holding of early presidential elections in Republika Srpska, scheduled for November 23, 2025. Dodik and his SNSD party fiercely rejected the decision, dismissing it as illegitimate. Nonetheless, the announcement of the vote underscores the central institutions’ determination to reassert constitutional order, despite their limited capacity to enforce it against Dodik’s entrenched political networks.
Conclusion
The conviction of Milorad Dodik on February 26, 2025, marks an unprecedented turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton history and exposes the limits of the central state’s authority, which must now resort to exceptional measures to confront an increasingly autonomous Serb entity. Dodik has succeeded in concentrating all levers of power in his own hands, silencing any form of ideological opposition by aligning rival parties with his ethnonationalist narrative.
Dodik’s progressive radicalization and his direct challenge to state and international institutions deeply undermine the balance established since the end of the war in 1995. The fact that a national court has convicted an entity leader for defying the Dayton Accords demonstrates that central state institutions still function and attempt to uphold constitutional order despite political deadlock. However, while this judicial decision is symbolically significant, it should not obscure the structural limitations of the current system. The need for such exceptional interventions to sanction such serious violations underscores the fragility of this balance in a paradoxical situation where institutions exist and are capable of acting, yet remain constantly weakened by political pressure and systematic obstruction. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by cyclical political crises since 1995, the country’s political stability has become extremely alarming given the point of no return reached as a result of Dodik’s actions. The consolidation of a parallel power base in Banja Luka, coupled with Dodik’s international support, raises the specter of a potential secession scenario. The international community, until now cautious, can no longer limit itself to issuing statements. It will need to fundamentally rethink its mechanisms of action to prevent institutional collapse, while also taking into account the political ambitions of leaders in Croatia and Serbia, who play a major destabilizing role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This crisis compels a profound reexamination of the country’s governance model in a society where secessionist rhetoric stirs the fears of a population still haunted by its traumatic past, constantly revived by political figures like Milorad Dodik.
Moreover, Dodik’s political radicalization cannot be separated from the economic interests underpinning his hold on power. Control over public resources, procurement, and political and judicial institutions in RS has fostered a system of entrenched structural corruption, clientelism, and nepotism within the entity’s ruling elite, where political power has become an instrument serving opaque economic interests. Today, RS is one of the most corrupt areas in all of Southeast Europe, as documented by various international observers such as Transparency International. Furthermore, the emergency adoption of the “Foreign Agent” law on February 27, 2025—the day after the verdict—marked a major authoritarian escalation. By criminalizing civic engagement, particularly in the fields of human rights and anti-corruption activism, this law aims to neutralize civil society and consolidate Dodik’s grip on power. It forms part of a broader climate of escalating repression against political opposition, illustrated by the burning of opposition leader Nebojša Vukanović’s (Partija demokratskog progresa – PDP) car, and by explicit threats from SNSD figures such as Nenad Stevandić, who was overheard saying: “We must kill all of this , I will kill them, I swear.” Jelena Trivić (Narodni Front – NF), another key opposition figure in RS, has likewise denounced the slide toward a one-party dictatorship. With the RS Assembly almost entirely under his control, Dodik now wields unchecked political power. Even though he announced, on April 18, a new draft constitution for RS and an independence referendum scheduled for January 9—“Republika Srpska Day”—it is crucial to stress that behind this nationalist and secessionist discourse lies, above all, Dodik and his entourage’s determination to preserve a system that ensures them impunity, wealth, and influence, even at the cost of dangerously undermining the country’s stability.
The unfolding of this case also highlights the paradox of the current crisis. Dodik formally complied with the justice system by paying his fine, while simultaneously undermining the state by refusing to recognize its political authority. His strategy rests on mobilizing institutional allies in RS, using referendums to manufacture parallel sources of legitimacy, and perpetuating a system that guarantees his personal impunity, wealth, and influence. Bosnia and Herzegovina thus finds itself at a critical crossroads in its history: it must succeed in restoring the authority of the rule of law across its territory, or risk sliding into a system of competing sovereignties—a prelude to de facto secession.
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Neira Sabanovic is a Phd student at the Free University of Brussels, linked to the Cevipol. Her work focuses on the mobilization of collective memory in the discourses of fear in the Western Balkans. More broadly, she works on the Western Balkans region, the effects of political discourses and memory policies […]
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mai 7, 2025The questions of the interviewer are in bold. F.L. stands for François Lafond. The questions were sent to François Lafond in April 2025, while the Serbian student social movement was taking place.
First of all, could you briefly introduce yourself and tell us how you came to work in and on the Balkans?
F. L.: In the framework of the French Foreign and Cooperation policies, in order to strengthen its national strategy towards the Western Balkans, the French government has proposed to these countries to put at their disposal “technical experts” to accompany them in their European trajectories.
In 2017, I did apply to a job description offer looking for an “European expert”. Among other candidates, I was chosen to be deployed at Skopje in the cabinet of the Macedonian Deputy prime minister for European Affairs. I stayed in North Macedonia for 4 years, before applying to a new position “Adviser for Public administration Reform” in Serbia in 2021. I spent two years at Belgrade as French expert in the Ministry for Public administration and local collectivities and in cooperation with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA).
Before these two experiences, I was quite “candide” concerning the complex political, economical and social situation of the Western Balkans. However, I am a convinced “European promoter” since my master’s degrees, amplified then by an internship at the European Commission few months after the Berlin Wall fall. After that, all my professional experiences were colored by the European footprint, wherever I was, in France, in Italy or in the UK. The new opportunity to experiment “live” the Southeastern Europe was quite attractive that could be summarized by few questions I had in mind: How the European Union could become a global power if we are not able to fix the situation in the Western Balkans? How less than 18 million inhabitants could stay apart the European well being evolution, with bilateral disputes continuing and allowing potential instability spreading around neighbors, members of the EU?
Regarding the slowness of the integration process, do you think that all the Western Balkan countries could enter the EU at the same time?
F.L.: Let’s start from the current situation in the region. Three countries have started the negotiations (Montenegro in 2012 , Serbia in 2014 and more recently Albania in 2024), one is still stuck in a nationalist/populist mood refusing a new compromise in order to start effectively the negotiations (North Macedonia), one is risking to fall apart as a nation (Bosnia-Herzegovina), one (Kosovo) is candidate but is still not recognized as a sovereign state by five EU members states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). The process is effectively slow for many reasons. The first is due to the exercise in itself, meaning assimilation of the enormous “Acquis Communautaire” (dozen of dozens of thousand pages of technical legislation and rules) to be adopted by the candidate countries in order to integrate in a smooth way the internal market and participate in a fair manner to the different communitarian policies. The second reason is linked to the historical trajectory of these countries, reluctant to share elements of their “fragile” sovereignty to supranational institutions or to implement reforms that may constraint their governance system and well established “local habits”. Democratic reforms, respect of the rule of law, free judiciary branch and independent media, protection of minorities, open market economy are some basics principles which are still a work in progress. In principle, what we consider the “Copenhagen principles” are a pre-condition to open the negotiations, but their real implementation is still far from basic expectations.
As the EU membership acceptance final decision owns to each Member States (signature and then ratification), it seems difficult today that all the Western Balkan countries will get in at the same time. Some EU member states, because of their domestic political situation, may block for one or another reason. And the unanimity principle is applying for any new member. We did it in 2004 for 10 countries and for very specific timely reasons, but it seems improbable that the Members States want to reproduce the same move, without modifying the Treaties and in particular the current decision-making process. Even if the pressure from the exceptional geopolitical situation (Ukraine and Moldova) may change the current common thinking (own merit-based process), the “regatta” method will prevailed and surely be privileged. Montenegro and Albania may be the first next members of the EU in few years time. For the others, it will depend on the determination of the governments to accelerate the reforms…as their singular EU roadmaps are very clear.
In case of a new EU enlargement to the Western Balkan countries, which consequences are to expect for the EU stability and economic activity?
F.L.: Even more than ever, this is difficult to anticipate geopolitical and economic consequences for events that are not certain to happen in the short term. In particular with the current erratic Trump administration. Without drawing comprehensive scenario, let’s be frank: the EU cannot leave this region in the current middle way situation. The credibility of the European Union is closely linked to the stabilization and the prosperity of the Western Balkans. In several domains, such as foreign policy alignment (and sanctions), industrial defense production, migration contribution, economic growth and green transition, we must convince them to be onboard. Even before becoming full EU members, the gradual accession model that is today on the table, promoted by the EU institutions, gives each of the 6 countries the possibility to play a positive role, agreeing on our society model (values) and contributing to the “European strategic autonomy”.
What does the election of Donald Trump change in the Western Balkan region, as internally as with the relations with the EU?
F.L.: As everyone can see in Washington DC, this is presumptuous to anticipate which specific orientation will be taken. But let me give you two elements of contextualization. During his first mandate, for a short period, a special envoy of President Trump (Richard Grenell) was quite active in the region on a “business and economic mode”, without always coordinating with the State department… Most of the European chancelleries were not used to such an expeditive and individualistic approach. Without any concrete result. Secondly, during the Biden Presidency, on the contrary, both side of the Atlantic were working in real syntony and in particular the “EU special representative for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and other regional issues concerning the Western Balkans” was systematically backed by the US administration. The Europeans were in charge, the Americans supporting. Without better success. What will be the attitude of the Trump 2.0? Eventual real estate interests in Albania and in Serbia? Beyond the differentiated taxes, suspended for 90 days, (Serbia, 37%, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 35%, North Macedonia, 33% and the three others 10%), this is still not so clear how much attention the new US administration will give to the Western Balkans, considering the other wars going on elsewhere and its China’s obsession.
According to you, does the EU have the diplomatic strength to soothe the tensions in the region?
F.L.: The EU has an obligation to succeed. There is no alternative. We shall be obliged to change again the enlargement method, as the new methodology decided in 2019 has not given any expected positive result. We may decide to be more “proactive” with each of these countries if the EU membership is still their real national priorities. Why to do not propose for each of them a more constraining roadmap with specific measures to be implemented with a precise timeline and a strictly monthly monitoring by a quartet of EU representatives (a representative from the EP, from the European Commission, from the Court of Justice and from the Strasbourg ECHR)? A step-by-step approach targets with concrete benefits once the reform initially agreed done. Let’s learn from the process that we have used ten years ago to keep in the Eurozone Greece with the economic successes that we can observe today. The “Troika” was not greatly appreciated by citizens (sovereignty lost) and it has constrained Alexis Tsipras and its government to implement difficult measures. But the economic results of such therapy are today undisputable. Let’s be clear: the European Union implies sovereignty shares or sovereignty transfers. This is maybe this issue which has still to be explained and understood in order to make real progress.
How can you describe the position of Serbia as it seems taken between EU integration and Russian influence?
F.L.: A choice needs to be clearly made by the current President Vucic, who is still stuck in the non-alignment posture of the ex-Yugoslavia. The mirage of the third way…Beyond this historical reference, there are also concrete elements that explains this continue determination to do not take any sanctions against Russia, after the start of the war in Ukraine. Orthodox religion brotherhood, gas dependence (and till today a very good price contracted), and more important, Russian UN security council seat… in order to block any international decision on Kosovo’s recognition. President Vucic is entertaining in a permanent way the ambiguity, claiming that EU membership is the priority of Serbia without acting to prove it, and considering that he is the only one in capacity to know what is good for his country. This is why he wants to stay in power as long as possible. A characteristic that all autocrats in the world are sharing…
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François Lafond is the former France’s special counselor in Serbia and has a long experience in working with CEE countries’ administrations. Before that, he was lecturer for the Center of European Studies at Sciences Po (2013-2016) and researcher at the Center Robert Schuman of the European University Institute of Florence (1992-1999). […]
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avril 14, 2025By Johannes Heidecker, former economic advisor for North Macedonia’s PM.
How should governments react on the recent US tariff announcements? Retaliate with similar tariffs – like China? Propose negotiations to drill some small holes in the tariff wall – many governments have announced this, and the president is ready to negotiate « if countries offer something phenomenal ». Tit-for-tat, like for jeans, whiskey and motorcycles? Start a broader consultation – like the EU with their strategic talks to different sectors? Wait, because the US government may just reverse their decision? Or just better prepare for a world with more insecurity?
Abstract: For the Western Balkan countries, the US market per se is not very relevant, only indirectly via the economies they sell to. They have little to offer for any kind of negotiation, at least not officially, except for Zero tariffs on US goods.The recommendation is to focus on new markets, regional and EU first, to improve the Commerce organizations and to strengthen their own economies. This will make them more resilient whatever happens in the US.
Government Advisors are usually useless, because smart people do not need them while others do not listen. But there is an exception: A sudden crisis. As the US government only finalized its strategy in the last few hours before « liberation day », no other government had a ready response, all just knew they had to do something. This is the time to turn to advisors and ask for a detailed suggestion, due in the few hours preceding the evening news. Suggestions are difficult, because the situation may have changed before the written suggestions are finalized. Still, here is a proposal.
Basics first:
No one likes theory, but you should be knowledgeable about economy basics. Let us start with Adam Smith and his invisible hand. He describes in his « Wealth of Nations » « that governments do not normally need to force international traders to invest in their own home country. » Later, Paul Samuelson popularized the use of the term “invisible hand” to « refer to a more general and abstract conclusion that truly free markets are self-regulating systems that always tend to create economically optimal outcomes, which in turn cannot be improved upon by government intervention« . In other words, the market always wins. If you do not believe, take a look at prohibition when the US banned alcohol during 1920 – 1933. Far from converting citizens to teetotalers, it created a secondary, illegal, market for alcoholic beverages to the benefit of the Mafia. The same was true before 1989 in COMECON countries when not everyone could get consumer goods according neither to their needs nor to their regular salary, as opposed to those with access to foreign convertible cash who could afford everything at the detriment of the ‘regular’ economy.
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The second person to remember is David Ricardo who came up with the theory of « comparative advantage« . In modern times, he would have argued that it does not make sense for the US to make sneakers that can be imported when this limits the chances to sell medical electronics to Vietnam.
The third person worth mentioning is George C. Marshall. He got the peace Nobel prize, not for his military successes, but for his ideas that started the « Marshall plan » and the conviction that « the division of labor is the basis of modern civilization« , and that if the US wants to sell something abroad, it needs to give the buyer a chance to earn his money, by buying from him as well. And that, without this, « there can be no political stability and no assured peace« .
The last thought, that trade will ensure peace, has been challenged in the last years, specifically with the war of Russia against Ukraine. It should be added that Russia is able to wage this war because it can trade with other partners like China or Iran.
To this set of three theories that have been validated for quite some time, should be added the knowledge of the base accounting scheme for a country. There is trade, services and financial flows and the
Trade balance: import and export of goods; raw materials and energy are important factors
Service balance: services bought and sold, this includes tourism
Financial transfers: remittances from citizens from or to their families abroad, foreign investment in- and outflows, credit in-and outflows, international assistance
www.ClearIAS.com
Only these three together mold the balance of payments. Which may or may not go against a reserve if a country has piled up some cash, like Russia or Norway from former oil sales. If a country has a negative balance of payments, it has a problem – like Venezuela or Argentina. Balancing the (Trade + Service) volume is sound economic policy, all while watching the financial balance as well. But watching the trade balance alone is nonsense. This is easier to understand for tourist destinations like the Seychelles that will never intend to produce their own buses, but a little bit more difficult for industrial nations with a mercantile past where the service import was mostly represented by slaves who got traded against some glass pearls.
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The last hypothesis here is not standard knowledge, yet based on reasonable grounds: Economic growth does not correlate with democracy. We currently have countries with impressive economic growth like China, but no democracy so to speak. We have democratic countries which levy a huge toll on their economy for defense like Israel. But we can link economic growth to values like stability or rule of law. Even the most autocratic leaders tried to establish a secure system to ensure the safe back and forth transit of merchandise and its counter value. In a way, it can be argued that countries like Yugoslavia were better at achieving economic growth through rule of law than many of their successor countries with more corrupt judges and public purchasing organizations.
Second: the current situation
Before jumping to conclusions, like simply copying the recipes from 1947, countries need to consider some current issues like
Digitalisation:
Value may be created outside the country borders, e.g. when tourists booking via Airbnb send 1/3 of the revenue off shore and outside the country taxation. Add the advertising revenue by Facebook & Co. or the trade profits of online dealers like Amazon. Add licensing, e.g. for the right to use the name Starbucks, that adds tax revenues in tax havens at the detriment of the countries that produce or serve the coffee.
Any economic policy needs to integrate these effects. The fact that most of the big digital companies are based in the US makes the required policy more complex, with a higher need for innovation and risk-taking. The US has already acknowledged this, as demonstrates the line-up of the big digital players behind the current president.
Structural balance of payment issues.
A Lack of strategic input factors like raw materials or energy, or raw earths for industrial countries, creates a need for compensation revenues. While each country is responsible for its own balance and will thus have to find an individual solution, large imbalances are not sustainable. In economic limbo, Terms of Trade, the amount you pay for imported goods in relation to the price of your export goods, do play a role. But even if we assume fair terms because of international competition, a country cannot just let go of a (trade + service) deficit for a long time.
Yugoslavia made this experience after 1989 when no one was ready to lend money on favorable terms for global strategic reasons; the breakup was one of the consequences as the relatively richer Slovenes and Croats did not want to continue to pay for their poorer fellow states. The Euro zone mastered the Greek crisis in 2009+ but clearly showed that there are limits if there is no economic incentive for those lending funds.
As Europe has much less energy available compared to the US – selling their LNG and maybe oil is high on the wish list of the current US government – the energy strategy needs to be integrated, especially if Russia or the Middle East are not good political alternatives.
Another factor is that the US has a very export-oriented agriculture while Europe tries to keep some autarky, another area of conflict yet also opportunity: last time, a deal « soy beans against champagne » could be struck even though the then and current president prefers McDonald’s food & drinks.
Any US government should realize that in case of a balance of payments (trade + services) deficit, the shortfall has to be covered by foreign money, either through investments or by obtaining loans.
And this is true not only to finance the federal deficit. Also consider that the US borrows money from other countries for their industry and private households. As Ursula von der Leyen recalled at the World Economic Forum, « European household savings reach almost € 1.4 trillion, compared to just over € 800 billion in the United States. € 300 billion of them are invested abroad every year. » Without the savings and trust of Europe, but also Japan and China, the US could not lead the economic policy that it currently does. The tariff increase is supposed to solve this, assuming that it works. In other words, assuming that the US treasury gets more money from import tariffs than it loses from reduced purchasing power and linked economic effects through the induced price increase.
US policy background and options
The US tariff policy does not come down from heaven, and is not an AI suggestion generated last week. And the US has some more options that the president may implement.
Increasing tariffs has been a long-term goal – for some
Analysts hint that tariffs are the one constant policy of the current president, a policy opinion rendered public in 1987 when he was running ads in the largest newspaper (The Atlantic). Changes or deals are possible on other issues but this is a tough one. Not sure for his potential successor, though, if the policy shows no results by the 2026 mid-term elections.
Possible US$ devaluation
A devaluation of the US$ may help US exports but will make imports more costly. Money lenders will lose interest in the US$ while loans will become more costly for the US treasury. This will raise interest rates, which is bad for the US economy. Again, the tariff increase will have to bring in lots of money to compensate these effects. Devaluating the US$ on purpose – as thought by some – is possible yet risky, a catch-22.
US Tariff vs. tax trade-off
Can the US compensate the price effect of tariffs by lowering taxes on companies and citizens? The current president is confident and points out a situation when 120 years ago not only the US, but also countries like Germany were financed by tariffs, not income taxes. This question is not easy to answer: Some countries still finance their governments that way, like Russia, the Gulf countries or some tax havens like Panama. Russia and the Golf countries perceive their income from energy exports, related royalties and export tariffs, not by import tariffs. Micro-countries like Andorra do not really serve as good examples for larger states. What can be said: if there is a large import volume as compared to the citizen base, it may work – e.g. for a Caribbean island. But if the majority of the GDP is created by the internal market, like in the EU, taxing only imports will not suffice. It could work for Alaska if very few inhabitants benefit from royalties on energy exports, become rich from attracting Silicon Valley businesses so that they can afford the tariffs on their imports. With a larger population and a rising state share, be it for education, health or social transfers, this does not seem an option.
Now, the current US tendency is to increase tariff revenue and reduce taxes and the share of the state in the GDP. How far this can go remains to be assessed. As a consequence, if tariffs rise, the US market for international exporters will become smaller.
www.Economist.com
US share in international trade
The shrinking importance of the US in international trade is not only a prediction. According to the Economist, it is already a fact: from 20 % in 2000 it shrank to under 15 % in 2023. EU + « open market allies » like Canada, Australia and others have a 1/3rd of the global trade, more than double the US. If this trend continues, the US will become – on a global level – « economically irrelevant« . Like today’s Russia after they started the war.
These are strong words, and of course apply differently whether you sell sport utilities or snails. But it gives a clear view of the options: focus on growth sectors, and reduce your engagement in shrinking sectors.
Negotiation tactics
Keep in mind that long before even considering presidency, the mandate current holder wrote a book that became a no. 1 national bestseller entitled “The Art of the Deal”. The front page announces “He makes one believe in the American Dream Again”. The back page cites him as “the personification of hustle”. Many of his moves could just be part of a deal strategy, like making an announcement that crashes the stock market, buying cheap, withdrawing the announcement and benefiting from the stock market gains.
Governments can take advice from him directly:
Art of the DealDownload
These tactics are not common knowledge, yet not new. Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Putin with his sidekick Sergey Lavrov act just alike. People with less speculative minds know how to integrate a more long-term view. Would you use 1/3rd of your salary to rent an apartment in a Trump Tower if you do not know whether the rent doubles next week? You may see it differently if you get a three night bargain at hotel Trump, but not if you are trying to house your family for the next five years. So the “good news” of the reduction of a 33 % tariff down to 10 % should not let you forget that the next “Foreign Pollution Free Act” with a 37 to 100 % additional tax is already in the Congress.
Acting individuals on the US side
A short look at the bio of four key players in the current administration besides the “PotUS” can also be helpful:
TE 4 TariffEscalationPlayersDownload
The Western Balkans situation
Having said all this, what needs to be added for the Western Balkans?
At first glance, the importance of exports from the Western Balkans to the US is minimal, ranging from 0,1 to 1,1 of the GDP while the US share in the total exports ranges between 1 – 14,6 %.
Let us take a look at each country separately, as their situations are quite different. (Trade data is from OEC.world in US$ mio and 2023 if available)
Albania
Albania’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,4 % of the GDP.
Albanian politics tend to be friendly to the current US president, be it for ideological reasons or because of business relations. Albania’s Democratic Party PDSH is like-minded, Prime Minister Rama and his Socialist Party PSSh have exceptionally granted full development rights of Albania’s Sazan Island to Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. “Rama has begun a pilgrimage across Europe to tell Europeans what a blessing it is that Trump was elected US President.” A complete shift of opinion on his part as in 2016, Edi Rama “explicitly said in two media appearances that Trump was a threat to Albanian-American relations, as well as a threat to America itself.”
The benefit: Albania got away with a 10 % tariff in the last tariff round.
Of 4,25 bil. $ Albanian exports, the US represents a meager 1,9 % with 80,8 mio $, consisting for 19,5 % of plants for perfumery, pharmacy or insecticides and 25 % textiles and shoes.
Albania imports for 8,76 bil $, 1,9 % or 158 mio $ from the US, mainly cars, aircraft parts, energy and poultry. The positive US balance should keep the US happy. The real economic impact for Albania is tourism, with 11,7 mio foreign visitors that should have generated some 4 bil $ of income. Americans accounts for a mere 3 % of the total, although their number has been growing by 11 % a year in the last seven years.
US FDI in Albania is small, around 200 US$ (Tirana Times)
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,4 % of the GDP.
Bosnian-Herzegovinian foreign policy does not usually make much noise, the reason being that the two entities act more separately than as a country. Srpska Republika’s boss Milan Dodik has been criticized by Marco Rubio, so he is not such a close friend of the current US administration as he is Putin´s.
The country exports 9,67 bil. $ of which the US gets 1,7 % or 163 mio $. Details are only available for 2022: gun cartridges account for 18,5 %, furniture and clothes/shoes have some importance.
Of the 15,8 bil. $ imports, the US has a share of 3,2 % or 512 mio $, of which 73,8 % to bituminous coal.
Bosnia got a 35 % tariff (before the pause) and you may wonder if you look at these OEC (American) numbers: why? To understand, you need to know the intricacies of the trade data: goods that leave from or arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina e.g. via a Croatian port to go to or come from the US may be counted differently as Bosnian or Croatian. The US Census sees the trade data in 2023 as US > Bosnia-Herzegovina with 25,3 mio $ and Bosnia-Hercegovina > US with 158,8 mio $, suggesting that the Bituminous coal does not show as US export in the US data for some unknown reason. (It could also be that it is a US company doing the trade and paperwork, but the origin is in another country).
Kosovo
Kosovo’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 1,1 % of the GDP, the highest of all Western Balkan countries. But Kosovo also has the lowest estimated amount of exports of the region.
Kosovo has been a very US-friendly country since Bill Clinton supported its independence, there is still his statue in Pristina. The Kosovar AmCham has suggested to remove unilaterally the 10 % tariff on US goods hoping that the US will reciprocate, something that did not work for Israel or Switzerland.
The Kosovo government thinks about developing a skiing area in Brezovica, and at some point the idea was taking hold that the current US president could be personally interested to invest 500 mio $ there. A possible compensation could be to name a lake after him, “Lake Trump”, as special envoy Richard Grenell named it.
As Kosovo is in a complicated situation, trade data is difficult to get and OEC does not even list the country. A reason is that the north, very closely linked to Serbia, has no interest in participating in any statistic and Serbia does not see this trade as international.
Kosovo is told to have exported 889 mio € in 2024 while it imported 6 bio. €. Major export goods, after electricity, were door and window items, iron bars and furniture (Telegrafi.com).
Tirana Times estimates Kosovo’s exports to the US at 130 mio $. in 2022, roughly in line with US Census that came up with a huge deficit of 123,9 mio that same year. Things turned bad in 2024 when the US notes 49,4 mio $ exports to and 34,0 mio $ imports from Kosovo, thus the US trade has a surplus and the country only got a 10 % tariff. (Which suggests a regular adaptation of the US tariff model when supply chains change?)
Montenegro
Montenegro’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,1 % of the GDP, the lowest of all WB6 countries.
Montenegro is another tourism country with rare appearances on the international political scene, at least outside the Western Balkans.
Of 1,56 bil. $ exports of Montenegro, the US share amounts to 1 % or 15,2 mio $, of which 53 % is hard liquor. Out of 4,78 bil. $ of imports, the US represents 1,6 % or 77,9 mio $., coal, cars and a mix of other stuff to the liking of the current US government. The US sees slightly less exports, maybe again coal, but still has a trade surplus and therefore only applies a 10 % tariff.
North Macedonia
North Macedonia’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,3 % of the GDP.
North Macedonia’s current government is very close to the current US government. The Prime Minister was in Washington during the presidential inauguration, not in the White House but in a stadium where the Republican Party held an event.
Add to this several visits of closer friends of the current president like Richard Grenell or Chris Pavlovski, mostly to discuss business. But none of the projects, from data center to potential energy investments, would result in higher exports to the US.
The fact that a 33 % import tariff (before the pause) is to be applied to Macedonian goods has been declared by the government as “some kind of mistake” and the government hopes for a correction, if not for a free trade agreement or similar, although some tariff was expected.
The data comes from three different sources and there exists a detailed analysis. In essence, of the 10,1 bio $ exports of North Macedonia, the US accounts for 2,7 % or 273 mio $, 74 % of which are buses from a single Macedonian factory being built specially for the US market (i.e. unsellable elsewhere) based on US engines and transmissions. The imports are 257 mio $ from the US or 2,1 % of a total of 12,4 bio $, which gives a slight deficit of 16 mio $ according to OEC. The US Census sees this differently and estimates a 228,7 mio $ deficit in the same 2023 year; North Macedonia itself counted the buses as export to Belgium where they are driven to receive the final preparation till mid-2024.
Serbia
Serbia’s exports to the US are calculated by WIIW with 0,7 % of the GDP.
Serbia has had long ambiguous foreign relations with nearly all countries in the world since 1945, always trying to balance their relation between the West, Moscow and now China. Serbia has a free trade agreement with Russia and privileged relations with China. Serbia also has close relations to the family of the current US president whose son was in Belgrade a few days ago. Serbia has offered his “memorial to US bombing”, a destroyed military building in the center of the city, to the president’s family to build a hotel.
The biggest country in the Western Balkans exports 32,6 bil. $, of which the US counts for 2,2 % or 707 mio $. The 2022 OEC data shows a mixed package of products and fire arms (“AK 47”) representing 10 % as a very popular import item in the US. Of the 39 bio $ imports, the US counts in 2023 for 1,4 % or 545 mio $ with a variety of products, resulting in a trade deficit. The US sees the exports to Serbia 300 mio $ less in 2023 and a deficit of 600 mio $ in 2024, justifying a tariff of 37 %, the highest of all Western Balkan states.
Add to this that US FDI in Serbia is huge, around 4 bil. US$ (Tirana Times)
Overview about trade figures of different sources:
In addition, the proposed 2025 Foreign Pollution Free Act , if enforced, will affect all countries, Western Balkans included. This means an addition of tariffs of 50 % on Iron and Steel, of 40 % on Aluminum, of 55 % on Aluminum Articles, of 48 % on Glass & Cement, of 69 % on Fertilizer or Hydrogen, of 100 % on Solar Products and 37 % on Battery Inputs. Now, Montenegro’s aluminum plant does not work anymore, US steel has ended their activity in Serbia and these goods are not key products anyway. But Solar products or Battery inputs could be future products and e.g. Serbia exports iron and aluminum products. Bauxite, the raw material needed for aluminum, is mined in Serbia.
Conclusion of the present situation for the Western Balkans:
While the policies of the six countries of the Western Balkans are quite different, from very pro-current US government in Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia to neutral and slightly problematic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro, the trade numbers show a similar picture:
the USA, at least directly, is not a relevant trade partner
in several countries the numbers between the country, the US and from an international perspective differ
the tariffs did not take any “political proximity” into account, just the US Census statistics
potential business projects with US partners do not involve trade but rather investments in tourism or energy.
In comparison to the free trade agreements and the close exchange that the Western Balkan countries have with the EU, there is neither potential for significantly higher US exports nor any major importance of the US market for the countries in general, except for the very few specific factories like the Serbian rifle or the Macedonian bus manufacturers. These could be hit very hard as they hardly have alternative markets on hand.
On the other hand, all countries are very much dependent on the EU economy, so if there is an economic crisis in the EU, there will be less exports and less jobs for Balkan manufacturers. Some countries can compensate with tourism, others are not able to do so, at least not in the next three years. Measures for tourism can have an effect within a few weeks/months. Establishing new supply chains, looking for new customers or offering new products takes years.
Recommendations to the Governments of the Western Balkans
Negotiations with the US
In the Western Balkans the first reaction was to negotiate with the US government to get a better deal. The arguments differ, from “there is an error that will be corrected” to “we abolish our tariffs, they will abolish theirs”. No one is mulling a “phenomenal” offer, at least not in public.
Different countries have different strategies towards negotiations. China has acted without negotiation, set tariffs themselves and sold US treasury bonds in higher amounts. The US has reacted with increasing the tariffs even further. The UK and Japan have been first in line for negotiations. UK Prime Minister even handed an envelope with… an invitation by King Charles. US President admitted to lacking time to handle the many talks already waiting in line. Others, like the EU, have first started consultations with their own industries, before coming up with offers that may not be acceptable to voters, like to allow the chlorine cleaning of food.
The Western Balkan countries may be well advised to wait a little bit and use the time to consult with one another before negotiating, individually or together. In a few weeks, the US administration may feel the first effects, as occurred when the bond market moved so much that the US president paused the additional reciprocal tariffs.
If some countries get a deal, this could map a path to others to in turn achieve similar agreements. Offering a zero % tariff for industrial goods comes up as a standard offer. With some luck, some or all of the Western Balkans could get some favorable treatment even though their trade balance remains negative in the US view: the total amounts are not really significant. Not being in the EU, the Western Balkans may be more flexible on product standards: it does not really matter if vehicles that fulfill the US windshield standard FMVSS 205 do not fulfill the EU ECE R43 standard because any new vehicle will be safer than the many old clunkers that drive along the Balkan roads.
Governments are advised to check where they should lobby and with whom they have to negotiate. The EU trade envoy Maroš Šefčovič just found out that talking to US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick (a “personal friend“ of the Prime Minister of North Macedonia) or US Trade representative Jamieson Greer was not helpful to avoid any tariff escalation since the one pushing the president for higher tariffs is the presidential advisor for trade and manufacturing Peter Navarro.
There could be phenomenal deals available “in private”, as the “Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions” Richard Grenell is quite familiar with the region and projects are flying around. Chances are better to achieve a small exception for one/a few specific custom codes of one specific party with good lobbying than a general agreement that even large countries with no trade deficit like the UK could not achieve since Brexit, with or without the current president being in office. Unless, of course, the current US government changes its mind.
Following the US statement that they had to slap tariffs on an island inhabited by Penguins only “to close absurd holes in the system”, tariffs are favored over checking the customs documentation to find that a rock without harbor or inhabitants cannot export 1,4 mio $ mechanical and electrical products. The time it takes for the first ‘phenomenal’ deal to occur will indicate if and when more deals are possible. The US has been very consistent in the last weeks: they want more production to move to the US, and less non-tariff barriers for US goods in the world. Offering only zero percent tariffs – when present tariffs are not so high anyway – may not suffice.
Focus on other markets
The direct importance of the US market is rather small for the Western Balkan countries, except for a few companies like the exporters of coaches in North Macedonia, ‘household’ AK 47 rifles in Serbia, perfume ingredients in Albania, hard liquor in Montenegro or cartridges in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Add to this textiles, shoes and furniture for all countries. These goods can however be sold anywhere in the world. The US represents 15 % of the world trade. A good market, a profitable market, yet small as compared to the rest of the world. And the rest of the world may have no such tariff barriers.
The first market to look at is the EU itself. Its potential is far from being exhausted. Regional trade only with the surrounding countries Greece, Bulgaria and Romania gives the Western Balkans a market with more inhabitants than their home market, comparable purchasing power, tastes, and within a few hours drive. Using tourism and the diaspora, additional markets in the EU can be reached with food products, and near shoring becomes even more important. The potential is huge for further exchanges, be it services, tourism or goods. Neither China nor Latin America have the luck to have so many “trade ambassadors” in a target market to explain how to cook with Ajvar, why rafting in Albania can be an adventure or that having the accounting done in Herzegovina is a viable alternative to Germany.
Growing trade with other parts of the world, from the Middle East over to Africa and Asia, seems like a good idea. But keep in mind: if a country is not able to adapt Ajvar to the local taste of Denmark despite the help of its huge diaspora, how will they conquer the Kenyan market with far less cultural and personal links.
A few countries already have special trade agreements and there is potential. Serbia has some with Russia and China, Slovakia with South Korea. No big impact on exports but some help in getting FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) from China. Add the shorter connections via the Greek ports compared to shipping goods via the Netherlands to Asia. Again, this will be easier for some countries but politically difficult for others. Focusing on the EU may be the faster option, although no opportunities should be neglected.
It is necessary is to focus on how customers are currently hit by the US sanctions. North Macedonia will have issues exporting a high-tech alloy beam to Germany if a third of these beams end up in electric vehicles sold in the US and this number is decreasing. Especially North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and somewhat Serbia should reconsider the cluster risk of being dependent on passenger car manufacturers for their exports and refocus on commercial vehicles, agricultural machinery and machine parts instead. They are very often similar to manufacture as passenger car parts, in the same quality but with lower volumes. Which makes those supply contracts within better reach of existing manufacturers, local or foreign.
Attention should also be paid to the defense industry, specifically by the NATO members Albania, North Macedonia and to some extent Montenegro. Demand is rising and production capacity is scarce. There is no reason why Macedonian welding structures could not be attractive as part of a European military vehicle if a similar structure becomes unsellable for a coach intended for the US.
Strong international commerce organizations
Switching the trade (and service export) focus needs a strong international commerce organization, strong chambers of commerce, good collaboration between different industries (e.g. food export and incoming tourism) and a professional management.
While such organisms exist, their practical value has a huge need for improvement. WB6-CIF Chamber Investment Forum has taken some steps. Their market access database exists. But it is a far cry from AliBaba that allows every European to access a digital supermarket. The good news: proposals for such digital tools are in the drawers and funding would be available. The bad news: the dust on such proposals takes more space in the drawer than the proposals themselves.
Another issue is the collaboration of national institutions with one another. Take the example of North Macedonia: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade with his economic counselors, the Invest in North Macedonia agency with its export promotion task, the SKSM chamber with its export club, the SSK, MASIT and OEMVP chambers with their export support together with 14 different trade missions from different countries all try to promote the export of Ajvar, textiles or steel beams. And this does not include the Agency of Promotion for Tourism. If a request for a Macedonian supplier of plastic fixtures comes in, it takes a lot of luck to route it to the potential supplier. Even though the country supplies the plastic shells of Kinder chocolate egg gifts worldwide – except to the US where they are illegal.
In Serbia, a few months ago CEBAC, an association of all associations and chambers, was created. The Austrian way to combine most of the functions under a single organization has been praised. Yet to be seen how such an idea can be realized in countries like the confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo.
Activities can be joined, at least for some countries. The “Open Balkan” Belgrade “Wine Vision” is an example thereof, despite excluding wine-producing Kosovo and placing the by far largest producer and exporter, North Macedonia, just as “number two” on the fair. Likewise, ideas for common tourism marketing exist since years. The latest CEFTA agreement now allows travel agencies to drive their buses from one country to another, however still excluding tour guides who have to stay home: a Serb from Vranje is not allowed to explain to a Japanese visitor the history of the 50 km-neighboring Macedonian town of Kumanovo.
To sum up, there are opportunities, and there is the political reality. Countries can at least strengthen their own national organizations. Serbia is an example of what can be achieved.
Strengthening of the home market
The EU has made it a goal for the Western Balkan countries: strengthen the local economy. They have put money behind it, 6. bil. € in the RGF “Reform and Growth Facility”. The first payouts have been made.
In essence, it would not be necessary to export to the US or anywhere else if the local population would consume the products and services produced in the country. With the twist that good jobs and lifestyle may reduce emigration, and more inhabitants increase the market for local sales.
This even is an official reasoning for the US tariffs, buried deep in the Executive order in para 11:
« Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic policies and practices of our trading partners, including currency practices and value-added taxes, and their associated market distortions, that suppress domestic consumption and boost exports to the United States. This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent). »
In essence, the US is saying
Your policies take away too much money from the consumers, so we cannot sell enough to them.
and this is also valid for the Western Balkans. This is especially true for cars, where the VAT adds to the tariffs. A US vehicle like the Dodge Hornet sells for 30 854 € in the US including the 6 % GST Sales Tax in Michigan. The essentially identical Alfa Romeo Tonale would sell, including motor vehicles tax and 18 % VAT, for 42 300 € in North Macedonia, the net income for the manufacturer being the same. No wonder that most imports are used vehicles and smoky used cars raise the pollution of Skopje to 69 PM10, far above the 25 PM10 level that car-intensive Los Angeles records according to the WHO data at a given point.
The lower growth and consumption are probably a consequence of a higher stake of the state in the GDP, increasing labor cost and taking away purchasing power through taxes. It makes sense to increase efficiency through digitization and cutting red tape. A goal that the EU has already set by asking to cut regulations in the RGF.
The S3 Smart Specialization Strategy gives recommendations on how to achieve higher economic growth, and the EU has made S3 mandatory for all European regions. Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia already work on Smart Specialization plans, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in preparation. Government administrations, academia and companies are supposed to work together to focus on the economic development, regulations and research in promising sectors only.
Education comes as another focal point. Different countries face different situations, but the high unemployment of University graduates shows problems in the system. Vocational education is on the rise, which is good. Smart Specialization may step in. Bear in mind that a good vocational education should dedicate over 50 % of the time to professional learning in the company. To become a successful baker, it is more important to be a guru of pastry variation than to know what national heroes thought who ate them some centuries ago. The “number of anthroposophy graduates that Czech Republic needs” (to cite the Czech president) is much lower than the number of English-speaking accounting graduates, some ‘economic steering’ and interlocking with the job market, e.g. via mandatory traineeships, can thus help.
Investments in infrastructure will strengthen the countries. But before starting a high-speed rail from Skopje to Blace, it would make better sense to repair the road to Vizibegovo. A high quality but cheap intercity bus network, conveniently named “Student Agency”, has done more for public transport in the Czech Republic at close to zero public cost than all plans to realize a railway line from Prague to Nuremberg or Munich. Sometimes, a sense of what can be done with a quick return in money and time should prevail over “politically correct” ideas that will take years and millions of Euros but risk to end up like the Bagdad railway: a good basis for literature and movies, but nothing for public transit.
However, this does not mean that an optimized economic mix between airline, rail, clean buses and clean cars plus skates, bikes and pedestrian options cannot improve life in the Western Balkans tremendously.
Investments in Health are an issue for the Western Balkans. Probably it will need more means. It would be wise to immediately implement new approaches like in Denmark where the focus is to spend more on prevention thus less on the recovery of sick people. Errors from the Western European countries can be avoided. Not every pregnancy requires six ultrasounds, at least not for medical reasons. Privileging the contact to the doctor or community nurse (male/female) and less “let’s buy machinery and scan them all” should help to keep the costs down. Newer EU members like the Czech Republic and Poland have shown that health systems can be run more efficiently than in Germany. Tele-medicine is another solution to bring solutions everywhere, including in every mountain village. Digitalization can keep costs down. Everyone complains about the lack of staff, while they explain that they spend half their time on paperwork. In our time of digitalization, « time on person » target should be 90 % and logging the potty result of grandma and grandson alike should be left to technology.
In this context, elderly and juvenile care can also benefit from attention. The family network up to the “zadruga” is much stronger in the Western Balkans than in Western Europe. The “system” should use this, from family taxation to flexible work possibilities. Here as well, a system of community nurses (male/female), the establishment of social enterprises and many more competences can help to keep the youngest and oldest in the community instead of storing them in old age camps like it happens in other countries for those not fortunate enough to pay for private care.
That energy and climate preservation need action is no news. The Western Balkans have to increase their production of renewable energies. They are blessed with plentiful sun. Opportunities exist from photovoltaics to hydrogen, this latter could flow through existing pipelines to buyers “gore”, further up north. Governments should be aware that the state has no money for all these investments, not even for the necessary power transmission lines. Activating private capital is key. While some countries are fast to implement, others are lagging behind and pay the price with higher electricity cost and higher pollution from coal.
The same goes for recycling or waste management. The concept that every village will have their own waste or water treatment company that conveniently employs all friends of the acting mayor may be tempting from a political perspective, the sad reality however is that water treatment plants are as rare in the Western Balkans as illicit dumping in the nature is plenty. Private management is required to run things efficiently. Other new EU members could settle the problem within a generation. Hint: it is a necessity for tourism, which can bring more money to poorer regions than the waste/water management costs. Just take a look at Austrian or Swiss mountain areas that were much poorer than Skopje or Belgrade 100 years ago.
Conclusion
To sum up, negotiation, alternative markets with the help of strong commerce organizations and strengthening the home market are the three options. Negotiations do not really seem a promising option to solve the general problem of export dependency, not so much directly to the US but rather to the EU, with special regard to passenger car suppliers.
Touristic countries withstand somewhat better and seem to be more resilient. Developing tourism is within reach of every country.
The internal market, not only within WB6 but also with the EU, shows far more potential. If Estonia started at a comparable level to that of North Macedonia in 1990 and has now doubled its GDP per capita in purchasing power, so can North Macedonia by making the most of its home market and benefiting from its ties to the EU. Other continents may be opportunities, but need preparation and at least a medium-term strategy. Going via FDI attraction seems a safer bet than hoping that Macedonian rice cookers become a hit in India or Japan.
We may think that what happens on the other side of the Atlantic is not relevant. But we should be aware of its impact on Europe that trickles down to the economically weaker Western Balkans. People may vote with their feet and just emigrate. Citizens in the Western Balkans can endure a lot. Yet the current unrest in Belgrade and elsewhere shows that their patience is not endless, the Balkans have known revolutions before.
The Western Balkan countries are not (yet) part of EU, but definitely in Europe. Unlike the current US policy, Europe does not want to re-balance its trade to the detriment of the Western Balkans. But in times of war in Ukraine, the capacity and the means of Europe are not endless, and each Western Balkan 6 country competes with Ukraine and Moldova, both eager to outpace them for their mere survival.
The Western Balkan countries will be hit harder by the indirect impact of US tariffs via the slower economy of their EU partners than by any reduction of direct exports to the US. Using existing market potential within their own economies, the region, the EU and the remaining 85 % of world trade left in the rule-based WTO trade sphere offers enough compensation for what they risk to lose. Staying open, tourist and trade-friendly and caring for the wealth of their own citizens remains the best choice to deal with #TariffEscalation.
Further Sources:
Richard Baldwin, Trump Tariffs and the World Trade System
Simon Evenett, Marc-Andreas Muendler: Evidence from Tariff Laffer Curves – Tariffs cannot fund the government
Simon Evenett: Briefing on US Tariff Pause
Tommaso Giardini, Svenja Bosard: Geopolitical Tensions in Digital Policy
Shuting Pomerleau, The New US Carbon Tariff Proposal: A Brief Overview
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Johannes Heidecker was manager in different industries with a long-time experience in several Central and Eastern European countries. In the last four years, he was economic advisor to the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. […]
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mars 19, 2025By Johannes Heidecker, former economic advisor for North Macedonia’s PM.
The Balkans are geographically located in Europe. Is this to say that they should necessarily become part of the EU? History brings no clear answer, or does it? A view on the perspectives, opportunities and difficulties.
When we say Europe today, many think “European Union”, the idea of Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer or Jean Monnet who thought of the German-French reconciliation as a base for peace; of Walter Hallstein, Johan Beyen or Alcide de Gasperi, who pushed for a common market as a stability pole in this union; of Winston Churchill who thought that democracy was a necessary base; of Joseph Bech and Paul-Henri Spaak who started with the BeNeLux Customs Union, of Charles de Gaulle who pushed for more European independence, and of Sicco Mansholt with his focus on a common agricultural policy for food self-sufficiency. Later, the common Euro currency, the Schengen borderless travel, common foreign policy and, a short while ago, the common vaccination research and procurement as well as defense were added to the European idea.
Europe grew from an initial nine countries to encompass the western part of the continent. The South with the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, Cyprus and Malta, the North with Sweden and Finland, and Central Europe from Estonia to Bulgaria followed. In the Balkans however, only Slovenia and Croatia, that have long-time links to the European core, are members.
How come? The former Yugoslavia is said to have tossed the idea around 1990, when the country was economically and politically in a better shape than Baltic countries like Latvia. Internal conflicts however soon prevailed over the interest for Europe. Hardly any politician in the Balkans discusses “peace zones”, “common regional markets” or even “free border crossing”, although this existed within the former Yugoslavia. The names we remember are those of the warlords that launch conflicts, starting with Milošević.
Had it not been concerned with stability, Europe could have lost interest. The intensity of the conflict led to the use of military force in Bosnia & Herzegovina since 1992, in Kosovo since 1999 and in today’s North Macedonia in 2001 – this latter quite successfully as an extension of the turmoil could be avoided with much less effort and damage. Still, in the mind of most Europeans, except maybe for their close neighbors, the word of Bismarck echoes “that the Balkans are not worth the bones of a (German) grenadier.”
It was not always so. In the Roman empire, the area was an integrated part, much less exposed than were Germania and other border areas. The location of the region shifted from central to peripheral with the division of the Roman Empire. The north remained linked to the western countries while the south was connected to today’s Istanbul. This is where the different religions, administrative structures and other elements come from, that distinguish the region from most of the current EU countries. While states with central governments emerged in Western Europe, the Ottoman empire governed by sending local governors, yet allowing local communities to regulate their own affairs in the “millet” system: as long as taxes were paid, a Jewish, Christian or Muslim community could self-govern in whatever social, trade or other matter. If this sounds like a perfect democratic solution, specifically in multi-ethnic situations, it should be kept in mind that the population had to comply with the central government’s requirements as to conscription and tax money, usually taken from those opposing the least resistance, namely the weakest. Confidence in the central government was consequently always low. Meanwhile Westerners were guided by the ideas of enlightenment kings like Frederick of Prussia who saw himself as “first servant of the country” and some base state principles dating back to the Magna Carta in 1215.
Is a different history an obstacle that can be overcome?
Whoever doubts this should remember that there were far more reasons to doubt in 1950 that Germany could become a democracy, that countries like Spain or Greece have had non-democratic governments till a few years before joining the EU and that several members of the EU are still monarchies without this being any issue in their daily political life. A region that combines politically stable countries like the Netherlands with younger democracies like Bulgaria is bound to experience internal tensions.
Let’s rather consider what a common vision may bring as advantages. It is far easier to integrate a culture with similar educational or consumer habits than say, Sri Lanka or Nigeria. As a Russian said “Europe is everywhere where people are moved when listening to Beethoven”.
When the EU decided to integrate Romania, the country was poor and it will remain a net receiver of funds for many years to come. But it currently ranks 12th in the EU by nominal GDP, 7th by purchasing power adjusted GDP, and has grown from an average of 44 to 72 % in the GDP per capita classification of European countries since 2007 when it joined the EU, with potential for more. If we imagine the world as competing regions, today with China and India, tomorrow possibly with South-East Asia, Latin America or Africa, it may be a good idea to integrate the geographically close Balkans in the economic space before they potentially turn into a zone of foreign influence and its load of problems. Europe can look for sunshine in Mauritania to produce hydrogen, but the pipeline connections to the Balkans already exist and the sun there is plentiful, too.
The Balkans are an interesting touristic region at affordable cost and can be reached with far less CO2 than Turkey or Egypt. Albania has just been ranked as the country with the highest tourism growth in the world.
From a security perspective, having Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia as NATO partners may not be the biggest gun in the NATO arsenal, but it is a better contribution than to have to station troops like in Kosovo or Bosnia & Herzegovina. Likewise, the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria is already substantial, be it to extend the rocket shield of Europe against Iran or to produce ammunition to support Ukraine. The first ministries to declare themselves fans of the Western Balkans are the ministries of interior: stable Western Balkans mean less criminality infiltrating the richer European countries, and a better control of migration streams.
And last but not least the Balkans can contribute to science and technical progress. It can be discussed if Tesla was a Croat or a Serb, but he was definitely from the Balkans. Porsche has just recently transferred some of their technology development to Rimac in Croatia, a convincing example of what a sunny climate and an innovative culture can contribute in this field.
It is precisely this very opportunity for enrichment that must guide the European countries when they consider the Balkans. Efforts of enlargement, from Iceland to Ukraine, the integration of Canada into the EEA or an increased cooperation with countries like Morocco should of course be pursued as well. However, geographic proximity induces closeness in many other ways.
At the same time, the European ideas and ideals, so dear to a Western Europe torn by wars and eager not to repeat past errors, still have to be planted, nurtured and grown in the many regions that were not part of this movement 75+ years ago. They cannot be replaced by the technocratic requirements of the ‘acquis’. “One sees clearly only with the heart. What is essential is invisible to the eye” – said Saint-Exupery and this also applies to the European values in the Balkans.
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Johannes Heidecker was manager in different industries with a long-time experience in several Central and Eastern European countries. In the last four years, he was economic advisor to the Prime Minister of North Macedonia. […]
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mars 18, 2025By Ivaylo Dinev, Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Berlin.
On 15 March, the largest protest demonstration in Serbia’s history took place in Belgrade. It was the culmination of the student protests that started after the death of 15 people in the Novi Sad train station collapse. According to police figures, which traditionally give a lower number of protesters, the number of participants was 107.000, while the non-governmental organisation « Arhiv Javnih Skupova », which counts participants at the protests through images and drone videos, put the number between 275.000 and 320.000. According to opposition media, there is talk of as many as half a million or 700.000 people.
If such a protest had occurred in a major Western country, the media would likely frame it as a revolutionary moment — because that is precisely what it is. Yet, beyond its immediate political implications, the Serbian protests set a powerful example for other countries: they demonstrate how people from vastly different social backgrounds and ideologies can unite behind a shared cause. At a time when the political divide between progressive urban centers and more conservative rural areas, or between different generations, is widening across the world, Serbia has defied this trend over the cause of justice, accountability, and transparency. Over the past four months, the protests have not remained confined to the major urban centers Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš. On the contrary, they have spread nationwide, with demonstrations taking place in over 400 towns and villages. Students have deliberately marched from city to city, where they are welcomed in each new location as national heroes. They have purposefully aligned themselves with protest campaigns by workers, pensioners, and teachers, creating a broad-based movement.
A renewed sense of hope and solidarity through large protests.
The result? A rare sense of solidarity and hope. Recent polls show overwhelming public support for the students and their demands, reflecting the depth of the movement’s reach.
However, the outcome of such crisis is not dictated by internal dynamics alone. President Aleksandar Vučić is skilfully leveraging international factors and state resources to maintain his grip on power. Just days ago, Donald Trump Jr. met with Vučić, a visit linked to the Trump family’s long-standing interest in developing a hotel complex in Belgrade. Meanwhile, the European Union’s response has been soft, with no significant criticism from key regional players.
The protesters have already achieved much of what is need for a successful revolution: they have mobilized on a national scale, gained support from diverse social groups, and secured high public legitimacy. Yet, a critical question remains unanswered — what comes next? The protests have made it clear that change is necessary, but no clear alternative to Vučić’s rule has emerged so far. With March 15 likely marking the peak of mobilization, the real challenge now is not just sustaining momentum, but defining a clear path forward during this rare moment of opening of political opportunities.
Protesters at a political crossroads.
Two potential options lie ahead. The first is for students to organize a plenum with representatives from political parties and civil associations to lay the groundwork for a new political movement. The second is for the opposition to form new electoral alliance, drawing on the support of students and other key protest groups. Each option carries its own challenges and opportunities, but one thing is clear: the momentum of the protests must now transform into concrete institutional change.
A comparison with neighbouring Bulgaria highlights both the potential and the challenges ahead for Serbia. While Bulgaria’s 2013 and 2020 mass protests, including a student occupation, led to the creation of new political parties that entered successfully electoral arena, they remained largely confined to Sofia and ultimately resulted in political deadlock. Still, the institutionalization of the protest movement reshaped the party system. The Serbia’s protests have broader public support and social basis, suggesting that if activists successfully channelled the mass protest into political movement, they could drive deeper transformation of the country’s political system.
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Ivaylo Dinev is a researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), in Berlin where he coordinates the Multi-method data laboratory of the KonKoop research network. He is a specialist of social movements, protests and civil society. […]
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mars 13, 2025By Ervin Goci, University of Tirana.
At a time when the world is being torn apart by deep geopolitical and cultural divides, the ruling class in Albania has found a remarkable sense of harmony. Politicians across the divide all seem to be going out of their way to showcase their deep admiration for the new US administration. Rather than clashing over our innumerable pressing domestic issues, the country’s two main opposing political parties — one center-right, called ‘democratic’, and the other left, even called ‘socialist’— seem only to clash over who can fawn more over American President Donald Trump.
On one side, we have Albania’s Democratic Party (Albanian: Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë, PDSH or PD) which holds high the flag of conservatism. With Trump’s coming to power, their populist ideology has rapidly advanced further to the right, to the point that the party’s leader, Sali Berisha, now calls himself the “New Sheriff in Town,” promising a new law for the de-‘Sorosization’ of Albania with penalties for those who push pro-LGBTQI+ agendas in education, while declaring a war on « woke culture. » Berisha presents himself as victim, playing up his political ‘assassination’ while drawing parallels with the American President. But, above all, for the current 2025 election campaign, the Democratic Party has hired one of Trump’s former campaign managers, introducing the slogan « Make Albania Great Again,” directly mirroring the US’s “MAGA — Make America Great Again” sentiment.
On the other side, current Prime Minister Edi Rama, chairman of the Socialist Party (Albanian: Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë, PS or PSSh), has exceptionally granted full development rights of Albania’s Sazan Island to Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, ignoring civilian backlash and public consultation. Rama has begun a pilgrimage across Europe to tell Europeans what a blessing it has been that Trump was elected US President. In mid-February, Rama went to the Munich Security Conference and told European leaders that they did not understand how lucky they were that Trump was re-elected; that the American President was a generous gift from God because his presence would serve to wake up Europe. He repeated the same message for the Spanish media outlet “La Razon,” adding that an internal danger to Europe from immigrants should not be ignored — using verbatim the rhetoric of US Republicans about immigrants – which US Vice President Vance also strongly emphasized at the Munich Conference.
This comes as a shock since one can recall that earlier, in 2016, Rama explicitly said in two media appearances that Trump was a threat to Albanian-American relations, as well as a threat to America itself. Now, he seems to have changed tuned, reflecting the US discourse around the “danger of immigrants,” contradicting his earlier statements on Albania, saying: “we are a nation of immigrants.” Thus, the two political and ideological opposing leaders of Albania both pray and thank God that President Trump is in power. While some smaller political parties continue to fight on behalf of citizens, with regard to the two main parties, now the primary issue of debate is TikTok being shut down. Rama’s SP government says they will ban the social media platform domestically, and Berisha’s DP opposition says they would work immediately to reinstate it upon coming to power. Concerningly, neither side talks about Albania’s economic structures or the oligarchies that have taken over the country. We hear nothing about the challenges tied to over-tourism and environmental degradation, the geopolitical pressure on Kosovo, relationships with Europe, NATO, emigration, education, social services — all pressing issues that citizens would expect be discussed in the face of upcoming elections. Albania’s government has instead become transfixed on impressing the United States, and if it had the surface area and close geographic position of Greenland, we would not be surprised if our two main parties joined forces to propose Albania become the 52nd American state – since Canada has already been unilaterally earmarked as the 51st.
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Ervin Goci is a researcher at the Department of Journalism and Communication, Faculty of History and Philology of the University of Tirana. His research focuses on communication theories, theories on public space and community engagement. […]
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